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Abstract 
 
In the thesis I argue that intentionality, infant subjective knowledge and 
metacognitive growth, all interact to constrain and focus language acquisition to an 
inevitable and successful outcome. Neither innate UG, nor emergent usage based 
theories adequately address these elements and the literature review reveals that 
some or all them are either assumed, side-lined or left unconsidered by standard 
bootstrapping hypotheses. When foregrounded however, these elements can be 
demonstrated to provide a bridge between the conceptual and syntactic systems.  
I show that initially, infants’ utterances focus on the ‘here-and-now’ in joint 
attention, and they express infant subjective knowledge about how dynamic 
properties are attributive of substantive objects/entities. Uses of apparent nominal 
and verbal forms lack their typical grammatical function.  Infants around 18months 
old, experience an inherent meta-cognitive development, which enables them to 
collate representations of Manifest Events, alongside a contrasting, constructed 
representation of a desired or intentional state of affairs. These Complex Events 
involve sub-events which are not currently in shared attention. Associated utterances 
involve intentions and desires, which require them to be understood by others. The 
acquisition of a conventional means of expression is therefore paramount.  
The research presents three sets of corpus studies based on 22,000 infant 
utterances, and includes exemplification from diary evidence, to show the inevitable 
bootstrapping effect of such intentional utterances. Complex Events require a 
predicate that describes an intentional state change and also a means to refer to a 
theme object that ‘measures out’ the change. In effect, it requires the use of Verbs 
and DPs. In contrast to other theories I show that it is only Complex Events that are 
the locus for the advent of grammatical categories [V] and [DP] and that a 
surprisingly simple, minimalist Merge process licensed by a selectional feature 
afforded by ‘it’, effectively bootstraps the syntactic system for English.
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Chapter 1  
Scope and overview of the thesis 
Introduction 
This thesis explores the nature of infants’ initial acquisition of verb phrase 
constructions in English (VP and DP) to present a new bootstrapping hypothesis. In 
overview, the hypothesis proposes that there is an inevitable developmental or 
cognitive growth process which arrives at a meta-cognitive shift for an infant at 
around age 18 months of age. Prior to this, infant utterances can be shown to map to 
events manifest in the here and now. The new meta-cognitive ability enables infants 
to consider and collate representations of manifest situations with new mentally 
constructed, non-occurrent situations. The collations result in being able to express 
changes of state, that is, either a desired situation differing from a current state (e.g. 
mend this toy), or alternatively expressing a prior event which results in a current 
situation (e.g. Nana bought this toy). These will be termed complex event 
representations, in contrast to manifest event representations. I will show that infants, 
when expressing linguistic descriptions of manifest events, refer to observed objects 
and actions in terms of the dynamic properties of those objects according to the 
infant’s individually developing subjective experience. Infants share their 
understanding of a perceived situation by offering what can be interpreted as generic 
propositions about the dynamic properties of participating objects. The nature and 
structure of infant subjective experience has hitherto not been considered to play 
such a role in linguistic expression. Linguistic expression of complex event 
representations, however, demands a differing approach. Utterances about Complex 
Events, as will be defined, involve the infant describing an intentional change of 
state of an object. For this to be understood by an adult, the intended change of state 
must be made explicit and the participating object must be referenced and tracked 
through to the intended changed state. In English, this requires a verb to predicate 
over the change event and DPs which can ‘measure out’ (Dowty 1991) the change. 
The hypothesis predicts that infant utterances about Manifest Events will differ 
substantially from those about Complex Events. Infant utterances involving Manifest 
Event representations are predicted to show a greater use of bare nominals and 
attributives as infants express the properties known (to them) to apply to the 
substantive objects participating in the observed manifest situation. In contrast, 
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utterances involving Complex Event representations will exhibit significantly greater 
use of referential DPs. This prediction is the focus of the empirical study in support 
of my hypothesis. Arriving at a new bootstrapping proposal, however, has been 
motivated by the desire to find a compromise or resolution between existing, 
differing and sometimes conflicting acquisition theories. 
For a long time, accounts of language acquisition have been categorised into 
one of two opposing camps - rationalist or empiricist, with long standing debates on 
the merits of each. When describing modern representative positions, i.e. generative 
or emergentist theories, a neutral ‘no man’s land’ between them is exposed, and is 
open for exploration.   
On one side, the generative approach focuses on the child as an individual 
where language knowledge is a specialised aspect of cognitive growth, which is 
generally held to be innately or genetically motivated. This approach is best 
illustrated by the work inspired by Chomsky's vision of language, what it is and how 
it may be acquired. Chomsky’s work has developed over a protracted period from 
Chomsky’s (1957a) review of Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour, where he challenged the 
behavioural conditioning model of language learning, and argued against the then 
view of a simple Stimulus – Response learning mechanism for language acquisition. 
He showed that there is no evidence of the intricate types of stimuli which would 
need to be available to an infant to result in the complex, creative responses 
characteristic of language. Thus behavioural conditioning cannot be a valid learning 
mechanism. Poverty of stimulus, in a different sense from that of conditioning 
however, has become an iconic argument in support of the nativist approach and 
against empirical learning models in general. The nativist claim is that there is 
insufficient evidence from the linguistic input to be able to derive the complex 
characteristics of language, and syntax in particular. From his earliest writings to the 
present day with the development of the Minimalist Programme of research, 
Chomsky has emphasised language as knowledge where syntax holds a central role. 
Considerations of real time communication - speech production and comprehension 
– are essentially aspects of how this knowledge is used in specific and varying 
contexts for various purposes. Study of these aspects of performance, it is asserted, 
depends on there being an established core of language knowledge.   
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On the other side, an emergentist approach stands in opposition to this. 
Language is considered to be a system of communication geared towards social 
interaction and cultural transmission, and motivated by adaptations of general 
cognitive and physical mechanisms over evolutionary time. Language conventions 
need to be learned from the language input. Generalisations and analogies, formed as 
a result of this learning, provide the basis of language knowledge. Although 
considered here as if a single empiricist approach, there are many different theories 
and accounts which constitute it. For ease of this introduction, I will consider 
Tomasello’s work as representative of emergentist theories, as it is acknowledged to 
present a lead in current developments from this perspective. Selecting Tomasello’s 
approach in opposition to that of Chomsky, is reinforced by his detailed refutation of 
Chomskyan generative grammar (Tomasello 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006) and his 
championing of what he refers to as Cognitive-Functional grammar (Langacker 
2008), although Tomasello himself speaks from a position facing Psychology rather 
than Linguistics.  
My research has not been designed to support nor be led by any single 
linguistic or psycholinguistic theory. In adopting a theory neutral approach, the 
research is not, however, a-theoretical. Rather, it represents an attempt to identify 
aspects of the acquisition process that have been assumed or ignored by all 
theoretical accounts or are simply problematic for these accounts. By exploring such 
areas, I develop the new hypothesis which should be capable of incorporation in any 
approach. The central claim is that ‘missing links’, found in the role of infant 
intentionality; the nature of infant subjective experience and knowledge; and meta-
cognitive abilities in the acquisition process have been uncovered. This introductory 
chapter will define in broad brush the territory and range of the research. 
1. Bootstrapping 
To maintain the metaphor of the opposing battle lines, I intend to highlight the 
highly productive, no man's land of neutral territory which can be viewed from either 
camp. In this territory, lies evidence informative of how language learning gets 
started. This will be known as the bootstrapping process.  
In learning a language infants must be equipped to be able to engage with a 
wide range of possibilities. Infants may experience and acquire any of the world’s 
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languages, used in any cultural and social environment, for any intentional purpose. 
This would indicate that a high degree of flexibility is needed in the learning process. 
At the same time, this flexibility must be constrained to achieve an inevitable result. 
Given any physical social and linguistic environment, infants will inevitably learn to 
communicate linguistically, and their linguistic communication will exhibit the 
intricate and specific syntax of the ambient language. 
Infants experience a vast amount of linguistic activity around them, either 
directed towards them or not. Any type of learning system, innate or emergentist, 
would be inefficiently constructed if it were to make available too much information 
for the infant to process. Such inefficiencies are not usually attributed to innate 
mechanisms, and the suggestion that infants learn a limited number of initial 
constructions, suggests a similar concern for emergentists. Indeed, any kind of 
inefficiency would be a challenge to the undeniably high success rate of language 
acquisition. The learning system must be flexible but predicated on success, as 
without it the learner would be at a severe disadvantage. Overloading the infant with 
processes which are not of immediate relevance cannot be viable, and as such there 
must be a series of natural and inevitable constraints on the learning which guarantee 
the result. There are a number of areas where a system of ‘constrained flexibility’ 
which limits the learning space sufficiently, provides inevitable access to the 
acquisition of the syntax of the ambient language. I will show that a bootstrapping 
process does this and, crucially, involves addressing the following questions (which 
will be collectively labelled the Research Areas):  
 Intentionality: What is the place for an infant’s active learning and creative 
intentionality in the acquisition process? How independent are infant conceptual 
and linguistic systems? 
 Initial language experience: How does a start-up mechanism or bootstrap, 
operate? How does the infant exposed to a potential infinite input of 
social/cultural and linguistic information inevitably break into the syntactic 
system of the ambient language?  How is linguistic experience constrained?  
 Word learning: How are the difficulties of word learning, and verbs in 
particular, addressed and resolved to provide a seamless transition into language 
knowledge and use?  
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 Meta-cognitive growth: What is the role and effect of general meta-cognitive 
growth on initial language acquisition?  
The evidence, which accrues from answering these questions, is in itself novel 
and interesting but available and usable by any approach. I will illustrate here, how 
this evidence appears from each of the ‘camps’, and then give an outline of how I 
will argue for a new initial acquisition model, which I name the Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal.  
2. The generative viewpoint 
On Chomsky's account, language is a uniquely specified aspect of human 
cognition, defined as the faculty of the mind within which knowledge of language 
grows, based on a universal blueprint present from birth. He likens language growth 
to the way vision develops in typical infants. Given limited visual sensory input, the 
infant unconsciously develops a 3-D vision system capable of discriminating fine 
detail, changes through motion and so on. The input is limited, because the infant 
clearly has no access to all she will see in her life. The system, however, is capable 
of effectively working with future eventualities, and has adaptive ability should true 
novelty occur.  
Transposing this example to language, an infant’s linguistic experiences are 
limited, and, as generally held by this model, relatively impoverished, yet it is from 
this linguistic input that she develops a system enabling her to speak and understand 
an infinite variety of sentences per learned language. Grammatical development is 
unconscious, and as for the vision system, is not accessible to awareness. To 
demonstrate this last point it will suffice to recall that after 2000 years of language 
study, maybe more, a full specification of a grammar of any language, which can 
generally be achieved by infants in the first three years of life, is still elusive. In 
many ways, this quest is at the heart of Chomsky's program. If an infant born into 
any speech community in the world can quickly and seemingly effortlessly develop 
the knowledge of her ambient language there must be two basic potentialities.  
Firstly, any language however varied or different from any other must be 
learnable by humans; and secondly, humans must have the wherewithal to learn any 
language which may apparently vary in substantial ways from any other. 
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 These requirements suggest two implications for the language acquisition 
process. There must be some commonality between languages and there must be 
some common process available to learners. These commonalities are posited as 
Universal Grammar, which consists in overview of a finite collection of parameters 
which can be set with values which vary for specific languages according to a finite 
set of fixed principles. By these means, the natural language variants of the 
Universal language blueprint can be derived.   
Identification of the parameters and principles has been at the heart of research 
in the Chomskyan tradition.  
"we hope to find that complexes of properties differentiating otherwise similar 
languages are reducible to a single parameter fixed in one way or another." 
(Chomsky 1981 p6) 
 
The following description of the Head parameter will serve to exemplify the 
term, in anticipation of further discussion of very early parameter setting (VEPS) in 
the next chapter. 
Paraphrasing Cook and Newson (2007 p 44): the definition of Head Parameter 
is held to be a parameter of syntax concerning the position of Heads within the 
phrase, for example determiners in DPs, verbs in VPs and so on. A particular 
language consistently has its Heads on the same side of the compliments in all its 
phrases whether Head-first or Head-last. So English is Head-first e.g. ‘in the bank’ 
(Preposition Head before complement DP in a PP) or ‘(the story) amused the man’ 
(Verb Head before a complement DP in a VP). In contrast, Japanese sets the 
parameter to Head-last. E.g. ‘Nihon ni’ (Japan in) Preposition Head (ni) last in the 
PP, and exhibits a general SOV structure, verb last. Thus by setting the Head 
parameter once, the outcome will hold true throughout the language in areas that, by 
traditional description, might not be equated. Therefore an important generalisation 
is established: preposition / postposition versus (S)VO / (S)OV. This and further 
parameters will be addressed in relation to models of verb acquisition in Chapter 2. 
Principles on the other hand, are constants expressing general conditions that 
must hold in establishing different constructions, to the extent that human languages 
can be considered to consist of principles with no construction specific rules. So the 
Locality principle is a property that restricts the application of a linguistic process to 
a limited part of the sentence. Chomsky (1981, 1995) lists subsystems of principles 
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to include bounding theory, government theory, θ-theory, binding theory, case theory 
and control theory, all of which have been established over many years of Generative 
Grammar research. The detail of the theory and its continuous evolution is 
essentially a theory internal matter and not immediately relevant to this overview, 
but there are significant questions that arise that are important to this study and 
should be carried forward. In general, the proposition is that humans are endowed 
with a language faculty that in its ‘raw’ state consists of a number of parameter 
variables with a potential value setting as yet unrealised, and a series of fixed 
principles which must hold true, which allows language knowledge to grow based on 
partial and limited linguistic input. One question that suggests itself is how can 
parameter setting get started?  
Chomsky suggests that experience, presumably hearing language spoken 
around the child, will provide:  
"… Limited evidence, just sufficient to fix the parameters of UG, will determine a 
grammar that may be very intricate and will in general lack grounding in 
experience in the sense of an inductive basis." (Chomsky 1981 p4) 
 
Chomsky maintains a firm focus on the centrality of the syntactic form which 
has hegemony over Phonetic Form and Logical Form from which both derive their 
input. Actual speech production and language comprehension are dependent on PF 
and LF but involve additional mechanisms and influences outside of the language 
faculty. These are considered under the label of Performance. Chomsky maintains 
that study of externalised and perceivable language performance is an inadequate 
means of accessing the unconscious processes of I-language, the internal system 
where syntax is the heart. This presents new problems. Paradoxically, core grammar 
is a product of parameters set in permitted ways, and experience is a construct based 
on an internal state either given or already attained, which serves to fix the 
parameters. Chomsky (2002 p96) seems to be prepared to introduce more flexibility 
by suggesting that  Parameters and Principles is now better thought to be more an 
approach rather than a theory. Nevertheless, languages (as opposed to grammars) are 
not determined solely by fixing parameters in UG. Chomsky suggests: 
“it is reasonable to suppose that UG determines a set of core grammars and 
that what is actually represented in the mind of an individual … is an artefact 
resulting from the interplay of many idiosyncratic factors” (ibid p8) 
 
On this Chomsky further states:  
Neil Parr  Chapter 1  
Page 19  
 
“..It is not clear how important [these] are, or whether it is worthwhile to try to 
settle them in some principled way.” (ibid p4) 
 
The suggestion is that the divergence between core grammar and language artefact is 
due to the  
“… heterogeneous character of actual experience in real speech communities.” 
(Ibid p8) 
 
Although Chomsky has always maintained his account focuses on an idealised 
situation, there is nevertheless an interesting query about the nature of the infant’s 
initial experience. As primary linguistic data is inevitably drawn from the 
heterogeneous speech community, does an infant have a means of differentiating 
experience for core purposes as opposed to peripheral structure? On this Chomsky 
offers that marked structures within a periphery outside of core grammar…   
“ have to be learned on the basis of slender evidence too, so there should be 
further structure to the system outside of core grammar” (ibid p8) 
 
How these structures are to be differentiated is not immediately clear. 
The nature of the initial linguistic experience of infants and the role it plays in 
acquisition is of fundamental importance and is one of the Research Areas, listed 
above, that will need to be further clarified. Another problematic area concerns the 
development of the lexicon. 
Chomsky’s Minimalist Programme relies on a well specified lexicon whose 
entries provide features which interact with the operational principles – this is known 
as the projection principle. The lexicon consists of a set of lexical elements as an 
articulated system of features: 
“the lexicon should provide just the information that is required for CS.. [the 
computational system],,, without redundancy and in some optimal form, 
excluding whatever is predictable by principles of UG or properties of the 
language in question. Virtually all items of the lexicon belong to the substantive 
categories, which we will take to be noun, verb, adjective, and particle, putting 
aside many serious questions about their nature and interrelations. The other 
categories we will call functional (tense, complementizers, etc.).” Chomsky 
(1995 p.6)  
 
And further: 
“It must specify, for each element, the phonetic, semantic, and syntactic 
properties that are idiosyncratic to it, but nothing more; if features of a lexical 
entry assign it to some category K (say consonant initial, verb or action verb), 
then the entry should contain no specification of the properties of K as such.” 
(Chomsky 1995 p130) 
Neil Parr  Chapter 1  
Page 20  
 
But how such a complex lexicon is initially formed is not clear. In discussing a 
specific example, Chomsky suggests: 
“Someone learning English must somehow discover the sub-categorisation 
features of ‘persuade’, one aspect of learning its meaning. Given this 
knowledge, basic properties of the syntactic structures in which ‘persuade’ 
appears are determined by the projection principle and need not be learned 
independently”. (Chomsky 1981 p.31) 
 
How an infant ‘somehow’ discovers the necessary additional features is an important 
question. Learning the meaning of words is a fundamental issue for any acquisition 
model, and whether grammatical categorisation is an aspect of word meaning is a 
controversial point. Clearly this is an area of interest to carry forward for further 
consideration.  
The formation of the lexicon, or more generally, word learning would appear 
to be an essential element of linguistic experience, and is closely tied to an infant’s 
experience of the world generally. Chomsky accepts this when discussing word 
learning. He agrees that the meanings of words are difficult to describe, exhibit great 
intricacy and involve the ‘most remarkable’ assumptions, yet infants learn many 
words each day on very few exposures.  
He states: 
“This would appear to indicate that the concepts are already available, with 
much or all of their intricacy and structure predetermined, and that the child’s 
task is to assign labels to concepts, as might be done with limited evidence 
given sufficiently rich innate structure.” (Chomsky 2000 p60) 
 
“There is, it seems rather clear, a rich conceptual structure determined by the 
initial state of the language faculty (perhaps drawing from the resources of other 
genetically determined faculties of mind), waiting to be awakened by 
experience.” (ibid p64) 
 
It is of some importance that ‘word learning as concept labelling’ is explored 
as one of the Research Areas, to provide some clarification of the relation between 
rich conceptual structure and the language faculty’s initial state. Chomsky, himself, 
in the same paragraph as the quotation above, suggests that the ‘whole matter 
requires extensive rethinking’, and, although the treatment here might fall short of 
what Chomsky envisages, the interface between the conceptual and the syntactic 
systems is at the heart of the proposal I will be presenting.  
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A further Research Area, closely associated with experience, is the role of the 
infant herself as an active, intentional participant in the learning process.  
Grammar acquisition, as described in the Chomskyan tradition, implies the 
unconscious operation of genetically specified (physical) growth which inevitably 
‘happens’ for, what might be considered to be, a linguistically passive recipient. 
Might there be more active, intentional elements involved?  
For instance, in the realm of physical growth, when an infant begins to move 
independently (crawling and walking) it is a moot point whether the ability to walk 
prompts the infant’s intention to change physical position or perspective, or whether 
the intention for change has a bootstrapping effect on the ability for independent 
movement.  
Are there instances of active intentionality which might prompt language 
growth? When an infant says ‘juice’ or some such, which can be interpreted as 
expressing the desire to have juice rather than the identification of the substance, is 
she simply communicating a perceived internal state? If so, then this will be an 
example of language used for communication and be subject to performance issues 
of social interaction – which on Chomsky’s account, will be outside core syntax.  
If, however, this utterance is not simply such a communication but is more 
pointedly about a change of state of the world, namely, that juice is not present 
within the infant’s immediate surroundings a situation which she wants altered, then 
it becomes an extension of physical development which involves exploring and 
changing the environment. On this basis the development from the pragmatically 
motivated ‘juice’ to the grammatically distinct ‘I want to have some juice’ has its 
grounding in meta-cognitive growth. The infant has achieved a level of cognitive 
growth enabling her to collate a representation of her physical surroundings in the 
here and now where there is no juice present, with a contrastive, constructed 
cognitive representation where juice is potentially present; that is, something she 
wants to occur. That this request is intentional and relevant to the infant could 
provide an experience which influences and prompts linguistic growth but is 
seemingly sourced from a cognitive domain outside of the language faculty. 
Intentionality and active participation by the infant in her development, is clearly a 
key Research Area for further consideration. 
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2.1 Summary of issues prompted by the generative viewpoint 
This brief overview of Chomsky’s approach has raised a number of queries, 
relevant to the defined Research Areas: 
i) How do the infant’s early linguistic experiences and linguistic input 
contribute to linguistic growth?  
ii) Does word learning equate with concept labelling involving innate 
conceptual and categorical specifications? The nature of the lexicon 
required by the generative model exhibits great complexity. Can this 
complexity be achieved in early acquisition? 
iii) Does the intentional infant play any direct part in the linguistic growth 
process? 
iv) What role can be attributed to meta-cognitive growth in language 
acquisition? 
The answers to these questions do not appear to be directly given in this 
overview, but they have exercised researchers in generative grammar over time. A 
more detailed review of such research will be reserved for Chapter 2. The intention, 
now, is to consider whether the opposing theory provides some answers or simply 
adds to the list of queries. 
3. The emergentist viewpoint 
The generative approach, arguably placing language acquisition at the centre of 
linguistic theory, presents a radical departure from the empiricist tradition which has 
widespread representation in Psycholinguistic research. By Chomsky’s definition 
empirical study of corpus data, although important, is defined as the study of 
linguistic performance, which he argues depends on prior acquisition of language 
competence. Gaining Linguistic competence involves the child as an individual with 
the mental facility to use impoverished (i.e. limited) linguistic input from the 
surrounding physical environment, to trigger the language appropriate configuration 
of parameters honouring given principles to grow linguistic knowledge.  
In contrast to this, opposing views describe the infant as a member of a 
complex human social and cultural structure, where linguistic communication is an 
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important and necessary instrument for social cohesion and the transmission of 
knowledge (Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner 1993, Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & 
Moll 2005); for social interaction and communication of intentions   (Snow 1999); 
and pragmatic development (Bruner 1975, 1983; Bates 1976; Ninio & Snow 1996).  
Language is considered to be a conventional means of communication shared and 
owned by the speech community (Akhtar & Tomasello 2000). On this account, 
human language is thought to have evolved in tandem with social developments, and 
is a product of physical evolution – (upright stance, development of the larynx and 
articulatory apparatus) – and cognitive evolution, where sophisticated 
communication processes develop to ensure the community benefits from an 
increasing ability for complex thinking and co-operation (Tomasello 2008, 2009).  
So languages adapt and change according to the level of contact between 
speech communities, and language families, independently developed, vary 
considerably from each other.   Languages have to be learnt, and the mechanisms for 
learning are largely domain general involving abilities in generalisation and analogy. 
Language knowledge can be said to emerge as greater linguistic complexity is 
learned to accommodate greater communicative demands.  
As Snow (1999) points out, if language is to emerge, where does it emerge 
from? 
“Any argument that language emerges as a natural product of development … 
must specify what the preconditions are for that emergence, or the domains of 
accomplishment that make the emergence of this powerful new system 
possible.” (Snow 1999 p257)  
 
Snow claims that it is human social interaction and the socially precocious child, 
which provides the motivation for language acquisition. Infants from birth establish 
communicative inter-subjectivity with their mothers and seem to engage in 
conversational turn taking through facial expression and non-linguistic vocalisations 
(Trevarthen & Aitkin 2001; Reddy & Trevarthen 2003; Trevarthen 2004).  
Because language is a human adaptation for the sake of communication, 
meaning and how meaning is shared is a central concern for this approach. Words 
and word combinations appear in a limited number of constructions which can be 
learnt as a repertoire. Words evoke meanings, but constructions may also convey 
more abstract meanings which interact further with words, providing a meaning–
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form relation. Goldberg (1995, 1999) proposes that five key argument structure 
constructions can accommodate a significant range of communication requirements.  
These are: 
Construction Meaning Form 
1. Intransitive motion  X moves to Y Subj V Oblloc 
2. Transitive X acts on Y Subj V Obj 
3. Resultative X causes Y to become Z Subj V Obj XComp 
4. Double object X causes Y to receive Z Subj V Obj Obj2 
5. Caused-motion X causes Y to move Z Subj V Obj Oblloc 
 
Given the motivation resulting from the requirements of social interaction and 
inter-subjectivity, there remains the question of how such constructions are accessed, 
abstracted from the speech stream, and put to productive use. The nature of this 
initial linguistic experience, as the context for learning, requires further explanation 
and will be addressed through the Research Areas. 
Tomasello (2000a) presents a detailed challenge to the generative approach 
which he claims to be too ‘mathematical’ to reflect the naturalistic nature of human 
behaviour. He claims that rather than the triggering of an innately specified range of 
parameters, language learning makes use of children's very powerful skills of 
intention-reading and cultural learning; analogy making; and structure combining. 
He takes the view that language competence consists of mastery of linguistic 
symbols and constructional schemata each of which consists of one or more 
linguistic form (signifier) each with a communicative function (signified). 
"Competence with linguistic symbols and constructional schemata are very 
general cognitive abilities that manifest themselves in many domains of human 
activity, although they may take on some special characteristics in the domain of 
linguistic communication" Tomasello (2000a p.236) 
 
Universals from this viewpoint are commonalities that can be observed 
between languages, a view which contrasts with the notion of Universal Grammar 
where it is possible that some parametric values are not used by some languages at 
all. 
Within the approach being currently considered, Language is a by-product of 
general cognitive abilities, put to work in service of communicative requirements. 
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Tomasello espouses the usage based approach developed fully in Tomasello (2005), 
which in sum, proposes that all linguistic knowledge derives from the 
comprehension and production of specific utterances on specific occasions of use. In 
support of this, he notes that early on, infants do not use verbs in constructions which 
have not previously been heard. It is not until much later (3-4 years old) with 
sufficient experience and increased generalisation ability, that infants will use verbs 
in previously unheard constructions.  
So a verb heard used in a passive construction will be used as such, but verbs 
not heard in this construction will not. Tomasello’s Verb Island Hypothesis which 
develops this line of thinking will be considered in more detail in chapter 2. 
Tomasello claims that as there is no universal grammar, there is no linking 
problem between local learning and knowledge of grammar. He claims that only 
generative grammar needs to do this. There is reason to question this claim. Rather 
than pre-empt the fuller discussion of Tomasello’s hypothesis in Chapter 2, it will be 
noted here that there remains the question of how infants access constructional 
schemata in the first place, and then how they effect the change from only 
reproducing elements from within heard constructions, to creatively producing novel 
utterances. Tomasello considers analogy to be a powerful enough mechanism but 
this is open to challenge, which will be addressed in the next chapter. How 
productive language acquisition and learning result from constructions linked to 
contextual understanding is problematic for usage based approaches as much as it is 
(although for different reasons) for generative approaches, and these issues are 
addressed by the Research Areas. 
Learning words and learning the meanings of words, and how they combine to 
provide structurally acceptable and semantically appropriate constructions, is 
fundamental to the emergentist approach. How children learn words and particularly 
how they acquire verbs is a long standing problem extensively represented in the 
literature. Many studies (reviewed and discussed by Braine 1976) have shown that 
the first words acquired, tend predominantly to name/label objects and entities in the 
child’s environment. Although there is some dispute about the statistical ratio of 
nouns to verbs in the child’s early lexicon, most studies show that nominal terms 
predominate. Indeed word learning studies generally show greater success when the 
task is object labelling rather than verb learning (Gentner 2006; Gleitman, Cassidy, 
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Nappa et al. 2005; Brandone, Pence, Golinkoff et al 2007). Experiments that require 
the learning of a label for specific novel actions are particularly inconclusive. This 
difficulty is generally assumed to be attributable to a greater ease in mapping a word 
to a concrete object or person. The concept-word mapping approach to word learning 
is confronted by special difficulties and controversy in the realm of verbs, thus how 
words are learned is again as important an area to clarify for emergentists as well as 
it is for generativists. 
It was suggested above that the generative approach does not overtly consider 
the child as an active learner. In fact both broad-brush approaches being considered 
here have the tendency to suggest the child as a passive recipient of linguistic 
information and language learning processes which are largely unconscious. 
Although the usage based approach lays emphasis on language production, it also 
strongly implies an element of passivity by initially restricting the infant’s linguistic 
production to what she has heard. Although creativity is a high premium for the 
generative approach and over time for the usage approach, the intentional child who 
may take some responsibility for her learning is essentially missing, or at least given 
little emphasis.  
3.1 Summary of issues prompted by the emergentist viewpoint 
Once again some queries have been raised by the emergentist proposals which 
occupy the same general territory as those raised by the generativist approach.  These 
appear to repeat those already highlighted in 2.1: 
i) How do infants’ early linguistic experiences and linguistic input contribute 
to productive language learning?  
ii) Does word learning equate with concept mapping? What is the nature of 
early conceptual experience and its interaction with language learning? 
iii)  What role does the intentional infant play in the language learning 
process?  
iv) What role can be attributed to meta-cognitive growth in language 
acquisition? 
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4. Further important considerations 
There are more general concerns which neither of these theories directly 
addresses but which inform my bootstrapping proposal. These are: 
4.1 The conceptual and syntactic systems, are they independent or 
mutually dependent? 
Both approaches recognise that conceptual understanding is a necessary 
precursor to language production. For generativists, an established complex 
conceptual system awaits to be ‘woken’ by the language faculty. The syntactic 
system is independent of the conceptual system. For emergentists, an acquired 
conceptual understanding of the environment prompts the learning of closely 
matched linguistic constructional conventions. The conceptual system is at the heart 
of the language learning process and the syntactic system is dependent upon it. These 
positions seem to be pointing in different directions.  The Conceptual-Intentional 
Bootstrapping proposal will be shown to conclude that an independent syntactic 
system is bootstrapped by independent development/growth evident in the 
conceptual-intentional system. 
4.2 Comprehension and production 
The much debated relation between comprehension and production concerns 
whether infants can (verbally) understand what they cannot as yet produce for 
themselves. The generativist view is that infants’ underlying knowledge of language 
enables understanding which, due to performance limitations, infants are unable at 
that time to produce for themselves; the other viewpoint argues that exposure to 
semantically motivated grammatical constructions conveying a generalised meaning 
supports understanding and this in turn contributes to grammatical development.  
Chomsky (2010) has offered the opinion that language use for social 
communication is of a lesser proportion than use for organising thought and inner 
speech, which is then available to be processed for speech production. From an 
emergentist perspective, social language use might be described as a means of 
bringing thought to external social scrutiny. For the former, comprehension and 
production are performance processes dependent on an established language 
competence (knowledge) and independent of the conceptual system. For the latter, 
learning linguistic conventions grows from a (socially motivated) conceptual system.  
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In both cases it can be argued that language provides a means for converting internal 
representations, consisting of complex overlapping networks of personal meanings 
and associations, into a linear (essentially auditory) stream. Production and 
comprehension, however, do not only work within the individual. Language 
production has to be comprehended by others in a communicative exchange. The 
differing perspectives can be illustrated by the following example, drawn from infant 
corpus material (CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester/Gail15a).  
Context: Gail who is 28months old is looking through a printed catalogue of 
children’s toys with her mother.  
(1) 
 
Gail: Gail’s like that house, my got. 
MOT: it’s like your one already, isn’t it? 
Gail: I just like another one, Mummy. 
MOT: I don’t think you need another one, do you? 
Gail: yes. 
MOT: you do? 
Gail: we got that at playgroup. 
………. 
Gail: just like that bicycle 
Gail: and that dolly go in 
Gail: I like that bicycle, Mummy 
Gail: I like that bicycle 
Gail: want sit on it 
MOT: well 
 
In production, Gail’s opening statement is clearly not well formed syntactically, and 
becomes a source of misunderstanding between her and her mother. The 
continuation of the dialogue shows that Gail is probably focussed on a topic of 
things she likes. Her mother interprets the initial utterance in a different way, as Gail 
indicating that she possesses a similar house. What could be the communicative 
intention behind Gail’s opening statement? 
  
(2) 
 
a) Gail likes that house …  
b) Gail has a house like that …  
c) Gail likes the house which is like the one she has at playgroup? 
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Gail’s mother opts for (2b), but as the conversation continues on the theme of 
‘liking’, it is probable that Gail intends (2c). If this is the case, then a generativist 
might suggest that Gail’s initial utterance lacks linguistic competence and her 
utterance resembles linguistic labelling of conceptual chunks, lacking syntactic 
organisation. An emergentist may suggest that Gail is expressing her 
conceptualisation of her intention using two constructions representing (2a) and (2b) 
from which a subordinate clause structure will emerge, a process recognised by 
construction theory in acquiring complex sentences (Diessel 2004).  
Gail’s reply to her mother’s doubt that Gail needs a second house, shows a 
lack of comprehension of the mother’s utterance. If Gail’s intention is the equivalent 
of (2c) then her mother’s question is not relevant to her. It is generally accepted that 
when infants do not understand questions they either ignore them or answer ‘yes’ (an 
approach also available to adults). The mother’s question is syntactically complex “I 
don’t think you need another one, do you?”, and arguably beyond the competence of 
a 28 month old. It also lacks an interpretable context for Gail, particularly if as 
suggested, it lacks relevance for her. She therefore opts for a reply based on the 
general heuristic – ‘agree’. Both generativists and emergentists agree that 
understanding linguistic utterances depends to some extent on existing language 
knowledge. Neither recognises the extent to which the syntactic form can be 
supplemented or enriched by contextual evidence for pragmatic interpretation. Given 
such recognition, comprehension becomes a complex process of relevant conceptual 
and linguistic interaction (Sperber and Wilson 1984/96) which on the face of it, 
production does not replicate. Examples of infant comprehension ability are best 
drawn from those displaying where the process goes wrong, i.e. through 
misunderstandings.  
One such example will serve at this stage to illustrate a glimpse of the pragmatic 
abilities of the young infant.  
(The example is drawn from CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester/Dom10b, where 
Dominic, who is 26 months old, and his mother are engaged in an activity playing 
with model animals): 
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(3) 
 
MOT: that is a rabbit. 
Dom: rabbit. 
MOT: yes. 
MOT: it's an albino rabbit. 
MOT: it's got pink eyes. 
Dom: not ribena rabbit. 
MOT: not a ribena rabbit. 
MOT: no. 
Dom: no no. 
MOT: and the +... 
Dom: xxx. 
Dom: not ribena rabbit. 
 
Ribena is a black current drink, very common in British households 
particularly with young children. In its diluted form it has a pinkish colour. Clearly 
Dom does not understand the word ‘albino’, yet the context shows the talk is about a 
(model) rabbit and Dom is told it has pink eyes. The last two syllables of al-BINO 
prompt Dom to retrieve a word he does know that sounds similar and has the pink 
colour associated with it. For him this is Ri-BENA. He is aware of the contradiction 
this presents and attributes this to his mother’s utterance. The script does not give the 
type of information usually apparent to indicate that Dom is making a deliberate joke 
– adults generally make some sort of comment acknowledging the joke. Instead, it 
seems that Dom is making a declarative, directly contradicting what he has 
understood from his mother’s utterance. The topic of the conversation is relevant to 
Dom and his understanding is fully pragmatically derived. 
The conclusion to be taken forward is that comprehension and production of 
linguistic utterances depend on language knowledge but linguistic comprehension 
also utilises contextual, pragmatic processes, which has been shown, by extensive 
research, to be available to pre-linguistic infants. This research will be reviewed in 
later chapters.  The basic principle adopted throughout this thesis is the strong view 
that it is only when infants have productive control over syntax that it can be said to 
have been acquired. That is, language acquisition will be measured only in terms of 
infants’ productive use of language, rather than their comprehension, because the 
additional contextual evidence available to infants enables them to form 
understandings apparently in advance of their productive ability. Chapter 8 will 
address the nature of comprehension testing in relation to already acquired syntax. 
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4.3 The effects of meta-cognitive growth 
Infants while acquiring language are also subject to extensive natural cognitive 
and meta-cognitive developments. Acquisition theories tend to assume these 
developments as background effects. At 18 month or so, infants undergo a meta-
cognitive development enabling them to collate representations of the ‘here and 
now’ (Manifest Events), with secondary representations of events not in the ‘here 
and now’, (Complex Events). I have identified meta-cognitive growth as one of the 
central Research Areas. It turns out that this meta-cognitive development will play a 
crucial role in the acquisition of syntax and as such becomes a defining moment for 
the proposal I am putting forward in this thesis. 
4.4 Time span 
It is generally held that by three years of age children appear to have achieved 
a reasonable grasp of either core syntax or productive language constructions 
(depending on the viewpoint). All evidence generally suggests that infants are 
producing their first words by 12 months and two word utterances by 18 months, or 
so. For generativists language acquisition is innately specified as are complex 
conceptual abilities, for emergentists infants from birth are engaged in social 
communicative relationships and have rapidly developing conceptual abilities. All 
evidence shows that very young infants within a few months of birth are perceptually 
aware of the nature of the language they are to acquire (Jusczyk 2000; de Boysson-
Bardies 2001), and are in continuous contact with spoken language through all 
waking moments. The question which arises is why it takes so long, just on 3 years, 
for infants to acquire productive use of language. Is the language learning process 
simply dormant until the infant has undergone a requisite amount of maturation, or is 
the process working in the background awaiting the moment to make its work 
apparent? Either way, the infant is communicating in one way or another to adults 
from birth, and it would be more efficient and advantageous to all concerned if 
infants could use language earlier than they do.  
My claim is that there are specific reasons, essential to ensure the inevitability 
of language acquisition, that demand this time span, and are integral to the 
acquisition of syntax generally, and [V]erbs in particular. The factors contributing to 
this inevitability will be shown to be essential elements of the bootstrapping process, 
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building towards the inevitability of successful language development/growth which 
becomes apparent over the twelve month period, when infants are 18 to 30 months 
old. 
4.5 Are Verbs ‘hard words’? 
Neither the generativist nor emergentist overviews outlined above identified 
any major inherent problems with the notion of ‘verb’, but some researchers have 
suggested that verbs are ‘hard words’ (Gleitman, Cassidy, Nappa et al. 2005).  
Gleitman (1990) deemed verbs to be difficult principally because they are used 
to express relations between entities, presenting the following problems, amongst 
others:  
i) Conceptually, the actions verbs express do not stand alone and are not 
discrete; their expression is integral to an event which can only occur in relation to 
entities that are interacting in some way. Thus no verb can be meaningfully uttered 
or understood devoid of participants in an action or change/state relation. It could be 
argued that it is what the participating entities are capable of doing that is made more 
explicit by the verb use. 
ii) Action verbs are not labels. A label freezes or nominalises an action and 
loses the fact that an action is going to happen, or is on-going, or is over and 
frequently has results. To illustrate: a simple action of someone opening a door, 
generally involves a person turning the doorknob, pulling or pushing the door and 
this action results in an open door. This result can be reported from the person’s 
viewpoint: ‘she opened the door’, or from the perspective of the result of the several 
actions: ‘the door (was) opened’. Gleitman points out that although children can 
readily appreciate dynamic events, in order to learn verbs they need to know what 
aspect of the event to attend to. For example a single scene of a dog running behind a 
cat is both ‘a dog chasing a cat’, and ‘a cat running away from a dog’. The verb in 
each case highlights a different perspective.  
iii) Verbs have a structural role in a sentence, which functions to support the 
expression of time of the communicated event relative to the utterance; aspect 
relations involving outcomes and processes; perspectives and attitudes of the 
speaker/hearer as well as the roles of participants in the event. 
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iv) Dual category issues. There is a large and productive set of words, in 
English in particular, which can be categorised essentially as nouns but which also 
can be used as verbs: as in ‘hand me the book’ or ‘milk the tea’ and ‘milk the cow’ 
(Nelson 1995, Clarke & Clark 1979). 
v)  Languages lexicalise events in different ways. A much explored area at 
present concerns the manner/path distinction for motion events (Talmy 2003). In 
Spanish and Greek the path is lexicalised through the verb, but in English it is usual 
to lexicalise the manner of the movement, and state the path using prepositions.  
For instance, compare ‘she ran into the house’ versus ‘she entered the house 
running’. The former is the usual means of expression in English, the latter in 
Spanish.  
Consideration of how these difficulties are overcome will provide a fairly 
constant backdrop to the research here presented, foregrounded when relevant. Many 
of the difficulties listed above are semantic and rely on an existing identification of a 
word as a verb. The general approach in this research will be to challenge the view 
that words have inherent grammatical category membership, and it is only when 
words are in the structural role of [V]erb in syntax, that they so become. This 
separation of the semantic and syntactic properties of words will be shown to go a 
long way to obviating most of the apparent ‘difficulties’. 
4.6 Innateness debate 
A central issue which divides the two main theories of language acquisition is 
the nature and extent of innate endowment for language learning. To maintain 
neutrality in this issue for the time being, the following position will be taken. 
Language is species specific for humans. A human baby is destined to acquire 
and speak a language. Languages themselves differ, and the words they all use are 
arbitrary, yet languages and word combinations must be learnable and deliverable 
and capable of being understood. The nature of language is therefore maximally 
limited by human physical and mental capabilities. That all infant humans learn and 
use at least one language for effective survival, underlines that they are equipped 
with the capacity to do so. This is essentially a truism and in these terms should be 
generally acceptable, and as such the debate about innateness will be set aside, in 
favour of an exploration of how the massively flexible language learning 
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environment is naturally constrained to provide inevitability. In this way, neutrality 
over the innate or not nature of the specifics of language acquisition can be 
maintained. I will show, however, (Chapters 5 and 7) that there are grounds to 
suggest that certain processes, like Merge, and what appear to be prototypical 
grammatical categories, are quite possibly examples of innate elements in the 
language acquisition process.  
5. The structure of the thesis 
In the 18-30 month window identified above, infants are learning words which 
will function as verbs, and acquiring the complex interrelation between word 
meaning and syntax. I have identified a number of Research Areas which will inform 
this thesis and which will be addressed in the following way: 
In Chapter 2, four documented models of verb phrase acquisition will be 
reviewed, representative of the two theoretical approaches already discussed. These 
are Semantic Bootstrapping (SeB); Very Early Parameter Setting (VEPS); Verb 
Island Hypothesis (VIH); and Syntactic Bootstrapping (SyB). It will be found that 
contradictions remain both within and between theoretical positions.  
Chapter 3 will focus on the input for language acquisition. This will review the 
nature of Child Directed Speech (CDS), and how infant intentionality and the 
structure of infants’ unique subjective experience serve to constrain the learning 
space resulting in the inevitability of language acquisition. 
Chapter 4 will address differing views of word learning and word meaning to 
show that constraints must also be applied to this task. I question the validity of 
concept mapping as a learning process and conclude that word learning is most 
efficient within a constrained learning environment if, initially, words are considered 
to be grammatically unspecified and semantically underdetermined. 
Chapter 5 will directly address the effect of meta-cognitive growth on language 
acquisition and demonstrate that a specific change around age 18 months enables 
infants to draw a critical distinction between Manifest and Complex events. I will 
claim that it is the expression of Complex Events which provides the locus for 
bootstrapping into a productive syntactic system. 
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Chapter 6 will present a series of original empirical studies based on an 
extensive corpus to test the predictions made by the proposal. The proposal will be 
shown to be empirically sound. 
Chapter 7 will characterise the new Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping 
proposal, and show how syntax may be derived, for English, utilising a simple 
Merge principle. Further developmental implications of the model will be 
considered, including new insights into phenomena like null subject expression, the 
root infinitive option, acquisition of modals, aspect and tense. 
In Chapter 8, the model will be tested in the context of published 
comprehension studies. These espouse the syntactic bootstrapping hypothesis and 
make specific predictions about infant syntactic ability. In contrast, I will 
demonstrate how the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping model (CIB) can explain 
the various outcomes of these experiments, based solely on the syntactic knowledge 
that my bootstrapping proposal expects infants to have acquired. 
Chapter 9 will provide a summary conclusion of the thesis, and suggest 
possible ways forward. 
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Chapter 2  
Approaches to verb acquisition 
Introduction 
 The introductory chapter considered in broad-brush two opposing views of 
language acquisition. Four crucial components of the Conceptual-Intentional 
Bootstrapping proposal were identified as Research Areas summarised as: 
Intentionality; Initial language experience; Word learning; and Meta-cognitive 
growth.  These, together, provide the necessary constraints on the learning space 
and will be shown to constitute the bootstrapping mechanism. 
In this Chapter a representative sample of four models of language 
acquisition, with a particular emphasis on verb constructions, will be reviewed.  
Each will be described to assess how far they address the Research Areas, if at all, 
and to gauge what insights they provide, or equally what further questions they 
raise.  
The chapter is structured with the following sections, (each given an 
abbreviated coding for ease of reference): 
1. Semantic bootstrapping hypothesis [SeB], which explores Pinker’s 
proposal which relies on a high degree of innate knowledge. Alongside this, 
Braine’s challenge to Pinker and his alternative suggestion will be described. 
These proposals will be found not to shed much light on the Research Areas. 
2. The Very Early Parameter Setting model [VEPS] attributed to Wexler 
and based on the Principles and Parameters hypothesis will be outlined. 
Challenges and revisions proposed by Rizzi and Fodor will be presented as they 
attempt to constrain the VEPS model which appears to over-generate.  Issues of 
the null subject parameter (NSP) and optional infinitive (OI) stages are relevant to 
the Research Areas, and will provide a focus for the discussion in this section. 
3. Tomasello’s Verb Island Hypothesis [VIH] an Item/usage based model 
will be addressed in this section.  Additional versions of this hypothesis from 
McClure et al. and Ninio will be presented. These proposals will be found to 
address some of the Research Areas but also present new difficulties to resolve. 
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4. The Syntactic Bootstrapping account [SyB], developed variously by 
Gleitman, Fischer, and Naigles, stands in contrast to the other proposals in that it 
suggests that infants access the meaning of verbs through syntax. This proposal 
will be seen to be relevant to the Research Areas from a differing perspective. 
1. Pinker’s semantic bootstrapping hypothesis [SeB] 
Pinker’s Semantic Bootstrapping Hypothesis addresses the problem of how 
a child can break into the grammatical rule system of a language given only an 
input consisting of strings of speech sounds.   
Pinker (1984/96) argues his case from the point of view of Lexical 
Functional Grammar. Although he states that the specific linguistic theory is not 
critical, he maintains that acquisition theories should align with established 
linguistic theories to maintain continuity from infant acquisition to adult 
competence. Pinker adopts this rationale as a challenge to treatments which 
account for infant speech data by developing linguistic theoretic elements which 
apply only to the infant data and which do not contribute to the final grammatical 
characterisation of the language. Pinker supports a generativist approach. 
According to Pinker, there is a consensus in all linguistic theories that there 
exists a large domain of rule types which include: small sets of grammatical 
categories and relations, phrase structure rules, inflexional paradigms, lexical 
entries, lexical rules and grammatical features. An acquisition theory, therefore, 
needs to provide an account of how an infant learns the ways these elements are 
realised in her ambient language. He argues that these rule types are task specific 
in that they are of use only in the domain of language knowledge and are central 
to the language acquisition process. The task specific learning mechanism should 
provide the infant with a maximally simple set of minimal rule schemata with 
parameters whose values may vary from language to language. Pinker concedes 
that the language learning mechanism may not be discrete and could be sourced 
from some prior general learning process. He concludes, however, that it would 
be logically more parsimonious if language learning, task specific elements were 
already present rather than derived. Although this argument is designed to side-
step the innate status of the language mechanism, he does not resolve what prior 
mechanisms would be required to derive the language learning mechanism.  
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Either way, his assumption is that an infant comes to the language 
acquisition task with a prior knowledge of language (the rule types). The task for 
the infant is to abstract from the heard speech stream a set of correspondences 
between the ambient language and the available rule types. Pinker also makes five 
fundamental assumptions about the linguistic input and the infant’s relation to it: 
i) The infant is able to segment the speech stream heard from 
parental input into useable variables – words, phrases. 
ii) Not all sentences, or parts of sentences produced by parents are 
used or understood by the infant, but infants make use of parts of the input 
without having to know all the words the adult uses. 
iii) Negative evidence is largely unavailable to the infant, as 
feedback and correction is not generally noted in adult child speech in 
terms of syntax at least. 
iv) Infants are able to infer meaning from adult utterances using 
physical and discourse contexts, and the meanings of individual words in 
the sentence input. Thus the infant is assumed, within context, to be able 
to pair a sentence and its meaning. In support of this, Pinker notes that 
parental speech often refers to the ‘here and now’ with a limited number 
of propositions for the infant to comprehend. Sentences of this kind he 
terms basic, the semantic relations and meaning of which are highly 
predictable from the meaning of individual words independent of ordering 
or affixation. 
v) A strong assumption is that infants are able to extract the 
meaning of predicates and arguments, the relation of arguments to 
predicates, the grammatically relevant semantic features of sentence 
participants (number, person, sex), the proposition of the whole sentence 
(tense, aspect, modality) and discourse features (declarative, interrogative, 
negative, suppositional). 
Acquiring a specific language requires fixing parameters of variation in the 
universal rule schemata which have the properties of linguistic symbols like 
Noun, Verb, Subject, Object, constituent structure branching, inter alia. These 
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symbols are not overtly marked in the input which for the infant provides only 
information of linear ordering, prosodic qualities and meaning. The bootstrapping 
problem is how to establish a correspondence between the overt input and the 
properties of the symbolic system. Pinker rejects a distributional analysis of the 
linear ordering information available to the infant, reasoning that linguistic 
symbols are largely opaque to linear distributional analysis. He also rejects 
prosodic information input as being unreliable. Instead, he favours the semantic 
input as the more direct means. Because of this he terms his hypothesis Semantic 
Bootstrapping.  
1.1 The bootstrapping hypothesis 
Semantic bootstrapping proposes that the semantic content of a 
word/contextual situation perceived by the child, may initially link to grammatical 
categories; grammatical functions; cases; grammatical features and tree 
configurations. The semantic inductive bases, without listing them all, are of the 
following types: names of persons or things correspond to [N]oun, actions or 
changes of state to [V]erb, agents to [S]ubject and patients or themes to [O]bject.  
Pinker’s exemplification of how this might work is as follows: a child 
experiencing a scene, accompanied verbally by “The boy threw rocks” will be 
able, by linking rules, to know that ‘boy’ refers to a person who is agent of an 
action and therefore can assign ‘boy’ to [N]oun/[S]ubject; that ‘threw’ is the 
action performed and therefore assigned to [V]erb and ‘rocks’ refers to things 
undergoing the action and therefore assigned to [N]oun/[O]bject, which would 
provide an entrée to the abstract tree structure:  
(4) 
The boy   threw   rocks 
Name of person/agent     action     name of thing/patient 
     Noun / Subject           verb        Noun / Object 
S[[NP[det + N] +   [VP[V+  NP[N]]]] 
 
This parse aligns with the Phrase structure rules: 
(5) 
S→NP + VP 
VP→V + NP 
NP→Det + N 
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The example Pinker chooses is surprising, because it appears to violate his 
own initial assumption (1iv above) as this sentence is not characteristic of the 
‘here and now’. If the boy threw rocks, then the boy’s action is completed. 
‘Throw’ will have to have been learned at some other time. Presumably the 
infant’s knowledge of proposition structure (assumption 1v) about tense and time 
will need to be brought into effect.  
Having correlated a sentence input with a grammatical structure appropriate 
for the language variant being acquired, the prediction is that the construction can 
be readily applied to a significant number of noun-verb-noun inputs. Pinker 
suggests the phrase structure rules, once acquired, may be extended to analyse 
input sentences where semantic support for syntactic categorisation is missing. He 
gives the example of a child armed with correspondence rules, being able to 
adduce the syntactic structure of ‘the situation justified extreme measures’, which 
has the same constituent tree structure as ‘the boy threw rocks’.  
This outcome may seem to be an odd example to suggest for a young infant, 
(not being able to assign much meaning to the abstract sentence, the infant may be 
tempted to simply ignore it). At a theoretical rather than practical level, however, 
the bootstrapping process is assumed to be being applied by a passively listening 
infant and as the process is sub-personal to the infant it will require no conscious 
involvement. As such, phrase structure rules should be established before the 
infant speaks. The prediction is that, given early lexical items, assigned 
grammatical categories and triggered rules,  the sentences children do first utter 
should exhibit an appropriate syntactic consistency in a short span of time if not 
instantaneously, although, as Pinker concedes, within the bounds of performance 
restrictions.  
 Pinker’s proposal has come under sustained challenge, as empirical 
evidence tends not to support the prediction. There is little evidence of consistent 
and rapid development of verbs which an acquired rule would provide. Diary 
evidence (Bowerman 1973; Tomasello 1992) tends to show that some verbs 
develop well before others and the expected outcome that all verbs show 
consistently rule governed behaviour is elusive.  
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1.2 Revisions 
Pinker’s hypothesis in its early guise (1984/96 first edition) is very 
inflexible particularly in the specification of the elements constituting the task-
specific mechanism which he maintains are in fact innate. Pinker (1987, and 
1984/96 second edition commentary) considers the various challenges to his 
hypothesis which include: 
i) Semantic regularities are not universal – ergative languages do not have 
agents as subjects. Non-basic sentences are not invariably filtered out of the input 
by adults, and in parental speech semantic interpretation is not always available 
which might result in agents and patients becoming confused. Thus applying the 
linking process in these cases would yield a wrong analysis for the infant. 
ii) The hypothesis makes no allowance for individual differences, nor offers 
any criteria for which input is critical for an infant to attend to, or which is to be 
ignored. If the choice is wrongly made then there is potential for false analyses 
which would pervade the whole linguistic system of the infant. That this does not 
happen needs to be accounted for. 
Pinker’s (1987) response to these challenges is to employ a constraint 
satisfaction model, which in effect suggests that initial conclusions made through 
the semantic hypothesis are open to confirmation or otherwise utilising additional 
information drawn from distributional analyses and further prosodic evidence. 
The end result should be the formation of a network of mutually predicting 
attributes. Pinker (1984/96 second edition commentary) suggests that the infant 
uses a set of multiply uncertain cues (semantic, distributional, prosodic and 
syntactic) which converge on the most globally consistent analysis of the input. In 
this way, the bootstrapping mechanism which formerly provided a clear link 
between innate language knowledge and input variation has changed radically. It 
is now more loosely providing what Pinker calls ‘fuzzy labelling’ of innate 
grammatical categories. 
1.3 Gaps and queries 
There are a number of issues for the bootstrapping process that arise as a 
result of Pinker’s formulation.  
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i) He suggests a large battery of innate grammatical and functional 
categories which are difficult to substantiate. The Principles & Parameters 
paradigm argues against some of these, most notably the functional categories of 
Subject and Object. Extensive innate categories as Pinker describes can be viewed 
with some scepticism. 
ii) Category membership is discovered initially based on semantic 
definition: Nouns = names of things, Verbs = labels for actions and so on. But the 
semantic definitions do not always hold true, as Pinker has had to admit in 
response to wide-spread challenge, through his revision to the required ‘fuzzy 
labelling’. 
iii) His foundational example - ‘the boy threw rocks’ - despite claiming that 
initial talk with children is of the here and now, cannot have been used to 
accompany the action event of a boy throwing rocks, as it refers to a past or 
completed series of actions (assuming the rocks were thrown singly). There is an 
interesting and important effect which can be derived from the speaker’s 
perspective. The sentence in the example invites the interpretation that the 
speaker is largely uninvolved in the scene. It is as if the scene is viewed from a 
third party perspective. If, however, the rock thrown is in the ‘here and now’, i.e. 
the result of the throwing is a rock in the presence of the speaker: ‘the boy threw 
this rock’, then this utterance would be of a Complex Event type (with two sub-
events, one in the here and now and the other constructed and not of the here and 
now). It is precisely this kind of utterance that, according to the Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal, makes a critical contribution to bootstrapping. 
Pinker’s hypothesis, however, does not recognise Complex Event utterances. A 
fuller discussion of Complex Events will be given in Chapter 5. 
A revision of Pinker’s bootstrapping proposal has been put forward by 
Braine to overcome the difficulties presented in (1.3i) and (1.3ii) above. The 
following section will consider this alternative. 
1.4  Braine’s semantic bootstrapping revision 
Braine (1992) proposes a revision to reinforce the semantic element of the 
bootstrap. His concern is based principally on Pinker’s claim that grammatical 
categories (Noun, Verb, Verb Phrase and so on) are primitives. As there exists to 
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date no conclusive means of demonstrating that such categories are innately 
specified, Braine explores a bootstrapping process which enables grammatical 
categories to be formed by an assimilation process from primitive, semantic 
categories. This contrasts with Pinker who held that grammatical categories are 
primitive, each with particular semantic categories as canonical members. So in 
Pinker’s terms, for instance, a Noun Phrase has argument(agent) and 
argument(patient) as members. Braine’s reformulation would set argument(agent) 
or argument(patient) as primitives with objects (object-words) as members. 
Braine suggests 2 main types of primitives: a learning mechanism and categorical.  
These will be described in turn. 
1.4.1 A learning mechanism  
The mechanism employs an ‘old-rules-analyse-new-material’ principle. 
Braine attributes this principle to Schlesinger (1982) enabling new material to be 
assimilated into existing categories, and as a result the category expands beyond 
its original semantic core. For Schlesinger, this principle contributes to the 
development of the functional category ‘Subject’, extended from an original 
designation of ‘Agent’. Braine cites Schlesinger’s proposal that an original 
semantic agent-action schema (assumed to be readily derivable from observed 
events) is used to analyse novel NP-VP input and progressively agent and action 
categories expand so agents come to include experiencers, and actions expand to 
include experiences. 
1.4.2 Primitive Semantic categories 
Braine claims that certain semantic framework categories are innate. In 
these he includes ontological categories like object, place, time, event, and 
proposition. He also includes predicate and argument as additional framework 
categories on the following basis: 
“The term ‘predicate’ comprises concepts (including properties) and relations; 
the term ‘argument’ refers to instances of concepts or entities related by 
relations.”  
 
It follows that:  
a concept is a predicate with one argument, and so to predicate a concept or 
property of an object is merely to say of the object that it is an instant of the 
concept.”  (Braine 1992 p80) 
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So a relation is a predicate with 2 or more arguments, the entities related 
being the arguments. Braine suggests there is good reason for the predicate-
argument distinction to be primitive, since all theories of concept formation take 
for granted the distinction between a concept and its instances. On this basis, an 
infant’s comprehension system is equipped to understand input sentences and 
encode events perceived, assuming the infant encodes events as having objects 
related to other objects. So, a scene depicting a dog biting a cat, would be 
perceived as an action relation (biting) between an object argument (dog) and 
another object argument (cat). The infant, therefore, may analyse the sentence 
accompanying this scene (‘The dog bit the cat’) as: 
(6) 
 
Argument-object   predicate Argument-object 
Object-word  action  Object-word   
By analysing the predicate as an action relation, Braine claims a phrase structure 
comparable to Pinker’s can be derived, but differently labelled. The use of Noun, 
Verb, NP and VP and so on is avoided. Braine’s phrase structure rules appear as: 
(7) 
 
S → object-argument phraseagent + action phrase 
Action phrase → predicate + object-argument phrase 
Object-argument phrase → Det + object word 
 
Once such a structure is established, Braine, like Pinker, assumes, by the 
old-rule-new-material principle, that ‘the situation justified extreme measures’ 
will receive the same analysis. The claim is that the innate specification of Noun, 
Verb, NP and VP is unnecessary, as they are category labels which are applied to 
semantic primitives fulfilled by semantic information, and not categories in their 
own right. Braine finds support for this position from, what he claims to be, a 
widely shared assumption that there is some basic similarity between the structure 
of a semantic representation and phrase structure. As such, he concludes that there 
is no reason to posit grammatical categories like Noun, Verb and the like as 
primitives.  
1.5 Discussion 
Braine’s proposal is not without problems. It rests on the universality of 
semantic relations, which appears well motivated but the direct syntactic 
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representation of  semantic categories and relations is open to question, 
particularly in the generative tradition, where the syntactic component is 
considered to be independent from meaning (Chomsky 1957b). In addition, 
Braine describes his exemplar scene as ‘a dog biting a cat’, and then exemplifies 
what is uttered as ‘the dog bit the cat’. As such, it suffers from the same problem 
as Pinker’s example, described in 1.3iii above. 
Neither Pinker’s nor Braine’s semantic bootstrapping hypotheses appear to 
contribute to the Research Areas. Infant intentionality is not addressed. What 
appears to be required of the infant is to engage with a scene and unconsciously 
parse an accompanying utterance, but it remains unspecified on what basis an 
infant attends to the relevant input. The important elements of infant interest and 
relevance are assumed, but not included in Pinker’s background assumptions (1i-
v). These assumptions themselves have been difficult to substantiate as shown by 
Pinker’s willingness to revise them fundamentally (1.2).  
A problem for both Pinker and Braine is the extent to which infants need to 
have learned the words before experiencing the scene. Both assume that the words 
and their meanings can be derived from the scene at the same time that the 
structural learning, which depends on knowing the meaning of the words, takes 
place. It leaves an open question for the Semantic Bootstrapping hypothesis as to 
how much infants should know before the bootstrap can begin. These are specific 
issues addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 below in relation to the Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal being developed here. 
I turn next to a somewhat different approach, very early parameter setting, 
VEPS. 
2. Principles and Parameters: Very Early Parameter Setting. 
[VEPS] 
Pinker’s semantic bootstrapping model assumes that grammatical and 
functional categories and phrase structure rules are part of the innate endowment 
for language learning. The problem as he sees it is how the child links what she 
has heard spoken around her to these categories. His solution is the child's 
identification of these categories through semantic links provided from 
observation of real-world events associated with a given appropriate utterance. 
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Once the categorical membership of words is established then participation in 
given phrase structure rules follows for specific language variation. Thus, 
although based on an array of proposed innate elements, an infant builds up her 
language by developing a rule system from sentence constructions she 
experiences. Once the rule for a construction is established other input examples 
conform. Infant grammars grow from the formal organisation of grammatical and 
functional categories. The Principles and Parameters approach (P&P) adopts a 
different starting point.  
Universal Grammar (UG) provides the fundamental set of grammatical 
parameters and computational principles underlying all languages. The infant, at 
birth, is equipped with this blueprint, and through experience of positive evidence 
provided from the language spoken around her, the parameters are set which 
match with this evidence. Language variation is therefore accounted for by 
differential parameter settings. There are a number of implications of this 
theoretical approach which set it out as radically different from others, but the 
following two areas are particularly relevant to this work: the learning 
mechanism, and the status of infant language production.  
2.1 A learning mechanism 
In contrast to Pinker’s model, P&P presents a different approach to the 
learning process. Infants are born with a specification of UG and the task is 
simply a matter of setting the available parameters to reflect the language variety 
spoken around them. Crain & Lillo-Martin (1999) in their introductory text offer 
the following: 
“The main conclusion to draw is that language development seems to be 
internally driven. It comes from the child rather than from anything parents 
provide from outside. It seems that children are just built to learn.” (Crain& 
Lillo-Martin 1999 p14) 
 
Any hypothesis an infant makes about language is constrained in advance 
by UG. If it is right, as Gibsen & Wexler (1994) and Wexler (1998) maintain, that 
parameters are set before infants make two word utterances, then learning need 
not be behavioural. The infant does not need to make active use of language to 
learn it. He suggests the language learning process is an instance of perceptual 
learning. That is, learning is achieved through input only as for the visual system, 
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which is an input system without output. As such only positive evidence is used to 
set parameters and no overt behavioural response is required: 
"The assumption is that the learner attempts to generate an input sentence 
with her current grammar (i.e. parameter settings) and if she can't generate it 
she changes the setting of the parameter" (Wexler 1998 p32) 
 
Recent experimental evidence questions this assumption. In response to 
claims by manufacturers that infants can learn language from watching DVDs, 
DeLoache, Chiong, Sherman et al. (2010) examined how many new words 12- to 
18-month-old children learned from viewing a popular DVD several times a week 
for 4 weeks at home. They found that infants did not learn any more words from 
their month long exposure to it than did a control group, and the highest level of 
learning occurred in active interaction with adults. This would imply that 
perceptual learning as espoused by Wexler necessitates more than simply 
undifferentiated linguistic input. There must also be a mechanism that focusses 
infant attention to discriminate relevant input from what might be relegated to 
background noise. 
2.2 The status of language production 
On the VEPS account, the status of infant language production is a 
reflection of what has already been learnt. In many research programs, infant 
linguistic production provides the bedrock evidence for defining the 
developmental progress in language learning. On the P&P account, UG is a given. 
Infant production must mirror this, as the interaction between UG and linguistic 
input is the only basis for language acquisition. Infants, however, are not adults 
and thought to be subject to performance limitations because of their immaturity. 
UG parameters therefore are not identified by researchers from infant production, 
but made from idealised adult data, which has long been Chomsky's claim. Thus 
by establishing universal principles and parameters which can account for all 
human languages, there will be evidence to define the nature of the genetic 
endowment to the new-born. Language acquisition, from this standpoint, concerns 
the successive setting of given parameters in tune with the requirements of the 
ambient language experience of the infant. As such, language acquisition research 
is focussed on how infants go about setting parameters, not how infants discover 
them in the first place.  
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There is extensive research that claims that even the earliest infant 
utterances fit a parametric analysis. Snyder (2007, 2011) asserts that the majority 
of infant errors are ones of omission and very few may be viewed as errors of 
(what he terms) co-mission, or in P&P terms, wrongly set parameters. Given 
universal grammar as a characterisation of the parameters underlying all 
languages, a related assumption is that infants should have a full competence of 
clause structure, awaiting definition according to the language variety being 
experienced.  As research into the nature of UG is a central target for this branch 
of Generative Linguistics, a specification of what parameters comprise UG is still 
very much a work in progress. When research outcomes identify potential UG 
elements, acquisition research then focuses on how the infant data reflect these 
elements. This leads to a level of frustration in Psycho-linguistic research in 
having to be led by advances in theoretical Linguistics, and this is especially so 
when advances in Linguistics pay little heed to infant linguistic data. Wexler has 
attempted through much of his work to show that study of infant production from 
a parametric point of view can make valuable contributions to the overall 
Generative project.  
2.3 VEPS 
Wexler (1998) suggests some of the early set parameters are: 
i) Word order (Head parameter) VO versus OV (e.g. Swedish versus German) 
ii) Verb raising parameter (French vs English) 
iii) V2 parameter (German vs French or English) 
iv) Null Subject parameter (Italian, Spanish vs English, French) 
Problematic, however, is the observation that infants generally present in 
their language production, utterances which appear to mask evidence that the 
parameters have been set. Utterances using non-finite verbs forms (where adult 
language would require finite verbs) are typical of this. It is well documented that 
infants tend to use finite or non-finite (Root Infinitive) verb forms optionally in 
main clauses and it is this context –which Wexler calls the Optional Infinitive 
stage (OI) – which masks parameter setting.  
Wexler claims for the OI stage that: 
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“a. Root infinitives are possible grammatical sentences for children in this 
stage, (around two years old). 
b. Those infinitives coexist with finite forms. 
c. Children nevertheless know the relevant grammatical principles e.g. head 
movement, checking etc.”   ( Wexler 1998 p.28) 
2.3.1 Finite Verb raising 
Poeppel and Wexler (1993) explored evidence for the systematic distinction 
between finite and non-finite verbs for infants acquiring German. German (in 
common with other languages like Swedish) is a V2  language, where the finite 
verb appears as the second constituent in the main clause, but in contrast to 
Swedish, non-finite verbs appear last, including the non-finite element of a 
compound verb. In a subordinate clause in German the finite verb appears last. 
For instance: 
(8) 
 
a).   Ich habe das Buch gefunden 
      I have found the book 
b).  Als er nach Hause kam, sah er seinen Onkel. 
    When he came home he saw his uncle. 
 
In studying infant corpus data, it is clear that this distinction is apparent 
from the earliest age (2 year olds): 
(9) 
 
a).  Ich hab tein Bürse 
    I have [a] small brush 
b). Thorsten Caesar haben 
    Thorsten has [the doll] Caesar 
 
The implication is that infants recognise that German has an underlying SOV 
structure and that in main (matrix) clauses the finite verb is raised to a second 
position (V2). In Swedish both the finite and non-finite verb occupies the second 
position, and so is correctly identified as SVO.  In Japanese where there is no verb 
movement, the early state is for the verb to occupy the final position after an 
object and therefore SOV. In English, where main verbs similarly do not undergo 
movement the early structure is SVO. The correct order SOV or SVO can 
confidently be assumed to be established early.  
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In French, however, where finite verbs do undergo raising, it is found in infant 
data that a finite verb will precede ‘pas’ (negative) but when a non-finite verb is 
selected it is not raised and therefore follows ‘pas’.  
For instance: 
(10) 
 
a). (Il ne) mange pas  
  
versus 
 
b). Pas manger 
 
The value of the verb raising parameter is set very early to ‘raise’ but it is the 
effect of the OI stage which masks the fact that infants have this as part of their 
linguistic competence.  
2.3.2 Null subject parameter 
One widely explored area is the Null Subject Parameter (NSP), which will 
be considered here in some detail. 
Some languages tolerate the non-expression of an overt grammatical subject 
(e.g. PRO drop languages - Spanish, Italian, Korean) whereas others require an 
obligatory grammatical subject to be overtly expressed (e.g. English, French). So 
for the former the NSP is set as positive (allowing the non-expression of subject) 
and for the latter, set negative (ensuring the expression of the subject). It is, 
however, well documented that infant speech is typically characterised by the 
omission of the subject whatever type of language is being acquired. What 
implications does this have for the infant parameter setting process?  
There are three possible settings available to the child. Firstly, the parameter 
may initially be in a neutral state (unset) and becomes set either positive or 
negative given evidence of the ambient language. If this were the case, then 
infants would correctly set the parameter from the beginning and the discrepancy 
(where infants omit subjects when the language they are acquiring requires the 
subject) would be an error. This eventuality would require a later process of 
corrective resetting, a theoretical position which should be avoided.  Because 
parameters are thought to have quite wide-ranging affects e.g. the Head Parameter 
(outlined in the introduction in Chapter 1), there would be equally wide-ranging 
Neil Parr  Chapter 2  
Page 51  
 
consequences if ad hoc parameter resetting were allowed. Also there is little 
evidence for a widespread resetting process.  
A second option is for the parameter to be set initially as negative which 
would imply obligatory subjects. This cannot be entertained because of the 
prevalence of evidence showing that subjects are dropped.  
The third option is one that Hyams (1992) and Hyams and Wexler (1993) 
support which is the proposal that NSP is set as if positive in UG. Infants 
acquiring null subject languages need not set this parameter as it accounts for 
their languages in its initial state. Infants acquiring English or French eventually 
need to set this parameter to negative, to ensure the obligatory requirement to 
express a subject. To account for the apparent discontinuities in parameter values, 
suggestions have been made that parameters are set at different times, and the 
time lag may be due to performance limitations on the part of the infant, which in 
the case of NSP is typically complete by the time the infant is three years old. 
This gives rise to different researchers favouring a distinction between Early and 
Late set Parameters. 
It is not clear, however, how infants come to set this parameter so late, 
when all positive linguistic evidence in English signals an obligatory subject. As 
there is little contrary evidence, an infant acquiring English should be expected to 
correctly set this parameter very early. Wexler (1998) is a strong supporter of 
very early parameter setting (VEPS), and suggests that key parameters are set 
probably before infants produce two word sentences. On this view, the NSP is set 
correctly from the beginning, but the production data is reflecting the effects of 
the Optional Infinitive (OI) stage of language acquisition.  Finite verbs are subject 
to the NSP but non-finite verbs are not. This would explain the apparent 
differential application of the parameter. That is, non-finite forms have no overt 
subject and mask the infant’s established knowledge of NSP. Once again 
empirical evidence would appear to confirm the claim. A survey of child language 
production reported in Wexler (quoted in Wexler 1998 based on a conference 
presentation by Wexler 1990) shows that null subjects occur 70 to 95% with OI 
and 15 to 30% with finite main verbs, suggesting that the OI stage licences a null 
subject. He suggests that those fewer null subjects occurring with finite verbs in 
the data are pragmatically influenced as a form of topic drop when the infant 
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assumes (rightly or wrongly) that the subject is salient enough from the context, 
and therefore the need to express it overtly is lessened. 
2.3.3 VEKI 
It would seem that parameters are correctly set early on, but they may not 
be correctly realised due to grammatical, contextual or pragmatic reasons. Wexler 
maintains that not only parameters are set early, but morphological inflexion 
variation is also well established early. (Very Early Knowledge of Inflection – 
VEKI).  He cites experimental evidence (Rice & Wexler 1996) where children 
(average age 3 years and further extended to 2 year olds) do not confuse examples 
like: 
‘She paints pictures’ vs ‘she painted pictures’ (although either can also be 
expressed by the child in the IO stage as ‘paint pictures’). 
From the survey, it appears that children never use –s form for past or –ed 
form for present.  
“There can be no question that these children knew that ‘–ed’ is +past and ‘–
s’ is -past” (Wexler 1998 p42) 
 
Wexler argues strongly for no late learning of parameters on the basis that 
infant linguistic errors can be traced to maturational features rather than 
performance errors. For this to be so, Wexler assumes that grammatical and 
functional categories are known (there can't be V-raising without V being in some 
way identified), as Pinker also does. The difference is that Pinker's innate 
elements are in effect an inventory of categories and initial phrase structure rules; 
whereas Wexler’s full competence model provides infants with innate knowledge 
of grammatical and functional categories and construction parameters which 
relate them in predefined, possible ways. Language is acquired without using it. 
Language by this description is the structural organisation of grammatical 
elements, in line with Chomsky’s view (1995 p227) that Generative Linguistics is 
concerned with the “narrow study of mechanisms”.  
2.4 Revisions to the Full Competence model 
Wexler is committed to VEPS and VEKI, in support of the full competence 
hypothesis which he espouses. There are, however, other researchers who do not 
agree and are concerned that even if infants have available the full linguistic 
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blueprint from UG, there should be a built-in means for enabling the infant mind 
to manage this powerful innate resource, given known limitations of physical and 
cognitive maturation.  
2.4.1 Late set parameters 
Bloom (1990) had suggested that subject omission may simply be due to the 
infant’s limited memory capacity, which prompts the omission of the subject as it 
is generated late in the derivation. Empirical evidence tends to oppose this view: 
subjects appear in WH-constructions where more complex computations follow 
from subject specification in the derivation. Similarly there is evidence of object 
omission. Objects are specified early in the derivation, and so object-drop cannot 
be explained through memory limitations. Memory capacity alone cannot be a 
deciding factor.  
There must, however, be some strategic limitations imposed if only for the 
trivial reason that infants are not as competent as adults. Rizzi (2002) proposes a 
strategy that can account for the indisputable limitations of the infant, yet preserve 
grammatical principles. 
"When production begins, the child initially assumes all parametric values 
which facilitate the task of the immature production system by reducing the 
computational load, and which are consistent with her current grammatical 
knowledge." (Rizzi 2002 p20) 
 
Such a proposal would suggest two types of parameter setting: VEPS and 
those that need to occur later.  
Rizzi offers an adult example of how parameters may not be set until 
needed. Null subject languages tend to be those that have a rich morphological 
agreement system. As Wexler has pointed out through VEKI, infants have a well-
developed inflexional system, and so it would be expected that the NSP will be 
set positive where a language exhibits a rich agreement system. From a study of 
language change in Brazilian Portuguese, it was found that due to the 
simplification of personal pronouns, second person ‘tu’ and ‘vos’ have been 
replaced by ‘voce(s)’ (your Grace) demanding a third person agreement, and first 
person plural pronoun ‘nos’ has been replaced by ‘a gente’ which also requires 
third person agreement. This has had the effect through the 20th century of 
reducing the six person verb paradigm to 3 forms. In parallel with this, the option 
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of null pronominal subjects has shrunk. Rizzi reports a calculation by Duarte 
(2000) that overt subjects have shifted from 20 to 25% at the beginning of the 
century to 67 to 74% in the second half. If it is accepted that the base state of NSP 
is positive in Brazilian Portuguese, then the setting of this parameter to negative 
over time has been motivated by grammatical factors (i.e. the option to set NSP as 
positive or negative is an available option in UG), but occurs for reasons 
prompted from outside the grammar per se. 
There are languages which do not have a rich morphological agreement 
system yet have null subjects (Chinese, Japanese). These languages are subject to 
the pragmatically motivated topic drop as discussed previously. Infants do, 
however, drop subjects in production even when a language has NSP set to 
negative (as in English). Rizzi suggests that Root Subject drop is an option 
unaffected by the NSP. Where languages have overt subject expression NSP is 
set, as VEPS would suggest, to negative, but this evidence would neither 
contradict nor support a Root Subject drop option. This is paralleled by other 
‘drop’ options including copula drop, as well as the OI effect. Research into adult 
written English use shows that diary register acceptably allows for subject drop. 
Similar phenomena are noted in non-standard colloquial dialects of German and 
Dutch. Root subject drop, then, seems to be an option available to language 
learners particularly in terms of economy but is grammatically motivated and 
fittingly appears to be more prevalent in infant speech than in adult use. 
Rizzi concludes that  
“it seems to be the case that some parameters are correctly set when 
syntactically relevant production starts, while others are not, and give rise to 
observable developmental effects…If this is correct, language development 
is grammatically based, but performance driven: non-target consistent 
properties ... correspond to genuine UG options, but the factors determining 
their temporary adoption ... lie in the growth of the performance systems, 
outside the grammatical system proper.” (Rizzi 2002 p24) 
 
Performance systems outside the grammatical system proper may be 
affected by many means, but early maturation and growth of the infant will surely 
play a significant role, as Wexler, himself, concedes, noting that  
“..developmental constraints often take much more time to work themselves 
out” (Wexler 1998 p74).  
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2.4.2 Fodor’s Treelets 
Further support for a constraint on the extent of parameter setting in initial 
acquisition comes from Janet Fodor (1998) who has argued that the approach to 
defining whole sentence triggers for VEPS (Gibson & Wexler 1994, and Wexler 
1998) presents the infant with a vast array of ambiguous triggers which 
necessitate a trial and error approach. In turn this can result in wholesale 
parameter resetting to derive the correct syntax. Her solution is to constrain the 
infant to unambiguous triggers which tend to mark structures within sentences or 
‘treelets’ rather than whole sentence structure. She concedes that information 
from ambiguous constructions may form stored information, but conclusions are 
not made (in her terms, parameters not set) until the structure is certain. This 
element of certainty accords with Snyder’s (2007, 2011) claim for infant 
conservatism, discussed in 2.2 above. 
2.5 Metamorphosis 
From a different perspective, Gleitman (1981) writes of the tensions evident 
in acquisition research between the linguistic environment providing the 
necessary input and the innate machinery which operates on it. She forms the 
opinion, based on her own extensive research programme that a sort of 
egg/tadpole/frog hypothesis might be appropriate, which she illustrates in the 
following way.  
In the earliest stage, the learner is incapable of representing language. In a 
succeeding period, the incoming language stimulation is represented as a 
conceptual system and linguistic units are semantic/relational. Finally, there is a 
jump to a different state whose outcomes are grammatical relations partly 
independent of semantic categories and relations. She suggests that mechanisms 
of change are more akin to metamorphosis than learning. She suggests that 
different rules and representations become available successively as a result of 
internal changes in learners. She ends her speculative paper with this statement: 
“… it is clear that language learning cannot be satisfactorily described simply 
as an environment-driven process. Rather, creative activities in the child, 
specific to language, do the lion’s share of explanation.” (Gleitman 1981 
pp112-3) 
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Through this, Gleitman provides a differing perspective on the language 
growth model, suggesting additional lines of enquiry complementing those 
proposed by Rizzi above. The full competence model may constitute the final 
stage metamorphosis of the learner into a syntactic organiser, but, as Gleitman 
and Rizzi, caution there are other aspects to infant growth and maturation which 
may play an influential role. 
2.6 Discussion 
This section has described in overview the P&P and VEPS approach to 
language acquisition, and highlighted some of the difficulties that arise when 
infant data appear to contradict a smooth parameter setting process. VEPS and the 
suggested revisions present important points to inform the Research Areas.  
The infant as an intentional participant in the language learning process is 
apparently denied by VEPS. Although the view that the syntactic organisation of 
linguistic material is largely unconscious, may be right, there is a case to be made, 
as Gleitman and Rizzi suggest, that there may be extra-grammatical elements 
driving the process. The interaction between growth in the language faculty and 
general cognitive growth and maturation may be a contributing factor. Wexler’s 
suggested perceptual learning process is somewhat speculative, and in the light of 
the de Loache (2010) research outlined in 2.1 above, there is an undeniable 
human interaction, or inter-subjectivity effect to be accounted for. 
In terms of the Language experience of the infant, it may be tempting to 
suppose that perceptual learning, as Wexler describes it, makes any bootstrapping 
requirement redundant. If it is true, that an infant can attempt to generate an input 
sentence from given or newly set parameters based only on the perception of the 
speech stream around her, there is a genuine question about the relationship 
between physical sound perception and the essential properties of the perceived 
sound which trigger the mechanism operating with UG. Accepting that P&P 
claims only to represent an idealised situation, there is something less than ideal 
about considering infant perception as a purely mechanical operation. Visual 
perception parallels sound perception as input-only operations, but these are 
different from language perception where the source input is a human 
performance created (more often than not) with more than just organised human 
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sound production in mind. Put more succinctly, there is still the problem of how 
the infant identifies the linguistic features necessary for parametric setting. How 
does she know what is a verb for the verb raising parameter, or a non-subject for 
NSP?  
An important observation provided by Wexler is the suggested OI stage. 
What makes infinitive use optional and how are choices made? The fact that OI is 
regularly observed in young infants acquiring a range of languages makes this a 
feature of acquisition that any account should explain.  
The OI frequently appears to express utterances that the Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal, under development here, recognises as those 
of Complex Events: an intentional event not occurring in the present or an event 
where results are apparent in the present.  
Compare the following examples from Dutch and Russian 
 
(11)  Dutch 
  
a) drink e(n)! (Niek 2;7) 
drink INF 
‘I want to drink.’ 
 
b) [eendje] [zi en]. (Matthijs 2;5.1) 
[duck DIM] [see INF] 
‘(I want to) see the ducky.’ 
 
(Quoted in Gavruseva 2003) 
(12)  Russian  
a) Carevna xoxotat 
 ‘Princess to-laugh’ 
 ‘The Princess started to laugh, right after something funny happened’ 
     
b)   Zriteli applodirovat 
 ‘Spectators to-applaude’ 
  ‘The spectators started to applaud right after something exciting was done’  
 
(Quoted in Rizzi 2002) 
The Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal can and does account 
for the OI stage, but specifies that it is not optional nor random. It identifies two 
types of infinitive use: one syntactically, and the other morphologically motivated 
in English. This issue will receive detailed discussion in Chapter 7.  
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Rizzi and Gleitman suggest that there may be influences on language 
acquisition from extra-linguistic cognitive development. A major development of 
this kind is at the heart of the bootstrapping model under development and will be 
addressed in Chapter 5, when a significant and decisive aspect of meta-cognitive 
growth will be described. 
Lastly, Gleitman’s description of linguistic metamorphosis is important 
because she brings a vast amount of experience of actual infant data to the 
observation. The Conceptual-Intentional bootstrapping proposal accounts for such 
a change, where infant speech appears to transform from the conceptual to the 
syntactic, which is mirrored in properties of utterances of Manifest and Complex 
Events. Again Chapter 5 will address this in some detail. 
The next section describes a very different approach to acquisition, which 
resides in the emergentist tradition and focuses on Tomasello’s Verb Island 
Hypothesis. 
3. Tomasello’s Verb Island Hypothesis [VIH] 
In ‘First Verbs’, Tomasello (1992) presents a detailed case study of his 
daughter’s (Travis) gradual acquisition of language and logs her 2+ word 
utterances from 15-24+ months old. It has the specific advantage of being a diary 
based on audio and video evidence. It provides contextual information as well as 
an indication of the adult interpretation of what Travis is thought to have meant 
by her utterances. The log also briefly suggests the supposed adult input which 
may have prompted Travis’ learning. One of Tomasello’s aims is to provide 
strong support for an emergentist, empirical approach to acquisition, to show the 
development of syntactic structure from (lexical) item-based combinations.  
3.1 Cognitive Linguistics 
Tomasello’s linguistic theoretic stance is based on Cognitive Linguistics, 
which he claims is an approach which describes linguistic structure as 
psychological (cognitive, social-cognitive) processes, and is therefore more 
amenable to a developmental analysis. Following Langacker (1987, 2008), 
Tomasello suggests that linguistic competence is based on cognitive symbols and 
a range of cognitive processes which operate on them. Cognitive symbols, on this 
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account, are semantic conceptualisations. Based on shared experience and 
cognition, for the purpose of communication, humans create an inventory of 
symbolic devices and integrate them into larger symbolic wholes. 
“There is nothing else in human language other than the symbolic inventory 
and general cognitive processes using it.” (Tomasello 1992 p3) 
 
He supports his view citing a wide range of linguistic and psycholinguistic 
analyses (principally Lakoff 1987 and Bates and MacWhinney 1982, 1989) that 
suggest that linguistic categories of all kinds – including words and syntactic 
categories like subject of sentence – are prototypical. Prototypical categories are 
characterised as having graded content with category members showing central or 
peripheral qualities, no one of which is essential. Prototypical categories, rather 
than essential categories, are by their nature more open to change and 
development. It is this developmental process over time which constitutes 
language learning, and is, for Tomasello, the key area for study. Langacker (1987) 
had proposed that the meanings of linguistic expressions are divided between 
nominal and relational predications. (He refers to semantic structures of any size 
as predications characterised relative to cognitive domains. Cognitive domains 
may be cognitively irreducible e.g. experience of time or space or colour, but 
most domains of linguistic relevance are not primitive and involve indefinitely 
complex cognitive structures).  
“A nominal predication presupposes the interconnections among a set of 
conceived entities, and profiles the region thus established. By contrast, a 
relational predication presupposes a set of entities, and it profiles the 
interconnections among entities.” (Langacker 1987 p68) 
 
Relational predications are not distinguished by inherent conceptual 
content, but by profiling interconnections, and may be simple or complex. For 
instance, consider these two examples: 
(13) 
  
a) There is a bridge across the river 
b) The hiker waded across the river 
 
In (13a) the relation expressed by ‘across’ is simple and stative (the bridge 
spans one side to the other). In (13b) the relation is complex because ‘across’ 
designates a series of stages the hiker undertakes to travel from one side to the 
other. 
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Relational predications also profile processes versus a-temporal relations. 
For Langacker, the set of processural predications is co-extensive with verbs, 
whereas a-temporal relations correspond to traditional categories like preposition, 
adjective, adverb, infinitives and participles. Langacker also distinguishes 2 types 
of cognitive processing – summary and sequential. The former involves a 
complex conceptualisation built up from successive scanning of a whole ‘scene’. 
The latter involves the successive transformation from one ‘scene’ to another, 
non-cumulatively and dynamic. Summary scanning is suited to the conception of 
static situations; sequential scanning lends itself to conceptual changes and 
events. 
Tomasello re-interprets Langacker’s complex adult formulation, for the 
purposes of analysing infant utterances and differentiating nouns and verbs. He 
suggests that words like ‘parade’ or ‘skiing’ when used as nouns refer to 
temporarily extended events where processes are treated as things with no 
sequential scanning. When used as verbs, the words require processural sequential 
scanning: 
(14) 
  
a) He paraded around the house 
b) He is skiing 
 
In brief, Tomasello offers this summary:  the noun is the snapshot and the 
verb is a moving picture. Because not all verbs can be likened to moving pictures, 
he also explains that verbs such as ‘remain’ or ‘know’ involve durative states 
which cannot be identified from a snapshot.  
These cognitive, as opposed to structural, criteria drawn from Langacker’s 
work, are used by Tomasello to identify children’s early verbs: 
“I call a verb any word that the child uses to predicate a process of 
something, regardless of that word’s status in adult language” (Tomasello 
1992 p11) 
 
By this token, words like ‘off’, as in ‘hat off’, are recorded as verbs. 
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3.2 Data analysis 
Tomasello’s analysis organises his extensive diary data into a number of 
themes that provide samples of development over the period of the case study. 
Not surprisingly, the focus of Travis’ talk is on relations and actions between and 
about people and entities in Travis’ everyday experience: family members, pets, 
food, toys and so on. Also recorded are uses of words indicating motion which are 
not usually analysed as verbs (in the adult sense): up, down, in, out. This tends to 
emphasise that children may well be operating with categories different from 
adults (Bowerman 1973), that is, a child’s category of verb, if they do in fact have 
such a category, may include a wide range of relational terms. 
Accepting that children may not have an abstract verb category, Tomasello 
analyses Travis’ word combinations – one ‘verb-like’ word plus a word which, in 
the main, describes an object or entity – into sets of conceptual categories, which 
he illustrates diagrammatically to show how the processural events might be 
conceptualised.  
The classification includes (with a selection of example verbs given in 
italics): 
 Presence, absence or recurrence of objects: whereda ; find-it; more; 
another 
 Presence, absence or recurrence of actions: again; do-it; finish 
 Exchange of possession: thanks; here-go; get-it; hold 
 Location of object: up; down; on; off; in; out; here; there 
 Movement of object: stuck; go; come; off; bring; take 
 State of object: open; close; fix; break; tear; crack. 
 A much smaller category indicates actions of objects: sweep; brush; 
hammer 
Lastly, a category that Tomasello labels as actions without objects (although 
many examples seem to involve objects in some way), which he subgroups into: 
 Physical activity: run; jump; swim 
 Perceptual activity: see; taste; listen 
 Emotional activity: scared; love; hurt 
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 Epistemic activity: talk; remember. 
Through this organisation, Tomasello is attempting to establish that the 
lexical items designated as verbs are a symbolic label for processural 
conceptualisations which are readily available to the infant. With the focus on the 
process, arguments are designated as being the substantive elements of the 
process. So, the verb ‘hit’ is associated with a ‘hitter’ and a ‘hittee’. The 
functional role of the argument is semantically integrated and defined by the 
symbolic representation of the verb. 
3.3 Verb Islands 
Tomasello observes that Travis’ extended knowledge of a verb develops 
individually. The most commonly heard terms develop more complex uses and 
participate in increasingly more complex constructions. Development is therefore 
word/item specific, dependent on heard usage and does not at this stage appear to 
provide a model or rule for other verb item development. For instance, Travis’ use 
of ‘get-it’: 
The case study records that parental use of this expression is of 3 kinds: for 
the telephone ‘I’ll get it’; telling someone to ‘go get it’; or telling Travis ‘you can 
get it’ in response to her request for something. It is assumed that Travis learned 
‘get-it’ as a single word expression in relation to objects that are perceived but 
inaccessible. Her earliest uses appear to be holophrastic in nature: ‘Phone, get-it’ 
and ‘Ball, get-it’ around 17mo. By 18mo Travis appears to put this in a 2 word 
combination structure resembling VO ‘Get-it silk’. ‘Get-it puppet’. By 20mo 
Travis is indicating the retriever ‘Mummy get sauce’ or ‘Daddy get-it bottle’. By 
21mo she utters ‘Get raisins to me’, and by 23mo Travis is specifying actor and 
intention as in ‘I’m gonna get more ice-cream’. 
The development seems to be specific to this verb, as the same complexities 
do not transfer or appear in similar words. Thus at 19+months Travis says 
‘balloon, have-it’  and ‘have-it cards’ and at 20 months she asks ‘give-it pencil’  
and at 23months ‘give it to me’. In another instance Travis uses ‘keep-it’ to imply 
she will not relinquish an object and this remains a single word assertion past 
20months. 
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Tomasello concludes from these and many further examples that if the 
developments of ‘get-it’ were rule governed then it should be possible to discern 
comparable developments for ‘have-it’, ‘keep-it’, ‘find-it’, ‘want-it’  etc. He 
claims that evidence for this, however, is not apparent in the corpus. Tomasello’s 
Verb Island Hypothesis proposes that grammaticalisation of verbs derives from 
learning combinatorial possibilities and argument roles for each verb individually 
as they are heard in the input.  
Verb expressions that are heard and used more frequently develop more 
extensively than less frequently used verbs. Tomasello’s principle argument is 
that this would not be predicted if it were the case that a single rule developed for 
one verb was applicable to others. From experimental evidence, Tomasello & 
Olguin (1993) and Olguin & Tomasello (1993) which tested for infant knowledge 
of morphological paradigms, Tomasello concluded that infants have a category 
Noun but no category Verb at 25 months. This conclusion was based on infants 
productively forming plurals of novel nouns, but not being able to form past tense 
‘-ed’ forms for novel verbs.  
How, then, do verb islands become generalised verb constructions? 
Tomasello (1992, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006) suggests that, given a critical mass 
of verb island constructions, a process of analogy enables the child to generalise 
to an abstract verb phrase structure.  
 “Children begin to form abstract utterance-level constructions by creating 
analogies among utterances emanating from different item-based 
constructions.” (Tomasello 2006 p45) 
 
His argument is that the learner gains an understanding of the 
interrelationship of the structures, aligned through analogy. He cites the work of 
Gentner and Markman (1997), and Gentner and Medina (1998), to provide 
evidence of the young child’s ability to make analogies. A closer look at Gentner 
and colleagues’ work raises doubts about this assertion, as the empirical evidence 
for analogous learning by young infants, in this context, is far from conclusive.  
3.4 Analogy 
The main objective of Gentner and Markman (1997) is to explore the 
psychology of a long discussed philosophical problem: the relation between 
similarity and analogy. They indicate widespread evidence from child 
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development where children make comparisons in order to draw conclusions. One 
example quoted, attributed to Lise Menn whose 2year old son, fascinated by the 
way ducklings eat, mimicked them and concluded: ‘have no hands’ to explain 
why the ducklings’ and his own eating behaviour differed. But this is not 
necessarily defined as analogy in Gentner’s terms, rather as comparison within a 
common context (eating). Gentner and Markman present 3 types of comparison 
and give rather quirky illustrative examples, reported here for completeness: 
i) Literal similarity where objects and relations are shared (e.g. comparing 
prison and jail);  
ii) Mere appearance similarity, where objects but not relations are shared 
(comparing a zebra and prisoner)
1
; and  
iii) Analogy, where relation but not objects are shared (comparing prison 
and a job).  
The key element of this research, for present purposes, is that in true 
analogy, only relational elements are shared. Experimental work has been 
conducted with children (from 2years old to 14years old) and adults to explore 
when and how such relational alignments are made between objects (Gentner and 
Medina 1998), or events and scenarios (Gentner and Markman 1997; Richland, 
Morrison and Holyoak 2006). Across all these studies, where young children are 
participants, the experimental presentation involves concrete items or visual 
scenes for children to compare and draw analogies. One simple example is to 
show a loaf of bread alongside a slice of bread. Children are asked to select from 
a range of pictures the appropriate entry to place alongside a lemon within this 
experimental context (they are expected to select a slice of lemon). More complex 
input involves comparing abstract object shapes and shading or complex 
scenarios containing distractors. The outcome important here, is that it is not until 
children are 4 years old that they can perform these experimental tasks 
successfully, and then only just above chance level. It is not until children are 5-6 
years old that they become secure in forming basic analogies, and even then it is 
with concrete items or visual representations. 
                                                 
1
 The comparison is assumed to be between a zebra’s stripes and a striped prisoner’s uniform. 
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Tomasello, however, is suggesting that children not yet 3 years old might 
have the ability to draw analogies from inventories of abstract linguistic 
constructions. Thus a collection of verb islands may present the infant with 
relations that do not comfortably meet the criteria for analogy making which 
according to Gentner & Markman (1997) demand that there is a relational 
element in common rather than shared objects. In the examples below (drawn 
from Travis’ most used verbs) the relations do not seem analogous: 
(15) 
 
a) hitter  --  (hit) – hittee 
b) drinker – (drink) – substance 
c) drawer – (draw) – location 
d) maker – (made) – made object 
 
The problem revolves around what comes first. Can an overall structure be 
derived from disparate parts, or is it more likely that the overall structure comes 
first and the disparate elements are fitted to it. So, assuming that the target 
analogous relation is something like a SVO structure; can it be derived from 
examples (15a-d)? If it is relations rather than objects that are critical then 
presumably (15c) would wrongly pattern with the others. 
Usually analogy appears to work in another way, that given an ‘umbrella’ 
structure new items that occur under this ‘umbrella’ can be inferred to take on 
comparable properties exhibited by the others. So, given an already acquired SVO 
structure, new ‘islands’ exhibiting Xer and Xee relations would be drawn together 
comparably under the pre-existing SVO umbrella. However, this also assumes 
that the Xer and Xee relation has already been abstracted. But many of the verb 
islands appear not to have these relational elements regularly present (so for the 
verb ‘X’, the ‘Xer’ and/or ‘Xee’ elements are not systematically stated).  
Although Tomasello suggests that the process of analogy is established by 3 
years of age, it is generally held that it is only by that age that the ‘Xer’ and ‘Xee’ 
elements become more systematically part of language production. This may lead 
to the conclusion that the ‘Xer’ and ‘Xee’ roles have a prior, more abstract 
designation like Subject/noun or Objet/noun which Tomasello explicitly denies, 
alongside doubts that infants have even an intuitive notion of verb.  It would 
appear that the item specificity of constructions they use can enable them to form 
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a conceptual/semantic alignment based on prior subjective knowledge/experience 
of how objects interact, rather than a structural/syntactic alignment which on this 
account appears to have no source.  
The literature on analogy (Ratterman and Gentner 1998) proposes a 
‘relational shift’ after 4years of age which enables children more readily to draw 
analogies. The conclusion reached here is that analogy cannot play with any 
certainty, the role Tomasello suggests. Gentner and Markman (1997) even 
suggest that it is the acquisition of language itself, which supports and prompts 
the ability to form analogies. 
Even if this view of analogy is wrong and there is some specific type of 
analogy available to infants as Tomasello suggests, then there is a further 
problem. Tomasello says that given a critical mass of verb islands then analogy 
becomes active. What constitutes a critical mass? What prompts the inevitability 
of analogy formation? It might be possible to develop a functional linguistic 
ability based only on extensive sets of verb islands, but there appears to be no 
research into what might constitute a tipping point. 
The notion of structural alignment is, however, an important one. Gentner 
and Markman point out that comparison is more easily performed when the items 
being compared have a structural or category alignment. Experiments with adults 
showed that participants could produce similarity and difference judgements more 
easily and in greater quantity when comparing, for instance, a cat and a dog 
(category linked ‘animals’) as opposed to a cat and a magazine (no category link). 
For structural alignment to be possible there needs to be some super-ordinate 
category/context within which items/elements can be compared. The collection of 
verb islands, however extensive, would appear to lack this higher order category 
to provide some unified context within which island instances can be compared 
and analogies drawn.  
3.5 Alternative proposals 
3.5.1 McClure, Pine & Lieven 
McClure, Pine & Lieven. (2006) conducted an investigation to establish 
whether the evidence for verb islands derived from Travis, generalises to a larger 
Neil Parr  Chapter 2  
Page 67  
 
group of infants, by comparing her acquisition data with a longitudinal study of 
10 children. They found the experience of all the infants to be largely in line, and 
so the data from Travis may be considered typical. The investigation also set out 
to explore 2 further aspects: the extent that infants’ knowledge grows gradually 
around specific lexical items and also to what extent verb-general knowledge is 
evidenced in the early stages of acquisition. McClure et al analysed infants’ 
utterances into Stage 1 (Mean length of utterance [MLU] 1-1.99 morphemes) and 
Stage 2 (MLU 2-2.49 morphemes).  
The investigation assumed that a strict interpretation of the Verb Island 
Hypothesis would predict that:  
i) few verbs would first appear in multi-argument structures;  
ii) utterances with ‘old’ verbs (previously acquired at stage 1) would at 
stage 2 have more complex structure than utterances with new verbs at stage 2;   
iii) utterances with new verbs at stage 2 would be no more complex than 
verbs at stage1. 
Having applied a common coding to the data for all the infants, the results 
suggested that the infants do tend to use their verbs initially in single argument 
structures; that old verbs at stage 2 do tend to occur in more complex structures 
than new verbs at stage 2, confirming that the longer an infant has known a verb 
the greater the complexity of its use. The third prediction, however, was not 
supported. New verbs learned at stage 2 had a more complex argument structure 
than new verbs learned at stage 1.  
This result may suggest that some learning is carried over to new verbs and 
that knowledge of argument structure is not entirely verb specific. Further 
analysis of the productive patterns within the infants’ utterances, however, 
showed that they were composed of high frequency nominal elements which 
could pattern as subjects and objects within an utterance. For example, across 
three of the infants a structure ‘Mummy X’ (where X stands for a verb) became a 
frame for new verbs as a slot filler. There were no counter examples from these 
infants of the type ‘X mummy’. The general conclusion drawn is that infants 
develop a notion of high frequency Subject (or Object) which patterns 
semantically with a new verb.   
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McClure et al. suggest that there is an advantage in this approach which 
allows for lexically specific patterns to be made around items other than verbs, 
with the possibility of developing S+V and V+O as abstract structures, with the 
nominal element as the driver, although no suggestion is made how the notion of 
Subject or Object of sentence is derived. This is an interesting extension of the 
Island notion, but makes the leap without explanation from conceptual to 
syntactic relations.  
Tomasello’s position is that the conceptualisation of a process specifies the 
participants, and as more participants are known to play a part in the process 
(from the infant’s growing experience) then the verb island forms e.g. a range of 
hitters and hittees consolidating ‘hit’. On the McClure account infants’ growing 
experience of entities defines the range of processes in which they can participate, 
thus boys, girls, bats and so on can ‘hit’, or boys, girls, balls and so on can ‘be 
hit’. This raises an interesting contrast: an action with a range of generic 
participants versus a participant having a range of generic actions. Infant generic 
knowledge of events and how this is expressed verbally will be addressed in 
Chapter 3, and forms a precursor to utterances of Manifest Events according to 
the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal under development here. 
3.5.2 Ninio’s Path breaking verbs hypothesis 
Ninio (1999) summarises various approaches to the acquisition of verb 
syntax. Ninio, firstly, dismisses Pinker’s Semantic Bootstrapping hypothesis, 
based on her empirical data showing that the first verbs infants utter are 
essentially stative, typically ‘want’ and as such do not meet Pinker’s  criterion of 
the triggering effect of an initial action verb. She then discusses Tomasello’s Verb 
Island Hypothesis which she describes as each verb developing a mini syntax for 
itself and after a considerable number of verbs are acquired the isolated syntactic 
elements are later integrated, at a time well beyond early word combination. 
Ninio’s review of evidence from 15 children learning Hebrew, along with 
Tomasello’s data, prompts her to suggest a third possibility which is most 
succinctly expressed from the original: 
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“when children start to learn to combine individual verbs in various positional 
patterns, they also begin to consolidate some more general or abstract 
knowledge about the verb form class, about different complements verbs 
take and about the positional patterns involved.” (Ninio 1999 p623) 
 
Ninio justifies this proposal through her data analysis showing that in early 
verb combinations the initial pattern is a single VO structure. There is then an 
appreciable time gap before the production of a new verb in a new VO 
construction. Across all the children in her study, this time gap averages 44 days 
(span of 17 -104 days) thereafter the number of new verbs appearing in this 
pattern speeds up. Ninio notes that an SVO pattern occurs consistently after VO 
development and exhibits the same kind of time lag: the second verb in a SVO 
pattern appeared an average of 42 days (span 12 -150 days) after the first 
occurrence. Further novel verbs appear in the pattern with an increasingly shorter 
time gap. Significantly also, VO and SVO appear to develop independently with 
different verbs. According to Ninio, Tomasello’s data showed a considerable 
number of verbs appearing in a VO pattern before Travis used a SVO 
construction. Another child Rudi showed a parallel developmental curve of VO to 
SVO with the SVO trajectory beginning over a month after the VO. 
Ninio attributes the gradual speeding up of the learning curves to 
‘facilitation, generalisation and transfer’ from existing verbs that infants already 
know how to combine.  She claims that this type of development cannot support a 
verb island hypothesis. If verbs develop independent syntax without influence 
from other verbs, then this would not explain the speeding up effect over time, 
and there is, in the Travis data, clear evidence of a dramatic increase in new but 
item specific verb combinations. The major problem that Ninio glosses over is 
why she designates the VO structures as V+O rather than some other designation, 
as previously, Ninio (1988) had argued that infants do not have abstract 
grammatical categories like verb or noun, which emerge gradually over time.  
Ninio clarifies this as follows: initial word combinations are semantically 
motivated rather than reflecting syntactic knowledge. Given a growing store of 
word combinations, she suggests (Ninio 1999 p116) that infants gain a ‘growing 
realisation’ or ‘insight’ into which words require arguments and therefore 
function as predicates. Given a growing stock of predicates, an infant gains 
insight into what words function as arguments. For example, a noun ‘apple’ 
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becomes an argument when entering into a predicate relation with an adjective in 
the 2 word combination ‘big apple’. This combination in turn becomes an 
argument of a further predicate: ‘want [big apple]’. On this account, infants’ 
abstract categories change dramatically as new combinations are successfully 
made.  
There remains however the major problem of what constitutes, motivates or 
guarantees, what Ninio terms, a ‘growing realisation’ or ‘insight’. Ninio’s path-
breaking hypothesis suggests that the first verbs infants acquire are prototypically 
transitive, and based on infant data, she claims that initial transitivity is reflected 
in terms of two cognitive processes firstly objects being drawn to/into the self 
(possession or consumption) or secondly object creation. This is explained by the 
observation that the first SVO constructions involve ‘want’ ‘take’ ‘eat’ ‘hold’ 
‘get’, or ‘make’ which Ninio terms ‘path-breaking verbs’ upon which verb phrase 
construction is based. How far they contribute to a ‘growing realisation’ 
becoming an inevitable outcome is not clear. Why are notions of possession and 
creation so central? In Chapter 5, the powerful effect of a meta-cognitive 
development enabling infants to express intentional outcomes and results will be 
described. It is the expression of such Complex Events, which may include 
possession and construction as well as other intentions, which provides the 
motivation for Ninio’s identified verbs. 
As previously noted subjects are regularly omitted in infant speech. So, 
developments from VO to SVO over time may be due to a range of possible 
influences. Travis does not include a subject in her utterances consistently until 
20+months for some verbs and even then where subjects are made explicit they 
appear to be pragmatically motivated (age is indicated in months and days): 
 
(16) 
 
a)   as vocatives to gain attention: 
Daddy look over there 20;06 
 
b)  consciously included because the agent is not present and therefore not 
immediately derivable from the context:  
Timothy gave that necklace for me   22;11 
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c)   the subjects specified are more significant than the object acted on (‘I’ 
has specific significance and is addressed in Chapter 7 below): 
I like it 23;0 
I want to get in your lap 24;28 
 
d)   as entities which contribute to a habitual event (intransitives): 
Maria go  17;14 
Daddy working real hard  20;15 
Pajama falling down  21;14 
Although a subject is obligatory in English constructions it seems that 
Travis in common with other English speaking infants, does not have the 
structural flexibility to reflect this formal requirement. Conceptually, she has no 
need to, when subjects can be readily derived pragmatically from the context of 
use.  
3.6 Discussion 
To summarise the VIH: structural knowledge develops from individual 
instances of words which focus on generally, dynamic events, learned from adult 
input. Through frequency of use, the verb gains more possible and explicit event 
participants whose thematic roles are inherently defined by the verb. So, ‘a hitter’ 
is an agent of ‘hit’; and ‘a drink’ is a theme of ‘drink’. The collections of verbs 
plus participant groups form verb islands. With sufficient numbers of islands 
known to the infant, an alignment is effected by analogy to provide a generalised 
notional/syntactic structure (S)V(O). Analogy, in the generally accepted sense 
was shown to be problematic, casting doubt on the plausibility of his account.  
Extensions to the theory suggest that the habitual actions of entities drive the 
island construction as in the case of ‘Mummy+ V1, V2, V3…Vn’, and that initial 
verbs which develop as path breaking examples involve significant events, 
particular to the infant – eat, make, get, have – which Ninio generalises as a 
process of taking (in)to the self or construction. 
As for the previous approaches, it is instructive to explore how this 
approach contributes to the Research Areas.  
The usage based approach, unlike the others so far considered, recognises a 
role for infant intentionality in language acquisition, at least at the level of 
learning being based on interactional use. Situations that frequently engage 
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infants in hearing and using language are those that contribute most to language 
learning.  
Tomasello’s usage-based approach appears true to its label. After initial 
learning from adult input, further development rests on frequency of use by the 
infant. The diary evidence would suggest that there is no watershed moment and 
infants do not assume grammatical properties for verbs until exemplified in the 
input. This has implications for the nature of the input upon which infants on this 
account have an obligation to rely. The inevitability of language acquisition is 
arrived at from what must be inferred as a dependency on involvement with the 
speech community. The nature of the linguistic input and how infants relate to it 
is addressed further in Chapter 3. 
On word learning, Tomasello’s identification of verbs presents lexical items 
which on most accounts would not be classified as verbs. It has been shown 
(Talmy 2003) that motion events are comprised of a number of components – 
means of motion and path of travel being two. Languages differ in how they 
lexicalise these elements, and English tends commonly to express the means of 
motion through a verb, and the path through a prepositional satellite construction. 
Given the usage based assumption that there is an alignment between what words 
represent conceptually and the role they play grammatically, Tomasello’s 
identification of the prepositional satellite as the verb is problematic, as it selects 
the wrong element of the semantics of motion to lexicalise as a verb in English.  
The preposition will not function as a verb in the target syntax. Word learning, 
particularly verbs as lexical items is addressed in Chapter 4.  
The final approach described in this chapter is Syntactic Bootstrapping, 
which differs in approach from all those so far considered. 
4. Syntactic bootstrapping [SyB] 
The fourth approach to verb learning to be considered is termed Syntactic 
bootstrapping, which has developed from work undertaken by Landau and 
Gleitman (1985), whose monograph presented a study of language acquisition by 
a blind child. As it has been generally held that words are learnt as a mapping 
process between the word heard and an observed event or object in the world, the 
study of a child for whom crucial sensory information is unavailable is very 
Neil Parr  Chapter 2  
Page 73  
 
revealing. Although it was found that haptic information plays an active role in 
identifying objects close to hand, such information is deficient in the context of 
distant objects and particularly in the recognition and labelling of relations 
between objects. Despite this, blind children do successfully learn language, and 
the research suggested that the available syntactic information from verbal input 
appeared to play an important role. 
Landau & Gleitman noted that early learned verbs were differentiated by 
the type of syntactic construction where they appeared. One area of focus for their 
research was how the words ‘look’ and ‘see’ were learned and used by the blind 
child. Although it was found that the visually neutral, haptic, meanings of these 
words were acquired by the child (‘look’ signifying searching, and ‘see’ 
signifying identifying), it was also clear that verbs like ‘give’, ‘put’, ‘get’ and 
‘hold’ were also learned. Landau & Gleitman suggest these are all verbs implying 
transfer of objects to and from people or locations. The relationships expressed by 
these words are not so easily determined by sensory means. These verbs, 
however, appeared in a different syntactic (essentially di-transitive) frame from 
‘look’ and ‘see’. The research concluded that additional syntactic information was 
available to the child to develop verb meanings. 
 It is reasonable to assume that the role syntax could play is equally 
available to sighted children, and as such additional research programmes were 
put in place to explore this issue. Although SyB would appear to focus on how the 
meaning of verbs is acquired, the hypothesis has been extended to a wider 
application, and as such complements the approaches so far considered. 
On the surface, SyB is the reverse of Pinker’s Semantic bootstrapping, 
which employs contingent linking rules to access clause structure information 
from the meanings of words within a sentence context. In overview, SyB uses the 
sentence structure to identify the argument structure and reverse build verb 
meaning, based on the supposition that verbs with similar argument structures 
convey a similar generalised meaning. The number of arguments is recognised as 
the number of participating objects/nouns in the sentence. Thus, in general terms, 
one argument tends to signify self-directed motion - ‘Ann arrived’; two arguments 
causation or contact - ‘Ann threw the ball’; and three arguments transfer or 
exchange - ‘Ann gave Tom the ball’. The effect of the number of arguments on 
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the meaning of the verb is apparent when considering the example ‘Ann threw the 
ball to Tom’, where in this case ‘threw’ now takes on an additional transfer 
meaning, compared to ‘Ann threw the ball’. (It is a moot point, however, whether 
the meaning of ‘threw’ which encodes the manner of motion, has changed or not). 
4.1 Contributing research programmes 
This section will track some of the experimental research contributing to the 
evidential base informing the model.  Naigles (1990) famously conducted an 
experiment to show the influence of syntax on how infants access verb meaning. 
The ages of the infants involved were 1;11 to 2;4 (average 2;1) and all were 
producing two or three word utterances. The experiment made use of novel 
actions and a nonsense word, to ensure that no prior learning about the scene or 
target word could be brought to bear. Infants were seated before two separated 
video screens, and initially experienced, replicated on both screens, a video 
depiction of an action event accompanied by one of two voice-overs. The video 
showed two characters (a duck and a rabbit) performing a simultaneous, novel set 
of actions.  One action was causative – the duck forcing the rabbit into an odd 
bending position; the other action was non-causative – the duck and the rabbit 
making the same arm gestures. Both actions were happening simultaneously in 
the scene. One set of infants watched the scene and heard an accompanying audio 
track of the sentence containing the target nonsense word ‘gorping’: ‘Look! duck 
is gorping bunny’ – a transitive/causative frame. The other set of infants heard the 
sentence: ‘Look! duck and bunny are gorping’ – an intransitive action frame. 
After 6 or 7 exposures as a ‘teaching’ phase, the control phase consisted of the 
actions separated with both duck and rabbit making the arm gesture only on one 
screen and the duck bending the rabbit only on the other screen. The infants were 
invited to respond to ‘Oh look they are different now’ and the looking time to 
each screen was recorded. The test phase maintained the two depictions but the 
infants were asked ‘Where’s gorping?’ or ‘Find gorping now’. Preferential 
looking time was recorded. The infants who had experienced the intransitive 
frame looked significantly longer at the arm gesture depiction, and the infants 
who had experienced the transitive frame looked significantly longer at the duck 
bending the rabbit depiction, than in the control condition. The conclusion is that 
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infants assigned meaning to ‘gorping’ based only on the syntactic frame of the 
prompt sentence in the teaching phase.  
This research methodology – novel action, novel word and preferential 
looking time – has been employed a great deal in verb learning research. In 
Chapter 8 this and other experiments will be challenged from the viewpoint of the 
Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal, but in anticipation of this fuller 
treatment, one key issue will be mentioned here.  
The causative/transitive encodes both cause and effect, and conceptually 
involves two linked but discrete action events: the duck gorping (pushing) and the 
rabbit gorping (bending). The intransitive sentence encodes a single action event: 
duck and rabbit gorping (arm waving). Thus simply resolving event complexity 
may have provided the successful outcome. In the first there are two differing 
sub-events. In the second there is a single event. Both of these scenes involve the 
same number of participants. ‘Gorping’, therefore, might be a meaningless tag, or 
as the subjects are not required to differentiate the word ‘gorping’ from any other 
word, it may simply not figure at all for the infants. Leaving these considerations 
aside, however, for the time being armed with an apparently clear link between 
verb meaning and sentence construction Fisher, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1991) 
explored in more detail the relation between verb meaning and the syntactic 
structures in which they appear.  
A number of experiments were conducted each designed to refine potential 
shortcomings in the others, but in overview 2 processes can be extracted for the 
present purpose. Adult subjects were asked to group sets of verbs according to 
semantic similarity. Specifically cognition and perception verbs, motion verbs, 
location verbs and symmetrical verbs were in the source corpus. With sets of 
verbs grouped by semantic similarity, a second set of experiments asked subjects 
to sort the verbs according to which syntactic frames they thought the verb could 
appropriately appear using their syntactic judgement. It was found that there was 
a close correlation between the verbs grouped by semantic and syntactic criteria. 
To provide cross-linguistic evidence, the core experiments were repeated using 
Italian speakers and Italian verbs. The findings were upheld for this group.  
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Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz & Gleitman (1994) worked with 3-4 year olds. The 
experiment involved a puppet ‘describing’ a number of scenes using novel words 
and the children were asked to offer what they thought the puppet meant. When 
the puppet offered only a single (neutral for structure) word to describe a scene 
(e.g. pilking) then the answers from the children were quite wide ranging. When 
the puppet described the scene using the same words in a sentence frame, there 
was more agreement about the proposed meaning of the nonsense word. 
Agreement increased with the age of the children. Fisher et al. conclude that the 
supportive effect of the sentence structure acts as a zoom lens on to the meaning 
of the verb. The structural context only shows global semantic properties and 
provides only semantic implications, the verb provides further meaning. 
4.2 Analogy 
 Fisher (1996, 2000) extended this thinking, to suggest that analogy can play 
an important role in furthering children’s verb learning, by providing a structural 
alignment between verbs. Those that appear in the same frames will have similar 
meanings. A widely accepted constraint on word learning is that different words 
are assumed to signify different meanings. The structural similarity provides a 
support mechanism to zoom into the specific differential meaning of individual 
verbs. So, ‘break’, ‘shatter’, ‘crumple’ will align generally to signify causative 
events, but their differences can be gradually learned from the context where 
differing entities fill the argument slots. Thus in an SVO structure, the way V is 
interpreted will depend on what type of entity is referenced by S and O. Vases can 
be broken, glass shattered, and paper crumpled. Although in the previous section 
it was argued that analogy is an unlikely learning process without some 
superordinate relational category within which to compare elements, it can be 
seen in this case that a sentence/sub-categorisation frame can, in fact, provide 
such a category. 
 This does not, however, explain how the infant breaks into knowing the 
significance of the sentence frame in the first place. Fisher argues that as infants 
are known to learn nouns first and as these nouns are always presented in a 
sentence frame in adult input, access to the argument structure is mostly a case of 
‘counting’ the nouns represented. In support of this, it could be noted here that 
conscious counting is not required, as it is agreed that knowledge of precise 
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quantities from 1 to 3 is an innate ability shared widely through many species (Xu 
2003). Fisher suggests that using the conceptual participants and an observed 
context and knowledge of the noun phrases used: 
“The outcome would be a rough semantic structure for the sentence, with 
semantic content derived from the specifics of the observed event” (Fisher 
1996 p46) 
 
Across three sets of experiments, Naigles, Fowler and Helm (1992, 1995), 
Naigles, Gleitman and Gleitman (1993), infants from 2;6 to pre-schoolers, 
children at school, adults, and children with Downs Syndrome were tested to 
gauge the effect of structural meaning versus verb meaning using an enactment 
test. Given a set of toy animals, subjects were presented with a number of 
sentence statements which they then were required to enact according to their 
understanding of what they had heard. The sentences were presented as 
grammatical or ungrammatical, the latter formed by placing an intransitive verb in 
a transitive frame, or vice versa: ‘the zebra brings’ or ‘the lion puts the arc’ or ‘the 
elephant comes the giraffe’. It was found that the younger groups followed the 
generalised meaning apparent from the sub-categorisation frame, but as the age of 
the subject was greater, so the meaning conveyed by the verb took precedence. So 
a 2 year old presented with ‘the elephant comes the giraffe’ would portray an 
enactment as if the sentence were ‘the elephant brings the giraffe’ a transitive 
event. Older children enacted the sentence meaning following more closely the 
meaning of the verb, as in ‘the elephant comes, and so does the giraffe’. It was 
concluded this work supported the syntactic bootstrapping hypothesis in that the 
initial meanings of verbs appeared to be driven by the sentence frame, and that it 
required greater age experience for the verb meaning to take precedence.  
4.3 Challenges and developments to the model 
Pinker (1994) questioned the viability of SyB, doubting that semantic 
information could be drawn from the syntactic properties of verbs. He claims that 
the apparent syntactic cuing device is in fact semantic, as the sub-categorisation 
frames are not different for every verb. He maintains that verb meaning can be 
derived from observation and that the first task is for the child to make basic 
syntactic discoveries, and verbs with already learned (root) meanings are 
incorporated in the phrase structure. The detail of the root meaning of a verb 
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cannot be derived from the sub-categorisation frame, and it is the root meaning of 
the verb which is what the acquisition of word meaning is about. He maintains 
that linking rules which connect semantic roles to thematic roles are not 
reversible: 
“A grammar is a mechanism that maps a large set of semantic distinctions 
onto a small set of syntactic distinctions” (Pinker 1994 p397) 
 
So, syntactic frames cannot distinguish the root meaning of verbs. He points 
out that experiments conducted in support of the hypothesis involve children who 
have already learned about English structure, and the experiments say nothing 
about how the structures are acquired in the first place. Fisher (2000) tackles 
Pinker’s criticisms, and presents a proposal for a learning process, outlined as 
follows. 
Fisher assumes a principled relation between verb syntax and semantic 
structure on the basis that semantic content has a generalised semantic structure 
and this semantic structure is reflected in the syntactic structure. Verbs occurring 
in similar sentence structures are judged to have similar meanings, as established 
by Fisher, Gleitman & Gleitman (1991) outlined above. Verb meanings are 
realised in the context of a sentence and so the contextual effect is just as 
important at any age or stage of development, adults or children. Pinker claims 
that linking rules for thematic roles depend on prior knowledge of the meaning of 
verbs, but, Fisher suggests otherwise, and shows that Pinker’s linking rules are 
not viable where the agents/patient roles are obscured, as follows.  
Fisher (1996) had tested infants (2;11 to 4;0) on their understanding of the 
match to a video scene of transitive and intransitive nonsense verbs with thematic 
roles ambiguously marked by pronouns. So, one test sequence had a scene 
depicting one person (A) using the crook of a cane to pull another (B) seated 
cross-legged on a wheeled dolly. The scene was accompanied variously with 
‘she’s pilking her over there’ or ‘she’s pilking over there’. In answer to the 
question ‘which one is pilking her over there?’ versus ‘which one is pilking over 
there?’ the children interpreted the verbs differently depending on the sentence 
structure, as pulling or sitting, even though neither sentence explicitly identified 
one participant in the event as subject. Fisher concludes that sentence structures, 
themselves, are meaningful, and sentence structures are considered to be an 
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analogue of the semantic structure attributed to a scene. Structural alignment 
between a scene and sentence structure can be arrived at without prior knowledge 
of the verb. Fisher suggests, based on her experimental evidence, that there are 
two main elements when infants learn a new verb.  
The first is that infants can infer something about the perspective of the 
scene (action, causative, or transfer) based on the number of available participants 
mentioned in the sentence.  
Secondly, infants assume that in an asymmetrical semantic structure, the 
more dynamic participants should be more prominent than the less dynamic. As a 
result the more prominent role becomes linked to subject position in the sentence. 
In sum, once children can identify any nouns within the utterance, they can align 
the utterance with a conceptual representation, and identify the subject by 
aligning the prominent participant: 
“At this point, the hearer will have been led to view the situation from the 
perspective encoded by the verb, and is therefore more likely to assign 
appropriate properties of a specific situation to the relation encoded by a 
novel verb.” (Fisher 2000 p38) 
 
This emphasis on identification of the subject appears to answer one of the 
problems Gleitman (1990) had posed, namely, how to differentiate ‘the dog 
chased the cat’ from ‘the cat fled the dog’, when the observed scene is essentially 
the same for both. Identification of the grammatical subject disambiguates the 
perspective on the scene, and this perspective is differentially encoded by the 
verb. Fisher also claims that infants assume an animate, frequently human 
participant will fulfil the subject role.  
Because the SyB model focuses on comprehension, no guidance is offered 
regarding the means infants employ to process this information for their own 
sentence production. Subject identification appears to be a crucial element for 
comprehension, on this account, but, as previously discussed (section 2.3.2 
above), infants habitually omit the subject in their own production. It is an open 
question why subject prominence becomes diminished so dramatically across 
comprehension and production. 
All of the research involves older children or infants who, as Pinker has 
suggested, could be thought to have some grammatical grounding. Fisher’s model 
Neil Parr  Chapter 2  
Page 80  
 
does not uncover very early knowledge of syntax. Tomasello’s alternative as 
discussed above (section 3) in common with Goldberg (1995), proposes that 
argument structures for verbs are established through learned examples of 
individual verbs on a verb-by-verb basis, and repertoires of such constructions are 
accumulated and aligned through the semantic commonalities which Fisher 
recognises. That is, constructions have meaning but these are accessed through 
having learned a large number of verbs and their argument structures. 
Lidz, Gleitman and Gleitman (2003) conducted an experiment to 
differentiate between these two approaches: the universalist which suggests 
universal properties for mapping syntax and lexical semantics, as opposed to the 
emergentist which claims that relations are learned through categorisation and 
generalisation over input. 
The experiment uses the same methodology as that in Naigles, Gleitman 
and Gleitman (1993) outlined above, utilising an act out measure to gauge 
sentence interpretation. The experiment involved speakers of Kannada, a 
language of south west India. Kannada has a number of means of expressing 
causativity; through transitive constructions, through periphrastic constructions 
(as in English: ‘The sun melted the ice’ and ‘the sun made the ice melt’) and 
through use of a morphological causative. The morphological element is 
apparently easy to recognise in Kannada, and has this single function. Input 
sentences both grammatical and ungrammatical were constructed and children 
(aged 3;2 to 3;10) were asked to act them out. The prediction, for emergentists, 
would be that the causative morpheme would prompt a causative response even 
when it appears in a grammatically inappropriate context as it only has one 
function and would be unavoidably learned as such. A universalist prediction 
would be that argument number would take precedence. The latter result was in 
fact found to be the case for the children but not for adults. Lidz et al. argue that 
noun phrase number is a privileged source of information as to the semantic 
structure of predicates, and that  
“early in life certain universal cues at the syntax semantics interface are pre-
potent for acquisition of the verb lexicon” (Lidz et al. 2003 p168) 
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It could be argued that the children involved were not that early in life (all 
were over 3 years old), and when presented with sentences known to them to be 
ungrammatical, noun phrase number would be a useful strategy towards 
compliance with the test. Goldberg (2003) replied to the paper suggesting that the 
children found pragmatic solutions to the comprehension problem, and 
questioning whether noun phrase number is a feature of UG, or simply a product 
of resolving indeterminacy.  
4.4 Discussion 
As for other sections, this review will indicate how this approach 
contributes to the Research Areas. Other than Landau & Gleitman’s (1985) early 
work with a blind child, the approach is developed from behavioural experiments 
focussing on comprehension studies. Infant intentionality in a natural setting is 
not represented.   
Older children, around 3+ years, provide most of the experimental evidence 
for the principles underlying SyB. Because of this, the hypothesis is open to the 
criticism that it is not addressing the complexities of infants’ initial experience of 
syntax acquisition. The proposal, that argument structure of verbs is obtained by 
calculation of the number of entities involved in a semantic representation which 
is then linked to the syntactic structure, assumes that infants have some prior 
syntactic knowledge. No proposal is made whether infants have an innate 
knowledge of lexical specifications, like Noun or Verb and without such 
knowledge the alignment required by the theory between semantic and syntactic 
structure would not result in analogous generalisations. Instead, there could only 
be a growing repertoire of semantic/syntactic pairings. A problem already 
encountered with VIH. 
Clearly, the focus of SyB is on learning the meaning of verbs, assuming as 
stated that infants can recognise a verb in the first place. In this area, SyB appears 
to make a strong contribution. That SyB may be revealing pragmatic strategies for 
comprehension raises the question whether the experimental evidence shows 
strategies for acquiring verb meaning, or strategies for sentence interpretation. In 
case of the latter, the approach offers interesting evidence about the relationship 
between syntactic knowledge and sentence comprehension. What the hypothesis 
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does not do is define the extent of syntactic knowledge necessary to achieve 
success in the experimental setting. This will be directly addressed in Chapter 8 
when it will be shown that the experimental results can be achieved by the 
expected outcomes of the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal, where 
infants rely on an early acquired and productive syntax. 
5. General discussion 
The four models of verb acquisition have been discussed which overlap yet 
differ from each other in various ways.  
SeB: Semantic Bootstrapping, (Pinker). This hypothesis assumes an 
extensive battery of innate categories, functions and rules that are accessed 
through a semantic interpretation of heard sentences accompanying an observed 
scene. Nouns are names for things, verbs are labels for actions, and the 
organisation of the identified linguistic categories is defined by preordained 
phrase structure rules. The hypothesis had the advantage of presenting a sense of 
inevitability for acquisition. But, there are no means at present to verify the innate 
elements available. The semantic identification of categories and functions had 
been successfully challenged, and Pinker’s reformulation introduced the notion of 
fuzzy labelling drawing on a wider range of input information than the semantic 
interpretation. The hypothesis would seem to be unravelling. Learning the 
meaning of words is required to occur at the same time as the bootstrap which 
relies on the meaning of words being known. There is no direct treatment of 
infant intentionality, nor the effects of meta-cognitive development. Braine 
suggests a learning mechanism that includes the useful heuristic ‘old rule to 
analyse new material’.   
VEPS: Very Early Parameter Setting, (Wexler). This hypothesis proposes 
that infants through a type of perceptual learning are able to metaphorically 
overlay the heard linguistic input over the UG template of parameters, which are 
set appropriately to match. Janet Fodor pointed out that given the nature of the 
performance features in the input it is likely that an infant will be faced with a 
number of ambiguous triggers occasioning parameters to be wrongly set, with a 
later requirement for whole-scale parameter resetting. The focus on only 
unambiguous triggers possibly involving ‘treelets’ or partial sentence structure, 
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and Rizzi’s proposal for some late set parameters based on cognitive 
developments or other factors are useful, and will be seen to inform the 
Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal. A further important contribution 
is Wexler’s insistence on considering the properties of infant production. His 
observation of the Optional Infinitive stage is important because it appears to be 
common in the acquisition of a number of languages. Although Wexler sees OI as 
having a masking effect on underlying parameter setting, it would appear to be 
worthy of consideration in its own right. How optional is it? The Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal addresses the OI stage and suggests it is 
syntactically motivated and not in fact optional (Chapter 7). The Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal fully accounts for Gleitman’s observation 
about metamorphosis as infant utterances before and after the advent of Complex 
Event utterances demonstrate the dramatic changes she describes. VEPS, 
however, gives no attention to infant intentionality, and does not seem to need any 
semantic input, and apart from Rizzi’s general suggestion, does not recognise the 
specific effect of meta-cognitive developments. 
VIH: Verb Island Hypothesis (Tomasello).  This hypothesis claims that 
infants learn and use verb constructions as they are heard. The more frequently 
used verbs develop syntactic complexity not mirrored in the less frequently used 
verbs, constituting verb island developments. Given a critical mass of such 
islands, infants are able to form generalisations, although how this happens is 
problematic for Tomasello. His research, however, makes available a rich corpus 
of infant data which will be drawn on extensively through this research. Although 
it reveals Travis’ intentionality in her utterances and gives very clear evidence for 
Complex Event utterance types, Tomasello does not recognise these signs in his 
research. It will be shown that the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal 
can account for Tomasello’s and other VIH researchers’ observations of infant 
acquisition, without the need to posit an island effect. 
SyB: Syntactic Bootstrapping (Gleitman/Fisher). This hypothesis 
approaches verb learning from a different direction and claims that the meanings 
of verbs can be learned from the role they play in syntactic constructions which 
by their nature are claimed to provide general semantic interpretations. The 
specific meaning of a verb is derived from its relation with the semantic content 
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of those elements in argument role.  The hypothesis tends to rely on infant’s 
having already acquired some knowledge of syntax, although the proposal 
assumes that an argument count would give access for infants to a basic set of 
constructions. The underlying process is that a verb heard in a range of differing 
constructions will give more access to its meaning. This hypothesis is supported 
by extensive experimental evidence, but as will be shown in Chapter 8, the 
experimental results are effectively explained by the assumptions of the 
Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal.  
5.1  Cross cutting differences 
Although the four approaches differ from each other in some ways, they do 
line up with each other in other ways. Evidence from the overlap will inform the 
discussion in subsequent chapters. 
5.1.1 SeB/VEPS versus VIH/SyB 
Firstly, there are clear groupings between approaches. SeB and VEPS are 
firmly based in Linguistics and VIH and SyB are developed from Psychology. A 
significant difference between these two sets is the place of meaning.  
SeB and VEPS focus on syntax and SeB only involves semantics as a 
means of identifying lexical categories. Both involve a commitment to 
unconscious innate specifications either of categories and rules, or a more 
extensive whole language specification of UG.  
VIH and SyB focus on meaning and how derived structure provides a 
means of conveying meaning. There is no commitment to innate syntactic 
machinery, and there appears to be an assumption of more conscious involvement 
in the derivation of structure through comprehension and production. 
5.1.2 SeB/VIH versus VEPS/SyB 
A second grouping shows that SeB and VIH propose synthetic processes 
which can be defined as ‘bottom up’, i.e. building from items or categories which 
must be acquired before larger creative units of language are available. 
VEPS and SyB propose analytic or ‘top down’ processes where specific 
language is analysed out of a larger context either full competence - seeking an 
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alignment between the UG blueprint and syntactic input; or conceptual universals 
seeking alignment between semantic and syntactic structures. 
5.1.3 SeB/SyB versus VIH/VEPS 
A third grouping shows that SeB and SyB share a commitment to 
meaning/form correspondence. SeB as a brief start up process, and SyB more 
extensively. VIH and VEPS make no claim for direct meaning/form 
correspondences. VIH makes verb meaning alone central whereas VEPS makes 
no use of meaning at all. 
5.2 Route forward 
Based on the survey of the field in the first two chapters of this dissertation, 
it is now possible to set out the principles guiding the thesis. 
In the introduction, I claimed that the inevitability of language acquisition 
relies on a series of constraints. When an infant acquires a language, she needs to 
be equipped to learn any of the world’s languages, in any of the world’s 
social/cultural settings. She needs to be able to relate her unique personal 
experience and growing subjective knowledge of how the world operates, and her 
relationship to others, and how her individuality and personal intentionality is 
expressed in this context. She is also undergoing physical, emotional and 
cognitive growth and development. Within this highly complex environment she 
must inevitably acquire a language. There is no option. Stating that language 
acquisition is inevitable does not confirm that language acquisition has innate 
properties. Proponents of UG have had to propose constraints of various sorts to 
overcome what are described as ambiguous triggers. I will show that these are not 
sufficient to achieve the level of inevitability required.  
This will be the objective of Chapter 3. It will consider the nature of the 
linguistic input to reveal the unexpected purpose and design of Child Directed 
Speech, infant intentionality, and how infants may efficiently structure their 
subjective experience. I will show that it is the interaction between these 
elements, intentionality and subjective experience promoted and supported by 
CDS, that constrains an infant’s engagement fully to put her on an inevitable 
course to language acquisition under her own control and direction on an 
‘acquire-as-required’ basis.  
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Language acquisition will be considered to be a process which is highly 
contextualised and ‘top down’, because it derives from the extensive flexible 
context outline above. Any type of synthetic, ‘bottom up’ process cannot achieve 
an inevitable outcome without that outcome being known in advance. Or put 
another way, completing a thousand piece jigsaw without any idea of the final 
picture is impossibly difficult. I will describe how this comes about, in Chapter 3, 
and show that both generative and emergentist theories depend on this prior 
eventuality.  
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Chapter 3  
The input for language acquisition  
Introduction 
Chapter two reviewed four discrete approaches to language acquisition 
concluding that differing emphases are placed on the nature and function of the 
linguistic input that infants experience, and that the active role of the intentional 
infant is generally side-lined, assumed or omitted. The infant while acquiring 
language must be prepared to do so in the context of extensive variation: 
language, culture and social expectations. For herself, she is undergoing physical, 
emotional and cognitive growth and development, and her subjective experience 
of the world is unique to her. Yet, she in common with all human infants will 
acquire a language. Generativists focus on the fact that the linguistic input 
underdetermines the output. Emergentists claim that a great deal is learned from 
the input, and that linguistic output correlates with it. Yang (2004) who considers 
the extensive evidence of statistical learning, particularly for the phonological 
system, concludes that 
“Language acquisition can … be viewed as a form of ‘innately guided 
learning’, where UG instructs the learner ‘what cues it should attend to’. Both 
endowment and learning are important to language acquisition” (Yang 2004 
p455). 
 
In this chapter, I address the nature of the linguistic input and language 
experience of infants, and consider the infant as an intentional learner within this 
context. Drawing on documented experimental evidence, I will show that the way 
infant subjective experience and knowledge is organised as events provides a 
‘contextual funnel’ for her engagement with language. I also show that adult 
carers’ intuitive actions support this fundamental process. My conclusion, 
however, will challenge Yang’s proposal above, and doubt that UG is the 
instruction manual, in favour of a different source of innately guided learning, to 
which either UG or emergence is responsive.  
Section 1 will consider the nature of the linguistic input, devoting 
consideration to what is known about the actual linguistic input from adult carers. 
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Section 2 will address the infant as an intentional learner, exploring 
Bloom’s Intentionality Model (Bloom & Tinker 2001); extracting from it the 
notion of Relevance to the infant, and its effect on placing the infant in control of 
her learning, following an ‘acquire-as-required’ principle. 
Section 3 will propose a simple model of how the organisation of infants’ 
subjective experience inevitably funnels infant engagement to the degree that 
language acquisition occurs in an established environment of rich and relevant 
contextual meaning. 
1. Child directed speech (CDS) 
  Cursory observation of the verbal interaction between a carer and infant 
makes it apparent that the talk differs from that between adults; trivially and 
obviously through the subject matter, but significantly in the way an adult 
addresses a child. This talk-type formerly known as motherese and now more 
appropriately Child Directed Speech (CDS), has been thought to contain the 
intuitive elements of language instruction, which would show graded syntactic 
exposure and simplifications appropriate to an infant’s needs in acquiring 
language. One of Pinker’s assumptions (Chapter 2 section 1vi above) is that 
adults address infants using ‘basic’ sentence types, but research into the nature of 
CDS has established that this is far from the case. Syntax is largely opaque to 
most adults, and although adults can readily make judgements about the 
grammatical acceptability of sentences, how they derive such judgements is 
frequently difficult to make explicit. There can be no expectation that adults adopt 
a conscious structuring of syntax with a pedagogic intention. 
Pine (1994) in his survey of CDS research, notes that early studies 
comparing CDS structural elements with infant utterances very often found 
unusual correlations that could be given conflicting interpretations. Studies found 
that far from exhibiting false starts, hesitations and other degradations, CDS is 
largely clear, well-formed and semantically and syntactically simpler than speech 
addressed to adults. But the simplifications do not amount to a graded exposure to 
syntax for infants, as in fact, it was found that declaratives are used sparingly at 
the beginning and increase in use as infants develop their facility with language. 
Questions are more frequent, and adult syntax does not appear to be tuned to the 
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infant’s linguistic ability. Instead it seemed to be adapted to the infant’s limited 
comprehension abilities, where adaptations accord with communicating with a  
“..cognitively and linguistically naïve child in the here and now”.  
Newport, Gleitman & Gleitman 1977 
 
So, language teaching gives way to trying to ensure understanding on the 
part of the infant including a fair degree of social organisation and behaviour 
management. Syntactic simplicity becomes an artefact of semantic simplification, 
with adults focussed on word choice and comprehension of content, rather than 
syntax. Adult adaptations to ensure comprehension on the part of the infant are 
motivated by feedback judgements on how well the infant appears to have 
understood. The infant, therefore, receives a range of linguistic information 
largely within her comprehension abilities but exhibiting a spread of ungraded 
syntactic complexities. Adults encourage spoken responses from infants to further 
support their judgements about effective comprehension, with the outcome that 
carers are not simply trying to impart information, but actively attempting to 
engage infants in conversation. This conversational relationship helps balance out 
the evident inequality of roles – adult vs infant – to create the context of 
conversation partners, where the infant’s interests and preoccupations can provide 
a lead. Snow (quoted in Pine 1994) suggests 
“..mothers do not talk at children, but with them.”  
(Snow quoted in Pine 1994 p18) 
 
Trevarthen has made several studies of the communicative relationship 
between primary carer and infant. Trevarthen & Aitken (2001) summarise some 
of this research and propose a developmental process of primary inter-
subjectivity, which Trevarthen & Aitken state contributes to infant development 
from birth to the first half of the second year. This entails the baby paying close 
attention to the mother’s face, reacting to small changes in expression, reacting to 
her continuous talk which accompanies the exchange. Trevarthen’s descriptions 
underline the intensity of this relationship, and the elements of turn taking in 
maintaining and enhancing the joint experience. He suggests this turn taking 
interaction is proto-conversational, with imitations of expressions, smiles to 
voice, mouth and tongue imitations giving way to vocal and gestural imitations. 
Through a period to 6 months of age the interaction includes ‘person-person’ 
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games, imitation of clapping and pointing, to ‘person- person- object’ games. By 
9 months children are co-operating in joint tasks and make use of language-like 
utterances, - a proto-language. Throughout all this inter-subjective interaction, the 
mother’s voice provides a familiar backdrop. As the infants get older, the games 
present tasks which provide more emphasis on the routines of events.  
Bruner (1983), in particular, noted the importance of the emphasis carers 
place on routines or familiar and well understood event structures, enabling a 
shared context which demands little attention. The infant is freed to focus on the 
mapping of linguistic elements within this known context. This was generally 
considered to provide an active scaffolding effect on the part of the adult to 
support the infant while learning.  
To demonstrate the scaffolding effect of adult talk, Bakeman & Adamson 
(1984) made longitudinal video recordings of middle class mother-infant 
interactions, as well as incidental interactions with siblings, and infant initiated 
interactions. Subjects were informed of the purpose of the study, to gauge the 
supportive nature of adult input for infant language acquisition. The results 
showed that, the majority of the times in mother infant settings, the infants were 
in a highly passive listening state with the parent talking, and initiating topics of 
conversation, largely based on shared picture book reading. In the other settings, 
however, the infants appeared to be more active and take more of a lead. 
Bakeman & Adamson concluded that the strong scaffolding effect of mother-
infant interaction was supported.  
Bloom, Margulis, Tinker, & Fujita (1996) replicated this study but involved 
urban, multicultural families who were informed that the interest of the study was 
focused on the children. In this case it was found that infants predominately 
initiated conversations and provided topics for conversation, with the adult 
following the lead, but making major informational input to support infant 
understanding. This contradicted the Bakeman & Adamson result. It almost 
appeared that the infant scaffolded the mother-infant interaction. 
The key difference between the experiments, apart from the socioeconomic 
background of the participants, was that Bakeman & Adamson had given the 
adults involved the idea that the study was focussed on the type of input the adult 
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gave. So, the adult participants may have felt just as much under scrutiny, and 
opted for emphasising one aspect of their interaction with their child which they 
thought most appropriate to the study. Bloom’s study was presented more 
neutrally, and might be claimed to record more natural interactions. There is no 
reason to discount either conclusion, as both types of interaction are available to 
adults. Both, however, are limited by the infant’s interest and willingness to be 
involved in the interaction. Neither study identified any specific linguistic content 
that could be thought to provide a direct scaffolding support for syntactic 
development. 
Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven & Tomasello (2003), however, analysed an 
extensive corpus, exhibiting both adult and infant initiated talk, to establish the 
influence of adult language usage from a different viewpoint, employing a 
(lexical) item-based analysis (frequently identified as ‘word frames’ in other 
accounts). They predicted that linguistic support is provided not from complete 
syntactic constructions but from fragments and item-based constructions that are 
repeated frequently. The corpus used, from the CHILDES database, is the same 
corpus used for the study in this thesis to provide empirical evidence (Chapter 6). 
Cameron-Faulkner et al. found that only a small percentage of adult utterances 
were SVO, the majority being questions, imperatives, copulas and fragments. 
51% of adult utterances, however, began with a limited number of item-based 
phrases, which the infants also frequently used. These included elements like: 
‘who’s..’; ‘are you..’; ‘what did…’. Cameron-Faulkner et al.  suggest that CDS 
analysis should take specific item-based constructions as well as general 
constructional categories into account, on the understanding that item-based 
constructions contribute a large part to human linguistic competence.  
Although this work introduces a new (lexical) item-based perspective on 
CDS analysis, which will be considered presently, it nevertheless seems to 
underline the general conclusion reached from all CDS studies, that the principal 
purpose or function is not to provide a graded pedagogic support for syntax 
acquisition. Problematically, analysis is usually limited to an attempt to make 
apparent the formal relations between CDS and syntax acquisition, but as the 
research evidence seems to show, adults are actually concerned with something 
else.  
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As part of a larger study, Tomasello & Kruger (1992) analysed corpus data 
to establish how adults introduced new verbs to infants. They found that adults 
predominantly used an impending model ‘Now I’m going to roll it’, or ‘Can you 
spin it’, or a completed action model ‘I found it’, or ‘you rolled it’, as opposed to 
an on-going model: ‘Look the ball is rolling’ or I’m sweeping it’.  In a follow up, 
infants (average age 15 months and 21 months) were observed in natural settings 
and their responses were analysed to include any kind of response, verbal or non-
verbal, that indicated whether they acknowledged the utterance. It was found that 
infants gave a greater response to the impending model, than any other. The 
research concluded that infants are particularly responsive to carer’s intentions. 
An additional observation can be made that the impending presentation describes 
a whole event with an overt outcome, a process that will be seen to be particularly 
meaningful to infants.  
Although this study did not analyse the data in terms of the syntactic 
content of what adults were making available to infants, it will become apparent, 
through the course of this dissertation, that this type of utterance is in fact 
axiomatic in the bootstrapping process. It seems, however, that neither carers nor 
researchers attribute the impending event presentation to overt syntax instruction. 
The key aspect noted from the research is that infants do respond positively to 
such utterances in terms of understanding or engagement. The nature of infant 
vocal responses was not reported, and so the link between this type of linguistic 
input and productive language acquisition was not made. 
Recorded dialogues show adults to be extremely tolerant of infants’ 
syntactic errors, and will accept (as Braine 1976 has termed it) ‘syntactic 
spaghetti’ provided they are able to derive some pragmatic understanding of what 
the infant is communicating. Studies of speech error and repair (Golinkoff 1986; 
Shatz & O’Reilly 1990; Marcos 1991; Fagan 2008) show that error repair and 
adult recasting does make alternative syntactic constructions available to the 
infant as a type of negative feedback, but the focus of attention for the 
‘correction’ is on comprehensibility rather than grammaticality. 
If comprehension, rather than syntactic form is important to adults, then it is 
tempting to accept that syntax must be derived from an innate specification. An 
obvious observation from a standpoint of generative linguistics would be that 
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adults evidently recognise that infants are endowed with linguistic competence 
and it is linguistic performance that requires such careful support. It would, 
however, be negligent not to attempt to discern if the non-syntactic focus of adult 
input does contribute, however obliquely, to syntactic development particularly to 
a bootstrapping process. Such a review will show that performance features 
provide the experiential context for shaping linguistic competence, and that adults 
are intuitively supplying essential information for the bootstrapping process, 
which is the claim I make here. An indication of the range of information 
available from adults is listed below.  
1.2 What does CDS offer? 
From works already cited, and from primary data from the corpus already 
mentioned, it seems uncontroversial to summarise that adult CDS focuses on: 
i) Providing a conversational context, where the infant’s ability in 
understanding/comprehension establishes the main constraint on what is said. If 
an utterance is not understood then either an alternative needs to be provided, or 
the topic abandoned. Studies on conversational repair appear to show that infants 
do have access to some form of negative evidence, through recasting and 
paraphrase, but the outcome is intended to target comprehension not syntax. 
ii) Providing routines and event sequences. Trevarthen & Aitken, Bruner, 
and others have pointed out that babies and carers are involved with two-way 
engagement as proto-conversations very early. The emphasis on demonstrating 
event sequences will help infants to build knowledge about what entities/objects 
can do, how they function and their generic properties, providing important 
additional information for categorisation and word learning (Bruner 1975; Clark 
& Wong 2002; Clark 2003). Event sequences introduce sequencing, causation and 
result, and predictions about dynamic generic properties of objects/entities. 
Conversations within a pretence scenario require instruction in and the 
recognition of conventional event sequences. (The role of event representations 
for language learning will be discussed in more detail in section 3 below). For 
instance the corpus commonly shows adult utterances providing generic 
information:  
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(17) 
 
MOT: you're not throwing eggs . 
MOT: you know eggs break, Becky . 
MOT: they make a mess, don't they ? 
 
(18) 
 
MOT: What do sheep eat? They eat grass, don’t they? 
 
iii)   Adults focus infants on intentions to act: ‘I’m going to …’, Can you …?’ and 
results of actions ‘I’ve spilled it’, ‘Nana bought this for you’. These utterance 
types will be seen to hold the key to the bootstrapping of syntax, and will be 
discussed frequently in subsequent chapters. Adults also focus on internal mental 
states: ‘I like…’; ‘do you like…’; ‘do you know what happens…’; ‘do you 
remember…’ Many item-based constructions appear to serve this purpose. The 
significance of this will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 7, when it will be 
proposed that this focussing makes a significant contribution to the bootstrapping 
process particularly for grammatical subject, as well as the understanding of first 
and second person pronouns. 
iv)  The provision of imitable phrases. These are largely holophrastic or word 
frames utilising a slot-filler process. These essentially make little demand on 
comprehension as they are highly context specific: ‘please’; ‘thank you’; ‘what’s 
happening’; ‘what’s X doing’. These contribute to the range of item based 
constructions that Cameron-Faulkner et al identify, and will be considered in 
more detail in Chapter 4 when reviewing initial language use in Manifest Events.  
v)  Within this complex context, it should be noted that well-formed sentences 
displaying ‘correct’ syntax come to the infant for free. It should, however, be 
emphasised that infants experience this range of syntactic constructions in a 
meaningful and involving linguistic context. 
1.3 Other sources of input 
Much of the evidence of the purpose and outcomes of CDS is drawn from a 
Western cultural tradition which exhibits a carer hierarchy with a primary carer, 
often the mother, operating in a 1:1 interaction with the infant. Clearly an infant 
even in this tradition has access to other people - secondary carers comprising 
fathers, siblings, grandparents and other family relations and friends, as well as 
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those in institutional (day care) settings. A significant verbal input is also 
available through various communication media – visual, sound and a growing 
range of digital resources.  
Tomasello, Conti-Ramsden & Ewert (1990) studied the contrast between 
primary and secondary carers (in this case exclusively mothers and fathers 
respectively) in how they responded to infant errors and attempts at repair. When 
infant utterances were not understood, it was found that mothers tended to offer 
time for the infant to repair what she had said and also offered various 
interpretations as feedback to the infant for further support, allowing for an 
average of 3 attempts. Fathers on the other hand would generally give just one 
request for infant repair signalled by ‘what?’, and if the infant’s second attempt 
was unsuccessful, would change the focus of conversation. Tomasello et al 
venture that this is a useful feedback mechanism for infants who need to know 
that not all adults will offer the kind of support generally given by the mother. In 
turn this gives further impetus for the infant to perfect comprehensible production 
abilities.  
Akhtar, Jipsen & Callanan (2001) conducted a series of experiments where 
infants from a range of ages were in a third party role in a discussion between 
adults using novel words either to refer to novel objects or to novel actions. It was 
found that the younger group (2 year olds) on test gave evidence of having 
learned words to label novel objects but not actions. From a different perspective 
Roseberry, Hirsh-Pasek, Parish-Morris, & Golinkoff (2009), and a similar study 
by DeLoache (2010), demonstrated that infants watching television programmes 
did not reliably learn new words for actions from the experience. It would appear 
from these studies that a degree of direct involvement from the infant is required 
for the acquisition of relational terms, and verbs in particular. 
1.4 Discussion 
The nature of the linguistic input and an infant’s linguistic experience is an 
area of conflict between acquisition accounts. Does it supply what is needed to 
acquire syntax by induction, supporting an emergent approach? Or is the input too 
impoverished requiring syntactic growth to be innately specified? 
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From this overview of CDS, it seems that there is no evidence to suppose 
that syntax is directly taught, and in this regard Crain and Lillo-Martin’s view 
that: “It comes from the child rather than from anything parents provide from 
outside” may have a grain of truth. However, this would be to ignore the wealth 
of information, direction and guidance that is available from parents, particularly 
the high premium placed on comprehension. This context cannot be discounted as 
making no contribution to syntactic development. Crain and Lillo-Martin’s overly 
strong position needs to be tempered, but first a significant barrier to further 
progress needs to be lowered. 
Gleitman and Wanner (1982) say that Chomsky’s work is continuing the 
tradition of American Structural Linguistics. A cornerstone of the tradition is a 
commitment to the structural description of language with no account, in fact 
specific exclusion of considerations of meaning.  
This tradition emanated from a guiding principle established by one of the 
founders, Bloomfield: 
“The statement of meanings is … the weak point in language study, and will 
remain so until human knowledge advances very far beyond its present 
state” (Bloomfield 1935/1967 p140) 
 
 Chomsky, in Syntactic Structures (1957b), his initial launch of generative 
linguistics, states: 
“I think that we are forced to conclude that grammar is autonomous and 
independent of meaning” (Chomsky 1957b  p17) 
 
It appears, as Pullum & Scholz (2002) observe, that Chomsky ‘shuts the lid’ on 
the influence of meaning. Within the generative tradition, the architecture of the 
language faculty is suggested to have a central syntactic component with two 
interfaces: the articulatory-perceptual and the conceptual-intentional. Of the latter 
Chomsky states: 
“Problems relating to the C-I interface are still more obscure and poorly 
understood. I will keep to these fairly conventional assumptions, only noting 
here that if they turn out to be correct, even in part, that would be a surprising 
and hence interesting discovery.” (Chomsky 1995 p3) 
 
Although obscure and poorly understood, there seems to be a strong 
intuitive message, from the evidence presented by adult-infant interaction, that the 
‘C-I interface’ is extraordinarily important, and the CDS input focusing on 
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conceptual understanding and knowledge development is making an important 
contribution. Section 3 below will discuss how the organisation of infant 
knowledge makes use of the CDS contribution, and with considerations of infant 
intentionality (section 2 below) the combination acts to constrain infant linguistic 
acquisition experience.  
Given that syntax, for infants under 2 years old, is still to be learned or 
awaiting growth, then there is a question whether ‘interface’ between syntax and 
conceptual/intentional components is an appropriate description for this early 
stage.  To indulge the metaphor, it may be more appropriate to explore the 
possibility that C-I presents an initial bootstrapping portal to the syntactic system. 
This would appear to be consistent with the direction of current Minimalist 
thinking (Chomsky 2002). 
Making this assumption not only recognises the intuitive contribution from 
adults, but means that conceptual/intentional bootstrapping is essential. This does 
not overturn the autonomous nature of syntax, but prompts serious consideration 
of an initial interdependence which will be shown to be evident and necessary for 
bootstrapping the syntactic system. On these grounds adult input cannot be 
dismissed. It will be seen that the germination and growth of syntax requires 
precisely the type of input that CDS provides.  
But the input is not to a passively receptive infant. The next section turns to 
establishing the infant as an active participant in the language learning process, 
picking up on a key feature of the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal: 
the infant as an intentional learner. 
2. The infant as an intentional learner 
Bloom (2000, 2001) and Bloom & Tinker (2001) make the following observation 
in introducing their work on infant intentionality:  
“.. in most theories of language acquisition, the child is often an object and 
essentially a passive receiver of physical or social cues, or the locus of brain 
mechanisms or hypothetical constraints, biases, or heuristic principles that 
filter available information for the child. Missing in such theoretical 
accounts…is the authority of the child.” (Bloom & Tinker 2001 p5) 
 
Their claim is that language acquisition depends on a close relation between 
cognitive, social and emotional representations which impinge on infant 
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consciousness. Acquisition accounts which do not recognise the importance of the 
influence of this interrelation leave aside the intentionality of the infant. 
Intentionality for Bloom, takes the form of unobservable, yet influential 
representations in the mind. Bloom & Tinker suggest that although such 
representations are unobservable, they are not mysterious: 
“… because the child constructs them and owns them. And they are not 
mysterious to other persons either, because the child acts to express them.” 
(ibid p6) 
 
Consequently, for Bloom, a child’s expressions, be they physical, emotional 
or linguistic are sourced from representations of intentional states. 
Bloom & Tinker’s proposed Intentionality Model accounts for infants’ 
involvement in cognitive development. It is based on the notion that it is the child, 
not some unconscious or automatic process, who constructs the intentional state, 
which in turn is individually owned by the child. Social influences and social 
constructions are viewed as meaningful only insofar as the child forms a personal 
mental representation of them. On this account,  
“Language is, necessarily, the convergence of content, form and use. 
Including language content and use in addition to linguistic form… ensures 
that what the child knows and is learning about language at any point in time 
is intimately connected to other things the child knows and is learning about 
the social and physical world.” Ibid p14 
 
This puts the child very much in the driving seat, taking responsibility for 
the pace of learning, insofar as it is within the context of her growing experience 
and knowledge of the world. This view is supported by the study outlined in the 
previous section by Bloom, Margulis, Tinker & Fujita (1996) showing that talk 
between adult and infant is seemingly led by infant interests and the need to share 
intentional states. 
The Intentionality model as described has two major components: 
engagement and effort. Engagement defines the extent of the child’s personal 
involvement with encounters, be they social, physical or linguistic.  The degree of 
engagement achieved results from a trade-off with the amount of effort required 
for that accomplishment.  
The model identifies three underlying principles which act simultaneously 
to resolve the cost-benefit dilemma of the degree of engagement and amount of 
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effort required. These are: relevance, discrepancy, and elaboration. Because of 
simultaneity, they become mutually defining: 
i). Relevance to an infant establishes whether an encounter is worth the effort of 
engagement. Bloom & Tinker invoke Sperber & Wilson’s (1986/95) First 
Principle of Relevance – cognitive relevance, in support: 
 “When we claim that human cognition tends to be geared to the 
maximisation of relevance, we mean that cognitive resources tend to be 
allocated to the processing of the most relevant inputs available, whether 
from internal or external sources. In other words, human cognition tends to 
be geared to the maximisation of the cumulative relevance of the inputs it 
processes. It does this not by pursuing a long-term policy based on 
computation of the cumulative relevance achieved over time, but by local 
arbitrations, aimed at incremental gains, between simultaneously available 
inputs competing for immediately available resources.” (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/95 p261) 
 
So, Relevance for the infant, is more than salience which may result in 
simple noticing rather than a fuller engagement. 
ii). Discrepancy between what the child and others have in mind, or between new 
information and existing knowledge, contributes to judgements of relevance, and 
also provides the basis for adding to, or adapting existing knowledge. 
iii). Elaboration of intentional states describes the process of adaptation of current 
knowledge in accounting for discrepancy. The effort required for elaboration 
contributes to judgements of relevance to maintain engagement with an 
encounter. 
The operation of these guiding principles, yielding intentional states, 
although not under conscious control, does, however, provide a constraint on how 
limited intentional resources are deployed. Given that the young infant has a great 
deal to learn about the social, emotional, cognitive and linguistic environment 
they inhabit, the model proposes the means by which the content of an encounter 
is brought to awareness.  
The outcomes of the Intentionality model are the expressions of resultant 
intentional states. These may be physical, emotional or linguistic in form. The 
pre-linguistic infant will utilise physical and emotional modes of expression 
which will be replaced (or enhanced) by linguistic expression as linguistic 
abilities develop. Bloom speaking from an emergentist position, sees linguistic 
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development as a process of continuous elaboration, enabling more effective 
expression of intentional states to result from social and cognitive interactions. 
In support of Bloom’s position, it must be agreed that the intentional 
participatory role of the infant in the language learning process is only an 
assumption in most experimental design. The methodology of psychological 
testing and scientific research requires that variables are restricted to those that 
are the target of testing and as such the wider context within which these variables 
operate is excluded or factored out. Whilst experimental design always includes a 
settling in process, and practice tasks to encourage engagement, the effect of 
engagement is not then measured as a variable other than to exclude subjects who 
appear ‘fussy’ (do not find relevance in the task).  The presence of a conscious 
human being, should however not be ignored. The drawback in a focus on the 
child as passive recipient, or locus of brain mechanisms geared towards adult 
competence and proficiency, invites the odd conclusion that infants are in some 
way deficient adults, with immature performance abilities. Bloom’s stance 
provides a valuable reminder that an infant is a developing human with identity, 
thought, intentions and motivations of her own.  
The balance, Bloom proposes, between attending to a relevant discrepancy 
and responding through elaboration, suggests that, at any one time in 
development, the infant defines the pace of her learning, and develops means of 
expression, including linguistic abilities which are sufficient and effective for her 
needs at that time.  
This is an important observation, which begins to provide a compromise 
between the full, versus no, linguistic competence debate. On Bloom’s account, 
an input activates linguistic development according to need as perceived by the 
infant in a real-world context. Be it parameter triggering or construction learning, 
the infant has some control over structuring or pacing what is acquired. On this 
basis, an ‘acquire-as-required’ criterion is an important element of the 
Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal. 
Infant intentionality cannot be excluded particularly when, as has been 
noted, adult CDS input places such emphasis on conscious involvement and 
engagement. The Intentionality model, however, apart from describing a 
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disposition to learn, does not necessarily explain how syntactic processes, which 
are largely outside of consciousness, are acquired.   
An infant may have the intention prompted by the components and 
principles of the model, to walk across the room, yet the mechanics of walking 
are largely sub-conscious, and although learning to do so requires practice effort, 
the neural and muscular process is outside of consciousness. Although the 
Intentionality model introduces the important element of the infant’s active 
involvement with her learning, and provides a motive for communicative 
intention, I contend that it does not restrict the learning space enough for 
linguistic acquisition. Engagement with an encounter or an event of some kind 
may focus attention on gaining knowledge about the event, but as there is no 
apparent direct correspondence between unfolding events and formal linguistic 
input from CDS, something further is required. Whether language competence 
grows from innate specification or social interaction, either of which could be 
argued to be present from birth, why does it take so long for an infant to make 
adult-like utterances in form (if not in content)? I suggest that there is a structure 
underlying infant subjective experience and cognition that provides a guiding 
context which emphasises precisely those areas most amenable to interfacing 
conceptual/intentional knowledge and early language acquisition.  Clarifying this 
position requires a brief consideration of how infant subjective experience may be 
organised in terms of Events.  
3.  Generalised Event knowledge 
No two events in the world are ever exactly the same. To provide some 
stability and predictability in the world, any living entity needs to have a system 
for representing the perceptual world around it – minimally to find and recognise 
food or avoid danger and threat. In an ever changing world, it is generally 
accepted that the perceptual system interprets sensory input to construct sensory 
representations of the physical environment of living entities. There is evidence 
that infants may have innate core knowledge as a foundation, which may be an 
endowment shared with other species. 
  Spelke 2002 and Spelke & Kinzler 2007 suggest core knowledge consists 
of four systems for representing objects, actions, number, and space. Spelke 
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(1988) established that core knowledge includes spatiotemporal continuity of 
objects (as a perceived object moves around it is considered by babies to be 
unchanging in its composition and form) and relational effects such as 
containment or occlusion. Extensive research (Baillargeon 1993; Needham & 
Baillargeon 2000; Hespos & Baillargeon 2001; Wang, Baillargeon & Brueckner 
2004; Song & Baillargeon 2007) has been undertaken to establish that very young 
infants have a good grasp of object permanence and how objects are expected to 
interact with each other;  Bonatti & Frot (2002) suggest that infants are 
genetically endowed to recognise humans first before objects; and Xu (2003) 
shows that infants have a detailed innate knowledge of number to three, and 
general quantification knowledge of large and lesser amounts. 
Being able to make perceptual representations of the immediate 
surroundings, based on core knowledge is limiting unless the organism can learn 
from them, to enable a level of familiarity, continuity or predictability when 
encountering repeated or similar surroundings. Clearly, this can be accomplished 
by storing all prior perceptual representations for future use. This may be 
appropriate for organisms that exist in very limiting environments, but is 
indisputably inefficient for humans. Thus a means of generalising subjective 
experience effectively is necessary. Nelson (1986) suggests that subjective 
experience of events is organised within a specific structure taking account of a 
variety of data sources, and contributory sub-events. Her study was conducted 
with 3-8 year old children recounting their knowledge of general events. 
Although, the age of the subjects is outside the range of current concern, the 
nature of this proposed structure is a useful starting point, and will provide an 
outcome to build back from giving some insight into how younger infants may 
organise their subjective experience.  
Nelson and colleagues focus on the Event as the most basic unit of 
representation of knowledge. A key reason for a focus on events is that children’s 
knowledge of the real world comes to them from personal experience within a 
wider physical, social and dynamic context. Nelson proposes that knowledge of 
the world is developed largely from representations of new experience, although 
cognitive processes may derive new knowledge by operating on existing mental 
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representations through inference, categorising, pattern analysis and 
transformations of various kinds.  
 The context of an infant’s experience and knowledge, however, 
unavoidably reflects the embracing social-cultural influences of her (speech) 
community. My claim will be that the organisation of subjective experience of 
events is represented in a social/cultural/locational context, with participants and 
objects interacting (verbally or non-verbally) in predictable and intentional ways 
to achieve ends. Steps towards substantiating this claim begin with consideration 
of what constitutes an event in Nelson’s research. 
3.1 What constitutes an event? 
A ball can be argued to be a stative event. A simple single bounce of the 
ball can be a dynamic event. However, Nelson’s research, with 3-8 year olds 
adopts a macro approach, involving a range of successive actions and sub-events 
bounded overall by an agent’s purposeful activity. An event (both macro and 
micro) can therefore be considered as a goal oriented bounded activity or set of 
activities. Events in these terms have structure with a temporal-causal sequence, 
with embedded and hierarchic sub-events.  
For instance, a description, say, of what to do to buy potatoes from a 
supermarket, will explicitly include – finding the vegetable section and taking the 
potatoes to the checkout. Implicit sub-events include: identifying the supermarket; 
opening the door; entering the building; recognising potatoes in their packaging; 
finding the means of paying; and so on. Each of these sub-events has a detailed 
event structure and sequence in its own right and has representational elements 
that are largely inaccessible to awareness. The specific intentional actions in 
particular, in opening a supermarket door, say – identification; manipulations; and 
body movement - remain completely sub-personal.  
In brief, Nelson’s research involves analysis of children’s verbal accounts 
of common events; e.g. a day in school, or a birthday party. A birthday party 
event (as per western cultural norms) included for all research subjects a recount 
of birthday cake eating, games playing, and present giving/opening, the order not 
being critical. Within sub-events, the order can be critical - birthday cake eating 
was always preceded by blowing out candles. On further questioning, children 
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were always able to place additional sub-events, which they had omitted to 
recount, in the appropriate sequence. It was found that causal connections 
reinforced temporal structures (cut the cake before eating it), where order is 
important, and changes in spatial location played a role in segmenting event 
structure into discrete scenes (cake eating versus games playing). From their 
reports, it was apparent that children formed general representations rather than 
gathering specific fragments of event experience. Nelson’s conclusion is that the 
generalisation of events seems to be a natural product of mind, even to forming a 
generalisation from a single experience. So a visit to McDonalds may form a 
‘restaurant event’ representation, and be assumed to apply to all restaurants (until 
disabused). It is generic schemata of events that are stored, which Nelson terms 
Generalised Event Representations (GERs)  
Although based on concrete experience, GERs differ from memories of 
specific events, as the schemata are generalisations about possible specifications 
rather than specific values. For instance it seems the birthday GER has obligatory 
cake, games, and presents slots but the types of games or presents are optional, so 
too the order of games playing, present giving, or cake eating. Event 
representations, then, are essentially generic. Nelson states: 
“The representation system functions through activation of relevant cognitive 
representations in situations in order to make possible the interpretation of 
activity in that situation. Event Representations are instantiated in familiar 
situations to guide actions and interaction, both verbal and non-verbal. They 
make it possible for a child (or adult) to predict what will happen next and to 
organise their own actions and verbalisations accordingly” (Nelson 1986 
p239)  
 
The central finding of Nelson’s study is that children as young as 3 years 
old are sensitive to the temporal structure of events, which are always goal 
oriented, and report action sequences of familiar events without error. As 
Nelson’s research involved verbal reporting, her subjects were necessarily adults 
or children of 3-8 years. Nelson emphasises that GERs by their generalised 
nature, are less detailed than actual experiences, and the verbal accounts are even 
less detailed than GERs. She concedes the results of her research programme do 
not involve infants below the age of 3 years, but she makes the assumption that 
comparable ability will be available to the young infant. There are, however, 
significant and obvious differences. Infants (around 18 months) have much more 
Neil Parr  Chapter 3  
Page 105  
 
limited experience, and are more constricted in the type of new experiences they 
can access, both developmentally and physically. Infants have very limited 
episodic memory abilities, as exemplified by the phenomenon of infant amnesia 
characterised by the universal lack of ability for anyone to recall specific events 
occurring in early life (Tulving 2002). So, most experience needs to be stored 
generically, although children over 4 years appear to be able to store and recall 
specific instances of significant experience, which might have an influence on 
their GERs. Lastly, the greater experience of older children will make more active 
use of hierarchic and complex GERs in terms of sequences and qualifications. 
Accessing generalised event knowledge of preverbal or very early language 
learners cannot be achieved by recount. The question remains, however, how 
infants under 2 years of age organise their subjective knowledge, which, as has 
been shown, carers find so important to support.  
3.2 Infant event representations  
A quick way into this question can be found in the use of differential 
looking time as a measure in many psychological experiments with preverbal 
infants. This measure is based in the assumption that an unexpected, or surprise 
occurrence in the experimental context will receive greater looking time from the 
subject. For an occurrence to be unusual or unexpected requires that the infant has 
some representation of the usual or the expected, for the occurrence to appear 
divergent. That some kind of generalised event representation is available to the 
very young infant is confirmed, as degrees of surprise or the unexpected are 
incorporated in experiments involving infants as young as 3 months.  
Baillargeon & Wang (2002) in their review of occlusion and containment 
event research conclude that infants in watching an event categorise it and use 
their knowledge of the event category to make predictions about how similar 
events unfold. Events from different categories (like containment, occlusion, and 
so on) are thought by the researchers to be treated by infants as novel and 
discrete, presenting them with the difficulty of mapping objects between events. 
An object, therefore, appears to be interpreted as a unique property of an event. 
Object specific properties, initially, do not appear to carry over into new events. 
Hespos & Baillargeon (2001) tested 4-7 months old knowledge of single 
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occlusion or containment events. The experiments consisted of lowering an object 
behind an occluder or into a container. The height of the occluder or container 
was either the same as or less than the object being lowered. This height 
difference acted as the test variable. The expectation therefore would be that part 
of the object would remain visible when lowered behind / into the shorter 
occluder / container. 4 month old infants were tested and their reactions, 
measured by differential looking time. The findings in this case confirmed that 4 
month old infants expected a tall object to protrude over a short occluder (and 
were surprised when it was fully occluded). But this expectation did not apply to 
the containment condition, where looking time did not imply surprise at the 
unexpected outcome (the taller object fitting into the shorter container without 
protruding). It was only at 7 months of age that the infants demonstrated the 
expectation that a tall object would not fit into a short container.  
Hespos & Baillargeon explain their results in terms of the child approaching 
scenes as event specific and not, at the earlier age, being able to generalise across 
the two types of events until they had gained more subjective experience of 
objects and containers. Commonly, 4 month old infants will have had experience 
of seeing objects side by side, in everyday life, enabling some comparison of size. 
They will also have frequently experienced occlusion, having seen objects being 
moved behind other objects, on the table for instance or being moved in front of 
or behind furniture in a room. But containment events conducted by adults only 
allow for the experience of seeing the object being placed in the container without 
prior side by side comparison, and such events performed by an adult are 
generally geared to complete containment. The adult places objects (or more 
likely fluids) in a container with the goal that they are contained and not, that they 
overflow the container.  
Strong evidence that early experience is organised as events arises from a 
series of experiments designed to challenge proposals from Xu & Carey (1996), 
further discussed in Carey & Xu (1999). Their experiment was designed to 
demonstrate that children first recognise objects as object sortals at 10 months and 
only begin to perceive object attributes at 12months. Xu & Carey’s experiment 
will be described first, followed by Wilcox & Baillargeon’s (1998) critique. 
Neil Parr  Chapter 3  
Page 107  
 
In brief, a screen is set up in front of a passively watching infant (10months 
-12months) who is habituated to a ball emerging and returning from the left of the 
screen and a toy duck emerging and returning from the right of the screen. The 
test displays the duck movement twice followed by two examples of the ball 
movement. At the time when the ball and the duck have both returned behind the 
screen, it is lowered to reveal either a ball and a duck (which would be the 
expected result as both items had emerged and returned behind the screen) or just 
the duck (which would be an unexpected result). By a preferential looking 
measure 12months infants showed the expected result (longer looking time at the 
single item behind the screen), but 10months infants showed the opposite: looking 
longer when 2 objects were revealed, indicating that, for them, the two item 
display was an unexpected result. Xu & Carey explain this in terms of a 10month 
old having only the notion of object sortal. The ball and the duck are not 
differentiated. By 12months it is assumed that infants have a greater ability to 
discern object properties and therefore can differentiate the ball and the duck and 
so having seen each emerge and return behind the screen, expect that 2 different 
objects will be present when the screen is lowered.  
Wilcox & Baillargeon (1998) pointed out that the actions of the ball (or 
duck) emerging and returning behind the screen may be interpreted by the infant 
as a coherent event. The experiment is therefore a display of two discrete events 
to the infant: ball emerging and returning or duck emerging and returning. This is 
a significant observation on the experiment. For Xu & Carey the emergence and 
return of the object was mainly a methodological necessity to show the infant the 
object beside the screen and enable the infant to maintain the image of the object 
being behind the screen. No account was made for the possibility of subjects 
regarding the object as a participant in a moving event.  
Wilcox & Baillargeon observed that if the 10month old infant either 
entertains each object event as discrete or only has memory capacity for one 
event, then the result (when the screen is lowered) would be expected to comply 
with the last seen event, i.e. one object would be behind the screen. 2 objects is 
surprising because only one object was involved in the last seen emerge/return 
event. By 12months it may be that the infant has the cognitive ability to 
appreciate the nature of the experiment as a two event display. If the infant can 
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retain both events as salient sub-events then the infant would expect the result of 
both emerge/return events to be displayed when the screen is lowered. A series of 
8 differing experiments were devised to support this conclusion, the gist of which 
will be described. 
Wilcox & Baillargeon propose that the problem presented to infants by the 
Xu & Carey experiment is one of contrast between event mapping and event 
monitoring, and not one of perceiving object properties. So, while watching the 
scene during habituation (the appearance and disappearance of objects behind the 
screen) the infants observe and form an understanding of the event (monitoring). 
When the screen is lowered the infants are presented with a new non-occlusion 
event and need to compare their previous understanding with the new observable 
event (mapping). They need to map the event as they understood it to the new 
revealed event; a task which evidently presents difficulties for the younger 
subjects. Wilcox & Baillargeon’s experiments are designed to show firstly that 
younger infants can successfully perform quite complex monitoring tasks and that 
younger infants given support in the mapping process can successfully perform in 
those tasks too.  
Monitoring experiments involved infants viewing the same kind of scenes 
as in the original tests but the difference was that in one condition objects moved 
behind a screen wide enough to accommodate both objects side by side; in 
another condition the screen appeared to be too narrow to occlude the objects 
completely. The screen was not lowered, so infants were required to monitor the 
event to its conclusion. Infants as young as 7.5 months old showed surprise (by 
looking time) that the narrow screen could accommodate the two objects. They 
had monitored the events to an expected outcome. 
The mapping experiments in this series, tended to replicate Xu & Carey’s 
experimental results, despite efforts to simplify the amount of movement of the 
objects. It was found generally that infants (9.5 months old) have difficulties in 
retaining a representation of the monitored occlusion event to map on to the test 
non-occlusion event (the scene revealed when the screen is lowered).   
Wilcox (2003) tested whether prior experience of the events to be mapped 
might support a more successful outcome. Infants of 7.5 months participated. One 
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group in a pre-test phase witnessed the emergence and return sequence in full 
view, that is the screen was lowered throughout to reveal in effect what ‘happens’ 
behind the screen. On test, it was this group that showed surprise when a ball-box 
emerge-return event resulted in a single ball being revealed when the screen was 
lowered. Thus infants at 7.5 months were able to perform the task successfully 
given the support of prior experience of an outline of the events involved.  
A clear conclusion, in contrast to Xu & Carey who attributed difficulties to 
infants being unable to discriminate attributive properties of objects, is that young 
infants are focussed on monitoring events and how they unfold, and that 
difficulties arise from the complexity of comparative mapping of different event 
types. This confirms that quite young infants do in fact form representations of 
discrete events punctuated by goals and expected outcomes.  Around 12 months 
old, infants can form sub-sequences of an event, defined by sub-goals. This again 
is supported by experimental evidence: 11 month olds discriminate single events 
by goal versus no goal (Woodward 1998; Woodward & Somerville 2000); 12 
month old infants discriminate extended sequences and respond positively 
towards freeze framing a video sequence at sub-event boundaries, as opposed to 
mid sub-event. (Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001; Baird & Baldwin 2001).   
It appears that infant subjective experience can be characterised initially as 
being organised as discrete telic events. Around 11 to 12 months old, there 
appears to be a meta-cognitive development enabling infants to map discrete 
perceptual events together (with the presumed proviso that they find it relevant to 
do so). It is probably no accident that it is around this time that linguistic events, 
continuously available in the environment, may be subject to a mapping process 
in relation to other perceptual events. This process will be the focus of the next 
chapter, and in preparation for that, the relation between intentional engagement, 
subjective event knowledge and meta-cognitive mapping needs to be considered. 
Perceived language to perceived event mapping is not random, and occurs within 
a rich, but tightly constraining context, which results from how events are 
structured. 
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3.3 A simple model of contextual constraints  
Telic events are experienced within social/cultural and locational contexts, 
and involve the physical and observable interaction between agents and objects. It 
is how these contexts interact, which funnels infant intentionality towards 
meaningful and relevant linguistic events. As shown in the previous section, 
objects may have differently understood properties in different contexts. Some 
means of fixing or stabilising contexts needs to be available to enable the required 
types of generalisation across contexts to occur. 
I wish to suggest that for infants less than two years of age, generalised 
event representations exhibit at least 5 interacting inclusive layers of contextual 
influence, which will be described in this section. The order presented shows a 
contextual funnelling effect, which is perhaps more clearly presented in 
diagrammatic form as in fig1 below.  
Any outer layer includes all those within it. The principle followed is that 
new learning at any layer is in the established context of those that surround it. 
Any novelty in an outer layer changes or disrupts established knowledge in the 
inner layers, which is demonstrated when considering the workings of this model. 
This will be exemplified from a range of available experimental evidence. The 
layers I will discuss are as follows: the social/emotional/cultural; the locational; 
the telic; the intentional; the dynamic substantive.  
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Fig 1 Schematic diagram of the potential contextual funnelling effect of infant subjective experience. 
 
For example, social/emotional/cultural familiarity provides a high degree of 
stability, on the basis that it provides an encompassing context for all infant 
learning. Young infants are in inter-subjective relationships with a limited number 
of carers who (in most cases) share a social/cultural backdrop for all new infant 
experience. Any changed experience in this layer, is likely to require either a 
widespread re-learning of events in subsequent layers, or the infant will simply 
not find it relevant, as illustrated in 3.3.1 below. The outer layers once established 
make no further demand on effort or engagement, enabling the infant to engage 
with inner layers. At the centre the components are the more changeable dynamic 
substantive events and therefore more relevant for the infant to attend to, but 
engagement will be subject to a contextual funnelling effect from the other layers. 
Engagement with any layer is informed by and dependent upon the contextual 
properties of the enclosing layers.  
Social/cultural 
Locational 
Telicity 
Intentional 
Dynamic 
substantive 
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I will provide support for this proposal by considering each layer in turn 
calling on evidence from available research, which highlights the disruptive 
effects of changes at different layers.  
3.3.1 Social/cultural/emotional layer 
The infant, typically experiences an all-encompassing cultural/social 
context, defined reciprocally with her carers. This involves those aspects of Social 
Cognition which have become the focus for many researchers notably the work of 
Rochat (2007), Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner (1993) Tomasello (2005, 2009), 
Trevarthen & Aitken (2001), and Trevarthen (2004) who have highlighted the 
complexity of the early carer baby relationship and levels of attachment, to 
establishing a stable intersubjective foundation. This is apparently effortful for the 
infant, as it demands her total attention, and is intensively supported by the adult. 
But for the young infant, the social/cultural context becomes a given and 
acts as a filter for all other aspects of event structure. In general, the wider 
social/cultural context is stable and encountering new or novel cultural contexts 
can be highly disruptive to established subjective knowledge, as the folk 
psychology term ‘culture shock’ implies. A clear and small scale (not 
psychologically damaging) example of this can be found in an experiment 
conducted by Meltzoff (1988).  
The experiment was designed to test whether an infant having seen an adult 
perform a successful event with a novel object, could recall and imitate the adult 
after a time lapse (typically 24 hours). The experiment included 6 elements. It is 
the last (which Meltzoff dropped in his later 1995 follow up experiment) which is 
of interest here. A panel on the table could be illuminated when touched by the 
experimenter’s forehead. In the experiment the infants (18months old) imitated 
the forehead touch to illuminate the panel, and did so again on retest.  
A follow up experiment by Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly (2002) replicated 
the forehead touch illumination event, but this time the experimenter’s arms were 
wrapped in a blanket, which prevented her using her hands to touch and 
illuminate the panel. When children imitated this event, they used their hands 
rather than their foreheads. The conclusion drawn by the experimenters was that 
the children rationally inferred that the experimenter would have used the most 
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direct means to touch the panel had her hands been free to be used. This 
conclusion is not in dispute. As there is no mention that the children attempted to 
use their hands to illuminate the panel in the Meltzoff experiment, the question 
arises as to the essential difference between the two events which led to such 
different responses from the infants.  
I suggest that the difference lies in the first experiment event being truly, 
culturally novel. The novel goal was ‘illuminate the panel with the forehead’, 
which the infants viewed as culturally unusual. As such the means and ends are 
imitated without reference to prior generalisation. The second experiment 
however, provided a clear disassociation between the means and the end. The 
hands were unavailable and so the goal in this case could simply be a culturally 
familiar ‘illuminate the panel by touching’ event. The second experiment aligns 
with possible existing event knowledge, (infants may have seen carers achieving 
goals in unusual ways because their hands are full), and so reasoning can be based 
on a known context. The first experiment provides no such basis. Imitation is the 
only option because there is insufficient information in the novel event on which 
to base a reasoned response. There is no report that infants had learned a new way 
of turning on lights outside of the laboratory (if they had it would surely have 
been mentioned), so this event remained a feature of the novel lab-culture, and 
remained a discrete event. 
To demonstrate this further, speculating why Meltzoff did not include this 
task in his follow up experiment (Meltzoff 1995) is instructive. The follow up is 
described in section 3.3.4 below, and involves experimenters trying but failing to 
achieve a goal – putting a peg in a hole and so on. How would the experimenter 
demonstrate failing in the intention to illuminate the panel with the forehead? 
Presumably she would have to approach the panel and only succeed in banging 
her head on the table. With no prior knowledge that in the experimental culture 
panels are illuminated by forehead touch, what could an infant (or anyone) make 
of this bizarre activity? 
My claim is that the social/cultural component of subjective experience 
provides a stable and for the infant largely unchanging, background context, and 
as such makes no on-going claim on conscious effort for engagement, once 
established. 
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3.3.2 Location layer 
Locations in themselves are often highly predictive of events. A kitchen is a 
location, characterised by objects and actions which can take place within it. 
These possibilities are also culturally/socially influenced. So, in a western culture, 
a kitchen may be exclusively for food preparation or socially defined as having a 
wider function as a family room where play, eating, food preparation and 
entertaining may be considered usual. Thus, rooms, the home, and so on become 
identifiable locations for predictable events. Encountering new or novel locations 
can have dramatic effects on event predictability, as most people who start a new 
job, or move to a new town or country are aware.  For the very young infant, the 
range of locations is usually highly restricted: frequently just a few rooms in the 
home, or nursery. Explicit familiarisation with this restricted set of locations 
needs to be established early and once in place provides stability. Experiments 
that explore how this component can be disrupted can be found in disorientation 
studies.  
Hermer & Spelke (1996) explored orientation systems shared by animals 
and humans. They found that after familiarisation with a room with fixed 
attributes (coloured walls or fixed objects) and a toy hidden while being observed, 
infants under 2 years of age when disoriented (spun round) used only geometric 
information to orient in the room even if it meant going to the wrong place to find 
the toy. The response was the same for rats. The experimenters concluded that 
infants rely on primitive, inherent, systems for re-orientation despite there being 
additional information (fixed attributes) in the room. This appears to show that 
any representation of the room and its contents that the infants had formed 
became unusable by them under disorientation, an effective change in the location 
layer of their prior subjective experience. 
3.3.3 Telicity layer 
Within the stable social/cultural and locational contexts, goals have been 
shown to be important. A goal or outcome can be considered to be an event or 
sub-event boundary, and as such performs a key function in defining an event, 
and providing purpose or relevance to an event.  
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As it is rare that any two similar events are exactly the same, a 
representation that is built by simply stringing together successive actions will not 
only be misleading, but actively work against generalisation, and become 
unmanageable. But using relational information to link actions overcomes the 
difficulty of finding connections between co-occurring actions and provides a 
rationale for linking any two actions that may occur in a sequence. Experiments 
which establish the importance of goals have been indicated in 3.2 above. For an 
event to be relevant it must have a goal. Meltzoff, reiterated by Csibra & Gergely 
(2007) suggest that infants are ‘obsessed with goals’.  A goal is a given for event 
representation as it provides a necessary boundary, and I suggest it is also a given 
for infants. 
3.3.4  Intentional action layer 
Most salient events for an infant have an aspect that must be attributed to an 
agent of some kind, usually people or entities who are always present in an event. 
The infant in a natural learning environment is generally in familiar surroundings 
with people/entities that are also well known – carers, family members, and 
family pets. As such, agents are also relatively stable, and may be considered to 
be implicit in event structures. Events are generally about agents acting in some 
way towards an intentional goal. Do infants recognise the actions of agents as 
intentional?  
Following Searle (1983), a distinction can be drawn between intention in 
action and prior intention, (or the planning of intentional action). A question 
addressed by many researchers is: given an infant’s ability to recognise intention 
in action (goal directed action) do they also have the ability to undertake more 
complex ‘mind reading’ to discern the prior intention of a volitional agent? 
Experimental work has focused variously on the relations between the following 
types of events: a sequence of events that has an intended outcome; a sequence 
that does not have an outcome; a sequence that does not achieve an intended 
outcome; or a sequence with an accidental/unintended outcome.  
Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello (1998) showed that 14 month old infants 
would neither imitate an accidental action to achieve a goal nor an action which 
accidentally achieved a goal. For the experiment some accidental acts were 
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accompanied by the experimenter uttering ‘whoops’ as opposed to ‘there!’ when 
the goal was successfully achieved. The results showed that 18 month old infants 
were twice as likely to imitate an intentional (signalled as non-accidental) rather 
than a non-intentional (signalled as accidental) action by an adult. 
Meltzoff’s (1995) investigation sought to establish whether 18 month old 
infants re-enacted what adults actually do as opposed to what they intend to do.  
4 groups of infants were presented with a series of (5) novel objects. 2 of 
the groups were controls: one was left to play freely with the objects the other 
played with them after watching an adult simply handling them. Of the remaining 
2 groups, one watched an adult perform an intentional action with the objects 
successfully achieving a goal (e.g. pulling a dumbbell shaped object apart, or 
inserting a wooden block in a slot in a larger wooden object). The last group saw 
an adult performing a purposeful action with the objects but failing to achieve a 
goal. Infants in these last two groups were invited to handle the objects the only 
instruction being ‘it’s your turn’. All the children were scored positively if they 
performed the intended successful action, regardless of their priming.  
As might be expected, the groups that had not observed the relevant 
purposeful activity by the adult scored quite low with few examples of the 
children performing the (unseen) model goal. Both groups that had seen the 
intentional action of the adult achieved the appropriate outcome with the objects 
whether they had seen successful or unsuccessful attempts by the adult. Thus the 
full demonstration or intentional but failing demonstration had a significant effect.   
In ‘correcting’ an adult’s failed attempt, infants can draw on their 
knowledge of what is an expected outcome without resorting to any intervening 
mind reading. Meltzoff (2007a,b), Meltzoff & Brooks (2001) draw the same 
conclusion paraphrasing the event more like ‘the adult intends to act as I would in 
the circumstance’ – the ‘like me’ hypothesis. This hypothesis introduces directly 
the role of the infant as (co-) intentional agent in the event. This is a proposition 
curiously unremarked in much research, where the infant is considered to be a 
passive observer, rather than active participant. It has already been shown that 
where the experiment is at odds with an infant’s GERs, she is unable to apply her 
event knowledge to ‘correct’ actions (illuminating the light panel). Where actions 
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alone, or ends without actions are displayed to infants (Bellagamba & Tomasello 
1999) they are unable to perform a whole action-goal sequence. 
Actions are attributed to intentional agents, who for the infant in a natural 
setting are a limited number of identifiable individuals, including themselves. 
Actions considered relevant to the infant are performed by these agents as a 
means to an identifiable end. As such, actions are not discrete or stand-alone 
elements of an event, but are essentially dynamic properties of agents. For actions 
to be understood, an intentional agent and a goal are required. This has significant 
bearing on verb learning, as will be shown in the next chapter. 
3.3.5 Dynamic substantive layer 
A static object with no apparent purpose will not be relevant to an infant (or 
anyone). Objects that can be manipulated, moved, have specific purposes or 
achieve outcomes are relevant for engagement. The quantity of objects in the 
infant’s environment are plentiful, and of interest. Although this layer appears the 
most open, there is interdependence between objects and social/cultural situations, 
locations, goals, and intentional actions. Empirical research into infants’ 
conceptual development and naming of objects frequently factors out these 
important influential levels. Objects in the natural learning environment of the 
infant are integral to the wider context of an event and are conceptually 
influenced by Event representations. So for infants, object affordances and 
understanding of such, is claimed to be contingent on a given social/cultural, 
locational, goal focussed, intentional context. 
Within this established context, objects have predictable dynamic 
properties. Cups and balls act in different but predictable ways, for instance. This 
has significant bearing on word learning and word meanings, as will be shown in 
the next chapter.  
3.3.6 Summary  
The model presented here proposes a simple structure and suggests a 
measure of the engagement-effort relation, in that, the more inner layers are more 
accessible for engagement due to the stabilising effect of the context and 
predictability derived from the outer layers. Engagement in the outer layers 
requires more effort because change here affects all the others. So, for instance in 
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wholly new environments the predictability of agents’ actions and object 
dynamics are less certain. 
The way an infant is exposed to early experience, appears to honour the 
structure. Social/cultural/emotional foundations are made early, locations with 
which to engage are limited, and events are purposeful. The number of agents is 
limited and involves specific known individuals, but objects in dynamic events 
are many and require and can receive the appropriate effort for on-going 
engagement. It is in the last layer that early productive utterances operate: objects 
and their dynamic properties. 
The importance of this proposed structure to the unfolding Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal is that engagement with and developing 
knowledge of intentional action and object dynamics are always set within a 
wider context. Or, put another way, infant attention and engagement is 
contextually funnelled towards objects and dynamic events which exist within 
given social/cultural, locational, teleological and intentional contexts. It is to 
establish this context that carers devote so much of the attention reflected in CDS. 
The additional necessary ingredient is an early meta-cognitive change enabling a 
mapping between perceptual events. The implication of this for word learning is 
addressed further in the next chapter. 
Reference has variously, and appropriately, been made to Event 
representations, GERs, Event knowledge and subjective knowledge. As all these 
terms figure in the construction of the model, there is the possibility of confusion 
arising from further use of these terms in other contexts. As such I will 
consolidate the discussion so far by using the term Infant Generic Knowledge to 
refer to infant event knowledge, and incorporate the four terms above. By this 
means, Infant Generic Knowledge signifies what is stored as a result of an infant, 
generalising representations of her subjective experience of events of the world. 
Generic Knowledge of this kind, is applied to new experiences and may be 
elaborated over time, nevertheless it provides the infant with stability to the 
world. It also appears to be actively supported and promoted by carer interaction 
with the infant. Generic Knowledge as defined here, contributes to what is 
traditionally called ‘semantic memory’ in psychology, and also provides the 
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means of understanding and comprehending the world, which will make a 
contribution to linguistic semantics. 
4. General discussion 
In this chapter I have focussed on the linguistic environmental experience of 
the infant to clarify the nature of the linguistic input, which was considered from a 
practical viewpoint by reviewing research into CDS. I concluded that linguistic 
stimulus appears not to provide a direct route into syntax, but does provide an 
extraordinarily rich input for Generic Knowledge. This input is considered 
intuitively important by adult carers in engaging with their language learning 
infants. 
By focussing on the infant as an intentional agent in the acquisition process, 
I have shown that the development of Generic Knowledge, important for 
organising infant experience and understanding the world, also provides a guide 
for engagement by the infant, bringing object dynamics to the fore. Infant 
engagement, guided by relevance, provides the lead and focus of infant/carer 
interaction. It is in this way that Crain and Lillo-Martin’s statement can be 
justified, that language development is internally driven.  I therefore propose that 
it is precisely this area of infant engagement, object dynamics, which will be 
productive for infant word learning, guided by an ‘acquire-as-required’ criterion, 
and enabled by a meta-cognitive development of perceptual event mapping.  
I claim that Generic Knowledge and Intentionality in engagement and meta-
cognitive ability characterise the main contributory components to language 
acquisition. At this stage however, it is only preparatory; (a kind of ‘Conceptual-
Intentional Boot-lacing’ - to extend the metaphor), which enables linguistic events 
and Generic knowledge to become intentionally related.     
With these foundations having been laid, the discussion will now be able to 
focus more clearly on the acquisition of language and linguistic form, starting 
with word learning in Chapter 4. The final stage, where intentionality and generic 
knowledge have undergone further elaboration facilitated by a further 
metamorphic meta-cognitive development, will be introduced in Chapter 5. This 
later interaction will be shown to be responsible for awakening syntax through the 
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C-I interface, confirming the efficacy of the new Conceptual-Intentional 
Bootstrapping proposal. 
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Chapter 4  
Word meaning and word learning  
Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the nature of the linguistic input which infants 
experience from carers and those around them. It picked up on intuitive processes 
that adults employ in supporting their children to acquire language. The 
conclusion was that there is a main focus on comprehension rather than syntax to 
help infants build and understand their subjective experience. The fundamental 
building blocks were shown to be generalised events which constitute infant 
Generic Knowledge. The way Generic Knowledge can be organised imposes 
contextual constraints acting as a ‘contextual funnel’ from the global to the 
particular. Three elements were proposed to set the conditions for the interaction 
between language and an understanding of the world:  
(i) Infant intentionality geared towards relevance;  
(ii) Generic Knowledge providing a meaningful context for understanding 
dynamic substantive aspects of experience; and  
(iii) a meta-cognitive development enabling perceptual, including linguistic, 
event mapping.  
Establishing this foundation takes time, and thus it is not until around 9-
12months that an infant is in an inevitable position to begin to learn/acquire 
language. This chapter continues on this route.  
In section 1, I will consider the linguistic outcomes which can be expected 
to be a product of the initial state described above, and conclude that these initial 
outcomes do not qualify as productive language acquisition. 
Section 2 will consider the relationship between event mapping and concept 
mapping, and show how the top down analytic approach makes word learning 
contextual. By comparing word-event mapping with other word-concept mapping 
proposals I show that the latter are wanting and cannot account for what is 
required for verb learning.  
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Lastly section 3 will consider whether knowledge of grammatical properties 
of words (categorised as nouns, verbs, adjectives and so on) is a necessary 
requirement for infants in word learning. The conclusion will be that it is not. 
The overall outcome for this chapter states that words learned are 
semantically underdetermined and lexically/grammatically unspecified. 
1. Infants’ first utterances 
In all waking moments from birth, maybe even before, typically developing 
babies and infants will be conscious of the fact that humans are a very noisy 
species. Two or more humans must make speech sounds to each other, and feel 
very uncomfortable in silence. Speech is an integral part of the human 
environment and is likely to have a presence in infant organisation of experience.  
From this point of view, there is a sense of inevitability about infants coming to 
make human speech sounds, but I would maintain that this is a different 
consideration from the inevitability of infants acquiring productive syntactic 
knowledge. The last chapter established a Generic Knowledge structure providing 
contextual stability, and a new meta-cognitive ability which enables infants to 
map perceptual events to each other according to relevance. It was suggested that 
this would provide the means to be able to map perceived linguistic events to 
other perceptual events within the confines of the ‘contextual funnel’ afforded by 
the organisation of Generic Knowledge. If this is so, then it should be apparent in 
early infant utterances. It is generally accepted that early infant talk is imitative. 
In reviewing corpus material, many infant imitations reveal their contextually 
bound nature and can be grouped into 3 large classes: mimicry; imitation; and 
word frames. 
1.1 Mimicry 
Mimicry provides a ready and cognitively effortless means to participate in 
a conversational situation, characterised by the inter-subjective relations between 
infant and carer, already described. Throughout the CHILDES/UK-
Eng/Manchester corpus of infants in their second year, there are examples from 
all the infants of mimicry of an adult’s prior utterance. Such utterances appear to 
be focussed solely on participation in a conversational exchange and show little 
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sign of either comprehension of the adult’s utterance or overt communicative 
content. These are of two general kinds: 
i) Repetition of the last word(s) uttered by the adult: e.g. 
(19) 
 
MOT: Did you have some fish as well? 
CHI: fish as well 
ii) Repetition of the main stressed elements of an adult’s utterance: e.g.in the 
context of talking about different aspects of grapes and strawberries: 
(20) 
 
MOT: They’re not as nice as strawberries 
CHI: not nice strawberries 
These appear to be linguistic event monitoring not mapped to any context, but 
simply explored within a secure inter-subjective social/cultural context. 
1.2 Imitation  
It is well documented that infants learn a repertoire of holophrastic 
expressions, which can be defined as unanalysed utterance tokens tied to specific 
contexts. These are of various kinds, but their close adherence to specific contexts 
leaves them open to being described as integral to event experience: metaphorical 
deposits on the ‘contextual funnel’. Once again there is a sense that these, as 
givens from adult utterances, do not convey conceptual content, but are more 
word or phrase types which are completely context dependent. These are 
generally of three kinds, showing an increase in complexity, from event 
monitoring (i), to event mis-mapping (ii), to full event mapping (iii), between 
perceptual and linguistic events. 
i) Utterances of greeting and politeness which adhere closely to social/cultural 
events, and have no currency outside of them. These include: ‘hello’, ‘please’, 
‘thank you’, ‘bye bye’.  
ii) Use of phrases in an appropriate context, but the meaning of which is not 
immediately relevant. This could imply that the child is repeating a contextually 
appropriate word/phrase without having any real understanding of its meaning 
potential, other than the context of use. This might be a kind of deferred 
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repetition: using a phrase heard uttered by an adult in a similar context. Such 
utterances tend to exhibit greater complexity than all other utterances:  
(21) 
 
a) CHI: I warn you cat (said to pet cat) 
b) CHI: Bring it to mummy (said to baby brother) 
iii) Uttering a word or phrase in an appropriate context which does convey 
appropriate meaning, and learned from frequent use by adults. Three such 
utterances appear to be commonly used by all infants in the corpus: 
(22) 
 
a) What doing? 
b) What happening? 
c) Where gone? 
1.3 Word frames 
A third type of imitation appears to be more productive. This is the development 
of fixed phrases as in 1.2iii above into unanalysed word frames with an additional 
variable slot. These seem to be commonly restricted to questions in the corpus: 
(23) 
 
a) What X doing? 
b) What happened to X? 
c) Where X gone? 
It can be argued that the item-based constructions that Cameron-Faulkner et al 
(2003) identified in CDS (Chapter 3 section 1.2) as ‘who’s..’; ‘are you..’; ‘what 
did…’  are unanalysed word frames of this type. Most examples allow for a 
variation in object/entity reference but little else: ‘what [you, he] doing’; ‘what 
happened to [entity]’. Linguistically, this may show the infant exercising a 
process of substitutability, which could be evidence of syntactic knowledge. But, 
as these utterances continue through the corpus in the same form even when the 
infant is exhibiting a greater control over more complex construction types, it 
would be equally valid to conclude that these form a closed class of highly useful 
utterance types. They, therefore, may not be making a long term contribution to 
syntactic development, if any at all.  
Emergentists, by tracking such utterances through to ever more complex 
word frames, tell only part of the story, and do not address how infants can 
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productively make their own new contexts for communication. This can be 
achieved through one word utterances without reliance on given phrases and leads 
to a greater personal control over linguistic form. Productive utterances like these 
will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
Holophrastic or imitated word frames are of a fixed structure and essentially 
unproductive. There has for long been the assumption that infants’ first 
productive words are object-focussed, and that initial learning follows lexical 
principles; namely, that infants learn nouns first which encode basic category 
items before superordinate categories, and verbs before adjectives and adverbs, 
and so on. When considering infant word knowledge, it is clear from all data (for 
example Braine 1976) that infants appear to learn more than just ‘nouns’ first.  
Bloom, Tinker, & Margulis (1993) longitudinal study of word acquisition 
by infants, found that object labels contributed to only a third of the infant 
lexicon, and if proper nouns (names) were included this rose to around 40%. They 
acknowledged the difficulty in making judgements of word types emphasising 
that it is unlikely that infant words are specified by grammatical category, their 
analysis therefore grouped object words against all others. The research 
established that infants have a potentially varied vocabulary resource available to 
them at the time of constructing more than one word utterances, although the 
actual words acquired vary considerably across subjects and within languages, as 
naturally, they are experienced relative to differing physical, social and functional 
contexts. Non-object words commonly included get, in, out, no more, open, woof, 
moo, yum, there. Markman (1992) established the ‘whole object constraint’, by 
which infants, in hearing a word which refers to an object, assume that the whole 
and not part of the object is the target of naming, and that learning relational 
words and verbs in particular requires that constraint to be over-ridden. Bloom et 
al propose that: 
“..associating gone with the disappearance of juice, or more with the 
recurrence of juice in the glass, is more likely the result of the same factors 
which contribute to associating juice with the liquid that disappears and 
reappears, gets poured, drunk, spilled, and so forth.” (Bloom, Tinker & 
Margulis 1993 p446-7) 
 
This proposal aligns with my view that a word maps to an object and its 
generic involvement with events, an aspect of what I have called the ‘dynamic 
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substantive’. The next section will seek to resolve controversy over whether 
words label or map on to concepts, or whether generic events are the target for 
mapping. 
2. Word mapping: concepts or events?  
On my account, engagement with particulars is always within a wider 
embracing, and importantly, already understood context. The development of this 
kind of organisation for experience of events appears to be promoted and nurtured 
by adults. The support comes from interaction and inter-subjectivity in a 
communicative, conversational context licensed by infant engagement available 
as a result of infant intentionality prompted by infant representations of relevance. 
This is conceived as a top down analytic approach to the construction of 
knowledge of events, very much under the control of the infant herself. 
It is in this context that word meaning and word learning is claimed to be an 
analytic rather than synthetic process. Synthesis assumes words map on to 
discrete concepts rather than events and appears to be a characteristic view of 
word learning, prevalent in much empirical research. There are also 
interpretations of the mapping process which imply that word mapping in some 
way encodes conceptual meaning.  
A code model of language assumes that thought, described as combinations 
of concepts, can be represented by sentences formed through words which encode 
those concepts combined in a similar way, but adhering to syntactic principles. 
Thus, code models of language are based on the assumption that thoughts that are 
communicable will have a matching sentence identical in meaning, and that 
communication of a complete thought requires only the utterance of such a 
sentence.  Opposition to such accounts has been presented through Relevance 
theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95, Sperber 1994, Sperber & Wilson 1998) on the 
basis that linguistic communication is largely inferential, and what is 
linguistically encoded is a skeletal conceptual frame which has to be added to and 
enriched to arrive at a speaker’s intended meaning.  
The bootstrapping proposal, being developed here, will be seen to favour 
the latter view as its outcome - language as inferential, over the former – language 
as a complete code system. As the discussion unfolds, I will show that theories of 
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word learning that assume a fixed code model, present considerable problems to 
any bootstrapping proposal, as a result. 
A starting point for this topic will come from a replay of Chomsky’s view 
of word learning as described in Chapter one: 
Chomsky observes that word learning seems to be quick and effortless, 
therefore: 
“This would appear to indicate that the concepts are already available, with 
much or all of their intricacy and structure predetermined, and that the child’s 
task is to assign labels to concepts, as might be done with limited evidence 
given sufficiently rich innate structure.” (Chomsky 2000 p60) 
On this account a word labels a concept, which has innate properties, and 
which will need in some way to be a discrete unit to enable labelling. Once a label 
is assigned, the label is presumably capable of being converted back to a concept. 
Words therefore appear to package concepts. Words form the lexicon and need to 
have associated grammatical features, which Chomsky suggests are substantive 
categories like noun, verb, adjective, and so on. 
A word then is required to encode a concept and grammatical properties, 
particularly substantive category membership and certain other sub-categorisation 
features. It is assumed here that this generally represents what constitutes word 
meaning and word learning for Chomsky.  
Although geared towards the requirements of generative theory, this view of word 
learning and word meaning is one commonly held in many theoretical traditions. 
Such traditions have focussed almost exclusively on concepts of kinds or 
artefacts:  
“Some have said that those interested in categorization think that concept is 
spelled ‘N, O, U, N’” (Medin & Smith 1984) 
 
There is, however, no agreement about what a concept is and theories range 
from definitional categories (Keil 1987, 1996), to prototypical categories (Rosch 
1978, Lakoff 1987), to a syndrome of innately specified conceptual primitives 
(Fodor, J.A. 1998, Margulis 1998).  
All of these assume a learning process from the particular to the general. 
Experience of exemplars enables a clustering together of definitional, prototypical 
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or innate conceptual primitives into coherent categories which indicate a concept, 
and which can be labelled by a word. But words are known to be notoriously 
imprecise and open to much pragmatic interpretation (Carston 2002). For 
instance, the word ‘red’ can be thought to label a colour concept. An object 
described as a red apple, should therefore be decoded as an object – apple – that is 
red. But red apples may not be completely red, the skin may be green in part, and 
its flesh may not be red at all. A set of books organised by colour coding marked 
by a red adhesive dot, may be referred to as the red books even though their 
covers may be any colour other than red. Further, Carston points out that the word 
‘open’ may encode a single general concept but more specific concepts, like the 
manner of opening, must be derived from context.  
The following is a selection of Carston’s examples (Carston 2002 p325): 
(24) 
 
a) Jane opened the window. 
b) Bill opened his mouth. 
c) Sally opened her book to page 56. 
… … 
g) The carpenter opened the wall. 
h) The surgeon opened the wound. 
 
The flexible use of words is particularly noticeable in various tropes: 
(25) 
 
a) You’re a parrot (Mother to 2 year old son who frequently repeats what she 
says) - Metaphor 
b) I’ve got millions of examples – Hyperbole 
c) A gift from the government (a tax demand) – Irony. 
 
To account for this apparent flexibility a code model needs to propose 
massive polysemy, i.e. a word encodes many differing concepts. The alternative is 
to propose that a word does not encode but indicates a conceptual content, 
contextually derived from existing knowledge and experience. 
There is little evidence that infants under 2 years old have an understanding 
of tropes as in (25) above even though adults use such in addressing them. Infants 
do, however, have daily experience of words used in differing contexts, which 
demands that meanings be interpreted flexibly. The process of labelling or 
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mapping words to concepts will result either in a range of entries of the same 
ostensive word mapped to different concepts or a single word which can point 
towards conceptual content which itself is subject to contextual flexibility.  The 
former would honour the labelling or mapping process but be very uneconomic in 
terms of memory; the latter would be economic but present potential problems for 
a mapping process, and could be thought to present the infant with too much 
potential flexibility to arrive at any certain semantic value for the words she 
acquires. The problem can be resolved by extending the notion of ‘contextual 
funnelling’ further to the dynamic substantive layer of the organisation of 
subjective experience (Chapter 3 section 3). This demands that words are initially 
learned as mapping to events (and their participants). Clarifying how this may 
work will entail considering concept development from an analytic rather than 
synthetic viewpoint. 
2.1 Global categories 
Mandler (2008) pointed out that experimental work on object 
category/concept development frequently focuses on a passive, watching child 
skewing the results towards perceptual differences between objects in vaccuo.  
A great deal of early psychological research into word learning took a 
referential mapping process for granted and concentrated on how infants form 
categories from instances, and what aspects of objects or entities are critical for 
category/concept formation. Properties of various kinds have been found through 
experimentation to contribute to infant categorisations including perceptual cues: 
shape, texture (Krojgaard 2004; Jones, Smith & Landau 1991; Jones & Smith 
1998; Markman 1987; Wilcox 1999); functional cues: uses, affordances (Jaswal 
2004, 2006); intangible cues: creators’ intentions (Bloom 1998), essences 
(Gelman & Wellman 1991).  
An alternative is presented by Barsalou (1983, 1987) who showed that, 
concepts as categories are not stable enough to enable a secure mapping process. 
Stereotypical membership of a category can vary according to different contexts. 
From a number of experimental studies, he cites 3 key contextual conditions 
which affect judgement of stereotypical or ‘most typical’ category membership: 
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i) He found that different determinants may be used by respondents in 
deciding the typicality of category membership, depending on how respondents 
stereotype exemplars, or if they apply ideals which can vary from context to 
context. For instance (Barsalou 1985), respondents were asked to select 
characters, described by their interests, their occupations, and other features, as 
appropriate for performing certain unrelated tasks e.g.  ‘Choose the person who 
would be the best programmer of Q.’ then ‘Choose the programmer of Q who 
would be better able to teach how to cook Indian food’.  There was no consensus 
between respondents.  
ii) Linguistic context has a strong influence on decisions of typicality. He 
cites the example of typicality decisions for the category ANIMAL. When most 
typical category members are elicited in the context of ‘milking’ then ‘cow or 
goat’ come to the fore. When considered in the context of ‘riding’ then ‘horse’ or 
‘mule’, become more typical. 
iii) The third contextual effect he considers is point of view and 
respondents’ cultural or occupational background. Experimental evidence showed 
that when asking for typical membership of the category BIRD, American 
respondents cited ‘robin’ and ‘eagle’, whereas Chinese respondents cited ‘swan’ 
and ‘peacock’. 
“such flexibility indicates that graded structure does not reflect some invariant 
property of categories--there do not appear to be invariant structures that 
underlie categories. Instead such flexibility suggests that people's perception 
and structuring of categories is a highly dynamic and context-dependent 
process.”  (Barsalou 1985 p646) 
 
From this range of research, he concludes that  
“.. Invariant representations of categories do not exist in human cognitive 
systems” (Barsalou 1987 p114) 
 
Ad hoc categories can be formed which are highly personal or temporary 
and would not readily be accorded the status of concept. For instance a temporary 
ad hoc category of ‘things I can use to keep open the door of my non-working 
refrigerator placed in the garden’ might yield an idiosyncratic category set. This 
presents a problem for the ‘mapping to category’ process, if words are to map to a 
moving target. 
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Barsalou (1999) promotes the notion of a modally coded 
conceptual/knowledge system based on perceptual elements. Partial generalisable 
perceptual information is stored along with contextual and attitudinal information 
drawn from experience of instances. Aspects of this information (perceptual, 
attitudinal, contextual) can be called forth as required.  
He presents empirical evidence of the close coupling of perceptual and 
conceptual information in adults (Barsalou 2003). One such set of experiments 
involved fMRI scans showing that when participants are invited to form concepts 
of tools there is a neural response in the same area as when actually handling the 
tool, this response can also sometimes be observed physically. In another 
experiment participants were asked to list features (not word association) which 
relate to a given concept (presented as a word). When given ‘lawn’ the features 
offered were different from those when given ‘rolled up lawn’ as the stimulus, in 
that the latter included features that are generally occluded. So participants were 
more likely to mention roots and soil in the latter case, as if given access to 
otherwise hidden features, which could only become available from a perceptual 
representation. This and other experiments appear to show that responses seem to 
be to the image of the given stimulus rather than any logical properties. In another 
set of experiments (reported in Barsalou 2003) on feature reporting, half the 
participants were asked actively to visualise from a given stimulus sentence, and 
the other half were given neutral instructions. The expectation might be that 
visualisation would require greater processing time. The finding of response times 
showed no difference between the groups. A possible conclusion is that all 
respondents formed images. Image making or perception based conceptualisations 
are not constructed consciously, but they provide a wealth of useable information 
to include object perception, possible contexts, uses and potential actions, and 
therefore generate a wide range of inferences.  
If Barsalou is correct for adults, then studies with infant participants should 
exhibit evidence of this at its inception, but as Mandler (2008) has said, the way 
infants organise their wider conceptual knowledge is frequently hidden by the 
design of experiments which seek to reveal infant responses to object reference. It 
is therefore inevitable that much research finds that (visual) shape differences 
contribute to or form the basis for object concept formation, when that is the only 
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strategy available to subjects to achieve the goal of the experiment. Inevitably, 
concomitant concept/word mapping is limited to the same degree, and results in a 
view that words reference static objects, and the dynamic properties of objects 
within an event are to be discretely conceptualised as actions or activities and 
therefore lexicalised as verbs.  
In over a decade of research, Mandler (2004a, 2004b, 2006,) Mandler and 
McDonough (1993, 1996, 1998a. 1998b, 2000) and also McDonough (2002) and 
Nelson (1985, 1996) have been presenting an alternative, and for the present 
purposes, highly relevant, approach. Their hypothesis is that object recognition 
and conceptualisation occurs within a wider context of experiential knowledge 
and that global categories form first, from which constituent categories or subsets 
are distilled. Their research is of the following type. 
By using a different test measure to ensure infant involvement and active 
participation in experiments, Mandler and McDonough claim that infants’ 
productive knowledge becomes more accessible for investigation. An 
experimental design which no longer simply focussed on static objects and 
passive observation was developed, and a participatory and purposeful event 
structure was introduced, more in tune with an infant’s daily experience. Over the 
period of the research, experiments were conducted with 7-14 month old infants. 
The model adopted is one of deferred imitation. An event is demonstrated to 
the infant in a play-type environment, the infant is then left to play freely with the 
toys. Infants willingly, with little prompting, attempt to imitate the actions they 
have seen. So, for example, the infant is presented with an array of model 
animals, vehicles and a cup. The demonstration is to act out one of the animals 
drinking from the cup. The model animal used for the demonstration is removed 
and the infants are left to play and invited to copy the experimenter if they wish. 
Across all participants the choice of model to enact the drinking event was chosen 
from the set of toy animals and not the vehicles.  
By the same token, when fuelling events were demonstrated, involving the 
vehicles and the cup, infants chose vehicle models to replicate the event, not 
animal models. The conclusion drawn from this and other control experiments is 
that these infants have a global concept of animate versus inanimate, which brings 
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with it expectations of certain generic properties – animates can drink, vehicles do 
not, although they do take on fuel. Experiments with progressively older infants 
show that they gradually make functional distinctions between the animal figures 
attributing different generic activities to four-legged animals, birds then fish. 
Quite expert distinctions are quickly made between vehicles which are four 
wheeled, two wheeled, boats and so on, depending on the infant’s experience and 
cultural norms. The researchers suggest that the Californian infant participants 
had extensive experience with vehicles which they did not have with birds or fish. 
The proposal is that global categories form first, in relation to early acquired 
generic knowledge. Animals drink but vehicles drive. Further work tested how 
infants grouped household objects, and found that global categories of objects 
found in a specific location like ‘kitchen-things’ or ‘bathroom-things’ formed 
before children fine-tuned their distinctions to narrow object classes, like cups, or 
cloths. 
Mandler maintains that infants form global categories first, in line with their 
subjective experience and elements or objects within these global categories are 
recognised and distinguished initially by perceptual re-description. The formation 
of subcategories becomes increasingly refined dependent on added knowledge 
from their subjective experience. Refinement is made, however, within a context 
of shared generic properties, e.g. kitchen implements can be individually 
perceptually distinguished but categorised as (say) ‘visually distinctive kitchen 
things’, before sub-categorisation into, knives; forks; spoons; cups and so on.  The 
implication is that word learning may provide an anchor not only for object 
identification but also relevant generic (event) information. By this means a word 
like ‘potato’ could be constrained initially to the context of food/eating, and as the 
infant gains further experience of additional possible contexts like food 
preparation, then the vegetable in its raw state may be  added, and also be 
included as being indicated by  the word ‘potato’. The global-to-particular process 
bestows many advantages. Words that are learned invoke not only an object but 
contextual information too, enabling the infant to use the word with 
communicative intent to convey a wider range of meaning (reliant on a hearer 
being able to infer contextual meaning). Without this facility, word learning and 
use could only function as retaining and reciting inventory lists. 
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2.2 Generic utterances 
Much of the above discussion has been directed towards making the case 
that infants’ learn about, and form concepts of objects in, and reflecting 
experiential contexts. Objects in such a context are not simply part of a static 
display but are integrated with associated activity and actions, a notion supported 
by adult input during CDS, (as shown in Chapter 3 section 1.2). Infants appear to 
assume that adults are providing positive evidence, when they develop their event 
knowledge and are flexible in how they relate words they learn to this knowledge, 
to the extent that they will trust an adult’s designation of an event over prior 
object word mapping. Grassman & Tomasello (2010) found that 2 year olds (in 
common with 4 year olds in the study) were willing to disregard lexical reference 
in favour of adult ostensive pointing in responding to requests. The infants were 
shown two objects, one familiar (a car), and one unfamiliar, and asked by an adult 
pointing and looking at the unfamiliar object to give her the car. The unfamiliar 
object was selected. When the experimenter pointed to the car and asked for the 
‘modi’, then the car was offered. Grassman & Tomasello conclude that the infants 
used pragmatic strategies to identify the required object which overrode their 
lexical knowledge. This would not be the outcome if there was a tight and 
exclusive mapping between the word ‘car’ and the concept CAR, the infants 
would simply have been confused. 
So, my claim is that if words map to concepts, it is a very flexible process. 
This can be achieved if concepts emerge from infant global categories, mapping 
will then include associated contextual information relevantly defined from within 
infant Generic Knowledge.  
A comparable type of conceptual knowledge is operative in adult cognition 
and made evident through generic utterances. This may well have its origins in 
early infancy. 
 Leslie, S-J. (2007, 2009, 2010) has conducted research into the semantics 
of generic statements like ‘ducks lay eggs’ or ‘tigers have stripes’. In most 
settings, adults judge them to be true even though on reflection it is clear that they 
are not true at all. So, not all ducks lay eggs (male ducks do not) nor do all tigers 
have stripes (albino tigers do not).  
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Her account of generic statements suggests that a quantifier GEN would 
provide the appropriate contrast with ‘all’ or ‘some’ or numerical quantifiers. But 
no known language has a GEN quantifier. Leslie draws on psychological 
evidence in support of her account claiming that the way infants organise their 
knowledge involves generic type generalisations. She suggests that GEN is a 
default quantifier and therefore requires no overt marking. She cites Hollander, 
Gelman & Star (2002) whose research showed that 3 year olds tend to interpret 
the quantifiers ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘most’ as generic whereas 4+year olds do not. Her 
conclusion is that GEN is learned before other quantifiers and is an intuitive 
means of organising knowledge, i.e. that the most basic means of forming a 
judgement is not ‘how many’ but more a focus on how striking or important 
information appears to be. Generic information does not stand up to scrutiny, but 
provides an intuitive organisational strategy to capture what might be useful 
information, even for sophisticated adults. The sun neither rises in the east nor 
sets in the west, yet this is a common means of dealing with complex scientific 
material on a day to day (sic) basis.  
For young infants at a very early stage of organising their limited but 
quickly growing knowledge of the world, basic rather than statistical judgements 
appear to be necessary. They lack the experience to make reflective quantifiable 
judgements. The implication is clearly that infant generalisations have a generic 
quality, based on syntagmatic rather than paradigmatic relations, and also exhibits 
abilities in event mapping. 
Examples from the CHILDES/Manchester corpus show both infants, and 
adult CDS, investing in generic information around objects/entities 
(26)  
 
a) CHI: cake … nice party … a party …yum …yum on birthday (comment on 
a model cake) 
b) CHI: daddy’s up (comment on a picture of a ladder) 
c) CHI: fireworks go bang 
d) MOT: daddy comes home for dinner 
e) CHI: not eat boys (of snakes) 
f) CHI: dustmen take that (of rubbish) 
g) CHI: Ooo … Chocolate … mess … clean it (comment on a toy bar of 
chocolate) 
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These and examples already made (Chapter 3 Section 1.2.1), show infants 
and adults focussing on generic expected processes and outcomes to events. In 
(26g) the object is a plastic toy, but the infant expresses not only her view that 
chocolate can be eaten “Ooo” but also explicates from her experience the 
expected aftermath: “mess … clean it”. It could be that for this infant this 
collection of relevant generic events contributes to her understanding, i.e. this is 
what chocolate means for her. 
As Mandler has proposed, objects are conceptualised because they are 
associated with actions, which provide a focus not only on the object, but also on 
an object’s dynamic potential. This potential may also be considered an integral 
attribute of that object, and words therefore may ‘label’ the whole. Perhaps the 
closest example from adult English is the word ‘drink’ which is attributive of a 
substance but also expresses a generic, associated action event (or alternatively 
indicative of an action event with a generic, associated substance). 
Remembering that infants approaching 2 years of age have limited 
experience, and also mindful of the ‘contextual funnelling’ effect of subjective 
experience, it would appear to be inevitable that early word learning would focus 
on objects and actions. I am claiming that word mapping is less a matter of 
traditional concept labelling, but more one of generic object-event mapping. This 
proposal is reinforced when considering the traditional notion of word / action 
concept mapping. 
3. Mapping words to action categories  
Although the category labelling approach can be unsatisfactory for object 
categories, when it comes to stand alone categories of movement (let alone other 
conceptual elements that verbs are used to express) they become extraordinarily 
difficult to identify. 
Consider the following version of Pinker’s bootstrapping example 
(previously discussed in Chapter 2 Section 1 as the basis for SeB), where a child 
observes a scene accompanied by the utterance: 
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(27) 
 
 ‘the boy threw rocks’ 
 
It is assumed that the infant will identify ‘the boy’, ‘rocks’ and ‘threw’, and 
the proposition throw(x,y) is evoked where x=boy and y= rock. The word ‘throw’ 
is assigned by linking rules to the verb category as the predicate. If, however, the 
meaning of ‘threw’ is based on observation, an immediate Quinean problem 
presents itself: how does ‘threw’ relate to the elements of the action. (4 elements 
are identified here but there could be many more depending upon the degree of 
detail): 
(28) 
 
a) The boy picks up the rock with the intention of throwing it.  
b) The boy draws back his arm and moves it forward rapidly. 
c) The boy moves his arm forward rapidly and releases the rock.  
d) The rock travels through the air away from the boy. It is at this stage that 
throwing can be confirmed by backward projection i.e. the rock has been 
thrown. 
What becomes problematic is the identification of which of the above 4 stages, 
each with perceptual event boundaries, define ‘throw’:  
 The boy’s initial actions and intention? - (a) 
 The boy’s posture and arm/hand movement? - (b / c)  or 
 The rock’s eventual movement and trajectory? - (d)   
 
 ‘Throw’ in this context seems to involve all 4 stages as a complete event. Thus 
the meaning of ‘throw’ depends on (following Tomasello Chapter 2 Section 3) a 
‘thrower’ and a ‘throwee’ and the relation between the two describes ‘throw’. 
Unlike Tomasello, however, who assumes that the conceptual content of ‘throw’ 
is separable from the participants, it must be noted that ‘throw’ indicates two 
events: a causative intention in action from an agent (28a) (the boy), and a 
resultative action on a Theme (28d) (rocks). The meaning of the word is closely 
bound to the context provided by the participants and their capabilities in 
contributing to the event. In fact, it is extra-ordinarily difficult (perhaps 
impossible) to visualise the action ‘throw’ without any participants. Attempts 
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have been made to discern the nature of action concepts, which become the target 
for a mapping process. 
“It is important to note that achieving insights into the verb learning process is 
tantamount to achieving insights into the acquisition of grammar because so 
much of the sentence revolves around the verb... Discovering how children 
extract categorize, and label actions in their environment is crucial to 
unmasking how word-to-world mappings take place” (Golinkoff Chung, 
Hirsch-Pasek, et al. 2002  p613) 
 
In addressing the problem, Golinkoff, Chung, Hirsch-Pasek, et al. (2002) 
transposed movement and action events into point light displays. They then 
researched whether 3 year olds could recognise the movement types and attribute 
similarities. Their motivation followed Mandler’s (1992) proposal that infants 
build image-schemata of objects, based on preverbal concepts of motion, path, 
containment and force which are continuous rather than discrete features of their 
movement. Where Golinkoff et al. differed was to suppose that image schemata 
could be formed without reference to objects.  
From their experiment, Golinkoff et al. proposed that the ‘essence’ of 
movement events is recognisable, which would contribute to category formation 
of movement events on to which words (verbs) could be mapped. Indeed the 3 
year old participants in the experiment could recognise similarities and 
differences between displays. Point light displays, however, are subject to a 
Gestalt effect in that they can be elaborated to appear as stick figures performing 
actions, - i.e. the object/entity is inferred and imposed on perception, as Golinkoff 
et al. appear to note: 
“… the word “run” refers to movement of the limbs (the manner of motion) on 
a forward path. When a child recognizes that “run” can be used to describe 
Fido and Daddy, the child has abstracted the invariants of running, namely, 
movement of the feet (whether two or four and in a particular way) on a 
forward path”. (ibid p605) 
 
What is problematic for this proposal that an infant will have, without 
doubt, been told that her ‘nose is running’ and also have experienced a physical 
realisation of the intention behind the utterance (she gets her nose wiped). She 
may also know about or have heard reference to a running tap, and equally her 
carer may go and run the bath for her. So ‘run’ does not always refer to movement 
of the feet, but rather some kind of relatively ‘smooth, continuous flowing’, which 
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can be effected in legged animates by movement of their legs/feet, otherwise 
other dynamic properties come into play. That ‘run’ generally has a first stop 
interpretation involving legs and feet is another matter, but so does ‘walking’, 
‘jumping’, ‘hopping’, ‘skipping’ and other leg dependent actions. With an 
account that supports word/concept encoding, it might be argued that the word 
‘run’ maps to a range of different meanings (polysemy), or that ‘run’ is in fact 
different words with the same pronunciation (homophony). However, a more 
likely, and economic proposal is the probability of a core meaning enriched by 
contextually drawing on knowledge and experience. 
The fundamental question is whether action events can be defined as 
conceptually discrete from those objects/entities performing in them, and if not, 
how can the lexicalisation process be one of mapping, when, as will be shown, 
different languages frequently lexicalise the same event sequence in different 
ways. It appears that there is a real disconnect between how action events are 
structured conceptually and how they are described linguistically. That such 
variation is evident suggests that conceptual category mapping is probably not the 
correct process at work here. 
3.1 Manner and path 
Golinkoff, Chung, Hirsch-Pasek et al’s (2002) example identifies manner 
and path as two variables (movement of feet; forward path) for the motion event, 
and these variables have become the subject of a great deal of research. Talmy’s 
original research in the 1970’s (and also reported in Talmy 2003) provided a more 
detailed characterisation of motion events, including figure/ground, and 
cause/enablement and agency, dynamic force amongst others. Golinkoff et al’s 
‘feet’ should ideally be considered under source of dynamic force, rather than 
manner. The reason why manner and path have found such currency, is the 
observation that many languages (Spanish and Greek have been the subject of 
much of the research), generally lexicalise the path of movement in the verb and 
the manner is frequently left to be inferred, or specifically stated through an 
additional (adverbial) construction. English, on the other hand, frequently 
lexicalises the manner of movement and specifies the path through a prepositional 
satellite. So for example: 
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(29) 
  
 [V] coding manner: 
  
a) She ran in (the shop);  
b) he hopped up (the stairs);  
c) we shuffled in (to the college). 
 
(30)   
 
[V] coding path:  
 
a’) She entered the shop (running);  
b’) he ascended the stairs (hopping);  
c’) we approached the college (shuffling) 
 
(It should be noted that there is an optional element here for English where 
examples in (30) go through felicitously when the manner is irrelevant or can be 
inferred). 
Gennari, Sloman, Malt & Fitch (2002) found similar evidence for 
manner/path distinctions. Spanish, Greek and English subjects conceptualised 
manner/path sequences similarly when reported non-verbally (through similarity 
judgements), although they differed as predicted when reporting scenes 
linguistically.  
Papafragou, Massey & Gleitman (2006) showed that Greek speakers were 
more likely to include manner information if it was highly relevant or could not 
be inferred from the path only utterance. They conclude:  
“Information encoded linguistically… is simply a pointer to much richer 
conceptual representations; rather than being constrained by the linguistic 
content of utterances, hearers can complete, expand, or otherwise enrich 
this content to arrive at what speakers meant” (Papafragou et al. 2006 B78) 
 
Pulverman, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, et al (2006) on the other hand note 
the range of elements that Talmy identifies for motion events, and recognise that 
very young infants can conceptualise fine distinctions  and conclude that verbs do 
not label whole events but a subset of many semantic subcomponents of motion 
events. Given variation across and within languages, Pulverman et al. suggest that 
the acquisition process: 
“ requires that the verb learning problem be solved anew for each verb 
learned and the most reliable solution varies depending on the language 
being acquired.” (Pulverman et al. 2006 p138) 
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This item-based solution appears to be quite laborious and very far divorced 
from the type of fast mapping proposals made for object labelling. The problem 
appears to be deciding what subset of conceptual elements of a whole motion or 
action event should be mapped. It may not be beyond the infant learner to apply 
this effort, but a different line of enquiry will offer a better cost-benefit outcome. 
The question to pose appears to be: do verbs map to discrete concepts? It can be 
argued that what they indicate are relations (between objects/entities) and the 
assumption that the task is to conceptualise a relation without accounting for the 
related items is at the root of the problem.  
Some researchers working on the acquisition of languages which are ‘verb 
rich’, (i.e. in CDS, verbs seem to predominate over nouns) have claimed that 
infants in this context first acquire more verbs than nouns. This proposal has been 
investigated by Imai, Haryu, Okada et al (2006) focussing on Japanese infants 
(learning a language with a high incidence of verbs without explicit arguments 
and distinctive verb morphology); Chinese infants (a language with high 
incidence of verbs but non-distinctive morphology) and English infants (high 
object focus and restricted verb morphology). The results showed that all children 
were able to name and acquire a novel word for a novel item before they were 
able to learn a novel word for an action conducted with the novel item. That is, 
the first assumption by all infants was that novel words label novel objects before 
novel actions. 
Tardif (2006) considered verb learning in a more natural context. In the 
Chinese language learning context, the emphasis on verbs in CDS is apparent and 
infants seem to acquire more verbs than nouns in early acquisition compared to 
English learners. To explain this, Tardif explores the differing nature of verbs in 
English and Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese). According to her analysis, 
Chinese verbs are more specific of an object context than English verbs. For 
example, there are distinct words for several aspects of carrying. The distinction 
is made by implying the types of objects carried: on the back; held in the arms; 
flat on two hands; dangling in one hand.  English distinguishes this information 
with an explicit object focus as in ‘back pack’; ‘shoulder bag’; ‘hand bag’; ‘clutch 
bag’ and so on. They might well be two sides of the same coin supporting further 
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the claim that objects and attributed actions seem closely bound. This effect 
appears to apply as may be expected to other relational terms, like adjectives.  
Waxman and Lidz (2006) suggest that a child’s interpretation of a novel 
adjective is tied to the properties of the specific nominal element it modifies, and 
further that children’s initial tendency is to extend adjectives very narrowly, as 
has been supposed of verbs. So, ‘white’ when applied to a cat, is extended to 
other cats but not generally to milk, snow etc. In fact, colour terms are notoriously 
difficult to ‘detach’ from specific items to form a generalised category. Sandhofer 
and Smith (1999), in a set of experiments to test the mapping of colour words to 
colour properties of objects, found that 2 year olds could answer successfully 
comprehension questions like “Show me the red one” which relies on word to 
property mapping and they could use colour words in answering “What colour is 
this?” whether their answer was correct or random. However, the infants had 
greater difficulty in abstracting colour in a property to property matching test, in 
effect answering the question “What matches this?” In this case, infants were 
more likely to match by similar objects (a series of different red cups for 
instance), than dissimilar objects (red cups and red blocks). One conclusion to the 
study is that infants have difficulty abstracting the colour property from the 
objects which have that property, and it is only after a period of time of actively 
labelling object sorts that property to property mapping becomes possible, 
matching red cups and red blocks.  
It would appear that the conceptualisation of objects and their relational 
attributes are closely intertwined. Lexicalisation demands that this tight 
conjunction is in some way separated. The conceptualisation of a [coloured 
object] needs to be lexicalised as a [colour] and an [object]. This separation would 
appear to present difficulties to young infants, yet ‘mapping’ and coding rely on 
this ability. The problem is magnified when considering verbs; a [thrower] and 
[throwee] need to be an [entity + action1] (causer and causative action) and an 
[entity + action2] (undergoer and resultant action). The two distinct actions 
[action1] and [action2] then need to be merged and lexicalised together as ‘throw’. 
Verbs, however, are predicates over events which involve objects and 
entities, expressed as arguments. This is a linguistic device. The experimental 
approach has been to focus on observable, perceptual events, requiring a relation 
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to be abstracted from the object participants. If, as claimed, conceptualisation is 
based on experiential knowledge organised as objects/entities and the generic 
dynamic potential that can be attributed to them, then there is a mismatch between 
infant conceptualisation and linguistic requirements (English in this case). Thus 
mapping processes between conceptualisation and linguistic, syntactic devices 
cannot be direct. This underlines the difficulty of treating language as a 
conceptual coding system. A verb is a grammatical device, not a semantic 
category,   
As introduced in Chapter 3, Tomasello and Kruger (1992) showed that new 
verbs were frequently presented to children by adults prior to or after performing 
an action. Tomasello & Barton (1994) conducted follow up studies and found that 
24 month old infants  could acquire the meaning of verbs used in an impending 
action (I’m going to plunk the doll) without prior knowledge of the nature of the 
event itself. Infants disregarded accidental, unintentional acts and only attended to 
the experimenter’s intentional action, gauging intention from what the 
experimenter had said. This in effect is an event monitoring task for the infant and 
well within their ability at this age. 
Although these experiments were designed to indicate the strong social 
effect of speaker’s intention, these model utterances more importantly 
demonstrate word learning integrated with a whole event and not simply selected 
parts. That infants responded well to being given a global event from which they 
could distil/analyse out component elements, would be predicted by favouring an 
analytic approach rather than the synthetic approach generally adopted by 
mapping theories. In Chapter 5, I will show how utterances like those described in 
Tomasello & Kruger reflect the bootstrapping process for infant acquisition of 
verbs, not derived from adult intentions but from infant intentions.  
But before doing so, there remains the problem of the status of the [V]erb 
category for the infant. Does she have such a category requiring a further 
mapping process, or is such a category not necessary for initial acquisition?  
4. Grammatical categories and lexical under-specification 
A standard assumption in linguistic analysis is that different languages and 
constructions within languages can be described with the same small set of 
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grammatical categories. Lexical categories including noun, verb, adjective, 
preposition amongst others, and functional categories like subject or object, are 
commonplace acting as a shorthand reference for descriptive purposes. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Pinker based his semantic bootstrapping hypothesis (SeB) 
on the assumption that such categories are innately mentally represented and 
accessed through canonical meanings: nouns indicate objects and verbs indicate 
actions, although he had to adapt his view to account for categories being more 
‘fuzzy’.  The view commonly held by generative linguists including VEPS is that 
such lexical categories are components of UG, and in the lexicon, words carry 
features identifying their category membership.   
Other researchers, Ninio (1988) and Tomasello (1992, 2000a) simply deny 
the proposition, and Tomasello & Olguin (1993) and Olguin & Tomasello (1993) 
conclude across two sets of experiments that infants develop a category [N] by the 
time they are 23 months but by 25 months still do not have a category [V]. Valian 
(1986) presents similar evidence from a corpus analysis for the acquisition of 
Noun, Adjective and Preposition Phases. Valian’s position, however, is that 
infants do have innate knowledge of such categories but lack the ability to assign 
the appropriate morphology. 
These experiments rely on evidence of infants’ use of morphological 
inflection to establish how categories are differentiated, which may indicate more 
about acquisition of inflection paradigms than the presence of mental categories. 
Langacker (1987) suggests a cognitive/conceptual basis where bounded entities 
are typically represented by nouns and processes by verbs although his approach 
allows for extensive overlap. The supporters of SyB (Syntactic Bootstrapping) 
identify verbs as those words occupying a defined slot in a syntactic construction. 
A wide range of word learning studies assume that (frequently nonsense) words 
will be interpreted as nouns or verbs as the experimenter intends. Given this 
diversity of viewpoints, the question posed for this subsection is how universal 
should grammatical categories be considered to be? 
Cristofaro (2009) presents a detailed literature review to define how 
grammatical categories are generally considered. She concludes that traditional 
categories like noun, verb and so on, are not reliably defined across languages, a 
position supported by Baker (2003). His wide ranging review of world languages 
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makes him conclude that the only aspect that unites what can be defined as verbs 
across all languages is that they are licensers of subjects, and that nouns are 
bearers of referential index. No evidence exists that these categories have 
universal mental representation, and if they do not have a universal mental 
representation then their status as innate categories must be considered doubtful, 
until further research in neuroscience is conducted. Nevertheless, even as social 
constructs for metalinguistic discussion, grammatical categories are useful 
descriptive devices, and are by definition grammatical. Perhaps such categories 
are truly grammatical rather than conceptual and therefore acquired other than as 
the meaning of the word. Help in resolving the problem of whether lexical 
categories can be considered this way comes from a generative theory-internal 
debate between lexicalists and non-lexicalists.  
As already described, Chomsky’s generative linguistics and specifically the 
present Minimalist programme requires that items in the lexicon are specified for 
grammatical category (as well as for a range of other grammatical and semantic 
features necessary to establish a syntactic derivation). There are those who argue 
that this demands too much of the lexicon per se, but particularly it presents the 
infant learner with the problem of how words and their full feature specifications 
are learned. Although Pinker used semantic considerations to trigger innate 
categories, on the basis that nouns predominantly appear to be used to indicate 
objects or entities, and verbs to indicate actions, it is clear that these designations 
are not definitional. Nouns do not always denote objects and verbs do not always 
denote actions or motion. Particularly problematic are nouns which denote actions 
(destruction, movement, education) and verbs which denote states (think, want, 
reside).  
As designation of grammatical category for words is so difficult, and as 
understanding the world, experiences and learning words, and developing 
physically and emotionally arguably occupies an infant extensively, do infant 
words really need initially to be fixed in grammatical categories at all?  A key 
reason for assuming lexical categories is that nouns and verbs, for instance, 
exhibit different morphology, and have privileged insertion rights into the 
syntactic structure. Indeed, it is largely morphological evidence that Valian and 
Tomasello, and others, have used to define an infant’s knowledge of lexical 
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categories. Current work on Distributed Morphology theory (Marantz 1998, 
Siddiqi 2010), suggests that the lexicon consists of a vocabulary (inventory of 
vocabulary items) and encyclopaedic knowledge (which may be stored 
elsewhere), and that word function and morphological form are provided from the 
syntax at insertion. The arguments for and against are theory internal and beyond 
the scope of the present work, but observations made by Barner and Bale (2002) 
from this standpoint are relevant and helpful. 
Barner and Bale suggest that for an infant to learn the word ‘water’ she 
would need, within a lexicalist theory, to have at least five entries, which would 
represent an unnecessary complexity for the learning process: 
Water – n. mass 
Water – n. count 
Water – vb. trans 
Water – vb. intrans  
Water(y) – adj.  
The alternative is for the child to store the root word – ‘water’ - in the 
lexicon representing a sound/meaning relation and therefore having appropriate 
linkage to encyclopaedic knowledge. The alternative uses and any morphological 
changes are created in the syntax. The implications are that the evidence 
researchers find for lexical categorisation through morphological change (Valian, 
Tomasello inter alia) may be an artefact of the role a word is playing in the 
syntax, rather than any inherent properties of the word itself. Syntactic 
development is sufficiently underway by 25 months, so the data used for the 
category research is in fact already subject to the influence of an established 
syntax. The lack of verb inflection on words is licensed by syntactic principles 
recognised elsewhere as the optional infinitive stage. 
In this research, I assume that grammatical categories are syntactic. That 
words used to indicate conceptual representations initially do not need to be 
subject to such categorisation, and that categories like [V]erb and [N]oun, 
[D]eterminer and so on designate roles words play in syntax. In this way, words 
are grouped into such categories courtesy of the role they play in syntax where 
categories are defined, not as an inherent specification of the word as it is 
acquired. This will also free the infant from any discomfort from having to know 
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that ‘drink’ is a noun or verb, or even a verby noun. Words learned are initially 
lexically unspecified.  
This position does not preclude the development of categories of word types 
over time, nor, that adults may come to form some kind of mental representation 
of them. But analysts involved in initial word learning research have frequently 
had a mix and match approach to lexical specification, which provides conflicting 
and confusing results, requiring different means of accounting for noun and verb 
learning. By denying that infant words have grammatical category membership at 
the start, a unitary approach becomes available, which, as will be seen, is 
necessary when considering single and two word utterances, in the next Chapter.  
5. Discussion 
This chapter has considered four key areas: 
i) The outcomes from simple initial abilities to map linguistic events to 
contexts. 
ii) The relation between generic knowledge and word learning, drawing 
distinctions between analytic and synthetic views of word learning, and 
concluding that progressing from the global to the particular provides contextual 
relevance for words. As words are contextually sensitive in adult use, it is 
advantageous to infants that the words they acquire have similar properties from 
the beginning.  
iii) When considering verb learning, the concept-mapping process does not 
appear to stand up. Objects/entities have integral dynamic properties.  
iv) Grammatical categories are derived from syntax, and are not (initially) 
aspects of word meaning. By removing the need to distinguish between 
grammatical categories for initial word learning, the effects of the ‘contextual 
funnel’ can be seen more clearly. Infants have the contextual understanding to 
focus on objects/entities and their integral dynamic properties.  
The conclusion drawn from Mandler & McDonough’s work is that 
knowledge of objects and entities builds on how they act within actual dynamic 
events. Objects and entities are conceptually indivisible from the events within 
which they take part. The predictability of events and how they unfold provides 
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stability for meaning attribution. Objects have generic event attributes and events 
have generic participants.  
The overall conclusion, therefore, is that words when first learned are 
semantically underdetermined and lexically unspecified.  
An implication is that utterances consisting of words so learned are without 
productive syntax, (holophrases and learned constructions have fixed structure). 
The point is now reached when the question of how syntax is acquired can be 
answered.  What resources do infants bring to the problem of structuring a rich 
cognitive content into productive intentional utterances capable of being 
understood by others? How infant utterances become more productive in this way 
is the topic of the next chapter when talk in Manifest Events will be explored. A 
further highly significant metacognitive development occurring around 18months 
will be described. This development enables the collation of primary and 
secondary mental representations. This ability, in effect a much more elaborated 
and abstract type of event mapping, enables infants to express Complex Events, 
which demand conventional, linguistic devices for them to be communicable. The 
interaction between intentionality, elaborated generic knowledge and advanced 
metacognitive ability will be shown finally to bootstrap the syntactic system.  
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Chapter 5  
 Manifest and Complex Events 
Introduction 
The discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 set out some of the important elements 
contributing to a bootstrapping process which promotes infant language 
acquisition. Chapter 3 explored the nature of adult input through CDS and showed 
a focus on helping infants as intentional beings, to develop their knowledge of the 
world. A characterisation of Infant Generic Knowledge was presented describing 
what is stored as a result of infant generalisation of representations of her 
subjective experience of events of the world. Knowledge of this kind, is applied to 
new experiences and may be elaborated over time, nevertheless it provides the 
infant with stability to the world. It provides predictability. Infant Generic 
Knowledge as defined in Chapter 3 contributes to what is traditionally called 
‘semantic memory’ in psychology, and also provides the means of understanding 
and comprehending the world, which will make a contribution to linguistic 
semantics. Knowledge of objects and entities builds on how they act within actual 
dynamic events. Thus, objects and entities are conceptually indivisible from the 
events within which they take part. The predictability of events and how they 
unfold provides stability for meaning attribution. For the infant, objects have 
event potential and events have expected participants, both derived from infant 
generic knowledge. It is this knowledge that infants drawn on when describing 
predictable situations which unfold in the here and now. 
The outcome is such that the perceptual world of the infant presents itself as 
objects and kinds and their dynamic interaction within a human social/cultural 
and locational context with which the infant engages when relevant to her. Infants 
organise their experience of the perceived world as generalised goal focussed 
events and based on these, by event monitoring, have expectations about how 
events should unfold. In Chapter 4, I proposed that speech events are similarly 
monitored, enabling infants, from babyhood, to hear and organise speech sounds 
from the ambient language. These speech events, however, are assumed to be 
discrete and not correlated with other perceptual events. A meta-cognitive 
development, before 12months, enables infants to map together different types of 
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perceptual events and form generalisations between them. I have claimed that this 
prompts the mapping of speech events to other perceptual events. Evidence for 
this, is to be found in imitations, holophrastic expressions and word frames, which 
are tightly bound to specific contexts. These include greetings, and other social 
expressions, often strongly promoted by adults: ‘hello’, ‘please’, ‘thank you’, 
goodnight’, as well as fixed frames like ‘what you doing?’, ‘what’s happening?’ 
and ‘what’s this?’ and so on. These expressions are a direct result of mapping 
CDS and perceived events. These utterances lack the productivity required for 
infants to create intentionally new or related contexts for personal expression.  
In this chapter I discuss the beginnings of infant initiated, productive 
speech, and highlight a further meta-cognitive development which prompts a 
distinction between what will be called Manifest and Complex event 
representations and the utterances associated with them. Manifest Event 
utterances concern the ‘here and now’ and show how infants apply infant generic 
knowledge to become productive in intentional communication about perceived 
events. I will show that the new meta-cognitive development enables infants to 
collate two contrasting mental representations - the perceived with the mentally 
constructed and non-occurring, and that to make utterances about these Complex 
Event representations, demands that, linguistic devices specific for this task, are 
acquired. It is the productive syntactic system that meets this requirement. I will 
show through qualitative corpus analysis, exemplars of the contrast between 
utterances of Manifest and Complex event representations, identifying those 
grammatical properties which appear only in Complex event utterance types. This 
observation will be confirmed by an original empirical study reported in Chapter 
6.  
1. Utterances about Manifest Events 
Verbal communication takes place between at least two participants, and 
early communication between infant and carer takes place in joint attention, 
which describes a carer and infant both focussed on a shared event: playing with 
toys, preparing food or some other event where both are actively involved. A key 
characteristic of this context is ‘common ground’ which includes the common 
knowledge of salient features of the event. Infants represent information from 
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shared events as common knowledge between infant and adult (Moll & 
Tomasello 2007; Moll, Carpenter & Tomasello 2007). This shared context 
provides the conditions for much of the support and input from CDS for infants to 
organise subjective experience as described previously as infant generic 
knowledge.  
The shared nature of the interaction reduces the inequality between infant 
and adult. As shown by Trevarthen & Aitken (2001), the establishing of inter-
subjectivity with pre-linguistic infants is marked by interactions typical of 
conversational exchanges, which were termed proto-conversations. As the adult is 
vastly more linguistically competent than the infant, this inter-subjective context 
not only allows for the sharing of events, but also enables a level of common 
ground where the infant derives an indication of how the adult talk is mapped to 
an appropriate event. Infants are very sensitive to adult intentionality (Baldwin 
1991).  Intentional labelling of objects by the adult is frequently accompanied by 
the provision of additional information which supports the infant’s developing 
generic knowledge about those objects, through profiling of events within which 
objects/entities can participate.  
For instance (from a conversation between a mother and her infant 
overheard in a supermarket) 
“This is a courgette. We’ll buy some of them and cook them up for dinner. 
That will be nice, won’t it?” 
 
Csibra & Gergely (2009) propose that human communication is specifically 
adapted to allow the transmission of generic knowledge between individuals, as 
natural pedagogy, at this early time. 
So, from any theoretical standpoint, this close level of inter-subjectivity 
provides a compelling context for imitating adult talk either to build a repertoire 
of constructions or, as supporters of generative linguistics agree, employ imitation 
as one of several strategies towards parameter setting (Crain & Lillo-Martin 
1999).  
The communicative outcome of infant talk in this context is frequently 
descriptive and confirmatory of both participants’ shared experience, in the here 
and now. The following examples from the CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester 
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corpus illustrate infant utterances accompanying adult/infant engagement with 
toys. 
(31) 
 
a) sheep 
b) red teddy 
c) big truck 
d) man here 
 
 The contextual basis of this type of communication will be termed a 
Manifest Event: single, shared situations in the here and now, as perceived and 
mentally represented as actuality. Comprehension of utterances made in this 
context stands a good chance of being successful, as the situation is shared in 
common ground, although it may require greater pragmatic effort on the part of 
the adult to derive the infant’s meaning, as these examples show:  
(32) 
 
a) cuddle juice biscuit  
b) sky skip balloon 
c) here’s baby’s the basket 
 
Experience of the context of these utterances is necessary to be able to interpret 
the infant’s communicative intentions in these instances. 
Adults also typically expend effort in ensuring that what they say has 
relevance to the infant and is within her ability for understanding. These kinds of 
utterance were seen to be the hallmark of CDS in Chapter 3. The key feature of 
Manifest Events is that they occur entirely in the ‘here and now’. The infant is 
forming, what Perner (1993) terms a Primary Representation, of the perceived 
present, which involves the infant drawing on her infant generic knowledge to 
interpret and represent actuality: the current on-going events with which she is 
engaged.   A striking feature of utterances, within this context, in the corpus 
material (Travis – Tomasello’s diary data; and CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester) is 
that they depart rapidly from imitation, and infant two word combinations quickly 
exhibit features which are seemingly unlike adult utterances. There appears to be 
a general kind of productive utterance about Manifest Events: namely a focussing 
on the participating object/entity modified by expressing the dynamic or stative 
attribute which the infant finds relevant relative to her generic knowledge of that 
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object/entity. In adult terms, such utterances appear to be a combination of 
noun+noun or noun+adjective. The nature of such utterances is clarified below 
and my claim is that these, unlike the adult analysis, have a single syntactic 
structure. 
1.1 Travis’ earliest two word utterances 
From 17 months Travis makes her first two-word utterances. Typically, they 
involve what might be analysed in adult terms as two nouns in combination, for 
example ‘potato mouth’.   
In the diary corpus, Tomasello gives a brief interpretive comment for each 
of Travis’ utterances and in this case his comment is: 
(33) 
Potato mouth – it is in it. 
 
Presumably Travis is commenting on putting potato in her mouth, and 
further, that she is probably commenting on eating a piece of cooked potato.  
By conventional analysis the utterance is constructed as [N]+[N], and by 
conventional word-concept mapping, the words she uses are the result of having 
learned the labelling of the category POTATO by ‘potato’ and MOUTH by 
‘mouth’. But ‘potato mouth’ is not a well-formed syntactic construction in 
English. It is highly unlikely that she has heard this uttered by adults before, yet 
she offers this utterance as a serious expression of her intention to communicate 
that she is eating (a/some) potato.  
There is no information about what motivated Travis to combine these two 
nouns. Tomasello gives no suggestion of the possibility that Travis is imitating 
stressed elements of the adult utterance: 
(34) 
 (Don’t) put that potato in your mouth 
 
 One conclusion is that Travis has created this utterance on her own, and the 
sentence structure appears to be productive, in that she also says around this time: 
‘ketchup mouth’; and ‘cracker mouth’. Each time the use apparently describes her 
involvement in an ‘eating event’, so the combination is not randomly produced. 
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According to the analysis I have been developing, ‘potato’ and ‘mouth’ are 
not nouns for Travis. Rather, each word might be thought to map to 
conceptualisations derived from Travis’ infant generic knowledge. ‘Potato’ is 
possibly indicative of a substantive object with edibleness properties, and ‘mouth’ 
a body part typically involved with edible things. The combination of these two 
words may be motivated by inferential association with ‘edible’. But Tomasello’s 
interpretation in (33) above does not suggest that he interprets Travis’ utterance as 
referring directly to an eating event.  
My account, however, suggests that synthetic combination might not be the 
process at work, i.e. the simple conjoining of discrete items. Rather, by supposing 
that Travis goes through an analytic process, from the general to the particular, 
yields more insight. On this account, ‘potato mouth’ expresses at least the 
following conceptual content, (which has to be expressed in words here but is 
obviously mentally represented in other ways reflecting the ‘contextual 
funnelling’ effect, previously discussed):  
(35) 
 
a) I am eating a potato which is typical for my social/cultural context 
b)  I am eating a potato in a typical location for potato eating. 
c) That I am eating a potato is the event I wish to share 
d)  It is me who is the intentional instigator of the eating and the speaking 
events 
e)  To convey this experience verbally, ‘potato’ signifies the type of edible 
thing concerned and ‘mouth’ provides a contextual modification by 
indicating a location where things that are edible go, elaborating on the 
fact that the edible nature of the potato is being realised in actuality. 
 
These five areas represent the important contextual understanding for the 
utterance. Travis then describes the experience she wishes to share in terms of the 
infant generic knowledge of the substantive object and its dynamic properties. 
She therefore undertakes to describe the substantive object participant in the 
perceived event – potato - which conveys its concomitant properties (socially 
acceptable edible thing), and to emphasise that the edibleness of the potato is 
manifest, a location is specified through ‘mouth’ (body part socially acceptable 
for receiving edible things).  
‘The eater’ is herself and not relevant to make explicit and ‘eating’ is an 
action which can be inferred from the properties of ‘potato’ and ‘mouth’. In this 
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way, Travis is not building a sentence from constituent parts, but indicating 
participants relevantly modified to express the whole event she is conceptualising.  
Many of Travis’ object-object utterances about Manifest Events exhibit a 
similar approach, a selection of these are exemplified below (Tomasello’s 
interpretation is given and Travis’ age at the time of the diary entry is indicated in 
months and days): 
(36) 
 
(a) Mommy chair – mommy is painting chair (17.15) 
(b) Ball mommy – throwing ball at mommy (17.18) 
(c) Mommy dirt – mommy is shovelling dirt (17.22) 
(d) Apple pillow – a piece of apple is stuck in the pillow (18.0) 
(e) Hands water – washing hands (18.02) 
(f) Ketchup mouth – eating it (19.00) 
(g) Sugar coffee – Mama is putting sugar in coffee (19.04) 
 
For each of these examples, the first word suggests the topic or the focus of 
the perceived experience and the second a modifying location which complies 
with Travis’ infant generic knowledge. The type of activity involved between 
these two conceptual elements must be inferred either directly from the perceptual 
context (all utterances accompany Manifest Events and are therefore in physical 
and cognitive common ground with the adult) and/or from the generic properties 
of the objects/entities concerned. This makes it unnecessary to express actions 
explicitly, and enables utterances to be made with a limited vocabulary, or limited 
understanding of the processes involved in the event described. For instance it is 
not until 19 months that Travis acquires the word ‘eat’ when she says  
“cracker mouth  ……  eat-it …..  mmm”  
 
In this case as Tomasello’s transcription implies these are 3 discrete 
utterances. (The nature of ‘eat-it’ and other such expressions will be shown to be 
significant for the bootstrapping process and is a feature of Complex Events.) 
This account favours an inferential model of language. To indicate an object 
participant and location of culmination, while leaving the adult to infer the 
infant’s meaning from what is said along with the available context, is a highly 
efficient means of communication with limited linguistic knowledge, especially 
when about Manifest Events.  
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1.2 Dynamic and stative attributes of event participants 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (section 1.3), Bloom, Tinker, & Margulis (1993) 
found that object labels contributed to about a third of the infant lexicon. Apart 
from holophrastic expressions, and set word frames, the infant lexicon has a 
number of words expressing relational concepts. Travis is no exception. 
At 17 months Travis makes two similar utterances on different occasions. 
These are: ‘coffee hot’ and ‘hot coffee’. The word order appears not to be critical, 
as her meaning seems to be identical. (Travis will most probably have heard ‘hot 
coffee’ and ‘coffee’s hot’ spoken by adults). It would be reasonable to assume 
that coffee is a regular feature of this (American) household, and that adults may 
have drawn her attention to coffee being hot for safety reasons. Travis should, 
therefore, have a generic understanding that coffee is a hot substance. If that is the 
case, her utterance serves to make explicit and share her understanding of the 
properties of coffee according to her infant generic knowledge. If, on the other 
hand, Travis has the additional knowledge that coffee can be a hot substance 
which can become cold, then her utterance serves to make explicit which of the 
two (for her) generic properties of coffee is applicable in the present.  
As infants expand their infant generic knowledge of the world around them, 
it is apparent that objects/entities may have more than a single generic event 
potential and there becomes a need to make more explicit which one is intended 
in a communication. For instance, from the Manchester corpus data, the dolls they 
use appear to be known by several infants to be in one of two states either sitting 
or standing. It is assumed that these figures, provided by the researchers, are such 
that they are articulated at the waist to adopt one of two positions – bent at 90 
degrees or straight. To differentiate and make explicit which generic state an 
infant wishes to indicate, infants use two expressions, recorded as: ‘doll sit’ or 
‘doll stand’.  In a similar vein the (toy)trains infants are using appear either to fit 
on the track or come off the track, expressed by several infants as ‘train fit’ or 
‘train crash’.  
In cases such as these, the event being described focusses on a substantive 
object and additional descriptive information about its properties is made 
available. This additional information is sourced the infant’s generic knowledge 
of that substantive object. As proposed in Chapter 4, objects and entities are 
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conceptually indivisible from the actions or dynamic processes they are known to 
perform. The closest example to adult thinking may be (in British English), ‘a 
spinning top’ which describes a traditional toy both in its static and dynamic state. 
When it is made to spin, it can equally be described as ‘a spinning top’. This toy, 
then, is an object which has the potential to do the only thing that it is known to 
do, and the expression ‘spinning top’ captures this.  
For an infant, this type of expression frequently appears in utterances about 
Manifest Events, and uses adult verb-like words, although they are non-finite and 
function more like adult adjectives. Dynamic action is conceptually identified as a 
generic property of an object/entity. I propose that the conceptual integration of 
objects/entities with their generic dynamic potential implies that infant syntax as 
yet does not accommodate a verb category. At this early stage, it appears that 
infants have a substantive word class and modifiers, which explicitly express 
properties available to the infant from her infant generic knowledge in the context 
of a Manifest Event. Many examples place the substantive item first possibly 
supporting a topic/comment utterance type. In this way the infant is capable of 
uttering a large and productive set of expressions which signify that, according to 
an infant’s generic knowledge, an object that has the property X, is exhibiting that 
property at present. In the context of these early Manifest Event types, the two 
word utterances that adults might analyse as noun-verb combinations are in effect 
representing a substantive-modifier relation. The structure represents an on-going 
inherent relation between an object/entity and its dynamic properties. This differs 
substantially from adult usage, as examples from the Manchester corpus show. 
Although the content for the infant is sourced from her generic knowledge, she is 
not making generic statements in the adult sense of ‘babies cry’ tout court. Rather, 
her styatements have a generalised semantics signifying: ‘what is happening with 
X here is an example of what I know about Xes’ 
(37) 
 
(a) Baby crying (babies cry, and that is happening) 
(b) Swimming hippo (hippos swim and that is happening) 
(c) Juice drink (juice is drinkable, and that is happening) 
(d) Doll sit (dolls sit and that is happening) 
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The same relationship obtains for these examples from Travis, as in the 
following examples: 
(38) 
 
(a) coffee hot – reaching for coffee (17.14) 
(b) hot coffee -  looking at it (17.14) 
(c) Turtle pillow – pillow in shape and colour of turtle (18.07) 
(d) Ice-cream milk – to a bowl of melted ice cream (18.17) 
 
What unites the utterances in these examples (37 and 38) and those above in 
(36) is that they are each describing a Manifest Event and involve the infant 
recognising that the object is functioning as expected and sharing what she knows 
about this functioning relative to her infant generic knowledge.  
Noun+Noun constructions are permitted in adult English and are highly 
productive – cake tin, newspaper cutting, knife attack and so on, in this case one 
noun mirrors an infant-type modifier. My claim is that infant apparent noun+noun 
utterances also involve a substantive-modifier relation. The possible syntax of all 
utterances of Manifest events is explored next.  
1.3 The syntax of two word utterances in Manifest Events 
All these productive construction types exhibit a semantic relationship with 
what Perner (1993) terms a Primary Representation of the perceived event, but 
they are also linguistically two-word utterances, as opposed to two one-word 
utterances. They should therefore have some principled internal linguistic 
structure. 
In acquisition studies of two word utterances, word order has received a 
great deal of attention, in proportion to the theoretical background of the 
researcher. Those from a generative standpoint wish to demonstrate that due to 
full competence two word utterances will reflect the roles the words would play in 
a well-formed syntactic structure, with discrepancies explained by performance 
limitations (Pinker 1995). Emergentists tend to describe infant grammar as 
discrete in itself and track how constructions develop towards the adult target as 
the infant gains more experience. An immediate problem for the latter group, as 
Braine (1976) has found, is that corpus material, however widely sourced, can 
only provide a snapshot in time, and the detail of developmental changes tends to 
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be masked. Comparison between corpora is difficult because of the differential 
development and experience of infants. Matching by age and experience, both 
cognitive and linguistic, is necessary, but extraordinarily difficult when using 
corpora from a wide range of sources. This presents no problem to the committed 
generativist, as the target language is known (to a degree) and so any corpus data 
can be scanned for evidence of the effects of UG. 
The reliability of the data for analysis is an important issue: is infant data a 
valid source?  Wexler proposes (discussed in Chapter 2 section 2) that insight can 
justifiably be gained from analysis of infant utterances; Rizzi and Fodor suggest 
that partial syntactic development can come on stream as required (Chapter 2 
section 2), accommodated in my account as the ‘acquire-as-required’ criterion put 
forward in Chapter 3. What makes this a particularly relevant issue, is that not all 
infant two word utterances perform the same function. By simply analysing all 
two word utterances formally as two word sentences certain information is lost. 
Braine’s (1976) detailed overview of different theoretical positions (at that date) 
shows that analysis of infant grammars could also be couched in terms of 
communicative intention. Braine groups the constructions that infants used, into 
‘pattern’ types, which are suggested to express the following functions, among 
others: 
(39) 
 
actor/action relations: Kimmy running  
locations of objects: juice here  
possession of objects: mummy juice 
negation: no juice 
recurrence: more juice 
disappearance: allgone juice  
requests: want juice 
 
Braine abstracts from this a pattern type, which he terms ‘grope pattern’ and 
which he sees as productive, developing from a freely ordered starting point, 
(groping) towards a combination having a fixed order, mirroring an adult-type 
construction. But this does not focus on the clear differences between function 
and structure. The adult constructions that should result from the utterances above 
vary. Compare for instance:  
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(40) 
 
a) actor/action relations: Kimmy running > Kimmy is running 
b) locations of objects: juice here > the juice is here 
c) possession of objects: mummy juice > this is mummy’s juice 
d) negation: no juice > there is no juice 
e) recurrence: more juice > there is more juice (?), can I have some more 
juice, please? 
f) disappearance: allgone juice > the juice is finished/ I have finished my 
juice 
g) requests: want juice > I want (would like) some juice (please) 
 
The examples in (40a-d) seem to be different in kind from those in (40e-g), 
and seem to be ‘groping’ towards quite different constructions. Greenfield & 
Smith (1976) studied a detailed diary corpus of two children, each around 2 years 
of age, and showed that even one-word utterances reflected different functional 
relations. They showed that infants can communicate reasonably effectively using 
one word utterances, which frequently appear to pick out  objects participating in 
an event experienced with an adult, but also express less manifest intentions. 
Consider the following examples of the different uses of the single word 
‘mummy’: 
(41) 
 
a) requesting something from her mother 
b) giving something to her mother 
c) identifying a coat as her mother’s in the absence of the mother 
d) indicating who gave the child an object in the absence of the mother 
e) vocative to attract attention. 
 
All research indicates, however, that infants go through a two word 
utterance phase however short-lived, with no available evidence that this phase is 
missed out. It is reasonable to suppose that this phase has a purpose. The 
conclusion follows that the two word utterance phase is indicative of the 
beginnings of some sort of syntactic growth, and worthy of description, in its own 
right.  
The scope of published analyses of two word utterances generally assumes 
that the two word utterance ‘stage’ is uniform. In section 4 below, I will show 
how a significant meta-cognitive development enables a broadening of 
communicative intention which changes the nature of two+ word utterances. 
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Indeed, in comparing the functions of two word utterances identified above by 
Braine (very young infants) and one word utterances from Greenfield & Smith 
(two year olds), it is clear that they differ significantly, in the communicative 
intentions being attempted.  As two word utterances are used for differing 
purposes, it may be advantageous to consider their underlying structure in 
different ways. 
Given that a distinction between utterance types can be made, the 
immediate discussion will focus on the context of Manifest Events and utterances 
which express infants’ primary mental representations of the here and now. 
In a Minimalist generative framework, there is a basic operation, Merge, 
which can apply freely to lexical items and phrase markers but which is normally 
driven or constrained by the grammar-specific requirements imposed by lexical 
features of the items or markers involved (Adger 2003). It is assumed that, in this 
infant oriented framework, it is conceivable that if items have no grammar-
specific features, then there are potentially no lexical constraints on their merging. 
Infants do not, however, combine words randomly in two word utterances.  
When infants use language to describe Manifest Events, their intention 
seems to be to highlight features of these shared events. Utterances like ‘baby 
crying’, ‘coffee hot’ and ‘potato mouth’ appear to provide additional modifying 
information relevant to the dynamic or inherent properties of the substantive 
object involved in the event being described. Such entities are understood within 
infant generic knowledge to have contextually defined dynamic (and other) 
properties. It has been suggested (Chapter 4), that a word which indicates a 
substantive object/entity also makes these properties conceptually available. So 
coffee is hot and babies cry. Utterances like ‘coffee hot’ or ‘baby crying’ make 
explicit this knowledge. Interestingly, in the examples (38a and 38b) above, 
Tomasello’s interpretation for ‘coffee hot’ and ‘hot coffee’ imply that Travis is 
reflecting on her knowledge of coffee states – in one instance she is reaching, in 
the other she is looking, and her communication may be to share or confirm her 
knowledge about coffee.  
Thus words like ‘hot’ and ‘crying’ appear to semantically modify, or 
highlight conceptual properties of the substantive item which holds the focus of 
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attention. In all such cases there seems to be a strong motivation, to suggest that, 
early two word utterances involve a conceptually motivated merge operation.  
This would result in a syntactic sister relation between [substantive] and 
[modifier], the word order apparently not being critical: 
 
 
 
 
 
or 
 
 
 
This raises three important questions: 
1. What is the origin of these prototypical syntactic categories? And 
2. Is the relation between [substantive] and [modifier] subject to free 
ordering? 
3. What is the nature of the unifying node? 
The first question is most easily addressed by recalling that the underlying 
conceptual structure is directly drawn from infant generic knowledge where (ref 
Chapter 3) infants are inevitably drawn to consider objects and their dynamic 
properties (the dynamic substantive layer). Substantives are perceptually 
recognised and knowledge of their dynamic properties is acquired. The suggested 
categories preserve the distinction between substantive and associated attributes, 
and it might be that infants replicate this distinction by establishing prototypical 
syntactic categories. Categorisation is recognised as a pervading human ability, 
and therefore the establishing of these two functionally different categories may 
owe something to innate endowment. 
substantive modifier 
modifier substantive 
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The second question involves discovering whether the changing word order 
presents a semantic difference between utterances. 
Although ‘hot coffee’ and ‘coffee hot’ may be interpreted in a very similar 
way, there remains the question whether ‘potato mouth’ and ‘mouth potato’ have 
similar interpretations. There are no instances of Travis’ use of utterances like 
‘mouth potato’ which could be due to a gap in the corpus collection. Alternatively 
it may be that for some reason this combination is not viable. There are, however, 
examples of productive utterances like ‘ketchup mouth’ and ‘cracker mouth’ 
which are recorded and have a similar ‘eating’ connotation. Nevertheless, 
intuitively, ‘mouth potato’ and ‘potato mouth’ appear to express different 
meanings (although the meaning of ‘mouth potato’ is elusive). Because there is a 
difference, it is questionable whether the word order is as free as it seems. Further 
examples help to clarify the position and suggest that word order is significant, 
but this rests on the proposal put forward in Chapter 4 that lexical items are 
unspecified for grammatical category in early acquisition, and that grammatical 
categorisation is derived from the syntax. Consider for example the following two 
recorded utterances from the Travis corpus (Tomasello’s contextual 
interpretations appear in italics): 
(42) 
 
(a) Mommy chair – mommy is painting chair (17.15) 
(b) Mommy chair – pointing to empty chair (17.17) 
 
(42a) has been considered earlier and was suggested to be a 
[substantive][modifier] construction, where ‘mommy’ is substantive and ‘chair’ 
the modifier expressing a known dynamic attribute of mommy (it is assumed that 
Travis has earlier seen her mother painting a chair). 
(42b) is a very different utterance. Travis appears to be conveying that the 
chair she is pointing to has a property which is attributed to mommy, i.e. the chair 
is mommy’s. In this instance ‘chair’ is substantive and ‘mommy’ is the modifier.  
The two utterances can be syntactically differentiated as follows: 
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(42a’)  [substantive]  [modifier] 
  Mommy  chair 
 
(42b’)  [modifier] [substantive] 
  Mommy chair 
These examples provide compelling evidence for the substantive/modifier 
relation not to be one of free ordering. In suggesting a structure which captures 
the appropriate relation an answer to the third question is provided. (42a) is an 
example of a modifier phrase and (42b) a substantive phrase suggesting the 
following generalised structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Thus all examples in (36) are of the [mod[substantive][modifier]] type 
(repeated here for convenience) 
(a) Mommy chair – mommy is painting chair (17.15) 
(b) Ball mommy – throwing ball at mommy (17.18) 
(c) Mommy dirt – mommy is shovelling dirt (17.22) 
(d) Apple pillow – a piece of apple is stuck in the pillow (18.0) 
(e) Hands water – washing hands (18.02) 
(f) Ketchup mouth – eating it (19.00) 
(g) Sugar coffee – Mama is putting sugar in coffee (19.04) 
 
 
Consider the following examples:  
 
substantive modifier 
modifier substantive 
Modifier Phrase 
Substantive Phrase 
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(43) 
 
a) baby crying 
b) coffee hot 
c) hippo swimming 
d) crying baby 
e) hot coffee 
f) swimming hippo 
 
The utterances (43a-f) are differentiated such that 43(a-c) are modifier 
phrases [mod[substantive][modifier]] and 43(d-f) are substantive phrases 
[sub[modifier][substantive]].  
Although word forms that are considered verb-like in adult language 
(‘swimming’) occur in such utterances, these seem to be in the same kind of 
structural relation with the substantive as ‘adjectival’ forms like, ‘hot’. As 
discussed further in Chapter 7, following Borer (1990), these can all be assigned 
to an inchoate modifier category. 
The majority of productive utterances about Manifest Events fit this 
structure, which exclude those learned holophrastic expressions and word frames 
discussed previously (Chapters 3, 4 and the introduction to this chapter).  This 
analysis cannot easily be applied to example (40g) above: ‘want juice’. This 
belongs to a very different type of utterance, that about Complex Events. The 
distinction will be addressed fully in section 4.  
The nature of Manifest Event utterance types are, however, highly limiting. 
This provides both advantages and disadvantages to the infant language learner. 
On the plus side, by talk being restricted to shared ostensive events as they unfold 
before the adult and infant in joint attention, the important elements of inter-
subjectivity are reinforced. An easy conversational environment will typically 
provide emotional well-being and security for the infant, and the shared activity 
promotes mutual understanding. Importantly, it provides support for the infant in 
extending her knowledge base about what people do and the predictable functions 
and actions associated with objects. As has been shown, infants also have the 
opportunity for intentional linguistic expression, developing early use of the 
prototypical syntactic categories [substantive] and [modifier] and the basic 
syntactic principle of Merge. 
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On the downside, however, the communicative content is generally not 
descriptively informative. Even a cursory look at infant utterances shows that 
from 18 months or so, their expressions exhibit functionality beyond simple 
descriptions of the ‘here and now’. They express intentions to do or obtain things 
not apparent in the ‘here and now’. Having access to these increasingly complex 
intentions and unearthing the conventional means of expressing them 
linguistically necessitates further syntactic development.  
2. Primary and Secondary representations 
This section will begin to describe the elements which contribute to a 
significant growth in cognitive ability. This ability involves the interaction 
between Primary and Secondary representational abilities, which will be exploited 
fully in section 3. Prior to that a brief discussion of the difference between these 
two representation types will clarify what is meant by them.  
 Perner (1993) proposes that discussion about representation should draw a 
distinction between the representational medium and representational content. 
Using a military example he illustrates a scenario where, generals overseeing a 
battle, but not present on the battlefield, draw up a model in a sand tray displaying 
the relative positions of the soldiers, resources, terrain and other relevant 
elements. The model depicts the current state of play based on information 
received and is up-dated as new information arrives. In planning battle strategy, 
an additional model may be constructed to depict possible movements of troops 
or to present hypothetical outcomes. Equally the model may be altered to reflect 
either an earlier depiction or a desired end result. In each case the representational 
medium is the same (the battlefield) but the modes of presentation or models of 
the representational content are different. The models need to be kept discrete to 
prevent confusion between a hypothetical layout and the actual ‘reality’ of the 
state of the battle. Perner proposes that young children are able to develop and 
maintain such representational models in contexts appropriate to them.  
Following Perner, two types of representational content can be identified as 
available to the young infant:  
i) Primary representation which was identified as central to the discussion 
of on-going Manifest Events above, referring to the infant’s updating model of the 
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‘here and now’. Its construction relies on perceptual input, and existing infant 
generic knowledge. Primary representation captures an infant’s awareness of 
actuality.   
ii) Secondary representation will be used to characterise models constructed 
by the infant solely from infant generic knowledge. The outcome contrasts with 
Primary representation in that it does not directly mesh with the here and now.  
Although the majority of interactions within Manifest Events involve 
Primary Representation as described in the previous section, there is a type of 
Manifest Event which involves only Secondary Representations. This is found in 
pretence scenarios and discussion of such will help to illustrate how Primary and 
Secondary Representations contrast.  
2.1 Secondary Representations and Manifest events - pretence 
Compare the following two scenes: two glasses are placed between an adult 
and infant, water is poured into each from a jug. The adult drinks one, and invites 
the infant to have a drink too. She chooses the glass with water in it, rather than 
the one the adult had just drunk from and emptied. The scenario takes place in 
real time in the ‘here and now’, and the conclusion is that the infant’s awareness 
of the scene is a Primary representation. 
Bosco, Friedman & Leslie (2006) used this scene with 16+ month olds to 
test for infant responses to pretence scenarios. The only difference was that there 
was no water. So the adult pretended to fill the glasses, pretended to drink from 
one glass, and invited the infant to drink also. Infant participants significantly 
chose the glass the adult had not used, and pretended to drink. In this instance the 
pouring-drinking event is brought to the child’s awareness as a Secondary 
representation. It is constructed from infant generic knowledge and played out in 
the present, but is not a representation of actuality, as there is no water, nor 
anything to drink. 
Research into pretence is wide and varied, and although the detail goes 
beyond the scope of this dissertation its fundamental structure relies on making 
Secondary representations manifest.  
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Bretherton (1989), for example, sees pretence as a precursor to socio-
dramatic play, as a preparation for creating imaginative scenarios and directing 
others or being directed in various roles. Leslie (1987, 1994) sees pretence as the 
beginnings of attaining Theory of Mind and particularly being able to gauge the 
beliefs of others. Lillard (2001) suggests that pretence is comparable to the Twin 
Earth process from philosophy where children can try out potential scenarios and 
events. Nichols and Stich (2000) see pretence as establishing a mental possible 
world box. Clearly, pretence may serve all these purposes, but it is infants’ 
linguistic responses which are of interest here.  
Leslie’s (1994) famous example of a child’s mother pretending to use a 
banana as a telephone in the presence of her child seemingly presents a linguistic 
puzzle. Leslie illustrates the example pictorially. The image of a stylised drawing 
of a ‘mother’ smiling and holding a banana to her ear is bracketed by these labels 
(as if thought by the child): 
(44) 
 
<<Mother’s behaviour - talking to a banana!>>  
<<Infer mental state - mother PRETENDS (of) the banana (that) it is a 
telephone>> 
 
Leslie’s description of the pretence presents a problem. He focuses the 
nature of the pretence on an object, requiring the infant to find a non-existent 
substantive relation between a telephone and a banana.  This has the result of 
suggesting that the scene challenges the infant’s understanding of bananas and 
telephones. If the infant has a lexical item ‘banana’ for a banana and ‘telephone’ 
for telephone, then it is highly unlikely that properties of either would overlap 
enough for the scene to be comprehensible. The fact that infants usually 
understand such scenarios, has exercised researchers. Using the terminology 
developed here, Leslie is assuming the event to be in primary representation, and 
the banana/telephone (bananaphone) to be in secondary representation for the 
adult. Part of Leslie’s solution is to suggest that the infant has a developing theory 
of mind enabling a ‘mind-read’ of the adult’s intention. Without this sophisticated 
ability, the infant would not appreciate the banana as a telephone, it would remain 
a banana. Although it is increasingly shown that infants as young as 13 months 
old can be attributed with early Theory of Mind capabilities (Surian, Caldi & 
Sperber 2007) it is not clear how these capabilities are used in pretence scenarios. 
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There is an alternative approach which does not rely on speculative mind 
reading abilities in young infants. The fact the pretence appears to work is based 
on the event having scope over the object, not the object itself. The whole 
‘making a telephone call’ event, not just the ‘bananaphone’, is in secondary 
representation, shared between adult and infant. Thus in Leslie’s pretence 
example the labelling should more likely be: 
(45) 
 
<<Mother’s behaviour – like a talking on the telephone event>> Secondary 
Representation 
<<Infer mental state - mother PRETENDS to be talking on the telephone >> 
 
The telephoning event is accessed from infant generic knowledge and 
requires a telephone object variable, which can be filled with any surrogate 
object, in this case a banana. The banana is a telephone in the pretence but 
(irrelevantly) remains a banana in actuality, with no confusion. This effect 
dramatically underlines the contextual influence on word meaning and word use 
discussed in the previous chapters. Experimental evidence in support of the notion 
of contextual effect can be found in Lillard & Witherington (2004) who studied 
the relationship between carer and child during pretence sequences. Their aim 
was to discover what communicative signals are given to the child to establish 
pretence rather than an actual event. Apart from smiles, specific eye gaze and 
body postures, a key element was that mothers repeatedly made an exaggerated 
showing and verbal explanation of the event sequence even though the events 
pretended were very familiar to the children. So, in a tea drinking pretence the 
preparing, making and layout of the scene was exaggerated and repeated several 
times, which served to reinforce the context of the pretence, and its relation to 
Generic Knowledge, which the infant either already has, or is developing. Thus it 
is the nature of the familiar event which defines its content. This provides 
additional support for the claim that conceptualisation proceeds from the global to 
the particular (discussed in Chapter 4). The global context defines the particular. 
This important support for infant learning was noted as an aspect of the input 
from CDS (Chapter 3 section 1.2.1ii). This ability to monitor events in secondary 
representation will be seen to be important in the discussion of Complex Events 
where the innovation will be the ability to monitor events across both primary and 
secondary representations.  
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As the pretence is a shared Manifest Event, utterances made need only be 
the same as those used to describe other Manifest Events. There are very few 
examples given of Travis’ speaking in pretend play, although the following show 
clearly that the same expression can be used for Manifest Events both actual 
(Primary) and pretence (Secondary). Both examples exhibit the same 
[sub[modifier] [substantive]] structure explored above. 
(46) 
 
 Cooking dinner -  she is (pretend) (19.26) 
 Cooking dinner – she is  (21.01) 
3. Collation of Primary and Secondary Representations  
Around the age of 15-18 months, a meta-cognitive development enables 
infants to maintain two contrasting representations in mind at the same time. 
These consist of a primary representation – the mental representation of the ‘here 
and now’, and a secondary representation constructed from infant generic 
knowledge representing an alternative event or state change. The advent of this 
meta-cognitive ability is well attested in the literature including Piaget’s well 
known observations described as Sensorimotor Phase, stage 5/6.  
Zelazo (2004) proposes 5 levels of infant consciousness which gradually 
become available to infants each year, from unconscious action to various degrees 
of self-awareness. It is Zelazo’s second level, during the second year of life, 
which accords with this collative ability. He terms this level Recursive 
Consciousness, and it functions largely as a means for comparison between 
representational elements recursively raised to awareness (Perner & Dienes 2003; 
Zelazo, Gao & Todd 2007). 
Suddendorf & Whiten (2001) directly explore the ability to maintain 
Primary and Secondary representations in mind, and compare representational 
abilities of children, great apes and other animals. Infants are found to differ 
significantly from the other comparators. Eight unique developments of the 2nd 
year of a child’s life are discussed and each attributed to Primary / Secondary 
representational ability, becoming more complex as the infant gets older. These 
are listed as:  
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Hidden displacement; Pretence; Means-end reasoning; Interpreting 
depictions; Mirror self-recognition; Attributing emotion; Attributing intention; 
Synchronous imitation.  
The process Suddendorf & Whiten identify involves a Primary 
representation, a Secondary representation and a potential outcome from 
comparing the two. They term the comparing process ‘collation’ to emphasise 
that a ‘side by side’ comparison, rather than a higher level evaluation, is achieved.  
To illustrate, they analyse means ends reasoning in the following terms: 
Primary representation: Perception – problem state 
Secondary representation: Imagination – desired goal state 
Collating mind: Means-ends reasoning – hypothetical path that can lead 
from one state to another. 
A practical illustration of this facility in action can be found in an 
experiment by Liebal, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello (2009) Although the 
experiment was actually designed to illustrate infants’ interpretation of pointing 
and common ground, I maintain that the success of the experiment is based on the 
18 month old  infants’ ability to maintain two contrasting events in mind. 
In the experiment, participants were 14 and 18 month old infants. An infant 
worked with 2 experimenters. The first experimenter (E1) played an insert tray 
game, encouraging the child to place objects in cut out sections on a tray. There 
was a piece missing (by design), and despite searching the table and the floor, it 
was not found.  
The same infant then took part in a different activity in a different part of 
the experimental lab with a second experimenter (E2). E1 was not present. This 
activity involved a tidying up game, where objects on the floor were to be put in a 
large receptacle. As this activity was drawing to a close (no more objects on the 
floor) E1 returned to the room and unknown to the child, E2 placed an object 
behind the child.  
For a significant number of older infants, if E2 indicated the presence of the 
object, the infant placed the object in the receptacle, but if E1 indicated the 
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presence of the object then the infant took the object to the insert tray in the other 
part of the room.  
This response was significantly established for the 18 month olds but not 14 
month old infants, who were successful when the experiment was redesigned to 
enable the adults’ differing foci to be contained within the same event. The 
experiment was interpreted as showing the power of common ground in 
prompting an understanding of agent intention. 
This is not, however, the full story. The experiment involved two distinct 
event sequences, in distinct locations, with distinct participatory objects and 
entities, for the infant:  insert tray event vs. tidying up event. The difference 
between the younger and older infant participants rests on being able to maintain 
two events in mind at the same time: one manifest and the other constructed from 
memory. The experimenter E1 or E2 served to enable the infant to identify the 
events. That the 18 month old could maintain this two-event representation - one 
manifest and one constructed from memory - is a product of this cognitive growth 
– primary/secondary collation, resulting in what will be termed a Complex Event. 
The evidence that 14 month old infants could perform positively when the 
experiment involved two manifest events of primary representations supports this 
conclusion.  
4. Complex Events 
From the age of around 18 months, infants achieve a new cognitive ability, 
and are able to hold two contrasting representations in mind at the same time. 
Whereas previously infants interacted with the world through raising to awareness 
a single primary representation as a Manifest Event, or secondary representation 
as pretence, they can now collate contrasting primary and secondary 
representations ‘side-by-side’. The collation of contrasting representations 
constitutes two sub-events which together form a Complex Event representation 
which contrasts with the previous single or sequenced Manifest Event types.  
The ability to bring Complex Event representations (henceforth Complex 
Events) to awareness gives rise to two important developments in cognition each 
of which has a dramatic effect on infant intentionality and language development. 
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These will be termed the Intentional (INT) and the Resultative (RES) and each 
will be defined in turn. 
4.1 Complex event type one: INT 
An infant can now construct a representation of a complex event, part of 
which is not in the present environment. For instance, an infant may for whatever 
relevant reason form a representation of a particular toy which she wants to have 
(or play with), which is not manifestly present in the here and now.  With this 
complex event in awareness, the infant’s intentionality is confronted with a series 
of discrepancies: 
i). The mentally represented toy is physically absent. 
ii). Any reference to the toy must simultaneously refer to mental ‘presence’, 
but physical absence of the object. 
iii). An adult is not privy to the complex event, as it is the product of an 
internal mental process. 
This type of Complex Event forms the conceptual basis for an intention 
towards an absent object/entity or for some kind of change of state, equivalent to 
‘I want to have the toy’ or ‘this broken toy is to be mended’. Because this event 
type lines up with wanting some sort of change to the here and now, I will term 
this type of complex event as the Intentional (which will be abbreviated to INT 
for convenience).  
There is a similar Manifest Event which may provide the generic 
knowledge or event experience necessary to construct the secondary 
representational component. This involves infants monitoring the continuation or 
cessation of a Manifest Event, most usually expressed by ‘more X’ or ‘allgone X’. 
For instance, when an infant is involved in a juice drinking event which finishes 
prematurely in her view and utters ‘more juice’, her intention is to maintain a 
continuation of the Manifest Event. This utterance can only be (easily) understood 
in the context of an on-going juice-drinking event. The conceptual content of INT 
differs significantly from this kind of Manifest event (the on-going Primary 
representations of the ‘here and now’) in the following ways: 
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i) The event consists of two contrasting sub-events, where the object has a 
dual reference across the public, perceptible present and a private, mentally 
constructed, intentional goal state.  
ii) The infant is not concerned about the generics of the typical object, but 
focussed on a specific identifiable object-state as a goal to be achieved. As such, 
the communication needs not to be about object attributes, affordances or 
dynamic properties. 
iii) The mental goal state is to be made actual. In other words, a toy, for 
example, is no longer simply something that can be played with, but is a thing to 
be obtained. The dynamic element of the event is different from the inherent 
dynamic properties of the toy. In fact the dynamic element of the event is 
focussed on a state change involving the object, e.g. absent to present, or broken 
to mended, or some such. 
iv) The event represented is goal-directed and telic, the end point being the 
achievement of the relevant state change of the object. 
Communication about Complex Events presents new challenges for the 
infant. Whereas, for Manifest Events, an object is present and provides the infant 
with the option to point or touch it, or use a word to indicate its presence, these 
options are removed in the context of a Complex Event. Either the object is 
absent, or not in the required changed state, i.e. the object may be broken and the 
intention is for it to be in an unbroken state.  To communicate her intention, 
physical expression will generally not be available to the infant, or be difficult for 
others to understand (pointing will not do, as the object to be referenced may not 
be present, or the change of state may not be apparent); emotional expression is 
possible but not effective (crying or whimpering may not be interpreted by the 
adult to yield the desired result); linguistic expression is the only means available 
to the infant to make manifest what is mentally represented. Although uttering 
‘toy!’ or ‘more toy!’ when no toy is salient, will give the adult some idea of what 
the infant has in mind, a great deal of pragmatic interpretation is involved, and the 
intended response cannot be guaranteed. The infant is required to acquire a more 
effective means of communicating her intention.  
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What is required is a structural innovation where there are words which can 
distinguish the overall event and others that can make reference to the objects 
involved. The referred object then ‘measures out’ the event to its conclusion, - the 
goal outcome (Tenny 1987, cited in Dowty 1991 p570). In adult (English) syntax, 
verbs perform the former role and noun phrases (or DPs) the latter. 
Some general illustrative examples of typical and commonly recorded 
infant INT type utterances include: 
(47) 
 
a) I want the juice – juice is not present and is a goal 
b) Mend it train – the state of the toy train is to be changed from its               
present broken state to the goal of it being whole again 
c) Build a house – goal state to be achieved 
 
From these examples, ‘want’, ‘mend’, and ‘build’ can be argued to fulfil the 
role of verbs as described above, and ‘the juice’, ‘it train’, and ‘a house’ perform 
the role attributed to DPs in adult syntax. 
Chapter 2 (section 3.5.2), described that a component of Ninio’s path-
breaking verbs hypothesis identified infants’ first verbs as expressing a ‘bringing 
into the self’ or ‘construction’, which presented some difficulty in explaining 
precisely why such conceptualisations should be so important. The present notion 
of the Complex Event INT, captures Ninio’s intention, but also provides an 
explanatory rationale. All of Ninio’s pathbreaking verbs (‘want’ ‘take’ ‘eat’ 
‘hold’ ‘get’, or ‘make’) and more can be accounted for when they play the 
required role in INT type expressions, which indicate an intentional change of 
state for an identified object.  
To unpick this further, a clearer picture of INT utterance use can be shown 
from recorded examples in the Travis corpus, which also seems to show a 
possible developmental progression. 
4.2 INT utterances in the Travis corpus 
The earliest examples appear when Travis is around 16 months (examples 
are given as previously with the interpretation and age). This seemingly consists 
of a word frame format ‘whereda X’ 
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(48) 
 
(a) whereda bottle – looking for and demanding it (15.20) 
(b) whereda spoon – searching, no discernable reminder (16.00) 
(c) whereda Maria – looking out of window for her friend (16.20) 
(d) whereda flower – to an empty bush (she had picked flowers there before) 
(16.24) 
(e) where’s baby – has bowl and spoon, wants to feed baby-doll (17.26) 
 
In adult terms ‘where’s the X’ most usually implies a query about the 
location of an object, but for Travis the focus is upon the object. The interpretive 
comments indicate each time that it is the object that Travis wants, not 
information about the location. There is no recorded evidence of use from 19 
months until 23 months when she does use this construction to accompany her 
own searching for items, which may indicate that she has refined the meaning she 
assigns to the construction to focus more appropriately on locations. 
A large number of examples of use around 18-19 months involve what can 
be identified as verbs with an accompanying ‘-it’ component, initially examples 
show ‘get-it’ to be most frequently used: 
(49) 
 
(a) block get-it – wants block (16.25) 
(b) get-it hat – going to pick up hat  (17.01) 
(c) Lulu get-it – wants picture of Lulu (17.12) 
(d) Get-it bird – looking out window (18.14) 
(e) Me get-it brown book – she wants it (20.09) 
 
From 19 months, her INT utterances include, ‘find-it’, ‘have-it’: 
(50) 
 
(a) Find-it Weezer – heard meow, looking for (18.08) 
(b) Find-it ball – she wants to (18.28) 
(c) Balloon have-it – wants it (19.20) 
(d) Have-it cards – she wants them (19.20) 
 
In each of the examples in (49) and (50) above, Travis is making utterances 
that are productive, intentional and, importantly, are in a form that she will not 
have heard uttered by adults. At this stage it unclear what function Travis is 
attributing to ‘it’, this will be addressed more fully in Chapter 7. Presently, there 
are several possibilities. The word might be being use to maintain the link 
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between the two sub-events of the Complex Event, ensuring that the object 
reference persists throughout, although the use cannot be considered a conscious 
decision on Travis’ part at her age. Alternatively, it might be a structural device, 
either representing an overt voicing of a sub-categorisation feature of the verb - 
‘get-it’ selects a complement that has a specific referent (which ‘measures out’ 
the event). A further alternative is that ‘it’ is an early determiner. The latter is 
encouraged by examples, which increase in frequency as Travis gets older, where 
‘it’ is replaced by a recognisable adult type determiner, establishing a very clear 
[DP] structure: 
(51) 
 
(a) Get the flowers – wants them  (19.29) 
(b) Find the stick – stick in popsickle, pulling away ice (19.03) 
(c) Hold this blocks –wants to (I have them)  (19.11) 
 
(Data from the Manchester corpus will suggest that this may not be the case. 
This is discussed in Chapter 7 when a proposed syntax of Complex event type 
utterances is presented). 
From 20 months or so, ‘want’ and ‘need’ become apparent in some INT 
utterances: 
(52) 
 
(a) I want the cup – telling daddy (23.00) 
(b) I want my bottle – not a cup (23.00) 
(c) Need this up here – wants book off shelf (20.21) 
 
These types of constructions (48 through 52) are used exclusively for INT 
type utterances, and appear to be undergoing some development, particularly in 
the establishment of a recognisable DP. Travis also utilises utterances which she 
has used for Manifest Events, relying on context to provide pragmatic 
interpretation. This may be a case of use what you already know in new situations 
(a rule favoured by Braine and discussed in Chapter 2 section 1.4). Utterances of 
Manifest and Complex Events are differentiated by Aspect. Complex events have 
culmination, Manifest Events are on-going: 
 
 
Neil Parr  Chapter 5  
Page 178  
 
(53) 
 
(a) Crying mummy -  wants to see picture of Mommy crying (19.04) 
(b) See Linda – wants to (19.20) 
(c) See Stu -  wants to be where she can see Stu 
 
These examples contrast with ‘crying mummy’ where that is manifestly 
happening, and ‘see Stu’ or ‘see Linda’ where Travis is indicating that she can see 
Stu or Linda. As Manifest Event utterances they have a [sub[modifier][substantive] 
structure: Linda/Stu are visible, but as utterances about a Complex Event, there is 
a different interpretation suggesting that there may be a contrasting syntactic 
structure involved. 
Utterances expressing the Complex Event type INT (henceforth INT 
utterances), appear from the Travis data to be an important environment for 
language growth. They have distinctive properties different from those utterances 
of Manifest Events. They are goal focussed. In terms of Aspect, they are in 
semantic terms Achievements, and appear, for Travis, to provide for the (birth 
and) growth of syntactic categories like [V]erb and [DP]. INT utterances are also 
intentional and initiated by Travis herself, and it seems unlikely that anyone has 
taught her to want things, nor how to express this mental state in these ways. 
Clearly, conclusions cannot be drawn based on a single infant’s experience. A 
general conclusion can only be reached by empirical testing, the outcomes from 
which are presented in Chapter 6. There is, however, a further influential 
utterance type which flows from Complex Events, which is discussed next. 
4.3 Complex event type two: RES 
The second complex event type again involves simultaneous primary and 
secondary representations as for INT, only this time the infant constructs from 
infant generic knowledge a means, which has contributed to an event or state 
outcome which is actual in the present environment.  
An illustrative scene would be, having a toy in front of the infant 
(manifestly present), and a mental representation that her grandmother (say) gave 
it to her. More commonly in infant utterances, an infant has hurt herself, (current 
primary representation) as a result of falling down at some earlier time (secondary 
representation) as in: 
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(54) 
 
a) Nana bought this toy 
b) I hurt my leg 
 
This complex event type will be termed the Resultative (abbreviated to 
RES for convenience).  In many ways, RES is the counterpart of INT, although 
this utterance type appears not to be as commonly used as INT. 
A parallel Manifest Event type may provide the generic knowledge or event 
experience necessary to construct the secondary representational component. This 
can be exemplified by the ‘mummy chair’ type utterances, exemplified in (36) 
above, which indicate event boundaries. The crucial difference is that for RES 
utterances the event onset is prior to the ‘here and now’, and therefore differs in 
the following ways: 
i) The object is actually present or in the desired state, but how this came 
about is mentally represented. 
ii) Any reference to the current object state is linked to a contributory non-
manifest event frequently involving a responsible agent. 
iii) Again, as for INT, the adult is not privy to the complex event, as it is a 
product of an internal mental process. 
The conceptual content of RES is similar to that of INT but differs from it in 
significant ways highlighted bold: 
i) The object has a dual reference across the public, perceptible present and 
a private, mentally constructed prior event. 
ii) The infant is not concerned about the generics of the typical object, but 
focussed on a specific means through which a goal has been accomplished. The 
communication is not focussed on object attributes or affordances but on how the 
condition or state of the object has come about in the perceptible present. 
iii) The dynamic component in this complex event performs a function 
ranging over the whole event, describing how the present state has been achieved. 
It would appear to provide a bridge between conceptual representations of the 
physically present and the mental previous.  
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iv) Additionally an agent role is generally required to identify the 
performer of actions in the dynamic event, providing responsibility for the present 
goal state. 
v) The event represented is completed, the current object state being the 
achieved goal. 
Some general illustrative examples of typical infant RES type utterances include: 
(55) 
 
‘I found the spoons’: the finding process is not of the present and 
results in the presence of the spoons. 
 ‘Nana bought this car’: Nana’s action towards the car results the car has 
been made present  
‘Danny made this’: Danny did something to make ‘this’ manifest 
 
Once again, examples can be found in the Travis corpus, but there are far 
fewer than the INT utterances, suggesting that they are more likely to come on 
stream after INT utterances. This can be supported by observation of the syntax 
used for their expression. RES, like INT, also appears to need a [V]erb and [DP] 
to be established, as shown in many of the following examples. 
4.4 RES utterances in the Travis corpus 
Travis seems to use ‘made’, ‘buy’ or ‘ate’ as her verbs of choice for RES 
utterances. 
(56) 
 
(a) Maria made this duck – picture Maria drew earlier (18.29) 
(b) Mommy made that table – table mommy had painted (19.16) 
(c) Mail-box made this – a doll that came by mail (20.10) 
(d) Buy this plum – Mama bought at store 20 minutes earlier (19.29) 
(e) Buy this sponge - Mama did at store, unpacking groceries (19.29) 
(f) Weezer ate the roach – he did (20.21) 
 
In each case, the utterance describes the means which results in an object 
being present (except in (f) where its manifest absence it significant). 
Other examples show the means which have resulted in events with 
emotional outcomes: 
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(57) 
 
(a) Danny hit tennis – got hit in the mouth with t-racket by Danny, crying 
(19.05) 
(b) Fall down chair -  it did  (19.22) 
(c) Spill-it leg -  telling Daddy about spill  (19.23) 
(f) Weezer hurt the leg -  he hurt her leg  (20.06) 
(g) Spill something over mommy’s coat -  sees stain (22.05) 
 
The utterances are initiated by Travis and are intentional and informative. It 
would appear that RES utterances are providing an important environment for 
language growth. They are means focussed. In terms of Aspect, they are generally 
interpreted as semantic Achievements, and in most cases (except when Travis 
herself is involved) an agent is explicitly stated.  
5. Discussion 
In this chapter a distinction has been made between two kinds of events that 
provide the context for infants’ early linguistic expressions. Foundational for 
these events is infants’ growing subjective experience of the world, how this is 
organised as generic knowledge, and the contextual relevance for an infant in 
promoting the intention to communicate verbally. Two types of contextual event 
have been identified, defined as Manifest and Complex Events. Manifest Events 
are characterised as those on-going, unfolding events of the ‘here and now’, and 
formed through Primary Representation which in turn is defined as the updating 
representation of reality. Linguistic expression of Manifest Events is typically 
conducted in joint attention and common ground with an adult carer.  
In the context of Manifest Events, apart from the social/cultural/emotional 
contact in maintaining inter-subjectivity, adult talk is focused on supporting 
infants’ growing generic knowledge of the world. Infant initiated talk is 
descriptive of the shared event and is confirmatory of the infant’s generic 
knowledge by identifying verbally, those aspects of the shared scene where 
‘entities do what entities are expected to do’. In this way, entities have integral 
dynamic properties, and infant expressions would appear to reflect this.  
For two or more word utterances of Manifest Events, the basic syntactic 
process of Merge appears to be operating with general syntactic categories 
suggested to be [substantive] and [modifier]. Novel infant utterances not heard 
Neil Parr  Chapter 5  
Page 182  
 
before and seemingly different from adult constructions are apparent. As there is 
no evidence at all that Merge is a learned process (nor that any adult attempts to 
teach it), the inevitable conclusion is that this basic, and really quite simple, 
syntactic process can be innately specified, and that two word utterances 
descriptive of Manifest Events appear to provide a conceptually focussed 
interaction with syntax. They are, however, severely limiting. 
A major cognitive ability is achieved during the second year of life, around 
18 months, when infants can raise two contrasting representations to awareness at 
the same time. This has been characterised as a collation between a primary 
(updating model of actuality in the here and now) and a secondary representation 
(a constructed model of an intentional change of current state, or prior event 
resulting in the present state). This context has been termed Complex because two 
interdependent sub-events are involved. Two kinds of utterance about Complex 
Events have been identified: INT (intentional) and RES (resultative).  
Events which these utterance types express contrast with those of Manifest 
Events and this contrast is diagrammatically represented in fig 2 below.  
 
Constructed prior event  
Secondary Representation 
Perceived present event 
Primary Representation 
Constructed intentional 
event 
Secondary Representation 
     
  Manifest Event  
 
  
 
 Complex RES  Complex INT  
   
 
Fig 2 Schematic diagram showing the relation between Manifest and Complex Event 
types 
  
  
Complex Event utterance-types have different properties from those of 
Manifest Events.  As opposed to public Manifest Events, a Complex event is 
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constructed privately by the infant, and can only be expressed verbally. The infant 
must initiate the utterance, and acquire a new structural means to be able to 
express intentional change of state which utterances of Manifest Events do not do. 
Additionally, she has to ensure that her expressions are understood.  
As Complex Events consist of two sub-events, one of which is constructed 
privately by the infant, the linguistic means must be acquired to maintain 
reference to the goal as it persists through each sub-event, and also to make 
explicit the nature of the event. In adult grammars, predicates play two important 
roles in the characterisation of events or situations. One is the ‘noun’ role of 
characterising entities which feature in the event and the other is the ‘verb’ role of 
characterising the event in terms of properties that could be attributed to the 
entities involved. In broad terms, clauses in adult grammar are built around ‘noun 
phrases’ (DPs) and ‘verbs’, the former refer to entities which figure in the events 
described by the latter.  
In Complex Events, there should be evidence of words being used in [V]erb 
and [DP] roles, not evident in Manifest Events (this will be the focus of the 
empirical study in Chapter 6).  
An infant’s achievement of this inevitable syntactic outcome has depended 
on three important factors being in place: 
 Infant intentionality: an infant expresses that which she has found 
independently relevant to mentally construct. 
 Generic Knowledge of the world: essential for constructing 
predictable and supposed events for expression. 
 Meta-cognitive developments: enabling productive relations 
between mental constructions, ranging from initial mapping of 
linguistic and perceptual events to later defining event boundaries 
outside of the perceptual here and now. 
It is the interaction between all these, not any single factor, which provides 
the inevitability required for language acquisition. Thus an innate syntactic 
specification like UG cannot become operational without this interaction being in 
place; or for language emergence, once the interaction is in place it enables 
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productive syntactic constructions to be learned or acquired. Thus either way, 
approaches espousing innate syntax or learned constructions cannot occur without 
the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal described so far. 
Discussion in this chapter has been exemplified from a single corpus; it 
remains to support the proposal by empirical study. The next Chapter presents 
such a study, and the chapters following will consider the implications for 
syntactic growth and why other bootstrapping proposals, particularly those 
outlined in Chapter 2, are challenged by this research. 
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Chapter 6   
Empirical evidence from corpus studies 
Introduction 
The previous Chapter established that there are two key types of event influencing 
infants’ early engagement and productive communication: Manifest and Complex 
Events. In Manifest events the linguistic expression the infant makes frequently 
forms a descriptive comment of the on-going event, with a focus on participating 
entities/objects and their dynamic properties. Because it is descriptive of an on-
going dynamic state of an entity/object, the comment is of the form ‘here is an 
entity I recognise doing something/being in some way that entities like this can 
do/be’. Utterances descriptive of, what the infant considers to be, the inherent 
dynamic properties of an entity or object, are on-going and involve a linguistic 
means of indicating inherent stative or dynamic properties of objects or entities. 
This has been exemplified in the previous chapter through use of a productive two 
word syntax, constructed by merging [substantive] and [modifier] in a sister 
relation as either [mod[substantive][modifier] or [sub[modifier][substantive].  On 
this account, [substantive] is a predicate over the event, and [modifier] provides 
additional descriptive information. [Substantive] is frequently expressed by a 
word which can be recognised by adults as a bare nominal, and [modifiers] have 
an essentially adjectival function. Some words used as [modifier] are recognisable 
by adults as verb-like, having a ‘-ing’ suffix, but this is not the usual relation 
between [V]erb and noun phrase [DP] in English, and as such infant utterances 
about Manifest Events cannot be so analysed.  
1. Hypothesis and prediction 
The Conceptual-Intentional bootstrapping hypothesis proposes that there is 
an inevitable developmental or cognitive growth process which arrives at a meta-
cognitive shift for an infant at around age 18 months of age. Prior to this, infant 
utterances can be shown to map to events manifest in the here and now. The new 
meta-cognitive ability enables infants to consider and collate representations of 
manifest situations with new mentally constructed, non-occurrent and contrasting 
situations. The collations result in being able to express changes of state, that is, 
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either a desired situation differing from a current state (e.g. mend this toy), or 
alternatively expressing a prior event which results in a current situation (e.g. 
Nana bought this toy). These have been termed complex event representations,  in 
contrast to manifest event representations. In Chapter 5, I showed that infants, 
when expressing linguistic descriptions of manifest events, refer to observed 
objects and actions in terms of the generic dynamic properties of those objects 
according to the infant’s individually developing subjective experience. Infants 
share their understanding of a perceived situation by offering generic propositions 
about the dynamic properties of participating objects, as they are perceived in the 
here and now. The nature and structure of infant subjective experience has 
hitherto not been considered to play such a direct role in linguistic expression. 
Linguistic expression of complex event representations, however, demands a 
differing approach.  
Utterances about complex event representations, involve the infant 
describing an intentional change of state of an object. For this to be understood by 
an adult, the intended change of state must be made explicit and the participating 
object must be referenced and tracked through to the intended changed state. This 
might be characterised conceptually as expressing something akin to 
 [modifier1][substantive1] > [modifier2][substantive1] as in  
Broken toy > unbroken toy (i.e. mend the toy) 
Thus a linguistic means needs to be acquired to convey the change of state 
while maintaining a reference to the object undergoing the change. In English, 
this requires a verb to predicate over the change event and DPs which can refer 
and ‘track’ the change to completion.  
The hypothesis firstly makes a general prediction that infant utterances of 
Manifest Events will differ significantly from those of Complex Events.  
Infant utterances involving Manifest Event representations are predicted to 
show a greater use of bare nominals and attributives as infants express generic 
properties known (to them) to apply to the substantive object kinds participating 
in the observed manifest situation. In English, bare nominal signify kinds and do 
not refer. Reference is achieved pragmatically from the joint attentional context. 
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In contrast, utterances involving Complex Event representations will exhibit 
significantly greater use of referential DPs, and in particular those appearing in 
Theme roles, as the change of state event is a change of the referenced object. 
Many verbs in English are words that need to be linked to their non-agentive 
themes.  
Empirical testing is predicted to show the contrasting structures of 
utterances about manifest and complex events in three ways: 
1. Bare nominals will tend to predominate in utterances about manifest 
events, whereas DPs will predominate in utterances about complex events. 
2. DPs functioning in Theme-role in the utterance will be significantly 
present in utterances about complex events, but less so in utterances about 
manifest events. 
3. Theme-role DPs imply the presence of a verb category, which prompts 
the prediction that DPs in agentive and grammatical subject role should also be 
significantly present in utterances about complex events in contrast to utterances 
about manifest events. 
4. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between utterances 
about manifest or complex events in the presence of bare nominals or DPs.  
The proposal makes some predictions that other approaches to grammatical 
category acquisition do not. Specifically, this approach can be compared to a 
richer innatist view according to which the full nominal/verbal system is in place 
from the earliest productions. Only the current proposal predicts that infants will 
tend not to use noun phrases (DPs) when characterising Manifest Events and 
determiner-less nominals will predominate. The use of DPs will become apparent 
when Complex Events are being described. Note that in infant language, the most 
commonly used DPs are pronouns, definite descriptions and demonstratives. Each 
of these types would be equally felicitous in describing a Manifest Event (a baby 
crying in joint attention) or a Complex Event (wanting to have a specific toy not 
present in joint attention). Thus, in contrast to my proposal, the standard view 
would predict little difference in the occurrence of these definite noun phrase 
forms between Manifest Events and Complex Events. In fact, for many Complex 
Events described by infants, the object is absent from joint attention and only 
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appears in the goal state represented in the infant’s Secondary Representation. 
Thus, if anything, the preponderance of definite DPs might be thought to be found 
in descriptions of Manifest Events.  
In contrast to the specifically innatist view, those proposals that do not 
assume that category knowledge is innate, such as the verb-island hypothesis of 
Tomasello (1992), claim that such knowledge is gained through acquiring 
constructions from adult input and forming analogies across a sufficiently large 
set of examples. As adults do have a functional noun phrase category, it is 
expected that infants will experience linguistic input that makes extensive use of 
DPs in utterances about any event. These theories do not draw a structural 
distinction between infant utterances of Manifest and Complex Events, and so 
would predict in a similar null hypothesis outcome to the standard theory that 
there would be no difference in DP occurrence between utterances about these 
two event types.  
2. The corpus data 
The source data for this study is the UK-Eng/Manchester corpus chosen 
from the CHILDES database. This corpus consists of a longitudinal record of 12 
infants over the 20-35 month age range. When the data was gathered, the infants 
were visited in their homes roughly fortnightly over a year, and on each visit two 
half hour recordings were made of the spontaneous speech in infant/carer 
interaction (in all cases the carer was the mother) while engaged in free play with 
an assortment of toys and props. Each child (barring very few missed visits 
through unavailability) has a record of 34 visits giving 68 half hour scripts 
(morning and afternoon) over the period. Each of these scripts records roughly 
800+ infant-adult exchanges. 
These scripts were considered to be appropriate to use for the study because 
they cover a similar age range to the Travis diary data and therefore provide the 
possibility to match linguistic developments in comparable social/home settings. 
Because the computer technology available cannot as yet analyse the scripts for 
communicative intent, for purely practical reasons a sampling system needed to 
be devised to make the ‘longhand’ analysis of the scripts manageable.  
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3. Preliminary feasibility study 
An initial feasibility study drawing on scripts from 6 infants was 
undertaken.  
The key aims of the study were to gauge the level of difficulty in identifying 
utterance types (ME, INT and RES); and given this, to explore whether a relation 
between utterance types, age and DP use was suggested.  The null hypothesis 
would be that there would be no effect of utterance type or age on DP use.  
Although the preliminary study was flawed in many ways, it is briefly 
reported here to explain the motivation for the organisational decisions made 
about the design of the final study. 
3.1 The data 
For the initial study the first six of the twelve infants were the focus, 3 girls 
and 3 boys – and the 23-28 month range was selected to give matched scripts. The 
reason for the cut-off point at 28mo for this initial study was to parallel as far as 
possible the age range presented in the Travis data.  
There are, however, significant differences between these data sets. 
Tomasello’s diary data is longitudinal and is claimed to capture all new utterances 
by Travis. This content cannot be replicated through the one hour fortnightly 
sampling regime of the CHILDES corpus. It is, however, assumed that the 
Manchester infants are exhibiting through their spontaneous talk, their established 
knowledge and productive use of language. 
For each of the 6 Manchester infants, dialogues were selected as a monthly 
(one hour) sample for each child. This provided the gross data of 25,540 child 
utterances.  
3.2 Method 
Each dialogue was analysed into utterance types: ME, INT, and RES, to develop a 
viable coding system. This required a detailed consideration of the context of use 
and information from the apparent adult interpretation of the infant’s utterance. 
For the trial, only decisions about INT and RES utterances were recorded when 
the judgement could be considered secure. Otherwise all remaining utterances 
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were defined as ME, which included a large number of one word utterances. The 
total breakdown was as follows: 
ME utterances 20057 
INT utterances 4549 
RES utterances 934 
 
Having defined the utterance types, the scripts were then viewed again and a tally 
of lexical items which were assumed to be definitional of DPs was made for each 
utterance. These items included pronouns, demonstratives, determiners and proper 
names (rigid designators). A distinction was also made at this time between 
grammatical ‘object’ and ‘subject’ reference, on the basis of the generalised 
categories of Theme role (O) or Agent/non-Theme role (S), using case marking 
on pronouns as a guide. Decisions were also prompted by the context of use.  
The tally involved the 18 different items listed below: 
(58) 
I 
me 
it O 
it S 
that/those  O 
that/those  S 
this/these O 
this/these S 
the/a O  
the/a S 
Rigid Designators RD O     
Rigid Designators RD S 
he /she /they 
him /her/them 
you O 
you S 
we 
us (there were no examples of the use of ‘us’)  
 
The scripts were grouped into three age bands: 23/24mo; 25/26mo; and 
27/28mo for each infant. The tally recorded the total number of each of the above 
DPs used in each utterance type for each infant within each age grouped script set. 
This meant that each DP had three tally scores reflecting occurrence in each of the 
three utterance types, and these were grouped into age bands. 
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The raw totals were converted into proportions: the number of each DP 
proportioned to the utterance type where it occurred for each infant for each age 
group. The data set therefore all contained values less than 1. 
A two-way ANOVA, using SPSS 17, was run on each DP against (age 
group) * (utterance type). The REGWQ post-hoc test was used to reveal the 
nature of any significant interaction.  
3.3 Results 
The main outcomes of the ANOVA and post hoc tests appear in Table 1 
below, which gives the result for each DP and an indication of any significant 
interaction with utterance type. Significant results appear in bold, (for all results 
df is the range 2,45). 
 
 
DP utterance type   ME;Int;Res        Post hoc test result 
I F22.02  p<.0001 Int > Res 
itO F19.73  p<.0001 Int> Res        
itS F9.317  p<.0001 Res      
thatO F5.503  p=.007 Res >Int      
thatS F.551    p=.580 - 
thisO F8.603    p =.001 Int> Res     
this S F.055    p= .946 - 
theaO F6.909    p= .002 Int >Res         
theaS F3.608    p= .035 Res         
RDO F7.840      p= .001 Res>Int            
RDS F9.481      p<.0001 Res >Int              
youO F2.214   p= .121 - 
youS F4.113      p= .023 Int>Res                
me F2.085     p= .136 - 
s/he/they F6.037     p= .005 Res   
him/her/them F2.345    p= .107 - 
we F1.531    p=.227 - 
us no data  
 
Table 1 ANOVA results for each DP and Utterance type only 
   
These results appeared to show a significant main effect of certain DP use in INT 
and RES utterance types.  
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3.4 Discussion 
A key aim of the study was to gauge whether utterance types could be 
identified from the written transcriptions. This was found to be relatively 
straightforward. Although some utterances required a judgement call, it seemed 
that from what the infant said, the context of the infant’s engagement and adult 
prompts and responses, it was possible to make viable judgements. It was 
instructive that all infant utterances could be comfortably allocated to one of the 
three utterance types. This provided confidence that such judgements could be 
independently verified. 
The results of the ANOVA also appeared to give a strong indication that the 
study was uncovering some interesting information about the relation between 
utterances of Complex and Manifest Events. INT and RES utterances seemed to 
have a significant effect.  
The method, however, was somewhat flawed, and the results are difficult to 
interpret. The data used was subject to a great deal of preliminary analysis: DP 
use organised as grammatical subject or object, and then also allocated to 
respective utterance types, prior to the empirical testing. The results might simply 
be reflecting this preliminary analysis. 
A further complication is that the infants, even from a cursory observation, 
seemed to exhibit different experience of language use, as should be expected. 
Infants develop at different rates. The age banding only emphasised this by 
grouping subjects on a false assumption of homogeneity by age. The data also did 
not discriminate for length of utterance; so many one word utterances were 
included, which skews the data giving a disproportionate amount of ME 
utterances. An alternative means of organising the corpus needed to be found to 
overcome these problems. 
The preliminary study, therefore, was successful in some respects, 
confirming that scripts could be analysed into utterance types, which appeared to 
interact with DPs. It also revealed that a number of changes to the methodology 
needed to be made.  
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4. Revised corpus data 
The corpus data and sampling was revised to address the problems found in 
the feasibility study: by introducing calculations of MLU (mean length of 
utterance); formalising the way utterance types are identified and commissioning 
independent verification; testing for gender differences between infant subjects; 
and finalising the items which would signal DP use. These adaptations are 
discussed in turn. 
4.1 MLU banding and age matching 
It is well known that infants develop at different rates, and it is usual 
practice to assume a 
+
/- 3 month leeway between subjects. As the study crucially 
concerns a limited window of linguistic development an alternative sampling 
system was necessary which would preserve the evidence of age experience as 
well as taking linguistic progression into account. In keeping with Roger Brown’s 
pioneering work (1973), Mean Length of Utterance (MLU) was adopted. This is a 
well-documented and much used measure which is calculated, most usually from 
transcripts of spoken language, as a proportion of morphemes uttered to total 
utterances. Brown considers that this is an  
‘”excellent simple index of grammatical development because almost every 
new kind of knowledge increases length” (Brown1973 p 77) 
 
He also emphasises that it is most effective as a longitudinal, within subject 
measure which can confirm over time, how MLU increases with age. As a 
snapshot of development, however, it can be misleading, as what is measured 
depends on what the infant chooses to say at any time. Because of this, MLU 
readings can vary from day to day, therefore a series of MLU readings are 
required to be able to make a judgement about linguistic development.  
Brown defines several MLU ranges for his research, which he equates to 
stages of grammatical development. His banding structure largely increases in 0.5 
increments in MLU, giving ranges from 1.5 to 2.0; 2.0 to 2.5; and 2.5 to 3.0. This 
measure is generally accepted and has become common practice. Because of this, 
three MLU bands were identified for this study:  MLU Band 1 incorporates MLU 
scores in the range 1.5 to 2.0; MLU Band 2 covers the range 2.0 to 2.5; and MLU 
Band 3 covers 2.5 to 3.0+.  
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A calculation of MLU for each half hour script was made for each of the 12 
infants. As two half hour scripts represented a day’s recording, an average MLU 
score was calculated and recorded for each ‘whole day’ visit.  A scatter graph 
plotting the daily MLU score and a trend-line was constructed for each child, to 
help interpret the trajectory of the various MLU readings. An example based on 
one child’s data, (Dom) appears in fig 3. (The results for all infants appear in 
Appendix 1).  
 
 
Fig 3 Showing the average MLU plot for each of the 34 days where one hour scripts were 
recorded from one infant (Dom). The trend-line and banding domains are shown. Arrows 
indicate the selected scripts. 
.    
Inspection of the graph reveals a clear linear trend whereby MLU length 
increases with age, although on some visits, Dom’s average MLU drops below 
trend.  All the 12 infants in the corpus showed an upward trajectory in their trend-
line, but the rate of development varied (as is expected from well documented 
evidence of differential developmental rates in infants). 
The corpus study was to be based on a sample of scripts for each infant with 
the aim of sampling two one hour scripts, the average MLU across both scripts 
would define membership of each MLU band. The choice of script was made so 
that samples represented as far as possible a monthly progression in age for each 
infant; i.e. scripts were chosen so that the sample represented a progression in 
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both MLU score and age. The reason for this stipulation was to capture both 
linguistic and experiential development in comparable ways. The upper limit of 
28 months was set as ideal, to establish some comparability with the Travis data, 
but this was not always possible.  
So for instance, in the example illustrated in Fig 3 above, for Dom, the 
scripts are plotted on the graph, where they fall within each MLU band domain 
and correlate with the visits numbered 1 to 34. 
Dom’s age across this period ranges from 23 months for the first visit to just 
2 days short of 35 months old for the last. To achieve the age progression (shown 
in Table 2 below for all the infants), the following scripts were selected for Dom 
(and indicated by arrows in fig 3): #7 (24 mo), #10 (25mo) for MLU band 1; #13 
(26 mo), #16 (27 mo) for MLU band 2; and #23 (30 mo), #26 (31 mo) for MLU 
band 3. (The scripts numbered between 17 and 22 although representing the age 
28/29 months, were all in MLU band 2). 
Two of the twelve infants were rejected because their profiles could not fit 
the requirements of banding samples to give a MLU progression and age 
progression, comparable to the others.   
The MLU plots for the two infants appear below figs 4 and 5. John’s scripts 
exhibit great variability in MLU score, and the majority pattern in MLU band 2. 
Nicola, on the other hand has a disproportionate number of scripts in MLU band 1 
and below.  
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Fig 4 MLU banding for John’s scripts 
  
 
 
Fig 5 MLU banding for Nicola’s scripts 
 
Samples from the remaining 10 infants were selected, as set out in Table 2, 
which logs against each infant: age in months and the MLU calculation of the 
appropriately selected script. For each infant, then, two one hour scripts per MLU 
band showing an age progression were selected. 
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Name  MLU band 1 MLU band 2 MLU band 3 
Anne Age (mo) 22 23 24 25 26 27 
 MLU 1.791 1.863 2.082 2.180 2.861 2.750 
Aran Age (mo) 23 24 25 26 27 28 
MLU 1.476 2.066 2.133 2.331 2.697 2.742 
Becky Age (mo) 25 26 27 28 30 31 
MLU 1.502 1.888 2.433 2.485 3.046 2.976 
Carl Age (mo) 20 22 23 24 25 26 
MLU 1.865 1.986 2.380 2.491 2.627 3.089 
Dom Age (mo) 24 25 26 27 30 31 
MLU 1.680 1.769 2.257 2.252 2.630 2.643 
Gail Age (mo) 23 24 26 27 28 30 
MLU 1.142 1.981 2.350 2.433 2.676 2.662 
Joel Age (mo) 24 25 26 27 28 29 
MLU 1.780 1.848 2.121 2.151 2.530 2.802 
Liz Age (mo) 23 24 25 26 27 28 
MLU 1.662 1.793 2.075 2.156 2.510 2.783 
Ruth Age (mo) 28 29 30 32 34 35 
MLU 1.843 1.931 2.069 2.425 2.836 2.837 
Warren Age (mo) 21 22 23 24 25 26 
MLU 1.903 1.870 2.225 2.456 2.648 2.868 
 
Table 2 showing MLU bands and infant ages of the selected corpus scripts 
  
It is clear from the table that the infants fit the criteria (MLU vs age 
progression) in a comparable manner. Ruth would appear to be border-line in that 
she is older overall than the others.  Her inclusion was considered important, 
however, for the data to have a gender balance. The resultant sample provided 6 
hours of talk for each of 10 infants, 5 girls and 5 boys. The scripts presented a 
total of 22,104 infant utterances of two or more words. This was considered to be 
a sizeable and appropriate corpus for the purposes of this study. 
4.2 Utterance types 
The analysis of the scripts involves the identification of utterance types 
expressing Complex Events, termed INT and RES. The remaining utterances are 
classified as Manifest Events (ME). Only utterances of two or more words were 
classified for two reasons. Firstly, looking at the corpus, it was evident that 
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identification of communicative intent is much less clear for a single word 
utterance in a transcribed text. Secondly, excluding one word replies to an adult’s 
closed questioning, (‘what’s this?’ requesting/checking the infant’s knowledge of 
vocabulary; or ‘what colour is it?’ or ‘how many are there?’), provided the added 
advantage of increasing the likelihood of focussing on infant initiated, productive 
speech.  
The following are some strong pointers towards INT utterances: 
Infant use of ‘where’ or ‘where’s’ generally signals INT. 
Infant use of ‘want’; ‘wanna’; ‘want to’. In general infants appear to use 
these words to signal intention (as do adults). Comparably the words ‘need’; 
‘need to’; ‘go’; ‘gonna’; ‘going to’; ‘can’; ‘will’ and negative forms of these with 
‘no’ or ‘not’  frequently appear in INT utterances. Note that this is not always the 
case. Compare the following: 
(59) 
 
CHI: wanna have train  (INT) 
MOT: OK. I think it’s in the box over there. 
and 
(60) 
 
CHI: wanna have train  (playing with it in the here and now) 
MOT: Yes that is always your favourite. 
In these examples the context shows that the infant is expressing different 
meanings. In (1) she is expressing that she wants the train, in (2) she is merely 
expressing something (in a non-adult way) about playing with her favourite train 
at present. Note that it is the context and the mother’s utterance which 
disambiguates this for the sake of the analysis. 
Other decision points concern whether the required action has happened or 
not. Compare: 
(61) 
 
CHI: oh, broken… 
CHI: Mend it train (INT) 
MOT: Daddy’ll mend it when he gets home 
with 
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(62) 
 
CHI: oh, broken… 
CHI: Mend it train (RES) 
MOT: So you have. You are clever! 
Once again the adult response disambiguates the utterance. In the first 
instance (60) the train is to be mended. In the second instance (61) the mending 
has taken place and the fixed train is the result. 
Decisions about utterance types are essentially judgements about infant 
communicative intentions. Formal cues can be misleading. For infants with 
limited facility with syntax and morphological distinctions, and with a limited 
vocabulary inventory, what they say may only approximate in adult terms to what 
they mean. As the study data is drawn from infants’ intentional communication 
with adults, judgements can be supported by additionally taking into account the 
wider context of the talk, particularly the adult reply.  This provides valuable 
insight into how the adult has interpreted the infant utterance. The infant response 
to the adult’s interpretation gives a further measure of whether the infant 
considers the adult has got it right. To clarify: 
(63) 
 
INF: building house 
MOT: oh, do you want to do some building? Let’s get the bricks out. 
INF: yeah 
 
In this instance the infant utterance alone may suggest that she is in the 
process of building and would be classified as ME. The additional context makes 
it clear that the utterance should be classified as INT. 
In the older age samples use of ‘want’, ‘gonna’, ‘gotta, ‘need’ all appear to 
signal INT.  
(64) 
 
(a) INF: want a banana 
(b) INF: dog gonna fall 
(c) INF: gotta wear this on 
(d) INF: I need my monkey 
In the main, a rule of thumb generally applies to determine INT utterances: 
the infant is making reference to an object/ event, or change of state not apparent 
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in the here and now. Note that this may apply equally to utterances which are also 
functioning as possible questions or imperatives. For example: 
(65) 
 
(a) whereda toy  
(b) get it toy  
In both cases the toy is absent in the here and now, but present only as a 
secondary representation. 
RES utterances are many fewer than the other two types, and again the rule 
of thumb is to consider if the end result is present in the here and now, and the 
infant is expressing her knowledge of how the current state of affairs has come 
about. Again, formal cues can be misleading, this is particularly true of the use of 
‘got’. Consider how the following two examples differ: 
(66) 
 
INF: got Thomas Tank (infant story book) 
MOT: yes you have, shall we read this one now? 
-------- 
INF: got Thomas Tank  
MOT: oh yes, did you find it in your box? 
 
In the first instance, the decision is whether the infant is confirming 
possession of the book (ME), or whether she would like to have it read now 
(INT). The second appears to be a comment on the infant’s having retrieved the 
book and therefore to be classified as RES.  
All 2+ word utterances were marked as INT or RES where clear judgements 
could be made otherwise ME was the designation, providing a very conservative 
analytic position. The following total numbers of utterances were recorded across 
all data scripts from a total of 22,104 infant 2+ word utterances: 
ME utterances  13,827 
INT utterances  6,994 
RES utterances  1,283 
Given the careful matching of linguistic ability (through MLU analysis), 
age progression, and restricting the data to 2+ word utterances, the profile of the 
ratio of utterance types for all infants collectively (63% ME : 32% INT : 5% RES) 
can be assumed to be a better reflection of productive language use for young 
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infants than the data from the feasibility study (79% ME : 18%  INT : 3%  RES), 
which was disproportionately skewed to ME. (It is instructive to note that even 
with this bias, INT and RES utterances still exhibited an interesting relation to DP 
use in that study).  
For each sample script the number of ME, INT or RES utterances were 
totalled and then divided by the total number of utterances in that script. Thus the 
data carried forward for statistical analysis of utterance types was expressed as a 
proportion: #Utterance types per script/#Total utterances per script.  Each datum 
therefore consisted of a number less than 1. To capture as much detail as possible, 
the proportion calculation was made to 3 decimal places. (The data tables appear 
in Appendix 3). 
4.3 Independent Verification  
As analysis into utterance types using transcribed scripts is frequently based 
on a judgement call, it was important to institute some verification procedure to 
confirm or otherwise the reliability of the analysis. Because of limited time and 
personnel resources, a postgraduate student with no connection with the research 
was remunerated to make comparable analyses of a sample of scripts. The nature 
of the verification was therefore not to reanalyse all the 60 hours of infant 
dialogues, but to gauge from a sample whether the analysis was feasible and 
statistically verifiable. The independent judge was only provided with a guidance 
sheet (reproduced in Appendix 2). A random selection of two infants was made 
and available scripts were randomly chosen from within each MLU band. So, the 
verification task covered 3 x 1 hour scripts per infant (total 6 hours of infant 
interaction with 2352 infant utterances of two or more words).  
Outcomes were collated with the original script analysis of this subset and 
subjected to a Cohen Kappa test, which showed the verification and research 
analysis had 89% agreement, (with a chance agreement rate calculated at 49%). 
The Cohen's Kappa value was calculated to be 0.78. For the current type of 
research, there seems to be general agreement that the Kappa score should be 
above .60 (Wood 2007). The result achieved for the verification task is therefore 
comfortably within the bounds of acceptability, and therefore my original analysis 
became acceptably the basis for the studies. 
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4.4 Gender effects 
After checking for homogeneity of the data, a two way ANOVA with MLU 
Band and Gender as fixed groups and utterance types as variables, was applied to 
confirm whether or not there were any significant differences according to the 
gender of the infants. Gender was found not to be a significant variable: 
Gender and ME utterances across all MLU Bands:  F(1,54) 1.302 p=0.259 
Gender and INT utterances across all MLU Bands:  F(1,54) 2.560 p=0.115 
Gender and RES utterances across all MLU Bands:  F(1,54) 0.693 p=0.409 
This is not an unexpected result. As it is an assumption that all typically 
developing infants undergo the cognitive growth necessary to make Complex 
Events available to them, this result simply reinforces that assumption (at least as 
far as the 10 infant participants are concerned). Boy and girl data were therefore 
not distinguished for any of the following studies. 
4.5 Identifying DPs 
For Study 1, a total count of DP use for each script was recorded as a 
proportion of DP use to total infant utterances for each script. (#DPs per 
script/Total Utterances per script). Table 3 below displays the items considered to 
be DPs. These comprised pronouns, articles, proper names (Rigid Designators) 
and demonstratives with or without nouns. The total gives a count of the total 
instances across all scripts.  
Note that for Study 1, DP data were pooled, so individual DP use was not 
analysed at this stage.  
Infant DP  Instances across all scripts 
I   2561 
it    2271 
the/a   1912 
Rigid Designators   1760 
that/those   1378 
this/these   657 
You   635 
He/she/they    398 
me   241 
him/her them   168 
We   98 
us   2 
Total   11736 
 
Table 3 Total instances of DP use across all scripts 
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At the end of this analysis there were a total of 60 data items for each 
category – ME; INT; RES; all DP use. Each of these items had been proportioned 
to a common base, namely total utterances per respective script. Raw data grids 
appear in Appendix 3. 
4.6 Identifying bare nominals 
As the hypothesis to be tested includes the proposal that there is a negative 
relation between bare nominal use and utterances of Complex Events, a tally of 
all such elements was made for two+ word utterances, and proportioned in the 
same way as the DPs to total utterances per script. The summary of frequency of 
bare nominal use across all scripts is: 
MLU band 1= 1280 occurrences 
MLU band 2 = 989 occurrences 
MLU band 3 = 514 occurrences 
4.7 Statistical calculations 
All statistical calculations for the studies were made using SPSS 17, 
variously involving Pearson Correlation and Regression, ANOVA with REGWQ 
post hoc tests, and χ2 and Φ tests. 
5. Empirical studies 
Three series of studies were undertaken to gain an understanding of the 
relation between DP use (as defined above in 4.5) and utterance type. The first 
explored the relation between bare nominal and DP use in ME and CE utterance 
types; the second explored the relation of endocentric DPs and utterance types; 
and the third involved the relation between exocentric DPs and utterance types. 
The original hypothesis and prediction made before the feasibility study 
remained, namely: infants will tend not to use DPs when characterising Manifest 
Events, while the use of DPs will emerge when Complex Events are being 
described. The null hypothesis in all cases is that there is no effect of utterance 
type on DP use. Conversely, it is predicted that the use of bare nominals will 
predominate in ME utterances. 
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5.1 Study 1. The relation between bare nominal use, DPs and 
utterance types. 
For this first study the INT and RES data was initially amalgamated to 
divide all infant utterances into Manifest or Complex utterance types: ME or CE. 
Correlation tests were then conducted to reveal the relation between DP use and 
bare nominal use in ME or CE. All data had been proportioned to total utterances 
for each script, providing a common baseline. 
The data below, shows trimmed mean values at a 95% confidence level for 
each MLU band, of the corpus data representing ME utterances, CE utterances, 
DPs, and bare Nominals.  
Variable 
 
Mean values  
MLU band 1 MLU band 2 MLU band 3 
ME .684 .636 .574 
CE .316 .364 .426 
DP .404 .530 .680 
Nominal .230 .136 .063 
 
This is presented graphically in Fig 6 below. 
 
 
 
Fig 6 Plot of means for ME, CE, DPs or Nominals by MLU band 
 
Pearson correlation tests were conducted giving the following results: 
 
   
DP 
ME 
CE 
ME 
CE 
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Pearson correlation analysis for Utterance types and DP 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = -0.696 p<.001 Negative, significant 
CE r = 0,696 p<.001 Positive, significant 
 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=25.728 p<.001 (R
2
=0.307). The linear relationship 
(CE:DP) accounts for 31% of the total variance. 
 
Pearson correlation analysis for utterance types and bare nominals 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = 0.458 p<.001 Positive significant 
CE r = -0.458 p<.001 Negative significant 
 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=15.406 p<.001 (R
2
=0.210). The linear relationship 
(ME: Bare nominal) accounts for 21% of the total variance. 
This analysis reveals a significant correlation between ME and bare nominal 
use and a strong correlation between CE and DP use. As the main focus of 
interest is DP use, this study was extended to examine the relation between DP, 
ME and each of the sub-components of CE utterance types: INT and RES. (The 
data utilised is the same as before but disaggregated). 
A series of Pearson correlation tests were conducted, to confirm or 
otherwise the positive correlation between each utterance type and DP use. These 
gave the following results: 
Pearson correlation analyses for utterance types and DPs 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = -0.696 p<.001 Negative, significant 
INT r = 0.552 p<.001 Positive significant 
RES r = 0.136 p=.302 Non-significant 
 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=25.464 p<.001  (R
2
 = 0.305). The linear relationship 
(INT:DP) accounts for 31% of the total variance. 
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These results show a positive, significant correlation between DP use and 
INT utterances. The strength of this relation was further tested by Regression 
analysis which showed INT to be a robust predictor of DP use.  
This relation can be graphically presented (fig 7) through plotting the 
trimmed mean value data for 95% confidence level across each MLU band: 
 
 
 
Fig 7   Plot of means for ME, INT, RES and DPs by MLU band 
 
 
5.1.1 Study 1 discussion 
Although many researchers have shown that infants use fewer bare nominal 
over time in favour of more full DPs, arguing that this reflects a grammatical 
development (the D position becomes obligatory), none have shown that the 
developmental process correlates with the meta-cognitive ability to defined here 
as the expression of Complex Events. The results from Study 1 confirm the initial 
Variable 
 
Mean values 
MLU band 1 MLU band 2 MLU band 3 
ME .684 .636 .574 
INT .263 .310 .365 
RES .053 .053 .060 
DP .404 .530 .680 
DP 
ME 
INT 
RES 
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prediction that referring expressions display a significant relation to INT 
utterances (complex events) rather than ME utterances (manifest events). This is 
surprising because one would expect that object reference would occur more 
significantly for situations where objects were always actually present in the 
physical environment, rather than those where the object is often physically 
absent but present only in the cognitive environment.  
Although there is a robust correlation between INT utterances and DP use, 
it is clear that correlation does not demonstrate causation. The result may simply 
be due to the case that infants make progressively more INT utterances and, in a 
coincidental way, also make more referring expressions as they attend to more 
objects in their environment. The significance of the Regression analysis gives 
encouragement that there is more information to be gained by drilling down 
further into the relationship between DP use and utterance types. 
Studies 2 and 3 attempt to do this by considering the thematic roles the DP 
elements are performing. Parsons (1994) suggests a means for identifying 
participant roles in an event, using the heuristic:  
Events:  by an Agent;  
of a Theme;  
for a Benefactive,  
with an Instrument. 
Parson’s example is “Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife”. This involves a 
[stabbing event] of Caesar (Theme); by Brutus (Agent); with a knife (instrument). 
There is no direct relation between thematic role and grammatical category, but 
frequently in English a Theme role is realised as grammatical Object.  With infant 
speech of 2+ word utterances, young infants tend to describe events with limited 
participant roles, the type of complexity suggested by Parson’s heuristic is 
generally not apparent in infant speech. Themes, however, appear to be an easily 
identified category, along with Agent. Just as there is no one to one relation 
between Theme and Object, so too is there no direct definition of Subject as 
Agent. Grammatical Subjects do not need to be functioning in an agentive role.  
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To begin to define working data sets with these provisos in mind, an initial 
analysis identified and noted those DPs used in Theme-role, coded as DPO. For 
instance, the following could be identified as DPs in Theme-role: 
(67) 
 
a) mend this toy (mending event of this toy) 
b) the hat off (an ‘offing’ event of the hat) 
c) where’s Caroline (a locating event of Caroline) 
d) Nana bought this toy (a ‘making present’ event of this toy by Nana) 
All remaining DPs were coded DPS. 
In keeping with the stated hypothesis, it is claimed that DPs in Theme role 
will be endocentric DPs, and will reveal the presence of a VP construction. Study 
2 will explore the relation between utterance types and DPO. Study 3 will explore 
further the nature, and membership of the DPS category, defined here largely as 
‘non Theme-role DPs’. 
5.2 Study 2 - Utterance types and DPO 
Having identified a strong correlation between general DP use and 
utterances of cognitive Complex Events, this study examines the relation between 
DP use in a Theme-role. The prediction at this stage is that DPOs will similarly 
exhibit a stronger relation to CE utterances than ME utterances. 
5.2.1 Testing the relation between all DPO and utterance types 
This study requires the identification of DP use in Theme role (DPO). The 
tally of totals across the corpus is reported in Table 4 below: 
Infant DP use DPO 
it  1506 
that/those 618 
this/these 291 
the/a 1567 
I  
me 241 
Rigid Designators 654 
He/she/they   
him/her them 168 
You 138 
We  
us 2 
Totals 5185 
 
Table 4 Total incidents of DPO use across all scripts 
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The proportion of DPO use to the total number of utterances was calculated 
for each script. All these calculations resulted in data values less than 1, recorded 
to 3 decimal places. As for the previous study, the first test involved the INT and 
RES data being amalgamated to divide infant utterances into Manifest versus 
Complex utterance types: ME or CE. The relation between ME; CE; and DPO can 
be seen in the graphic representation in figure 8 below, plotting the trimmed mean 
value data at 95% confidence level across each MLU band: 
Variable 
 
Mean values  
MLU band 1    MLU band 2    MLU band 3 
ME  .684 .636 .574 
CE .316 .364 .426 
DPO .174 .232 .288 
 
 
Fig 8  Plot of means for ME, CE and DPO by MLU band 
A Pearson correlation test was used to explore the relation between DPO 
and Utterance type. The result was as follows (The ME and DPO correlation is 
the negative – mirror image, as expected): 
Pearson correlation analysis for utterance types and DPO 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = 0.632 p<.001 Negative significant 
CE r = -0.632 p<.001 Positive significant 
 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=38.521 p<.001 (R
2
=0.399). The linear relationship 
(CE:DPO) accounts for 40% of the total variance. 
DPOs 
ME 
CE 
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A regression test was also applied to reveal that CE is a robust predictor, 
accounting for 40% of the variance, showing a stronger association between DPO 
and CE than was evident for DP and CE.  
In line with Study 1, the analysis was repeated to indicate the relation 
between DPO, ME and each of the sub-components of CE utterance types: INT 
and RES.  
The relation between ME; INT; RES; and DPO is represented visually by 
the means plot shown in figure 9, plotting the trimmed mean value data at 95% 
confidence level across each MLU band: 
 
Variable 
 
Mean values 
MLU band 1 MLU band 2 MLU band 3 
ME  .684 .636 .574 
INT .263 .310 .365 
RES .053 .053 .060 
DPO .174 .232 .288 
 
 
Fig 9 Plot of means of ME, INT, RES and DPO by MLU band 
   
A series of Pearson correlation tests were conducted to confirm or otherwise 
the positive correlation between each utterance type and DPO. This gave the 
following: 
 
 
DP O 
Means plot for utterance types and DPOs 
INT 
ME 
RES 
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Pearson correlation analysis for utterance type and DPO 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = -0.632 p<.001 Negative, significant 
INT r = 0,658 p<.001 Positive, significant 
RES r = 0.066 p=.615 Non-significant 
 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=44.384 p<.001  (R
2
 = 0.434). The linear relationship 
(INT:DPO) accounts for 43% of the total variance. 
These results show a positive, significant correlation between DPO use and 
INT utterances. The strength of this relation was further tested by Regression 
analysis which showed INT to be a robust predictor of DPOs. The linear 
relationship accounted for 43% of the total variance. 
This demonstrates that the generalised conclusion that DPOs bear a 
significant relation to INT utterances is reliable and robust. The conclusion can be 
drawn that INT utterances have a relatively larger number of DPs in Theme role. 
5.2.2 The relation of subsets of DPO to utterance type, and frequency of 
occurrence 
Given the frequency of ‘it’ and ‘the’ as DPOs in the raw data, there is the 
possibility that the result so far achieved might be prompted by the 
disproportionate influence of these DPOs. To explore this eventuality the raw data 
was recalculated to give proportions of ‘it/the’-DPs separate from DPOs 
excluding ‘it/the’. Comparative correlation tests were run, which yielded the 
following results (only the positive significant results are given here). 
INT and ‘it/the’ positive, significant correlation r=0.459 p<.001 
INT and DPOs excluding ‘it/the’ positive, significant correlation r=0.599 
p<.001 
These results persist in underlining a strong correlation between DPOs and 
CE utterances, particularly INT utterances. It does raise a further question of what 
if any effects are contributed by RES utterances. As there are comparatively few 
RES examples in the corpus (5% of all utterances) correlation tests are not fine-
tuned enough to show what contribution RES might play. χ2 analysis provides a 
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test for an association between variables by comparing the observed probability of 
occurrence against an expected probability.  
5.2.2.1 The association between DPO and ME; CE 
For this test, a new data set needed to be derived from that used so far. As 
DPOs had been independently identified, a tally was made of DPO as they occur 
in ME, INT and RES utterances. 
Thus the probability of occurrence of DPOs for each utterance type could be 
calculated. Calculations were made for each MLU band independently. The null 
hypothesis is that utterance type will have no effect on DPO use within any MLU 
band. As with previous studies the first test compared the broad division by ME 
and CE utterances, to the occurrence or non-occurrence of DPOs at each MLU 
band level, with the following results.  
The table  shows a strong association between CE and DPO, i.e. the actual 
count of DPO use in Complex Events is greater than the expected count 
(highlighted in bold). 
Association between occurrence of DPO and event types 
MLU1 χ
2 
= 867.8 df=1 p<.001 
 ME CE 
Actual 275 715 
Expected 669.2 320.8 
MLU 2 χ 
2 
= 1702.6 df=1 p<.001 
 ME CE 
Actual 399 1339 
Expected 1122.5 615.5 
MLU 3 χ
2
 = 1439.0 df=1 p<.001 
 ME CE 
Actual 626 1818 
Expected 1411.7 1032.3 
 
These results show that there is an association between use of DPO and 
utterances of Complex Events. The frequency of occurrence of DPOs in CE 
utterances is higher than the expected probability, which demonstrates a 
significant effect of CE utterances on DPO use in all MLU bands.  
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5.2.2.2 The association between DPO and ME; INT; RES 
The analysis was refined using disaggregated data for CE and applying the 
same test only this time to all three utterance types: ME, INT and RES. In this 
test, the resultant observed versus expected probabilities were used to differentiate 
between the significant utterance types.  
The following results were obtained. The frequency table shows that the 
significant association is between the presence of DPO in both INT and RES 
utterances (significant cells are highlighted and in bold): 
Association between occurrence of DPO and Utterance types 
MLU1 χ
2 
= 874.3 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 275 607 108 
Expected 669.2 265.3 55.5 
MLU 2 χ 
2 
= 1703.9 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 399 1134 205 
Expected 1122.5 517.1 98.4 
MLU 3 χ
2
 = 1470.3 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 626 1501 317 
Expected 1411.7 882.8 149.6 
 
For all MLU bands observed DPO occurrence in ME was consistently 
below the expected occurrence and the association was not significant. DPO 
occurrence in both INT and RES utterance types was higher than the expected 
count and significant.  
The difference between the actual and expected counts for any utterance 
type variable, gives an indication of the relative strength of the association. So, 
reading from the frequency tables for MLU bands 1-3, the difference between the 
presence of DPO count for INT and the expected count, is in each table higher 
than that for RES: 
 INT 
(YES count- expected) 
RES 
(YES count- expected) 
MLU 1 342 52 
MLU 2 617 107 
MLU 3 618 167 
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An interesting feature is that over time the difference between actual and 
expected count for DPO in RES utterances is increasing at a greater rate than for 
INT. This might suggest a developmental trend in the productive use of DPO in 
RES utterances. 
5.2.2.3 The association between DPit and ME; INT; RES 
Given the high incidence of ‘it’ in the data, a further series of χ2 frequency 
measures was run this time to explore the association between the word ‘it’ 
(which is here coded DPit) and utterance types within each MLU Band. The 
results were as below, all showing a significant association between DPit and the 
Complex Event utterance types INT and RES (except in MLU band 2 where INT 
alone shows the significant association).  
Association between DPit and utterance types 
MLU1 χ
2 
= 115.2 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 40 277 33 
Expected 104.5 230.7 14.8 
MLU 2 χ 
2 
= 90.28 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 35 383 53 
Expected 106.2 308.9 55.8 
MLU 3 χ
2
 = 31.37 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 112 416 92 
Expected 164.7 378.0 77.3 
 
The results raise the interesting question why ‘it’ in INT utterance types has such 
an apparently privileged status. This question will be addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 7. 
5.2.3 Study 2 discussion 
The study set out to explore the relation between DPOs (endocentric DPs), 
and utterance types. A series of correlation tests established that there is a robust 
positive relation between DPO and Complex Event utterance types, and a 
negative relation between DPO and Manifest Event utterances. Although 
correlation studies do not signify a causal relation, testing for observed versus 
expected frequency of occurrence showed there is a significantly higher than 
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expected occurrence of DPO in CE types compared to ME. When the Complex 
Event utterance types INT and RES were subject to the same testing, both INT 
and RES showed a significant effect. The null hypothesis, which would assume 
no differences is therefore disproved. 
Utterances of Complex Events appear to provide the context for the advent 
of distinct DPs in a non-agentive thematic role. Indeed, this context appears to be 
so robust that tests which attempted to distinguish between subsets of the DPO 
tally (‘it/the’ set versus the remainder) showed that such subsets each correlated 
significantly with Complex Event INT utterances. Focusing on the occurrence of 
‘it’ in each utterance type, the χ2 test confirmed that there is a significant 
association between ‘it’ and utterances of Complex Events occurrence particularly 
INT utterances, and to a lesser extent in RES utterances.  ME utterances 
consistently showed no significant association with DPO use.  It must be 
concluded that there is a very strong association between CE utterances and DPO 
use, and as INT utterances constitute the majority of CE utterances, it would 
appear that INT is the locus of initial DPO use in English, and ‘it’ shows a 
privileged relation with INT particularly in MLU band 2. It appears that direct 
objects occur more often in INT utterances than in utterances of Manifest Events. 
Study 3 addresses the relation between utterance types and DPS  
5.3 Study 3 - Utterance types and DPS 
 
5.3.1 Testing the relation between all DPS and utterance types 
This study involves a number of correlation and frequency analyses, 
following a similar pattern to study 2. The test data is the already identified DPS. 
This category was formed of those DPs remaining after the DPO category had 
been extracted.  The whole data set for this study appears in table 5.  It may be 
noted that the relative totals for ‘I’ and Rigid Designators are larger than those for 
the other DPS, and highlighted in bold.   
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Infant DP use DPS 
it  765 
that/those 760 
this/these 366 
the/a 345 
I   (DPI) 2561 
me  
Rigid Designators (RDS) 1106 
He/she/they  398 
him/her them  
You 497 
We 98 
us  
Totals 6551 
 
Table 5 Data set for DPS and DPA 
What makes these subsets additionally interesting is firstly that, the DPS set 
‘I’ played no part in the DPO analyses in 5.2 above (Table 3), and secondly, the 
total use of RD in the DPS set (1106) is almost double that of the RD use in the 
DPO set (654).   Each of these DPS subsets, which will be coded as DPI (for first 
person pronoun) and RDS, will be analysed to establish their relation to utterance 
type, if any.  
The relation between ME; INT; RES; and DPS is represented visually by 
the means plot shown in fig 10, plotting the trimmed mean value data at 95% 
confidence level across each MLU band: 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean values 
MLU band 1 MLU band 2 MLU band 3 
ME  .684 .636 .574 
INT .263 .310 .365 
RES .053 .053 .060 
DPS .225 .294 .387 
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Fig 10 Plot of means of ME, INT, RES and DPS by MLU band 
 
As in the previous study, a series of Pearson tests were performed to 
confirm or otherwise the positive correlation between each utterance type and 
DPS. These gave the following results: 
 
Pearson correlation analysis for utterance type and DPS 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = -0.381 p=.003 Negative, significant 
INT r = 0.362 p=.005 Positive, significant 
RES r = 0.149 p=.257 Non-significant 
 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=8.729 p=.005  (R
2
 = 0.133). The linear relationship 
(INT:DPS) accounts for 13% of the total variance. 
These results show a positive, significant correlation between DPS and INT 
utterances. The strength of this relation was further tested by Regression analysis 
which establishes whether INT is a valid predictor of DPS, (regression was 
significant at the .005 level, significantly greater than chance:  The linear 
relationship accounted for 13% of the total variance.  This result is not as robust 
DPS 
ME 
INT 
RES 
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as the linear relationship between INT utterances and DPO (43% predictor), and 
gives grounds to query whether the correlation analysis is being affected by 
factors derived from the way that the DPS category was defined (essentially non-
DPO). A series of frequency analyses were conducted for each MLU band, to 
measure the association between DPS occurrence and utterance types ME; INT; 
RES. The results are as follows: 
Association between DPS and utterance type 
MLU1 χ
2 
= 13.67 df=2 p=.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 658 242 78 
Expected 661.1 262.0 54.8 
MLU 2 χ 
2 
= 71.86 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 847 338 137 
Expected 853.8 393.4 74.8 
MLU 3 χ
2
 = 182.32 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 1196 514 220 
Expected 1114.8 697.1 118.1 
 
For MLU bands 1 and 2, it is with RES that the association is significant. 
For MLU band 3, it is with RES and ME that the association is significant. 
These results present an interesting contrast to the correlation analysis. The 
differential function of DPs which have been designated as DPS, may be the 
source of the problem. It is possible that ‘I’ (first person), he/she/they and RD 
could indicate Agentive roles in some utterances, which other DPS do not. Some 
may be non-agentive subjects, or expletives.  Although the frequency analysis 
shows a significant association with RES, the correlation analysis shows a 
significant relation with INT. The frequency result at MLU band 3 shows further 
interesting results where ME utterances and DPS show a significant association. 
To clarify this outcome, further tests were conducted by separating subsets 
of the DPS category. The subsets were those DPs which were the most frequent: 
DPI (first person pronoun) and RDS. The analysis of each these two DPSs is 
described in the next two sections. 
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5.3.2 The relation of DPI to utterance type, and frequency of occurrence. 
Given the extent of DPI use in the raw data (2561 occurrences), there is the 
possibility that the result so far achieved might be influenced by it. To explore 
this eventuality, the raw data was recalculated as the proportion of DPI use to the 
total number of utterances for each script. All these calculations resulted in data 
values less than 1, recorded to 3 decimal places.  
Pearson correlation and regression tests were run to analyse the correlation 
between DPI and utterance types ME; INT; RES, which yielded the following: 
Pearson correlation analysis for utterance type and DPI 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = -0.441 p<.001 Negative, significant 
INT r = 0.373 p=.003 Positive, significant 
RES r = 0.304 p=.018 Positive significant 
 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=9.376 p=.003  (R
2
 = 0.139). The linear relationship 
(INT:DPI) accounts for 14% of the total variance. 
Linear Regression F(1,58)=5.926 p=.018  (R
2
 = 0.093). The linear relationship 
(RES:DPI) accounts for 9% of the total variance. 
The linear regression analysis shows INT and RES to be predictors of DPI.  
As with the previous study, the correlation analysis was followed up with a 
χ2 frequency analysis. 
Appropriate data sets were prepared involving a tally of all DPS data as 
they appear in individual utterance types.  χ2 tests were applied to the DPI  data, 
to establish if there is an association between DPI and Utterance type ME; INT;  
RES and then to note the observed and expected frequency of occurrence. 
The results of the first analyses appear below, and show that the association 
between DPI and utterances of Complex Events is significant across all MLU 
bands, and that the difference between the observed and expected frequency of 
occurrence is high for both INT and RES utterance types (highlighted in the 
frequency tables): 
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Association between DPI and utterance types 
MLU1 χ
2 
= 222.5 df=1 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 72 146 55 
Expected 184.5 73.1 15.3 
MLU 2 χ 
2 
= 571.6 df=1 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 255 489 129 
Expected 563.6 260.0 49.4 
MLU 3 χ
2
 = 672.4 df=1 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 366 848 178 
Expected 804.0 502.8 85.2 
 
The findings from these tests are in line with the previous correlation tests 
for the relation between DPI and utterance types. Both show a significant effect 
between DPI and both INT and RES. 
5.3.3 The relation of RDS to utterance type, by frequency of occurrence. 
For the following tests the RDS data was expressed as a proportion, derived 
from total RDS use divided by the total number of utterances for each script. All 
these calculations resulted in data values less than 1, recorded to 3 decimal places. 
The RDS data was in a narrow range (average mean scores for each MLU band: 
MLU 1 = .066; MLU 2 =.051; MLU 3= .044) and correlation testing gave no 
significant results: 
Pearson correlation analysis for utterance type and RDS 
Utterance types Correlation Significance 
ME r = -0.022 p.865 Non-significant 
INT r = 0.041 p=.753 Non-significant 
RES r = -0.193 p=.139 Non-significant 
 
χ2 tests were applied to the frequency count RDS data, to explore the 
association between RDS and Utterance type ME; INT; RES and then to note the 
observed and expected frequency of occurrence. 
The results of these analyses appear below, and show that the association 
between RDS and utterances of Complex Events is significant for RES utterances 
across all MLU bands. INT utterances show a positive association with RDS for 
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MLU bands 1 and 2, but not MLU band 3 where ME utterances show higher than 
expected occurrence of RDS: 
Association between RDS and utterance types 
MLU1 χ
2 
= 478.20 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 174 124 30 
Expected 219.8 82.2 26.1 
MLU 2 χ 
2 
= 52.96 df=2 p<.001 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 188 136 64 
Expected 246.0 98.5 43.6 
MLU 3 χ
2
 = 10.54 df=2 p=.005 
 ME INT RES 
Actual 254 78 46 
Expected 232.1 103.2 42.7 
 
5.3.4 Study 3 discussion 
Analyses were conducted on three different DPS types.  
Firstly all DPS: In the correlation studies, DPS and INT utterances showed 
a significant relation, although not as robust as the DPO/INT relation. Frequency 
analyses showed RES to have a significant association with DPS for all MLU 
bands, ME to have a higher than expected DPS count at MLU band 3. In all bands 
INT utterances consistently scored a lower than expected count. These results 
seem to be contradictory. The tests each use different data sets (proportioned data 
for correlation analysis, and tally data for frequency analysis) and therefore the 
differing test results is revealing the heterogeneous nature of the DPS data set (all 
non-DPO). As the largest components of the DPS set are DPI and RDS, separate 
analyses of each of these provided some clarity. 
Testing DPI: For both correlation and frequency tests INT and RES 
utterances were found to have a significant association with DPI, and INT has the 
stronger association by consistent higher than expected occurrences. 
Testing RDS: Correlation tests showed a non-significant result. Frequency 
tests showed a significant association between RES and RDS for all MLU bands, 
and an association between ME and RDS at MLU band 3. 
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One conclusion is that the category DPS as defined, is as suspected, 
somewhat hybrid, and test results for DPS analysis seem to show a mix of two 
types of result: INT significant for correlation tests, but RES and ME for 
frequency tests. This contrast was clarified by separating DPS into DPI which 
exhibits the stronger association with INT, and RDS which exhibits the stronger 
overall association with RES, and also with ME at MLU band 3.  
6. General discussion 
The series of studies was set up to explore the relation between DP use and 
utterance types (ME, INT, RES). The first study found that bare nominal use 
correlated positively and significantly with ME utterances and that total DP use 
correlated positively and significantly with CE utterances. This result confirms 
the original prediction that infants will tend to use bare nominal forms when 
characterising Manifest Events, while the use of DPs will emerge when Complex 
Events are being described. 
Study 2 confirmed the strong correlation between INT utterances and DP 
elements functioning in a non-agentive Theme role in line with adult 
interpretation of grammatical Object. This relation was found to be so robust that, 
correlation tests of sub-groups of Theme role DPs showed positive significant 
correlations with INT utterances. The strong effect was confirmed by regression, 
and frequency analyses. The latter showed that RES utterances also had a 
significant effect on DPO use, but not as strong as INT utterances. All DPOs and 
particularly the single word ‘it’, very common in the data, was shown, by the 
frequency measure, to have a strong association with INT utterances.  
As transitive verbs are words that need to be linked to their non-agentive 
themes, the underlying assumption is that a category [V] is present in utterances 
that have DPOs. In conventional terms this constitutes a verb phrase [VP]. As it is 
INT utterances which appear to provide a robust context for the advent of distinct 
DPs in a non-agentive theme role, there is a strong suggestion that INT utterances 
are providing the context for the acquisition of the verb phrase in English. There 
is also the suggestion that ‘it’ is playing an important role in this process. 
Study 3 considered the relation between utterance types and potentially 
Subject role DPs, with comparable successive testing of sub-divisions of DPS. 
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These tests seemed more inconclusive. Frequency tests which focus on specific 
DPS use revealed for the most commonly used DPSs, that INT utterances have 
the strongest association with ‘I’ (first person) and RES utterances have a strong 
association with RDS. There is also the suggestion that RDS use is subject to a 
developmental effect, as progression in linguistic ability (MLU) and age 
experience show increased frequency over expected levels in ME utterances in 
MLU band 3. These results suggest that INT provides a context for DPI and RDS 
use, as does RES. One evident conclusion is that DPI and RDS are each fulfilling 
an Agent role, and for English acquisition, these are also grammatical subject.  
In considering how these studies contribute to the bigger picture, it is 
strongly inviting to conclude that CE utterances are providing the essential 
context for the Conceptual-Intentional bootstrapping hypothesis to operate:  
INT utterances exhibit DPO use, effectively suggesting [VP V DPO] constructions, 
where initially ‘it’ appears as DPO: [VP V -it] 
INT utterances also exhibit DPO and DPS use, suggesting [DPS[VP V DPO]] 
constructions, where initially ‘I’ (first person) appears as [DPS: I [VP V -it]] 
RES utterances exhibit DPO and DPS use: suggesting [DPS[VP V DPO]] 
constructions, where RDS seems to fulfil an Agent role: [RDS[VP V DPO]] 
ME appears much later to exhibit RDS but not DPO use: suggesting possible 
[RDS[V]] constructions. 
How these proposed structural descriptions are realised in practice is 
explored in detail in the next Chapter. In general, however, this evidence supports 
the proposal made in the conclusion to the previous chapter, that it is the unique 
properties of utterances about Complex Events which initiate syntactic growth. As 
INT utterances appear to be strongly implicated in all positive test results, a clear 
question is raised: why are INT utterances such a productive powerhouse for 
development, and why is first person use so evident?  
INT utterances are highly informative. They express mental representations 
that are attributed to the infant herself; are not necessarily shared in common 
ground; and seemingly make reference to absent or not yet occurring intentional 
events. Because INT utterances involve intentions and desires, there is a high 
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premium on having them understood by the adult. Miscommunication could result 
in failure for the infant to achieve what she wants/needs/requires. Utterances of 
this kind are highly important to an intentional being. Thus the acquisition of a 
conventionally acceptable means of expression is a high priority making the 
effort-engagement balance of infant intentionality very cost effective. 
In the next chapter, based on this empirical evidence and qualitative data 
drawn from the Travis and Manchester corpora, I will characterise how the 
bootstrapping process may proceed, to result in the acquisition of core English 
syntax for infants in the 18 – 30 month age range. 
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Chapter 7   
Conceptual-Intentional bootstrapping  
in the acquisition of the English [V]erb 
Introduction 
A decisive meta-cognitive development, described in Chapter 5, enables infants to 
construct new intentional environments of their own, as opposed to those given 
and manifest in the ‘here and now’. These have been termed Complex Events, 
which still focus on dynamic substantives, but concern intentional change of state. 
These events are all complete or culminated, and following Vendler (1957) can be 
classed as Achievements or Accomplishments rather than Activities. A simple 
mapping of linguistic expression to context will not meet the communicative 
needs to talk about Complex Events, which involve two sub-events, one manifest 
and one constructed. This complex context demands new linguistic means to be 
acquired.  Traditional acquisition accounts appeal to the idea that verbs denote 
actions and nouns denote entities, and that word mapping proceeds on this basis, 
deriving a route into syntax through lexically sourced grammatical categories. On 
these accounts, one reason why verbs have been considered to be ‘hard words’ is 
that it is conceptually impossible to separate an action from the actor, or recipient. 
Actions cannot occur without an actor of some sort. Thus learning verbs as 
conceptual labels of discrete actions is found to be difficult without including 
information about potential participants, and learning nouns as discrete object 
labels is equally difficult without including information about dynamic 
potentialities.  
In English syntax, it is noun phrases (DPs) and not nouns that refer to 
entities, and verbs are typically interpreted as functions from DP referents to types 
of events, denoted by verb phrases. It is the referent of the DP that ‘measures out’ 
(Tenny 1987, Dowty 1991) the event denoted by the verb phrase.  
My hypothesis makes certain predictions, as stated in Chapter 6, that infants 
will tend not to use DPs when characterising Manifest Events and determiner-less 
nominals will predominate. The use of DPs will become apparent when Complex 
Events are being described.   The empirical study in Chapter 6 revealed that 
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Complex Events do have properties significantly different from those of Manifest 
Events. Bare nominals correlated positively and significantly with utterances 
about Manifest Events, but negatively with Complex Event utterance-types.  The 
results confirmed that DPs are robustly present in Complex Event type utterances 
as opposed to those of Manifest Events. Complex Event utterances require a 
predicate that describes the change of state and a means to refer to a theme object 
that ‘measures out’ the change of state. There is, therefore, the strong suggestion 
that Complex Event utterances are the locus for the acquisition of grammatical 
categories [DP] and [V].  
Dividing the occurrence of DPs in the corpus into two general groups, 
roughly those defined as appearing to perform a Theme role and those that do not, 
revealed that Theme role DPs (DPOs) are robustly predicted to occur in INT and 
RES utterances. ‘It’ in this group (DPit) had a highly significant association with 
INT utterances. Of the other group, non-theme role DPs (DPSs), the results 
tended to reflect the hybrid nature of the group as defined. It was found that the 
most frequently used DPSs, ‘I’ and RDS, did have strong associations: ‘I’ with 
INT and RES, and RDS with RES (and later with ME). 
The Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal has tracked important 
contributory developments towards this point. As indicated in Chapters 1 & 2, no 
other acquisition proposal explicitly addresses the inevitability of language 
acquisition, nor why it does not occur productively, earlier than it does. The 
innate linguistic specifications and recognition of complex conceptual ability 
assumed by the generative theory implies inevitability deriving from inbuilt 
systems, but cannot explain why it is not until part way through the second year 
of life that productive linguistic expression is apparent. Similarly, emergent 
theories, which define early (neonate) learning of social communication abilities 
with recognised early understandings of the world, and plentiful linguistic input, 
cannot clarify why infants do not acquire productive language earlier than they 
do. The Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal shows how the 
developing infant is driven inevitably towards acquiring certain key features of 
grammar, a year or more after birth, as a natural consequence of various 
constraints. Chapters 3-5 set out the influential contextual components of the 
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Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal, which characterise the nature of a 
system of ‘constrained flexibility’.  
This is afforded by the interaction between:  
 Infant intentionality: engagement with events is delimited by relevance. 
 Infant generic knowledge: formed by the funnelling effect of engagement with 
wide to ever narrowing contexts. The prime contexts are the social/cultural, 
location, bounded events, intentional action, and finally the substantive 
dynamic properties of the immediate perceived environment (Chapter 3). 
 Meta-cognitive developments: enabling a shift from monitoring perceived 
events to mapping between events including perceived linguistic events. In 
this way word learning and word meanings are distilled out from global 
contexts (Chapter 4). Thence a further meta-cognitive ability enables 
expression of Complex Events.  
When productive infant utterances can be recorded, they exhibit evidence of the 
influence of a syntactic system. The aim of the discussion in this chapter is 
twofold. 
i) To provide a schematic description of the nature of infant early syntactic 
development as evidenced through utterances of Manifest and Complex Events. 
This will be inevitably speculative but is informed at each point by corpus and 
empirical evidence. The description will profile the developing syntactic 
knowledge of the infant from 18 to 30 months, and indicate the implications for 
generativist and emergentist or constructionist theories.  
ii) The outcome from (i) will define what syntactic knowledge infants can 
be expected to have by age 30 months according to the Conceptual-Intentional 
Bootstrapping proposal. This will prepare the way for the discussion in Chapter 8 
which will focus on empirical studies which have conflicting assumptions about 
syntactic knowledge by this age. I will demonstrate that the expected syntactic 
knowledge can account for the outcomes of key comprehension experiments, in 
contrast to the outcomes proposed by the researchers.  
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Examples for the following discussion will be sourced from the two corpora 
already used: Travis’ data and the CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester corpus 
(abbreviated to Manchester data) 
1. The structure of Manifest Event utterances  
Two word utterances in Manifest Events are descriptive of objects/entities 
in the shared event with adults, and the infant utterance, in effect, explicates her 
understanding and knowledge of the dynamic attributes of that object. So the 
following utterances all describe an actual event involving objects/entities doing 
what the infant expects such entities to do. 
(68) 
 
a) Baby crying 
b) Swimming hippo 
c) Doll sit 
 
I have argued in Chapter 5, that the syntactic relation between the words 
used, appears to be a sister relation between [substantive] and [modifier] 
categories: [sub[mod][sub]] or [mod[sub][mod]] and conceptually centred on the 
object/entity and those attributed dynamic properties known (by the infant) to be 
inherent to that entity. I have shown that in the context of these early Manifest 
Event types, the two word utterances that adults might analyse as Noun+V-ing 
combinations are in effect representing this substantive/modifier relation. As the 
structure represents an on-going inherent relation between the perceived 
object/entity and its dynamic properties, the overall utterance expresses an 
incomplete or imperfect event. 
Although this differs substantially from adult usage, examples, from such, 
can be found which appear to mirror infant utterances. As already suggested, ‘a 
spinning top’ describes a traditional toy both in its static and dynamic state. Other 
adult examples are not so clear cut. Compare, for instance, the nature of the 
adjectives in (69) below: 
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(69) 
 
a) watering can 
b) drawing pad 
c) writing table 
d) jumping cow 
e) amazing book 
 
‘Jumping cow’ (69d) appears to express a different relation from those 
expressed by the other examples. ‘Cow’ indicates the experiencer of the activity 
described by the adjective, not reflected in the other phrases. (Such an 
interpretation can be made, but the sense would be absurd; tables do not write, 
pads do not draw. There is a possibility that cans do water, or books do amaze 
given an instrumental interpretation). 
Borer (1990) in discussing the controversy over whether different V-ing 
type words are verb particles (69d) or adjectives (69e), concludes that there is an 
advantage in considering V-ing to be adjectival rather than verbal based on the 
syntactic distribution and morphological affixation. Borer proposes that the 
differences between V-ing adjectives, are due to the properties of the verbs from 
which they are derived.  
For the 18 to 30 month old, I suggest that these verb derivations are not 
accessible, as infants do not have verbs in ME syntax. I propose that all V-ing 
type words learned and expressed by infants are descriptive of the dynamic 
attributes of the object/entity described. These attributes commonly include what 
animate entities do, as well as their affordances and instrumental function.  For 
infants, most V-ing type words function as modifiers in the elementary syntax of 
Manifest Event utterances.  
Note that V-ing does not appear to be a productive stem+suffix 
construction, as shown in examples (68a-c), and the supposition made here is that 
words at this stage are used as they are heard. As ‘–ing’ is a frequently used suffix 
in English, appearing appropriately in utterances about on-going events, it is 
reasonable to assume that this form will be well represented in CDS.  
 For an infant, [substantive][modifier] type sentences ( [mod[sub][mod]] or 
[sub[mod][sub]] ) are limited to utterances about Manifest Events. Reference to an 
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object is made implicitly through the ostensive presence of the object/entity and 
the explication of its dynamic attribute is also motivated through its presence, and 
/or infant generic knowledge of such object-types. These expressions are 
inherently imperfect and on-going. Aspect, therefore is an important differentiator 
between utterances about Manifest and Complex Events, and so the rudimentary 
syntax of Manifest Event (ME) utterances will include an Aspect feature 
[imperfect], which will be accommodated for the time being as: 
[Aspect(imperf)[sub phrase]]   or  [Aspect(imperf)[mod phrase]]. 
2. The structure of Complex Event, INT utterances 
Throughout the Travis and Manchester data a progressive elaboration of 
INT utterances is plainly observable, and described in the previous chapter. In this 
section, I will attempt to track developments to provide a schematic description of 
the structure of INT utterances, based on informed speculation. I will also indicate 
implications for generativist and constructionist analyses as they arise.  
Complex Events of the INT type, as described above, contrast with 
Manifest Events in that the desired object/entity goal of the event is not apparent 
in actuality. To describe this type of event verbally, requires a linguistic means of 
referring to the object/entity, the equivalent for the infant of ‘linguistic pointing’. 
The referred object/entity then ‘measures out’ the event to its conclusion, - the 
goal outcome (Tenny 1987, cited in Dowty 1991 p570). So an event, where 
obtaining juice is the goal, has an associated utterance like ‘get the juice’. In this 
case the [V]erb ‘get’ is a predicate over the obtaining event and ‘the juice’ 
measures out the event to completion, the tracking of which specifies the end 
point. In this way, INT utterances exhibit the dual properties of event completion 
and reference. The generalised event that INT utterances describe is one of 
change of state. 
The empirical study (Chapter 6) demonstrated a strong association between 
INT utterances and DPs, and negatively with the use of bare nominals. 
Linguistically, DPs refer whereas bare nouns do not. Bare nouns indicate category 
sets attributive of objects/entities. Therefore, ‘dog’ denotes a set of kinds which 
all exhibit the properties which contribute to the attribute ‘dogginess’, however 
this is arrived at. Bare nominal use in adult English can be exemplified by the 
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generic plural. So, for example ‘dogs are dangerous’, does not refer to any 
particular dogs, but expresses an unquantifiable  collection of similarly 
categorised kinds, which are judged to have a salient attribute worthy of being 
given focus. DPs, however, can pick out individual members or subgroups of the 
set. So for example, ‘the dog’ picks out, by definite reference, one and only one 
member from the category set of entities conceptualised as ‘dog’.  
There are clues evident in the corpus, to how the structural change from ME 
utterances to INT utterances may come about to meet these requirements. 
2.1 Deriving [V] and [DP] in INT utterances 
Due to the privilege afforded by Tomasello’s data, which describes Travis’ 
progressive development, it is possible to note the heuristics this infant employs 
to differentiate the communicative intentions of ME and INT utterances. (The 
other infants, in the Manchester data, appear to exhibit similar developments, but 
due to the sampling process, a profile of progressive development is unavailable). 
A useful strategy to use, when confronted with something new, is to try out 
what is already known and see if it works - a strategy Braine (1992) had 
suggested (and discussed in Chapter 2 section 1.4.1). As change of state provides 
a fundamental differentiator between ME and INT utterances, Travis shows 
evidence of initially adopting the syntactic construction she already knows for 
ME utterances but with a perfective feature, relying on adult pragmatic abilities to 
interpret her intention.  
For instance, revisiting the example first cited in Chapter 5: 
(70) 
 
a) see Stu – seeing Stu (atelic) 
b) see Stu – wants to be lifted up in order to locate Stu (perfective) 
c) crying mummy – mummy is crying (atelic) 
d) crying mummy – wants to see the picture of mummy crying (perfective) 
 
This type of utterance, through using a named and identifiable person as a 
participant, provides the reference necessary to make the utterance work for both 
ME and INT. In 70a and 70c, Stu or mummy is present. The contrasting intention 
in 70b and 70d is conveyed contextually by the knowledge shared by infant and 
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adult in this case that Stu, or (crying) mummy are not present (within the eye-line 
of Travis). 
Relying on the hearer to interpret quite different content pragmatically has 
its limitations. There is a strong chance that insufficient information can be 
derived from the context, or that the hearer is unwilling to expend the effort 
required for the interpretation. Other devices are available and appear to be 
utilised not only by Travis, but systematically by all the infants in the Manchester 
corpus too. 
There is no doubt that all infants will have experienced in CDS, 
utterances like: ‘shall I get it?’  ‘do you want to get it?’ and the like, and there is 
a strong possibility that ‘get-it’ may initially be  learned as a single unit. 
Tomasello suggests this to be the case and his notes on Travis’ first use of ‘get-it’ 
records it as a single word utterance. Tomasello also regularly hyphenates ‘get-it’ 
in the transcripts.  
The empirical evidence (Chapter 6) showed that ‘it’ has a strong 
association with INT utterances. If ‘-it’ is some sort of suffix, then ‘get-it’ could 
be thought to be overtly marking the verb as telic to express a perfective event. 
The ‘get’ event terminates with ‘it’. This is, however, not a usual suffix in adult 
English, even though the combination is an acceptable utterance in its own right. 
Travis’ two word utterances, as transcribed by Tomasello, for the period 
from 16 to 17 months show the following uses of ‘get-it’.  
(71) 
 
a) Block get-it (16m25) 
b) Bottle get-it (16m26) 
c) Spoon get-it (17m07) 
d) Books get-it (17m25) 
 
On the face of it, Travis appears to be using the familiar ME merged 
construction type for these utterances: [substantive][modifier]. But this sentence 
form presents a problem. ‘Get-it’ is an unusual modifier, unlike any other. It does 
not modify or elaborate on the dynamic property of the substantive object. 
Spoons, books, bottles and so on, can of course be ‘got’, but this dynamic action 
is not a property that can be attributed to the object itself, which adopts a Theme 
Neil Parr  Chapter 7  
Page 233  
 
role within the event as a whole. These utterances appear to be closely reflecting 
the conceptual content of INT utterances by expressing what appear to be the two 
sub-events involved: objects (block, bottle, spoon or books), which are not 
present, and an end state where they are. Whether Travis is using familiar syntax 
or simply labelling conceptual elements of the event (or attempting both) is an 
open question, but from 18 months, Travis changes this construction consistently 
to [get-it] [Substantive], as in: 
(72) 
  
a) Get-it puppet   (18m11) 
b) Get-it guide     (19m01) 
c) Get-it spoon     (19m29) 
 
This is an extraordinarily important development, for two reasons:  
Firstly, this construction is not an acceptable adult sentence and as such will 
not have been heard uttered by an adult to the infant. Adults simply do not speak 
like this.  
Secondly, this usage is not restricted to Travis. The empirical evidence 
(Chapter 6) showed that ‘it’ is significantly associated with INT utterances alone, 
at MLU band 2. All the infants in the corpus studied, employ such an ‘it’ 
construction, although using different words from ‘get’.  
The main words used in INT utterances throughout both corpora are all used 
to express a change of state, and are listed in Table 6 below, the commonest are 
marked in bold. In adult English, some of these verbs are atelic (marked with an 
asterisk) although they have telic connotations in infant use, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Common change of state words in INT utterances 
 
bite-it bring-it mend-it 
do-it * buy-it open-it 
eat-it chop-it pick-it 
find-it clean-it play-it 
get-it cook-it push-it 
have-it * drink-it show-it 
hold-it * finish-it shut-it 
put-it fit-it throw-it 
see-it * fix-it tie-it 
take-it leave-it tip-it 
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Each of the words used can be interpreted as providing information about 
the required goal state of whatever object the infant is engaged with at the time. In 
addition, they play a key syntactic role in this construction. The words most 
commonly used (apart from ‘bite’ and ‘eat’ which incidentally provide insight 
into infant intentional priorities) denote an intention for the appearance or 
presence of an absent object. All these verbs are telic given what the infant 
intends to convey. The less common words display how the infant is refining and 
making more precise what goal states she intends to occur as she engages with 
varying contexts. This process of refinement will eventually affect the telicity (for 
the infant) of the asterisked verbs in Table 6. ‘Do’, ‘have’, ‘hold’ and ‘see’ are 
initially used in INT utterances and serve to express the perfective, punctual 
nature of the event described. As more appropriate (in adult terms) verbs are 
learned then these early verbs will express the more usual atelicity associated with 
them. 
The only large-scale condition that all the infants have in common, apart 
from their age, is that they are all learning English (British or American).  This 
type of construction appears to be so pervasive in early infant INT utterances that 
it suggests it must be a common leverage point into English syntax, yet other 
acquisition research programmes rarely, if ever, remark on it. This may be 
because it appears to exhibit a very odd [V] it [N] construction type. If this is in 
fact a ‘bootstrapping’ moment, then how can it be accounted for? 
A partial solution can be found by recognising the inherent nature of INT 
utterances, in any acquisition model. INT expresses events that are perfective, 
describing an intentional change of state towards an object which appears 
manifestly in its unchanged state (including being absent). The intention is 
focussed on the changed state of the object and not on the means of making the 
change. There would appear to be nothing to prevent an infant uttering ‘get 
spoon’, but the evidence is that they do not do so consistently. ‘It’ is a remarkably 
simple device with considerable power. As a word it can refer but its referential 
meaning must be contextually provided. As a feature it provides an end point for 
the telic verb expressing the complete event.  
Intuitively ‘it’ is integral to the meaning of the verb, as the list in Table 6 
shows: if viewed without the attached ‘–it’, the list reads simply as a vocabulary 
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list, but with ‘–it’, the Table reads as a list of interpretable utterances (admittedly 
requiring context). This intuitive adult judgement may have prompted Tomasello 
to record ‘get-it’ as one word. 
One explanation for the [V]it[N] construction might be that ‘it’ is making a 
major contribution by bridging object reference and verb telicity, the two 
important components of INT utterances. In Complex Events, the contextual 
information is not apparent from the physical context, and must be supplied. [N] 
fulfils this role by providing additional linguistic material attributive of the 
object/entity the infant has in mind (spoon, puppet, juice and so on).  
This does not address the problem of the grammatical status of ‘it’ nor why 
it disappears, when more appropriately adult-like utterances are made. The 
corpora show that when determiners are used, in most cases ‘it’ drops out, as in 
the following examples (although determiner use is sometimes approximate, a 
point discussed further below): 
(73) 
 
a) find a spoons (plural) 
b) mend the train (when a specific train needs mending) 
c) have this doll (no doll present) 
 
Explaining this from a constructionist viewpoint, Tomasello (1992) 
suggests that words like ‘get-it’ are learned from hearing adults say them (‘I’ll 
get-it’ or ‘you get-it’). The infant can then make a productive construction like 
[get-it][N].  
On Tomasello’s verb island account, the other verbs in table 5 would be 
learned individually; ‘mend-it’, ‘pull-it’ and so on. The problem for this account 
is when infants acquire determiner use; that is, when ‘get it spoon’ is replaced in 
favour of ‘get the spoon’. This would demand that either the prior construction 
has to be unlearned, or ‘it’ is acting as some sort of infant determiner, which is 
simply replaced by more appropriate words. In opposition to this last suggestion, 
Pine & Lieven (1997) through corpus study have also noted that determiner-like 
words appear in infant speech at this age. Their conclusion however, from a 
Tomasellan item-based usage approach, states that infants do not have a 
determiner category, as those that appear to be determiners are not used correctly 
Neil Parr  Chapter 7  
Page 236  
 
(relative to adult usage). The point they raise about correct usage will be 
addressed presently, but in their paper, Pine & Lieven do not identify ‘it’ as a 
determiner, even one used incorrectly. Constructionist accounts would appear not 
to provide a generalised view of ‘it’, its function or structural role. The problem 
can be approached differently by adopting a generative approach. The problem is 
essentially is ‘it’ incorporated with the verb, as the transcript hyphenation 
suggests? Or is it more an early infant determiner? 
 As stated in Chapter 5, in a Minimalist generative framework, Merge, is 
normally driven or constrained by the grammar-specific requirements imposed by 
lexical features of the items or markers involved (Adger 2003). On this account, 
for ‘get-it’ in early infant grammars, ‘it’ may be viewed as an overt feature of 
‘get’ which marks telicity. According to the theory, features remain in the 
derivation and contribute to semantic interpretation, or perform a syntactic 
function after which they are deleted (motivated by syntactic principles).  
This would suggest, for an INT utterance expressing change of state, the 
following, schematically expressed, illustrative structure in fig 11: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 11 Schematic diagram of INT structure where +telic indicates a 
feature marking telicity 
 
The verb in this structure has a feature (+telic) for telicity, realised by ‘it’. 
In utterances like ‘get it spoon’ there is no motivation for its deletion, and 
therefore it remains.  
 
 
 
V +telic N 
get + it spoon 
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But when determiners are present, which function as marking out the course 
and completion of the event predicated by the telic verb, ‘it’ is deleted, as 
illustrated in fig 12: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 12 Schematic diagram showing deletion of ‘it’ 
 
This account, where ‘-it’ is considered an integral part of the verb, is 
unsatisfactory in at least two respects: 
i) If ‘it’ is an overt verb feature of telicity, there is little reason for its 
deletion in the presence of a determiner. ‘Get-it the spoon’ should be 
commonplace, but such expressions do not obviously occur in the corpora. 
ii) ‘It’ may be an overt argument marker of the verb. Its overt nature in 
intuitively acceptable utterances (‘get it’) makes it accessible. It maps to infant 
understanding of whole events, and provides a marker for a direct object. 
Although there is controversial debate about the relation between verb telicity and 
direct objects (outlined in section 2.2 below), ‘it’ could provide an overt link, but 
its deletion is unexplained as with ‘get-it spoon’, spoon could adequately fulfil a 
direct object role. 
The alternative, that ‘it’ is an early infant determiner, has more plausibility. 
In order to make INT utterances, the sentence used will need to exhibit minimally 
three grammatical categories: 
i) a category with may predicate over the state change event  
ii) a category that provides reference to the participating object/entity 
undergoing the change of state, and 
V +telic N 
get + it spoon 
D 
the 
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iii) a category that describes the kind of object entity involved. 
Traditionally these categories are [V]; [D]; and [N] respectively. If this is 
the correct, then each word in ‘get it spoon’ faithfully maps to this category 
designation. This would point to ‘it’ as an early infant determiner. 
Pine & Lieven (1997) claim that infants do not have a determiner category, 
as those that appear to be determiners are not used correctly (relative to adult 
usage) as in: ‘find a spoons’. This view appears to be based on the synthetic 
approach often favoured by item-based research. This generally suggests that 
lexical items are learned independently and coalesce into categories when 
sufficient are learned. The alternative analytic process would propose that the 
global category [D] is established because of the syntactic function it needs to 
perform and category membership is extended and refined over time. What is odd 
about Pine & Lieven’s conclusion is that it seems to ignore that determiner-like 
words, whether used with adult precision or not, appear in determiner-like 
relations within sentences. From the analytic approach adopted here, it is noted 
that the determiner-like words and only these in effect project to the [D] node. 
This would appear to confirm that the words, although as yet lacking in the 
refinements of use, are all recognised as potential members of the same global 
category. Refinements in Determiner use can be eventually derived from positive 
evidence in nearly all adult utterances.  
‘It’ seems to be a mysterious element. There appear to be no examples of 
adults specifically correcting this unconventional use. Indeed, as the usage also 
seems to be generally transparent to researchers, it may be that adult carers do not 
even notice it. It is tempting to suggest that adult utterances like ‘get it’ constitute 
an unambiguous trigger for localised syntactic growth (treelets) of the kind Janet 
Fodor (1998) has suggested (discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.4.2).  
When adult-like determiners are used, the INT structure expressing change 
of state resembles a traditional VP type configuration for English. The result is 
generalised to a functional, syntactically well-formed ‘treelet’ or part sentence, 
which can be schematised below (fig 13) using conventional labels for nodes: 
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Fig 13 Schematic diagram of the INT ‘treelet’ 
 
Across all corpora, it is clear that this is a productive syntactic construction 
for INT utterances. Different words can appear in [V] position indicating different 
state change events (exemplified in Table 6), different objects can be indicated in 
[N], and a small restricted set of determiners [D] are used, to effect linguistic 
reference.  
The generalised structure of INT utterances and the verbs used, provide a 
strong challenge to Tomasello’s VIH proposal. His account states that lexical 
items, through frequent use and individual morphological development, form verb 
islands which when reaching a critical mass fall together by some means (analogy 
was suggested) to form a common category – [V]erb. The case made here is that 
the identified change of state words (‘have-it’, ‘get-it’ and others in Table 6) are 
not lexical items independently developing through usage, but those that can be 
members of an existing syntactic category [V] which functions within the context 
of INT utterances, and motivated by a change of state event. It is the category 
membership which develops over time, not the category. What is the source of 
such categories?  
I have indicated that to express the content of an INT utterance, three 
discrete contrastive categories are required. These have been labelled 
conventionally as [V], [D], and [N], but could equally be infant prototypical 
categories [event change], [reference] and [substantive]. These are clearly closely 
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related to the conceptual content of an INT utterance and, like [substantive] and 
[modifier] may be tracked to an innate endowment. However sourced, these 
necessary categories appear to be established early, and in the context of INT 
utterances. 
Reviewing the commonly developing ‘verb islands’ in Tomasello’s (Travis) 
data, reveals that they are in actual fact performing a role within INT utterances. 
Although Tomasello does not identify INT as an utterance type, he does define 
‘change of state verbs’ and more importantly he does explicitly recognise Travis’ 
intentions. His contextual comments on each recorded utterance frequently 
indicate that Travis’ utterances involve wants, requests, demands or reference to 
as yet unrealised outcomes.  
Calculating the proportion of unambiguously identified INT utterance types 
in the Travis data based on Tomasello’s own explicit comments about Travis’ 
intentions, gives the following results (Table 7): 
 
Verb Proportion % INT 
get 99 
hold 88 
fix 85 
open 85 
give 75 
pick 71 
get + out/in/off 70 
have 67 
wipe 50 
come 50 
see 46 
move 43 
take 41 
put 20 
Table 7 Proportions of INT utterance use of verbs in Travis data 
 
If INT utterances were recognised, it would be apparent that the lexical 
items for which Tomasello claims an island effect, possibly appear so courtesy of 
the role they play within the syntactic construction associated with INT, alongside 
other roles. They already contribute to a category necessary for INT utterance 
types, which I have labelled conventionally as [V].  
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Given the division between Manifest and Complex Event types, two 
troubling problems of VIH can begin to be resolved. Firstly, the observation that 
different verbs exhibit differential degrees of morphological and structural 
development can be traced to the roles they are playing in ME and CE utterances 
rather than their isolation as islands. Secondly, the problem of analogy is solved 
because of the presence of the superordinate category [V] in the syntax which 
defines the common relation between the collections of different words learned. 
There is no need to propose an undefined critical mass of islands that coalesce 
into [V].  
From a different perspective, Ninio’s path-breaking verb hypothesis can be 
challenged. In Chapter 2 Section 3.5.2, Ninio’s view of path-breaking verbs was 
outlined. On this account, initial word combinations are semantically motivated 
rather than reflecting syntactic knowledge. Given a growing store of word 
combinations, Ninio suggested (Ninio 1999 p116) that children gain a ‘growing 
realisation’ or ‘insight’ into which words require arguments and therefore 
function as predicates. However, what constitutes, motivates, or guarantees a 
‘growing realisation’ or ‘insight’ is unclear. Ninio’s path-breaking hypothesis 
proposes that the first verbs children acquire are prototypically transitive, and 
based on infant data, she claims that initial transitivity is reflected in terms of two 
cognitive processes, either objects being drawn to/into the self (possession or 
consumption) or object creation. This is explained by her observation that the first 
(S)VO constructions involve ‘want’ ‘take’ ‘eat’ ‘hold’ ‘get’, or ‘make’ which she 
terms ‘path-breaking verbs’ upon which verb phrase construction is based. Just 
how a ‘growing realisation’ can become an inevitable outcome is not clear. Early 
INT utterances would appear to provide the clarification missing from Ninio’s 
observation. As INT utterances express infant intentions towards a change of state 
of identified objects, it is most likely that the verbs Ninio lists will be included as 
verbs learned by infants to express INT utterances. Thus it is not specific verbs as 
discrete lexical items which demand a (S)VO construction, but the obligatory role 
they play in INT utterances.  
As the informative content of INT utterances is characterised by change of 
state and verb telicity, my account of early verb acquisition may shed some light 
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on the relation between verb arguments, aspect and event structure, an issue 
which has been hotly debated. 
2.2 Verb argument structure in INT utterances 
Verbs are traditionally categorised in terms of their argument structure, 
which helps differentiate those labelled intransitive - one argument, transitive – 
two arguments, and di-transitive – three arguments, exemplified respectively: 
(74) 
 
a) The girl is running (SV) 
b) The girl is holding a baton (SVO) 
c) The girl is passing the baton to a boy (SVOO) 
 
In many ways this is the converse of the conceptual problem stated in the 
introduction, where verbs are considered to be ‘hard words’ because conceptually, 
actions cannot be divorced from the participants performing them. This linguistic 
converse addresses the problem from the point of view of the verb where the 
meaning of a verb cannot be divorced from the nature of the allowed participatory 
entities.  
Although, the in/di/transitive classification differentiates 67 (a) - (c), it does 
not capture why the following should be possible without needing ‘write’ to be 
three different verbs: 
(75) 
 
a) The girl is writing (SV) 
b) The girl is writing a message (SVO) 
c) The girl is writing a message to a boy (SVOO) 
 
Additional problems occur for causative alternates, where some alternate 
and others do not as example (69) below: 
(76) 
 
a) The girl broke the vase (SVO) 
b) The vase broke (SV seemingly expressing *OV) 
c) The girl cleared the table 
d) *The table cleared 
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A traditional solution has been to assign appropriate theme role information 
to word entries in the lexicon, which describe the kinds of participatory roles a 
verb allows. Amongst these are Agent, Patient, Experiencer, Theme and many 
others. So in 69(a), the girl is Subject of the sentence and Agent of the act of 
breaking where the vase is grammatical Object and Patient of the act of breaking. 
In 69(b) the vase is Subject of the sentence but still Patient of the act of breaking 
warranted by the inference that a vase has an inherent structural potential for 
breaking. This contrasts with 69(d) where the table is the Patient/experiencer of 
the act of clearing, but has no inherent potential for clearing. Generative 
approaches generally adopt a procedure utilising thematic information through 
lexically supplied θ-marking and case assignment during the derivation. 
The problem with thematic role assignment is that the potential roles seem 
to proliferate to capture more information to account for the ways different verbs 
operate. There is little agreement about what such an inventory should be as 
Parsons (1994) has noted. One solution to this, following Vendler (1957), is to 
consider Aspect, as the time schemata relative to the events being described. 
Vendler identified 4 such event types (Aktionarte) labelled respectively States, 
Activities, Achievements, and Accomplishments, which Vendler defines in the 
following way:  
“For activities: "A was running at time t" means that time instant t is on a time 
stretch throughout which A was running.  
For accomplishments: "A was drawing a circle at t" means that t is on the 
time stretch in which A drew that circle.  
For achievements: "A won a race between t1 and t2" means that the time 
instant at which A won that race is between t1 and t2.  
For states: "A loved somebody from t1 to t2" means that at any instant 
between t1 and t2 A loved that person.  
This shows that the concept of activities calls for periods of time that are not 
unique or definite. Accomplishments, on the other hand, imply the notion of 
unique and definite time periods. In an analogous way, while achievements 
involve unique and definite time instants, states involve time instants in an 
indefinite and non-unique sense.” (Vendler 1957 p149) 
 
By this definition an Accomplishment is an activity with a unique and 
definite time period, and an Achievement is a state involving unique and definite 
time instants. 
Different researchers (Comrie 1976/98, Smith 1991) have found these 
categories too wide to be useful and have decomposed them into feature sets. 
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These features may combine in different ways to provide greater nuance for 
analysis. The features are variously labelled by different researchers but here the 
terms ±durative, ±dynamic and ±telic will be used.  
Olsen (1997) proposes that the aspectual features are not equipollent (+ or -) 
but privative, appearing only as a + marking for a verb as part of its semantics 
under all conditions. In other cases where a verb is unmarked, the aspectual 
feature (+ or -) is derived pragmatically from the context of use. For instance, 
‘drink’ is inherently an activity (+durative +dynamic -telic), but there is a need to 
draw a distinction between atelic ‘she is drinking’ and telic ‘she is drinking the 
coffee. If ‘drink’ is privatively marked (+durative +dynamic) and pragmatically 
(ø-telic) then the telic feature receives its value from the context.  ‘She is drinking 
the coffee’ (+durative +dynamic +telic), where telicity is pragmatically marked 
positive because the activity has a stated end point, and can be formally classed as 
an Accomplishment. 
On this account Olsen predicts 8 possible situation types (2 of which she 
finds unattested by the wide range of languages to which she applies her account).  
The two possible situation types in additional to Vendler’s  are Semelfactive 
(a single dynamic action: sneeze or cough, which may be repeated into a longer 
sequence) and Stage level state (a state of limited duration: ‘I am sick’ as in 
currently sick but knowing this state will not last). The 8 situation types appear in 
Table 8 below: (ø denotes that the value is pragmatically derived): 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Olsen’s organisation of privative and pragmatic Aspect features 
 
By this analysis, INT utterances which have been noted to be non-durative, 
and telic, pattern fully with the notion of Achievement. Rappaport Havav & Levin 
(2005), however, note that uniformity in argument expression does not correlate 
Situation types Durative Dynamic Telic 
Stative + ø ø 
Semelfactive ø + ø 
Activity + + ø 
Stage level state + ø + 
Achievement ø + + 
Accomplishment + + + 
unattested ø ø + 
unattested ø ø ø 
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uniformly with aspect for change of state verbs, particularly those denoting 
incremental change (as in ‘he dimmed the lights’).  Kratzer (2002) noted that telic 
verbs take direct objects, and in the languages studied Finnish, Gaelic, German, 
proposes that there is a direct link between telicity and objects being assigned the 
accusative case.  
The debate centres on how the aspectual features interact between the 
semantics and syntax and whether they are the exclusive property of one or the 
other component. Such a debate is well beyond the scope of the current concerns 
of a bootstrapping process. However, a bootstrapping focus gives a privileged 
view of language acquisition at its beginnings and may provide some insight into 
what may be at the heart of the debate, in the following way.  
The Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal is based on the well-
motivated assumptions that young infants have an under-developed lexicon not 
innately specifying categories like [V]erb and [N]oun. In the beginning 
conceptual-intentional abilities exert a strong effect on the initial acquisition of 
syntax. As has been described, in Manifest Events there is a direct relation 
between the perceived context and an infant’s informative intent. Consequently, 
the relation between words in two-word ME utterances is conceptually motivated 
based on generic knowledge of events and/or perception. Complex events do not 
allow for this.  
Complex event INT is based on a conceptual-intentional content 
summarised as ‘state change with a specified goal’, and it is the goal which is the 
focus of the infant’s attention. The actual object/entity involved and the change 
state is contextually motivated. An aspectual analysis places these events, in this 
context semantically as Achievements [+dynamic, +telic]. What is pivotal to 
syntactic development is the word ‘it’. As ‘it’ is referential of the infant’s 
representation of the goal state, there are grounds to suggest that ‘it’ provides 
expression to the telicity inherent in INT.  
In the initial acquisition of words that will function as [V], it might be 
proposed that the telicity inherent in the end state event bestows telicity on the 
word meaning of the verb. In other words, more simply, words used as verbs in 
INT utterances acquire their lexical telicity from the INT context.  
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Considering again the example (70) (quoted above as examples 62a and 62b 
and repeated here for convenience) 
(77) 
a) see Stu – seeing Stu (atelic) 
b) see Stu – wants to be lifted up in order to see Stu (telic) 
 
It was suggested that an infant’s word use (telic vs atelic) can be 
pragmatically motivated to draw the distinction between atelic Manifest Events 
and telic Complex Events. On the currently developing account only ‘see’ in 
77(b) is a verb, and in the context of INT must be telic. The strong claim is that an 
infant’s way into verbs demands that all early verbs are telic. INT utterances 
appear to require an object (conceptually the focus of the informative intent), and 
the empirical study showed a significant relation between INT utterances and 
object DPs. Intuitively, some of the INT verbs in table 5, are not telic in many 
contexts for adult speech: ‘have’, ‘hold’, ‘leave’, push’, but in infant INT 
utterances they are. They express intentions and have the form ‘have-it’, ‘hold-it’, 
‘leave-it’, ‘push-it’. They are required to express complete state change events 
and all require an Object DP. It would appear that a relation between event end 
state, verb telicity and object arguments is established early.  
However, there is no escaping that the verbs as lexical items, need to have 
been learned/acquired from somewhere. All the INT verbs listed in table 5 above, 
have been reported with an ‘–it’ suffix, and each combination, given an 
appropriate context, can be accepted as felicitous adult utterances, and telic. There 
is every reason to suppose that such verbs regularly appear in CDS (Child 
Directed Speech) possibly as imperatives, as sub-sentential or as stressed 
subcomponents of larger utterances. Thus these verbs are presented to the infant 
with, in effect, an overt yet inherently un-interpretable marker of the verb’s 
potential internal argument structure. They would also appear to provide evidence 
for word order in English: essentially direct object following the verb (VO). This 
provides little evidence for the universality of the telic-direct object debate. It 
does suggest that verbs that take a direct (theme role) object may not be telic in 
adult English, but the prototype is, however, telic. The key feature of the 
prototype is that it is the locus of acquisition, which however reinforces the 
bootstrapping case for English. 
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2.3 The morphology of INT verbs 
Key differences from adult syntax are that early INT utterances exhibit a 
null subject and that [V] is non-finite. This may qualify INT utterances for 
inclusion in Wexler’s optional infinitive stage (discussed in Chapter 2 section 2). 
The alternative being proposed here is that in INT utterances the non-finite form 
is not optional, but a feature of this early construction. As Wexler has not 
recognised Complex Event utterances, his analysis cannot show that there is a 
relation between verb finiteness and utterance type. Discussion in Section 3 below 
will show that RES utterances do appear to require a finite verb, but sometimes 
use a verb stem depending on factors outside of the syntax.  
Verb forms in English tend to utilise auxiliary verbs to make them finite. 
Morphological changes to verb stems are sparse and are limited to the past tense 
or the simple present, forms which infants will have already experienced through 
hearing past reference (daddy drove the tractor) or generic statements (daddy 
drives a tractor). Neither absolute past nor generic present meanings are relevant 
to INT utterances. If there is a time reference then it must be a relative time from 
the present into the future when the intended goal is achieved. English does not 
mark futurity through finite verb stem morphology. 
Imperatives in English, however, generally are formed from the verb stem 
(with zero morphological inflexion). Clearly, INT utterances can be interpreted as 
imperatives by adults (much to the advantage of the infant of course), yet it does 
not seem to be at the heart of the infant construction. INT utterances focus on 
achieving the object as a goal, not the means of accomplishing it, and as such an 
agent is not relevant to fulfil the goal. If anything, the implied imperative is 
directed towards the world generally not to a specific agent. In early uses, when 
specific individuals are referenced, the utterance appears to have an additional 
vocative element, seemingly drawing that person’s attention to the intention, 
rather than demanding they perform a specific action. Vocatives also include the 
infant’s own name. 
(78) 
 
a) Gail, get the doll (Gail is the infant) 
b) Mummy, eat it egg. (Carl is going to eat the egg) 
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Alternatively, the syntax might be interpreted as having a missing modal or 
future tense auxiliary, an issue addressed directly in (Section 4) below:  
(79) 
? Daddy (will) fix it  
The discussion so far has raised further possibilities about the developing 
structure of INT utterances which can be captured now with the following 
schematic diagram fig 14  (t* represents the time of culmination, t=‘now’, so  t*>t 
characterises futurity, and here is used to signify the intentional state-change 
element of the INT utterance). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 14 A schematic diagram of the structure of early INT utterances 
 
The ‘treelet’ (schematised in fig 14), which first develops for INT 
utterances is a partial sentence configuration.  As will be shown in section 4, it 
seems to become subject to significant and speedy development. Before exploring 
these developments, it will be useful to review the structure of RES, the 
companion utterance type for Complex events, which reveals additional structure, 
in a comparatively straightforward way. 
3. The structure of Complex Events: RES utterances 
RES utterances express how a present state has come about; usually the 
presence or absence of an object. This utterance type appeared, in the empirical 
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study, to be sparingly used representing only 5% of the infant utterances. One 
reason for this is that the goal state needs to be particularly relevant to the infant 
to prompt a spontaneous intention to communicate about it. So those means which 
result in exciting, interesting or surprising goal states are more likely to be 
brought to mind. An early RES utterance from the Travis corpus is of the 
following type: 
(80) 
 
Buy this plum (referring to shopping being unpacked at home) 
 
This utterance appears to have the same [V[DP]] structure as INT 
utterances. It is perfective in that the focus for the utterance is the ‘plum’, and 
‘buying’ describes the change of state now apparent and shares Travis’ 
knowledge of how the plum has come to be present. In this example, the RES 
utterance relies on pragmatic interpretation by the hearer to differentiate it from 
an INT utterance. More usual examples from both corpora show how the 
communicative intention behind RES utterances is made more explicit: 
(81) 
 
a) Mailbox made this (a doll arrived by post) 
b) Weezer ate the roach (the noticeable action of a pet resulting in the 
absence of the insect) 
c) Nana bought this Porsche (toy gift) 
d) Daddy hurt my leg (emotional outcome) 
 
These utterances identify an end point in the present and the additional 
information provided indicates some means by which the goal has been 
accomplished. Additionally a responsible Agent is named, and the verb form is 
finite.  
Thus a general schematic structure for RES (changed state, completed) 
utterances comparable to the following (fig 15) is suggested. 
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Fig 15 Partial schematic structure for RES utterances 
 
In traditional generative approaches, an IP or TP node (inflexion, tense) is 
defined which has the effect on [V] to license morphological inflexion and has the 
additional function of enabling subject raising after theta role assignment to the 
verb argument structure derived from the lexicon. This theoretical approach 
preserves the simplicity of syntactic development utilising successive merge 
operations.  
On the current account the structural requirements of verbs are still to be 
learned by the infant, and considerations of tense and inflexion are assumed as yet 
not to be established. However, Aspectual information is available to influence 
how RES utterances are structured.  Although RES appears to refer to a past 
event, it is not a discrete past time event. The event is reported according to infant 
knowledge as explanatory only of the end state which is clearly present in the 
here and now. 
It is generally accepted that infants younger than 3 years have very limited 
episodic memory (Tulving 2002), and as such cannot recall specific details of 
prior events or answer a ‘what did we do yesterday/last week’ type questions. 
Infants can give answers if provided with heavy prompting from an adult.  
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The Travis corpus does not include adult infant dialogues, but an example 
can be drawn from the Manchester data, where Gail who is 25 months old (CHI) 
is talking with her mother (MOT): 
(82) 
 
*MOT: and what did you find in the garden that we had to take to hospital  
*MOT: do you remember ? 
*CHI:  Mummy . 
*MOT: Mummy ? 
*CHI:  yeah . 
*MOT: no . 
*MOT: what did you find on the ground ? 
*CHI:  &um +... 
*MOT: a butterfly ? 
*CHI:  no . 
*MOT: no ? 
*MOT: you did . 
*MOT: do you remember ? 
*CHI:  yeah . 
*MOT: what had happened to it ? 
*CHI:  flopped . 
*MOT: it had flopped . 
*MOT: yeah . 
*CHI:  xxx . 
*MOT: it had flopped . 
*CHI:  flopped . 
*MOT: it had flopped . 
*MOT: and you asked Daddy to take it to hospital , didn't you ? 
*CHI:  yeah . 
*CHI:  and Gail's coming now . 
*CHI:  Daddy's coming . 
*MOT: Daddy's coming ? 
*CHI:  yes . 
*MOT: Daddy's coming home for dinner today . 
*CHI:  Gail's coming Gail's home . 
*MOT: Gail's coming to Gail's home ? 
*CHI:  mhm . 
 
CHILDES/Manchester/Eng-UK/Gail06a// 
Gail (25.15) 
 
In this case the adult prompt is helping the infant form a Secondary 
representation of the event in the present, making it possible for her to respond as 
she would in a Manifest Event in the ‘here and now’ with generic information 
from her Generic Knowledge, in this case about flopping butterflies.  
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This example of effectively ‘failed’ communication underlines that infants 
have considerable difficulty in placing episodes in absolute time divorced from 
the present. Relative time, however, is significant for RES utterances. RES 
utterances do not simply report a past event. 
The Complex Event, RES utterance covers the time from before the present, 
culminating only with the present goal. So ‘Nana bought this toy’ refers to how 
the toy has become present, and does not focus on the activity of buying. An 
appropriate adult gloss on the meaning which respects these aspect features might 
be ‘This toy is a result of Nana’s buying’. The Aspectual features for RES are 
[+dynamic, +telic, t*< t] which in general terms characterises Achievements. The 
following studies shed light on the infant choices of words which operate at [V] in 
RES utterances. 
3.1 RES Morphology 
Bloom, Lifter & Hafitz (1997) conducted a corpus study of infants’ 
acquisition of verb stem inflections: -ing; -s; irregular past; -ed. Their study 
focussed on individual verbs used by 2 year olds, listing the acquisition order of 
inflexions in relation to the semantic value of each lexical item. They found that 
the earliest acquisition centred on verbs which were contextually sensitive – light 
verbs – and reflected the aspect of the context of use. Three contexts were defined 
in the research: actions; agent/mover/patient locatives; or states. Those used to 
reflect durative events developed –s and –ing inflections, and those that were 
completive developed irreg/-ed inflexions. The conclusion was that infants were 
not using inflexions as tense markers, but were strongly influenced by event-
aspect, which was claimed to support the ‘aspect before tense hypothesis’. 
Antinucci & Miller (1976) observed that infants’ learning Italian and English both 
used past tense inflexions with verbs which indicate ‘end states’. Bronkart & 
Sinclair (1973) investigated French verbal forms and found that up to the age of 6 
years, aspectual information took precedent over temporal relations. Hyams 
(2007) research into infant root infinitive use in English, Russian, Greek and 
Dutch all showed that event structure, aspect and modality play a role in 
interpretation. 
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The Bloom, Lifter & Hafitz study also found that ‘irreg’ inflection was the 
first ‘in emergence’, although other studies place ‘irreg’ as ranked second to be 
acquired after ‘–ing’. In the present research, I have shown that ME expressions 
may utilise ‘–ing’ inflected words as attributional (adjectival) modifiers of 
substantive items.  
An overview of verb-form use for RES utterances from the Manchester data 
is summarised in Table 9 below.   
It shows how the verb morphology is realised in the 1283 RES utterances in 
the corpus data, and the number of verbs involved. So, of the 493 examples of 
‘irreg’ use, only 29 different verbs are involved. Of the 107 uses of ‘-ed’ only 30 
different verbs are involved. There are 11 instances of ‘-ing’ or ‘-s’ suffixes being 
used for RES utterances. 
 
 
Table 9 Breakdown of infant RES utterances by inflectional verb forms 
 
 
The 29 ‘irreg’ and 30 ‘-ed’ verbs used are listed in Table 10 below, but 
these do not represent any regularity between infants; that is, any one may use 
‘irreg’ when another uses a verb stem form. The disparate use of forms between 
infants suggests that RES verbs are simply learned as such. This underlines that 
RES utterances do not utilise a regular past tense form, derived by morphological 
rule, but express Aspectual, relative time by the acquisition of forms which are 
individually learned. 
 
 
 
 
 Irreg -ed Ø (verb stem) -ing/-s Total 
# utterance 
tokens 
493 107 672 11 1283 
# different verb 
types used 
29 verbs 30 verbs >90 verbs 4 verbs  
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Finite verbs ‘Irreg’  Finite verbs ‘-ed’  
ate forgot bumped hooked 
been found carried jumped 
bit   gave chewed moved 
bought gone cleaned pood 
broke got clicked pushed 
broken had coloured ripped 
brought  left drilled rolled 
built lost dropped saved 
did made finished showed 
done saw fixed slipped 
drunk seen flopped stopped 
eaten shot flushed stopped 
fallen was frightened tidied 
fell went goed weed 
flew  happened wiped 
Table 10   Infant finite verbs used in RES utterances with inflectional forms 
 
Further scrutiny of Table 9 shows that for a large proportion of RES 
utterances, the required finite [V]erb is realised by the bare verb stem. These 
examples and early INT [V]erbs are probably providing source data for the 
observations motivating the optional infinitive stage proposals. My claim is that 
in RES utterances, the [V]erb is finite even though the word used resembles the 
non-finite verb form. 
RES utterances appear to utilise ‘irreg’ inflexions for finite verbs, when 
available (i.e. known). ‘–ed’ inflexions are sparingly used compared to irreg or ø, 
and also appear to have been individually learned for specific verbs. If a specific 
alternative finite verb form is not known then infants use the word which is 
known to them, which is usually the same as the non-finite verb stem. 
That ‘irreg’ appears before ‘–ed’ suggests that infants of this age do not as 
yet have a past tense morphological formation rule, and that the finite verb 
variation is learned on an item by item basis. The prevalent use of ‘irreg’ would 
suggest that the lexical differentiation is overt enough to be relevant for 
acquisition and use. In addition, verbs which have ‘irreg’ morphology in English 
are amongst the most common, and will have been heard frequently. 
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At this stage, RES utterances can be schematically presented as in fig 16 
below. It shows that Aspect features play a grammatical role in the structure of 
RES, by prompting the acquisition of a distinctive finite verb form which is (for 
English) based on a recognisably contrastive morphophonemic form.  
As demonstrated at the beginning of section 3, Agency is a commonly 
present thematic role in RES utterances, and my claim is that this is 
accommodated once again by a simple Merge operation which will be 
continuously confirmed from positive evidence in input. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 16 Schematic representation of RES utterance structure 
 
This structure appears to be what underlies the canonical transitive structure 
in English, and may be making the contribution to those studies that recognise 
SVO constructions as developing after VO constructions, as in Ninio’s study 
(discussed in Chapter 2 section 3).  
The construction and semantics underlying RES utterances are open to 
significant development when infants are able to understand and express 
causative relations, rather than resultative action. This requires that the activity 
leading up to the resultant goal can be evaluated by the infant as a planned 
intention by the agent. 
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So “Nana bought this toy” as a RES utterance focuses on the toy and its 
appearance, and expresses ‘this toy is here as a result of something Nana did’.  
“Nana bought this toy” as a causative focuses on Nana’s intentional action in 
making the toy be present, ‘Nana undertook an act of buying to make the toy 
present’, and is a recount of a past event largely unavailable to infants 30 months 
old, as exemplified in example (75) above. This further development, requiring a 
Theory of Mind reading of the intentional planning towards a causative outcome 
is not typically expressed by infants younger than 30 months, and there are no 
such examples in the corpus data.  
Further discussion will be reserved for the next Chapter, when the nature of 
experimental evidence which claims to identify the acquisition of causative 
constructions from essentially manifest events will be reviewed and challenged. 
It was noted above that SVO structures are commonly observed  in infant 
speech, yet RES utterances which are claimed here to be the source of such, are 
quite thinly distributed through the corpora used here. This suggests that further 
developments in the structure of INT utterances are accounting for this increase. 
The next section will show how this might be possible. 
4. Structural developments in INT utterances  
The word ‘want’ seems to capture the semantics of INT utterances. It is not 
until the later entries in Travis’ corpus that ‘want’ is used, and its use becomes 
increasingly evident in the Manchester corpus as the infants are generally older 
than Travis. ‘Want’ appears to be a very flexible word and seems to be 
responsible for further syntactic development in INT utterance types. It can 
appear as [V] in the initially developed treelet: 
[VP[V want][DP the spoons]]  (want the spoons) 
It can appear ‘higher’ in the construction: 
 [VP [Wanna [V have]][DP the spoons]] (wanna have the spoons) 
Further development shows: 
I want [CP to[VP[V have][DP the spoons]]] (I want to have the spoons).  
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These developments can be explained best if Aspectual features play a role in INT 
utterances in a manner comparable to those identified for RES.  
The features for INT and RES have been defined in the following way: 
INT= [ødurative] [+dynamic] [+telic] [*t > t] 
RES= [ødurative] [+dynamic] [+telic] [t* < t] 
In English, RES utterances appear to specify that the verb is finite, 
expressed morphologically (‘irreg’, ‘-ed’ or ø), with a subject fulfilling an Agent 
role.  In English, finiteness, apart from past tense forms, is generally expressed 
through auxiliary verbal elements which work in conjunction with non-finite verb 
stem forms. It seems that INT utterances employ this means to derive a finite verb 
capable of accommodating a subject.  
Assuming that Tense features of absolute time are inaccessible at this stage, 
it follows that verb auxiliaries expressing tense relations are not found.  Verbs can 
be made finite in English through use of auxiliaries which have a modal sense, 
which is in keeping with the intentional purpose and implied futurity of the INT 
utterance.  
The words used to fill the subject ‘slot’ are generally null or ‘I’ (first 
person) and unlike RES do not generally denote Agency. (The unique function of 
‘I’ will be addressed in detail in section 5). A fuller INT structure, 
accommodating a grammatical subject, can be represented diagrammatically as in 
fig 17 below.  
 It introduces the new element ‘modal’ which, it is suggested, provides the 
means to make the verb finite. The list of items which commonly occur as infant 
modals is shown below. Some of these are clearly different from adult usage, 
although all can be understood, and generally acceptable to adults. 
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Fig 17 Schematic representation of INT utterance structure 
 
All the infant modals identified have a common semantics expressing 
futurity/possibility/intention. 
Further developments are beyond a bootstrapping remit, but at some point it 
is clear that ‘wanna’, ‘gotta’, and ‘gonna’, will eventually no longer group as 
simple modals. Positive evidence is plentiful for ‘wanna’ to be split into 
‘want+to’.  
Attributing ‘wanting’ intentions to others, comparable to the attributing of 
causative intentions for RES, will require the infant to have further cognitive 
abilities providing an additional focus on the actual activity involved within the 
intentions described by an INT utterance. This would enable the infant to specify 
potential actions which can be attributed to the planned intentions of others as 
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opposed to intention in action (Searle 1983). This advanced mind reading ability 
is generally agreed not to be available to infants of 30 months. There are some 
examples of intentions attributed to toys in pretence on a ‘like me’ basis (Meltzoff 
2007): 
(83) 
 
(Gordon and Annabel are steam train characters in a children’s story book) 
a) Gordon want get Annabel 
b) This doll want dinner 
 
The developments associated with INT appear to be challenging to infants, 
as the corpus examples show some developmental errors, while the system is 
becoming refined. The examples below, however, indicate that the errors still 
honour the underlying syntactic structure, and can be attributed to the problem of 
accommodating additional complexity, in two cases negation. 
(84) 
 
a) Want eat it the sausage (27 months) 
b) I can’t want to throw (28 months) 
c) I can’t go to fall (28 months) 
 
The next section turns to an explanation for the extensive use of the first 
person pronoun as grammatical subject in early infant speech. 
5. The role of ‘I’ (first person pronoun) 
The first person pronoun ‘I’ was shown to be extensively used in the corpus 
analysed in Chapter 6, and had a significant association with both INT and RES 
utterances. For RES, the strong association for both ‘I’ and RDS is 
accommodated through the Agent role appearing as grammatical subject as shown 
in section 3 above and exemplified in (78) below 
(85) 
 
a) I broke the chair 
b) I hurt my leg 
c) Danny made this 
d) Nana bought this car 
But Agency for INT utterances is only sparingly expressed, and generally 
indicates the person expected to be responsible for the change of state intention 
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expressed, and where it is relevant for the infant to indicate herself in such a role, 
her own name (RDS) is used: 
(86) 
 
a) mummy eat it egg 
b) Gail come outside 
 
‘I’ does not appear to fulfil an Agent role, in this way. 
Acquisition of personal pronouns in English has been a focus of infant 
acquisition research for some time, largely because of the apparent difficulties it 
may present to infants. If pronouns are referential then the reference for ‘I’ and 
‘you’ changes continuously as different speakers participate in a conversational 
exchange. An adult refers to herself as ‘I’ and to the infant as ‘you’, yet the infant 
must reverse the reference of the pronouns when using them herself. Generally it 
is held that ‘I’ and ‘you’ differentially refer to addresser and addressee. How 
infants understand this difference has been the focus of much research. 
Chiat (1986/97) summarises the extensive literature discussing this area and 
makes the following six summary points, which have a measure of agreement: 
i). Personal pronouns do not emerge in a clear cut order. Infants generally 
develop a predictable sub-set of pronouns which do not constitute a natural class, 
but generally are 1
st
 person singular; inanimate 3
rd
 person; then 2
nd
 person. (‘I’, 
‘it’, ‘you’ ) 
ii). Those pronouns acquired tend to occur in specific contexts rather than 
the adult distribution; with ‘it’ confined to post verbal position.  
iii). The order of acquisition of the remainder is not well established and is 
neither rigid nor predictable. 
iv). Sporadic use precedes systematic or frequent use. 
v). Pronouns are initially used in stereotyped, unanalysed phrases which 
encode the relationships involved in events and states as a whole. 
vi). Although pronouns are sporadic or limited, confusions between 
different personal pronouns rarely occur. 
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Many of Chiat’s summary points are borne out by the current research. The 
order of acquisition she cites in (i) is clearly replicated in the corpus data. The 
data count is reproduced here from Chapter 6 as Table 11 for convenience. 
 
Infant DP  Instances across all scripts 
I 2561 
it  2271 
the/a 1912 
Rigid Designators 1760 
that/those 1378 
this/these 657 
You 635 
He/she/they  398 
me 241 
him/her them 168 
We 98 
us 2 
Total 11736 
 
Table 11 DP count of the corpus data used for the empirical study  
(Chapter 6) 
 
Chiat’s second point that ‘it’ occurs only post verbally is supported through 
the analysis of INT utterances, but occurrences of utterances like ‘it’s a…’, are 
also common in ME. 
As for the last four points, the developmental process cannot be as random 
as it would appear, as infants are able to differentiate the pronouns successfully. 
The most difficult to explain is the differential use of ‘I’ and ‘you’. Loveland 
(1984) claims that successful learning depends on infants gaining a distinction 
between spatial perspectives of speakers and hearers, claiming that only infants 
with complete understanding of points of view are able to use I/you pronouns 
without error. The fact that infants do use such pronouns before achieving the 
required understanding of viewpoint is explained as infant production without 
understanding. Loveland suggests such utterances may be due to the use of 
unanalysed phrases. Charney (1980) prefers attributing I/you use to an 
understanding of speech roles – addresser/addressee – distinctions, but concludes 
that infants are aware of speech roles only when they themselves occupy those 
roles, which accounts for the disproportionate use of ‘I’. Budwig (1990) related 
pronoun use to function, and describes extensive use of ‘I’ as being attributed to 
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ego-anchored versus non-ego-anchored infants. Clarke (1977) noted that infants 
judged to be on the autistic spectrum were more likely to make errors in I/you 
reference reversals than typically developing infants. Her conclusion supports a 
theory of mind analysis assuming that the I/you distinction is based on mental 
perspectives on events. 
The difficulty with these and other accounts rests on the assumption that 
first or second person pronouns are solely referential. Wechsler (2010) provides 
an interesting challenge to this assumption. His case is that 1
st
 and 2
nd
 person 
pronouns are not referential TO speakers and addressees, but attributed BY 
speakers and addressees.  
So, 1
st
 person when produced, and 2
nd
 person when heard are attributed to 
SELF, a process he terms self-ascription. He cites the example of a teacher 
addressing a whole classroom with the utterance “write your names at the top of 
the paper”. This will be interpreted by members of the class as attributed to 
themselves as individuals and signify their own name, not a list of the names of 
all classroom participants. Wechsler proposes that the person feature of 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
person pronouns designates participants in a speech act as self-ascribers: ‘I’ in 
speaker role and ‘you’ in addressee role. But for a hearer to comprehend a 
speaker’s use of 1st person requires the hearer to infer the speaker’s utterance as a 
self-ascribed belief.  
Wechsler’s complex analysis is focussed on adult participants, but the core 
proposal  can be summarised in the following way: 
Situation 1 requires only simple self-ascription for understanding 
As a speaker producing 1
st
 person or as an addressee hearing 2
nd
 person 
Situation 2 is more complex and requires an inference of self-ascription to 
be attributed to the other participant. 
As a speaker producing 2
nd
 person or as an addressee hearing 1
st
 person 
If this is correct, the account would predict that for infants Situation 1 
would be more accessible than Situation 2, because infants’ theory of mind ability 
is as yet severely limited.  
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There is evidence that would appear to support this position. The 1
st
 person 
pronoun is extensively used by infants (see Table 11 above), and the research 
generally shows that infants understand 2
nd
 person pronouns when addressed to 
them. 
The data also shows that the 2
nd
 person pronoun is sparingly used by 
infants, and appears later in use than the 1
st
 person. There is a shortage of 
evidence of how infants understand the 1
st
 person pronoun when used by adults to 
them, but some insight can be gained from the ways adults use the 1
st
 person in 
talking with infants in CDS. 
A survey of utterances, as recorded for two of the adults from the study 
corpus, distinguishes those which use an unstressed first person pronoun as a 
carrier for contracted auxiliaries (I’m, I’ve, I’ll) from those which have stressed 
1
st
 person pronoun use. The data shows that the 1
st
 person predominantly used by 
adults, accompanied verbs expressing the adults’ mental states.  
The commonest, by far, is ‘I think…’  
Others include: 
I don’t know I bet 
I like I want 
I wonder I remember 
I missed you I can’t 
I saw you I thought 
 
This would suggest that adult use of ‘I’ is underlining the self-ascription of 
mental states. It is possible that adults intuitively recognise the difficulty for 
infants in hearing ‘I’ used. They appear to be focussing infant attention on the 
relation between hearing ‘I’ and the speaker’s mental state. So there would seem 
to be some support for concluding that infants will find Situation 1 (producing ‘I’ 
and hearing ‘you’) more accessible than Situation 2 (producing ‘you’ and hearing 
‘I’) 
An explanation why infant use of the 1
st
 person pronoun is so extensive in 
the corpus data, may be that on Wechsler’s account, it can be assumed that self-
ascription presents little difficulty to infants in understanding their own use of ‘I’.  
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This does not explain why it should be used so frequently when INT 
utterances are by default about self-ascribed intentional states. Null would be just 
as appropriate, more economical and therefore expected. Initially this seems to be 
the case. Early INT utterances exhibit a null subject as shown in Section 2.1 
above.  
However, given the acquisition of the basic syntactic structure with an 
available ‘slot’ for grammatical subject, and the positive evidence in the input that 
English obligatorily specifies subjects, a viable proposal is that ‘I’ becomes used 
as a default non-agentive subject marker, and perhaps plays a similar structural 
inroad to syntax, as ‘it’ would seem to do. 
This presents no communication problem as ‘I’ fits felicitously as a subject 
responsible for the intention (want) in INT utterances, and also fulfils a 
grammatical requirement. There are  instances in the corpus, where infant use of 
‘I’ appears quite specifically not to imply the agency of the child as in (80) below 
where the Agent involved appears to be the mother and not the infant at all . 
(87) 
 
*MOT: what do you  want me to do ? 
*CHI:  this here . 
*CHI:  I fit this . 
*CHI:  I fit it . 
*MOT: did I fit it? 
*CHI:  this here. 
*MOT: did it wrong ... did I? 
 
(CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester/Anne02b (Anne 22 months) 
 
In general, the first person pronoun functions as a grammatical device as a 
subject marker, and not to designate a specific Agent role. It is not used initially 
to make any semantic contribution, and as such could be simply an expletive 
Subject place-holder. Further evidence for this is found when infants are making 
specific reference to agents. In this case, they use a name (RD) which frequently 
includes their own when they wish to specify themselves as an agent of the 
Achievement, most commonly ‘[RD] do it’ as in: 
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(88) 
 
a) Carl do it (Infant is Carl) 
b) mummy do it (Infant is Carl) 
c) Becky do it (Becky is the infant speaking) 
d) Gail fit it (Gail is the infant speaking) 
e) Caroline get it (Caroline is the visiting researcher) 
 
6. Discussion  
This chapter has shown the possible bootstrapping of syntax which results 
from the principles forming the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping hypothesis 
developed throughout this dissertation. These  principles are summarised in the 
following list, each item contributing to the schematic development presented 
through this chapter: 
i. Infant intentionality and generic knowledge 
ii. An optimum set of possibly innate grammatical categories (state change 
[V]; reference [D] and substantive [N] 
iii. Analytic, as opposed to synthetic processes. 
iv. The acquire-as-required principle 
v. Meta-cognitive growth 
Appreciation of Complex Events is evident from around 18 months old 
when infant cognitive growth enables them to hold Primary and Secondary 
Representations in awareness at the same time. Complex Events are, therefore, 
comprised of two sub-events. This collation of representations/sub-events 
underpins two utterance types: INT (expressing an intended change of state from 
current actuality) and RES (expressing a resultant changed state in current 
actuality). The informative content of each of these utterance types is not a fully 
shared event, and requires that the infant acquires the means of expression to 
make public what are essentially privately constructed sub-events. Only a 
syntactic system can provide such means. 
The bootstrapping process begins to give the infant access to language 
specific syntax, honouring the ‘acquire-as-required’ and ‘analysis rather than 
synthesis’ principles. In English, the pivotal lexical item for bootstrapping verbs 
is the word ‘it’. Its conceptual content is totally contextually derived; it acts as a 
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bridge between the goal entity of the two sub-events in a Complex Event; and it 
has non-semantic structural properties. The word therefore provides a link 
between the Conceptual-Intentional and the Syntactic interface. A further pivotal 
lexical item for English is ‘I’. Its conceptual content is self-ascription and 
structurally marks Subject, obligatory in English. These two structural elements 
mark self-ascription and object reference, both of which underpin the abstract 
semantic content of INT utterances: “I (want) it”. 
Syntactic construction is effected through the principle of a simple 
successive Merge, motivated by Aspectual properties inherent in the utterance 
types of Complex Events. These are characterised as:  ødurative, +dynamic, 
+telic, and relative time t*>t/t*<t.  
Through these means a generalised core syntactic structure for both 
Complex Events utterance types may be thought to be derived, schematised as fig 
18 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 18 Schematic representation of the structure of Complex Event 
utterances 
The resultant structure is not dependent on lexical semantics, as words 
projecting to [V] and [N] nodes may vary substantially between infants acquiring 
English. Although item-based acquisition, as espoused by Tomasello, will inform 
what words are selected for [V] and [N] nodes, they do not of themselves play a 
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pivotal role in the bootstrapping process, and choice of word is a product of 
refinement within already set category boundaries. Although Travis has a 
preference for ‘get’ for INT utterances and ‘made’ for RES utterances, other 
infants make quite different choices.  
If this hypothesis is correct, then it would appear that a core syntactic 
structure is acquired before infants are 30 months old, and this structure is 
available to them for use in other contexts.  
ME and CE utterances are both characterised as focussing on 
objects/entities. ME utterances normally communicate information about 
objects/entities in the here and now. CE utterances, on the other hand, express 
intentions towards an as yet unrealised change of state of objects/entities, or 
events leading to an apparent, realised change of state. Complex Events expressed 
as INT and RES utterances are characterised as Achievements, and it is claimed 
that this is the main context for the acquisition of verbs.  
Most bootstrapping proposals are based on the assumption that Activities 
provide the source for the acquisition of [V] category expressions. Activities, 
which unfold in the here and now, present major complexity for the infant, 
particularly for linguistic expression. For instance  
“Gail is building the house” is an utterance of a Manifest Event. It focuses on an 
on-going activity rather than the goal but nevertheless expresses the intended goal 
outcome. In traditional analyses this is described as two independent yet 
concurrent aspect roles: the telic, lexical, aspect of ‘build’ and the grammatical 
durative aspect of the on-going event expressed through the imperfect (present) 
tense: ‘is…ing’. 
Conceptually, this should present no problem for an infant observing the 
scene in understanding what is happening. Chapter 3 discussed how infants from 
a very young age can monitor events, and infer intentional goals for actions, and 
maybe also causation in relation to actions and goals. The problem presented to 
the infant, however, is to develop syntactic resources which go beyond those 
already established for INT and RES which will enable a focus on activities rather 
than outcomes. 
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It might be supposed that the already established aspectual structure, 
schematised above, could provide a basis for doing so, by simply setting 
[durative] to positive, but the syntactic form requires quite wide ranging 
development. This would suggest that the means to productively express such 
content should not be readily available. Evidence drawn from the corpus, shows 
that such utterances are not usually present by 30 months. 
The bootstrapping proposal therefore would assume that infants up to 30 
months presented with a scene and utterance equivalent to “Gail is building the 
house”, would be able to make sense of the scene by event monitoring but would 
understand the utterance, in terms of the ME syntax she has acquired. This would 
imply that her parse would result in the two elements of the scene being 
represented: ‘Gail building’ or ‘building house’, but not combined. 
Published empirical evidence for verb learning and language production is 
based almost exclusively on Manifest Events. This may be because it is a 
convenient context for the design of elicitation studies, but also it is due to the 
belief on the part of many researchers that verbs are learned as referring to or 
labelling activities. I have attempted to show that it is Achievements not 
Activities which bootstrap infants’ first [V]erbs. Studying utterances of Complex 
Events, because they are based on an infant’s own intentions, tends to require a 
corpus study of spontaneous production, although it would be possible to develop 
experimental scenarios to elicit such intentional utterances. 
 The next chapter will address the relation between comprehension testing 
in Manifest Events and demonstrate that conclusions, drawn by research which 
does not recognise the ME/CE contrast, are open to challenge from the point of 
view of the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal. 
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Chapter 8   
Syntactic knowledge and comprehension testing 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a schematic profile of infant syntactic growth or 
development operating within Complex Event utterance types. This profile 
showed the establishment of a category [V] with a telic feature selecting for a 
Theme role argument, and a category [DP] noun phrase with a functional head. 
Complex utterance-types are labelled INT or RES. This proposal was based on 
available corpus data from infants less than 30 months of age - (Travis data and 
CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester). 
A strong position has been taken on defining syntax acquisition, namely that 
acquisition is confirmed when an infant has executive control over syntax for 
effective spontaneous production of language for intentional communication. This 
position enables a distinction to be made for the role syntactic knowledge plays in 
production and comprehension. For the latter, in natural settings, the infant has 
access to a range of heuristics to support understanding: relevance, generic 
knowledge, observation of the physical context, and pragmatic inference, all of 
which may complement and enrich a developing knowledge of syntax. In addition 
adult linguistic utterances are intuitively designed to make comprehension more 
accessible for the infant. Thus infants need not have acquired fully productive 
syntax to be able to make an interpretation of the communicative intention behind 
utterances addressed to them. That infants seem to understand more than they can 
say is generally assumed. 
My claim is that by 30 months, infants have acquired the syntax necessary 
for them effectively (by their own judgement) to communicate within the contexts 
they experience.  The utterance types they have acquired are identified as ME, 
INT and RES, and each exhibits a specific productive syntactic form, summarised 
here: 
i) ME utterances generally have a structure incorporating the following 
elements ME[Aspect imperfect[mod[substantive][modifier]]], or ME[Aspect 
imperfect[sub[modifier][substantive]]] (e.g. ‘hippo swimming’ or ‘swimming 
hippo’). Utterances of this type are attributive of events, and modifiers make 
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explicit (dynamic) properties or types of activities of participating objects. 
Modifiers explicating dynamic properties frequently appear with ‘-ing’ 
morphology and function adjectivally. ME utterances are not linguistically 
referential of specific objects, and do not need to be, as any entity/object is 
implicitly referred to, being present and manifest.  
ii) Early INT utterances begin as ‘have it spoon’ type utterances which 
become consolidated as [VP[Vtelic]+[DP[D]+[N]]] ‘have the spoon’. These are goal-
focused, and express intentional outcomes. The [V]erb is non-finite, telic and 
selects for a Theme role. My claim is that ‘it’ is an early infant determiner. 
Semantically, the verb predicates on the intentional change of state event. 
iii) RES structure is generalised as RES[[DP][Asp[[VP[V]+[DP[D]+[N]]]]]  
and are  also goal focused (‘Nana bought this car’), but are descriptive of a 
resultant change of state or outcome. Responsible Agents are frequently 
expressed, and an Aspect node is suggested to be present marking features of 
telicity, and relative time t*< t (where t* is the time of culmination). The finite 
form of the verb in English is recognised by adults as morphological {irreg/-
ed/ø}, although this does not seem to be productive for the infant. Finite verbs for 
[V] in RES utterances in English seem to be individually learned. If an ‘irreg’ or 
‘-ed’ form is not known, then a verb root is used. 
iv) Later INT structure appears to develop in a way comparable to RES: 
INT[[DP] [Asp[[VP[V]+[DP[D]+[N]]]]] (‘Daddy gonna get the spoon’, ‘I wanna 
mend the train’). These utterances are goal focussed, may state an Agent, but 
frequently appear with a grammatical subject (‘I’). An Aspect node is again 
suggested as marking the features of telicity and relative time t*> t (where t* is 
the time of culmination). Again English requires a finite verb, which seems to be 
achieved through productive use of auxiliary elements which appear to be modal 
in nature. An exception (as discussed in Chapter 7) may be the late acquired 
‘want’ which has an integral semantic relation with INT utterances, and appears at 
various points in development as a non-finite verb (‘want a banana’), a modal (‘I 
wanna get a banana’), and a main verb selecting for a CP (‘I want mummy to get 
a banana’), where it seems to pattern with utterances of self-attributed mental and 
epistemic states (‘I (don’t) want …’, ‘I (don’t) think …’, ‘I (don’t) know’). 
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The significant innovation of INT and RES utterances is the establishment 
of [DP] and [V] grammatical categories. Once established, there is the 
developmental possibility for [V] to be a grammatical object in its own right, and 
become a focus for the more complex developments typical of verbs in English. 
It, therefore, becomes possible to express absolute time relations, imperfective 
events, and means as opposed to ends. The claim here is that such developments 
occur typically after the establishment of INT and RES utterances. This is 
important because a sentence like ‘Gail is building the house’ is a present 
continuous construction describing a current event and differs fundamentally from 
‘house building’ (ME); ‘Gail gonna build the house’ (INT), or ‘Gail built the 
house’ (RES) – (‘house’ is emboldened to signify the conceptual focus of the 
utterances), in the following ways: 
i) Unlike ME utterances, ‘Gail is building the house’ contains a referential 
DP, and although it states an outcome (a house), the focus is on the means, i.e. the 
agent’s activity of building. This differs from INT or RES, where the nature of the 
activity of an Agent per se is implicit.  
ii) With the focus on the activity or means, certain additional aspectual 
information can be accommodated. Conventionally, this is analysed as lexical and 
grammatical aspect. ‘Build’ is lexically telic requiring a direct object in Theme 
role. ‘Is building’ is imperfective and also carries absolute time information T*=T 
(T* is the absolute time of the described event and T is the present). In English 
this requires a finite verb formed with the auxiliary BE and a non-finite verb 
formed from the verb stem + ing. 
Although it might be argued that adjustments to the syntactic structure of 
INT and RES should allow for this development, and this may well be correct, the 
syntactic means to express this new complexity still has to be additionally 
acquired. This would suggest that productive utterances incorporating the present 
continuous are acquired after 30 months, and corpus data show this.  
This suggestion runs contrary to most conventional thinking about verb 
acquisition. Generally the present continuous is considered to be a basic form for 
acquiring and communicating transitive and causative events. This may be largely 
due to the assumption that events expressed in the ‘here and now’ are supported 
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by perceptual information to aid comprehension. Although it may be 
demonstrated that infants appear to understand such utterances in context, it is 
debatable whether infants have acquired productive use of this construction. 
Many empirical studies start from the position that the present continuous 
construction is basic. By extension the assumption holds that linguistic transitivity 
is also basic and that the causative relations generally expressed by transitive 
sentences will be grasped by infants from the utterance.  I am making two claims 
about how infants under 30 months old interpret utterances which employ present 
continuous syntax: 
Firstly, that ‘Gail is building the house’ uttered in the context of a Manifest 
Event will be interpreted in accordance with the acquired syntax typical of ME 
utterances: i.e. ‘Gail building’ or ‘building house’ with a focus on the on-going 
dynamic potentiality of ‘Gail’ or ‘house’ (involving a child’s toy construction 
game). 
Secondly, that infant interpretation of the utterance may not necessarily be a 
causative understanding. 
The following sections will review a number of studies devised to support 
the Syntactic Bootstrapping proposal (SyB) theoretical position concerning 
language comprehension. In these studies test utterances are based on the present 
continuous. In reviewing the experiments, the given explanation of the outcome 
of the testing process will be complemented by an alternative explanation based 
on the syntactic knowledge that the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping 
proposal (CIB) claims infants have productively acquired. 
1. Comprehension studies: general overview 
In this section, all studies focus on comprehension, and are generally 
motivated by the syntactic bootstrapping proposal (SyB), which in brief, claims 
that infants use experience of linguistic constructions to access the meaning of 
new verbs. The more constructions an infant hears containing the verb, the closer 
the infant comes to assigning a meaning to it. The hypothesis is supported by 
constructionist proposals that constructions themselves have a generalised 
semantics, which influences the interpretation of verbs (Goldberg 1995). Relevant 
to this is the view that transitive constructions, SVO in English, express causative 
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actions. Syntactic bootstrapping does not detail how the syntax is acquired or 
known, but the implication at its weakest is that syntactic variations can be 
differentiated and appreciated by infants. 
Infant comprehension in these studies is tested by differential looking at 
appropriate scenes. The length of looking time is assumed to accord with an 
infant’s understanding of the novel verb. In general the infants view a composite 
scene depicting, for example, a causative and synchronous act by two 
participants. This is accompanied by a linguistic input which varies for different 
groups of infants depending on the test focus. For instance one group hear a 
transitive sentence, the other an intransitive both using a nonsense word as a 
surrogate novel verb ( ‘X is gorping Y’ or ‘X and Y are gorping’). The infants 
then see the scene decomposed on two screens into its component parts (causative 
act on one screen; synchronous act on the other) and asked ‘Where’s gorping 
now?’ The assumption is that infants will look longer at the scene whose meaning 
they associated with the input sentence. The task for the infant is one of 
recognition and mapping a linguistic input onto an observed scene.  
This type of comprehension testing contrasts with (re)enactment tasks 
which other studies have used. For these infants are asked to act out (using toy 
figures) scenes as described verbally by the experimenter, exemplified by Olguin 
& Tomasello (1993) (O&T). For clarity, this experiment will be described. 
The experiment was devised to test the Verb Island Hypothesis, which 
proposes that words are used in the frame that they are learned and there is no 
generalisation across ‘verbs’ in morphological paradigms. Verbs develop as 
individual words not as a verb class. 
Eight infants, 22-25 months old participated. 8 novel verb meanings were 
created for novel words. The meanings denote a causal relation between two 
characters (represented by plastic toy figures). Infants were assigned to one of two 
groups (A or B) and the room was set up with two different stations each 
providing the physical context for four of the eight activities. Each assigned group 
experienced only one set up, therefore taking part in 4 activities and experiencing 
4 of the 8 nonsense words used in context. One such set is exemplified in (82) and 
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gives the novel word used and its novel meaning (X and Y represent participating 
toy characters). 
(89) 
 
a) Keef -  X steps on a button that quickly pulls Y towards X by means of a 
string 
b) Gorp - X drops a coloured dough-like substance on top of Y 
c) Dack - X pushes Y down a hole 
d) Pud - X jumps on top of an apparatus that shoots out a plastic horseshoe, 
knocking Y over 
 
Infants individually took part in a free play session with the apparatus and 
the participating experimenter modelled each verb in only one type of the 
following sentence frame: 
(90) 
 
a) no arguments (e.g. oh look, keefing);  
b) agent argument only (e.g. see that, Ernie’s gorping); 
c) patient argument only (e.g. look, dacking cookie monster) or  
d) both agent and patient (e.g. see Ernie’s pudding cookie monster).  
 
During the game session, the experimenter said the appropriate frame 10 
times. Comprehension testing took the following form.  
The infants were asked to enact with the figures according to an instruction 
e.g. ‘Can you make Mickey Mouse gorp Ernie?’ or ‘Make Mickey Mouse gorp 
Ernie’. The test focussed on whether the infant could understand the appropriate 
word order for arguments if the verb had not been heard before with Agents and 
Patients specified. So the focus was on participants experiencing the no argument 
presentations (83a) above, with both arguments (83d) above as a control. 
The results of the comprehension tests were inconclusive. 4 out of 7 infants 
did not comply with the test requirements.  O&T explain this as possibly simply 
infant reluctance to perform on this task. They claim that it is known that it is 
generally difficult to get 2 year olds to comply with requests. However, it is also 
generally known that 2 year olds do comply with requests they understand and 
find relevant.  
Based on the extent of infant linguistic knowledge assumed by CIB, it is 
possible the infants were simply unable to understand the instruction. Replacing 
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the lexical causative with a periphrastic lexicalisation which had not been 
modelled previously for the infants, presents them with a major processing 
problem. ‘Make A do Y to B’ requires the introduction of an additional agent and 
double causative. ‘You act on A, with the result that A acts on B’. (Note also that 
there is a change in sentence structure and verb form: ‘X is gorping Y’ becomes 
‘Make X gorp Y’) 
The infants had been quite capable of performing the actions required 
because the toys are not animate and therefore will have to have been moved by 
infant or experimenter for the game to proceed. So the request would present no 
conceptual difficulty for the infants to perform. What is not considered is that the 
event ‘X is gorping Y’ when enacted during the game phase is occurring within 
pretence (pretence is discussed in Chapter 5 section 2.1). In this pretence event 
the toy/Agents are operating as if animate intentional beings. The manipulation by 
the infant or experimenter is transparent and unimportant to the pretence. The 
utterance ‘make A gorp B’ breaks the pretence and provides a focus on the actual, 
introducing explicitly an additional level of Agent, the infant herself. This 
presents three levels of representation for the infant to process, which may simply 
be too much, giving the test results found: 
 i) [infant intentional action (complying with request)  
ii) [infant acting on X (non-pretence)  
iii) [X gorping Y (pretence)]]]. 
Researchers do refer to the behaviour of infants when confronted with this 
task as continually looking to the experimenter for reassurance. This tends to 
indicate infant confusion with the nature of the task rather than with their 
response, as this type of uncertain behaviour is not reported in other contexts.  
Re-enactment tests seem to yield better results when older children are 
involved (Naigles, Fowler & Helm 1992). This may be due to the complex nature 
of the task. Not only do infants need to understand the input (the linguistic 
request) but also mentally construct and physically express the outcome. Because 
of this the experiments reviewed in this section will be those involving 
preferential looking time and which have been devised largely in support of SyB. 
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The task the infants are asked to perform does not include the additional physical 
construction of the outcome, as this is given. 
CIB implies that infants by 30 months old have acquired, and therefore have 
productive control over syntax to express three utterance types, the nature of this 
has been described previously. In keeping with the Syntactic Bootstrapping 
hypothesis the generalised semantics of such utterances can be stylised as  
ME: steady, (dynamic) state, atelic 
INT: intentional state change, telic. 
RES: resultant state change, transitive and telic. 
The infant participants in the various studies discussed below are likely to 
have acquired ME, INT and RES, but not as likely to have any more elaborate 
syntax than this. The input sentences in the experiments are generally (with 
exceptions which will be indicated in the descriptions of the studies) present 
continuous. The discussion of each will show that the results of the experiments 
can equally be accounted for in terms of the CIB proposals. 
The first series of experiments discussed below (Section 2) closely follow 
the general profile. The rest of the studies (from section 3) make certain 
innovations using what appear to be INT and RES utterances in the input with 
interesting results.  
2. Naigles’ syntactic bootstrapping experiments 
An early research study by Naigles 1990 (discussed in Chapter 2 section 
4.1) was designed to show that infants used syntactic information to acquire the 
meaning of verbs. The apparatus consisted of 2 video screens separated side by 
side which the infants face seated on their mothers’ knees. The infants, average 
age 25 months, view a single video scene replicated on both screens depicting a 
simultaneous causative and synchronous act, to which is associated a novel word. 
I will illustrate one of the scenes here. The whole experiment is comprised of 4 
comparable examples.  
The composite scene consists of two characters – duck and rabbit – and the 
causative element consists of duck pushing rabbit to a bending position. 
Simultaneously, the synchronous element is depicted by both duck and rabbit 
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making a fully matching arm motion. The novel word associated with this scene 
is ‘gorping’.  
This is illustrated as in Fig 19 below (reproduced from Naigles and Kako 
1993 p1672) 
 
Fig 19 Composite scene for experiment 1 (Naigles & Kako 1993) 
 
The experiment runs in the following way. One group of infants, while 
viewing the scene, hear an audio voice saying “duck is gorping rabbit”, a 
transitive construction. A different group hear the audio “duck and rabbit are 
gorping”, an intransitive construction. After several repeats, the scene changes to 
duck and rabbit engaged in the causative action on one screen, and on the other, 
the synchronous act is shown. All the infants hear the instruction “Where’s 
gorping now? Find gorping”.  Infants’ total looking time towards each screen is 
measured. The assumption is that infants will look longer at the scene they 
understand from the prior presentation input. It is reliably found across all the 
four different scene/novel word examples that infants who had heard the transitive 
input looked more (to significance) towards the causative scene, and those who 
had heard the intransitive sentence looked more to the scene depicting 
synchronous activity.  
Naigles had concluded from this that infants had derived a meaning for the 
novel word from the syntactic structure in the presentation, and therefore their 
attention was directed overall to the appropriate screen. In her conclusion, Naigles 
says; 
“Transitive frames appear to implicate actions which are at least ‘acting-on’ 
and perhaps specifically causal, while intransitive frames implicate actions 
which are non-causal or perhaps symmetric.”  (Naigles 1990 p372) 
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Naigles also notes that the experiment does not address how such form-
meaning correlations are acquired, nor is it known precisely what meanings 
infants infer from the syntax.  
The experiment and its conclusion are very compelling and as such it has 
become somewhat iconic. Superficially, it would appear to present a strong 
challenge to the CIB account, which claims that infants of this age (25 months) do 
not have a productive syntax for expressing the present continuous, which this 
experiment is based on. CIB does propose that infants have transitive 
constructions which appear in later developing INT or RES utterance types, but 
these are not relevant to the experimental condition.  The argument that infants 
may infer that the transitivity of their INT and RES utterances is analogous to the 
audio input is too speculative.  
What CIB does assume is that infants are equipped with ME type utterances 
to support their understanding of Manifest Events which the depicted scenes 
undeniably are. ME utterances have an [mod[substantive][modifier]] or 
[sub[modifier][substantive]structure with flexible word order, and these can signify 
the dynamic properties of substantive object/entities. Modifiers can be words with 
an ‘–ing’ ending, which are adjectival in nature. There are no [V]erbs, and as such 
no grammatical Agents or Patients can be specified or relevant.  
The question is whether infants can perform the experiment as described 
drawing only on knowledge of ME syntax.   
The causative event consists of two dissimilar sub-events: 
i) duck pushing 
ii) rabbit bending 
Infants in the transitive condition (hearing ‘duck is gorping rabbit’), may 
process this as ‘duck gorping’ or ‘gorping rabbit’ both of which assign a different 
attribute to either duck or rabbit. 
The simultaneous, synchronous event consists of both duck and rabbit 
performing the same action, - arm moving. 
Infants in the intransitive condition (hearing ‘duck and rabbit are gorping’) 
may process this as ‘duck and rabbit gorping’, which is a well formed ME 
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utterance with conjoined substantives modified by ‘gorping’. Alternatively the 
utterance may be processed simply as ‘gorping’. (There is evidence from the next 
experiment that suggests the latter is the case).  This ME utterance expresses a 
modifier and the infant will need to infer the substantive element.   
On viewing the two test scenes, the infants who understand the input as 
‘duck gorping’, or ‘gorping rabbit’ have an expectation that ‘gorping-ness’ is a 
specific attribute of ‘duck’ or ‘rabbit’, but not of both.  It is only in the ‘causative’ 
scene that duck or rabbit have unique dynamic properties, and this scene should 
receive more attention than the other.  The test results support this. 
The infants who process the input as ‘duck and rabbit gorping’ or simply 
‘gorping’, are forced, on viewing the scenes, to infer that as the input is about 
characters exhibiting ‘gorping-ness’, the best option is to attend to the scene 
where both appear to have a common attribute. The synchronous scene meets this 
requirement. The test results support this.  
Clearly, there is no evidence in the experiment to make the CIB proposal 
any more viable than the Naigles’ explanation. Three follow up experiments by 
Naigles and Kako (1993) (N&K), however, add new dimensions and it is 
evidence from these which appears to tip the balance in support of the CIB 
proposal.  
The first study in the series replicates the one discussed above but adds a 
third audio input condition. There are 3 groups of infants (these are older with an 
average age of 27 months). During the viewing of one of the composite scenes, 
one group hears a ‘frameless’ input (‘Look! Gorping!’). Another group hears the 
intransitive input: (‘duck and rabbit are gorping’), and the third hears the 
transitive (‘duck is gorping rabbit’). In all other respects the experiment, testing 
and measuring is conducted in the same way.  
The results are reported as follows: those infants who heard the transitive 
input looked significantly more at the causative action. For those infants in the 
frameless or intransitive condition there was no significant difference in responses 
- both looked more at the synchronous scene. N&K interpret these results as 
confirmation that hearing the transitive sentences has prompted the infants to 
derive causative meanings. This does not explain why the frameless and 
Neil Parr  Chapter 8  
Page 280  
 
intransitive input should give the same results. By design, ‘gorping’ is frameless, 
i.e. considered to be without a syntactic frame, and according to syntactic 
bootstrapping theory, the result for this group should be ambiguous.   
The alternative CIB view noted that frameless and intransitive are 
interpreted as equivalent (‘gorping’) using ME syntax. The result that the 
frameless and intransitive conditions give the same outcome would confirm this. 
Only the ‘transitive’ input, parsed as either ‘duck gorping’ or ‘gorping rabbit’ can 
be interpreted as intended for the hearer to focus on the unique dynamic attribute 
of the labelled substantive (duck or rabbit). 
In the second study in this series, N&K note that transitive constructions are 
also used to express contact events which may have no causative element. This 
study repeats the previous one, only this time instead of frog pushing and bending 
duck (a new character is used for this experiment), frog approaches duck’s head 
with its hand and touches it with a grasping motion. Duck does not react to this. 
Both frog and duck simultaneously make the synchronous arm movement.  
This scene is illustrated as in Fig 20 (again reproduced from Naigles and 
Kako 1993 p1672), the other composite screens in the experiment had the same 
contact/synchrony structure. In all other respects the experiment is the same as 
before. 
 
Fig 20 Composite scene for experiment 2 
 
This time the contact scene has only one dynamic event: frog touches duck, 
but duck does nothing. 
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The results show more looking time towards the synchronous scene for 
frameless and intransitive inputs, and virtually equal looking time at the scenes 
(contact or synchrony) for the transitive input. N&K conclude that the different 
type of response for the transitive input demonstrates that the transitive input 
prompted infants to look more to the contact event than did the other groups. So 
the transitive input is claimed to have had some effect, albeit non-significant. 
Alternatively, the results might be interpreted as showing a positive relation 
between the intransitive or frameless priming and the synchronous scene choice. 
The transitive priming, however, only displays an ambiguous result. 
CIB suggests that responses to the frameless and the intransitive input both 
interpreted as ‘gorping’ with no substantive mentioned would be as in the 
previous experiment: i.e. the recognition that ‘gorping’ is a dynamic attribute 
which can be applied to all participants in the scene, and therefore  the 
synchronous actions are favoured.  
The transitive frame is ambiguous from the CIB viewpoint given that it is 
interpreted as ‘frog gorping’ or ‘gorping duck’, but there is no unique dynamic 
attribute associated with duck other than being static. If the infants parse the input 
as ‘gorping duck’ and expect a unique attribute, then this will fail and so this 
parse should be less favoured when viewing the ‘contact’ screen. Although 
‘gorping duck’ may be applied to the synchronous scene, it will also fail because 
‘gorping’ will not be seen to be a unique attribute of duck. The recorded equal 
looking towards contact or synchronous scenes in the transitive condition can be 
argued to be reflecting this dilemma. The infants are attempting to attribute the 
property of ‘gorping-ness’ uniquely to frog or duck. Frog has a unique dynamic 
attribute (touching) but duck does not.  
The third study in this series, attempts to pit causative against contact 
actions, and is problematic for both Naigles’ and the CIB accounts. The 
composite scene shows the following: frog touches duck’s head with one hand 
and pushes duck down by the shoulder with the other. This scene is illustrated as 
in figure 21 (again reproduced from Naigles and Kako 1993 p1672), the other 
composite screens had the same contact/causative structure. 
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Fig 21 Composite scene for experiment 3 
 
A particular problem is that the discrete nature of the two test actions 
(contact or causation) is masked. In the composite scene the contact element may 
be considered to be integral and contributing to the causative event. It is only 
when the scenes are separated that the contact action becomes clearly separate 
from the causative action. 
In this experiment the infants hear only frameless input (‘Look gorping’) or 
transitive input (‘frog is gorping duck’). The test question is ‘Find gorping now.   
Find where gorping is now.’ The recorded result is that the infants, regardless of 
input looked more towards the causative screen. The infants in the frameless 
condition looked comparatively more towards the causative screen than those in 
the transitive condition. There were however no significant effects between the 
screen, or input condition. N&K conclude that the most striking finding is that the 
significant effect of the transitive frame found in the previous experiments, was 
not present in this one: 
Instead, the significant preference for the causative action in the Frameless 
condition did not differ from the non-significant preference for the same 
action found in the Transitive condition. (ibid p1679) 
 
What this means for the infant’s understanding is not clear. With the transitive 
condition, Naigles’ position is that the overlapping meaning of transitive 
constructions for causative and contact is the source of the ambiguity. If the 
transitive sentence is interpreted as ME utterances, ‘frog gorping’ or ‘gorping 
duck’ then the causative scene would satisfy this, which accounts for the recorded 
longer looking time at the causative scene. The frameless condition is trickier (for 
both SyB and CIB) and the results may be due to the causative element of the 
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composite scene being striking enough to prompt longer looking time to the 
(separated) causative scene regardless of linguistic priming. 
The CIB explanation can be applied successfully to the first two 
experiments
2
.  The explanation supports the conclusion that the infants may be 
using syntactic knowledge already acquired. This is ME type syntax, which does 
not have [V]erbs.  
The SyB proposal states that hearing novel verbs in a range of syntactic 
frames enables infants to learn the meaning of those words. CIB suggests from 
these experiments that infants use their productively acquired syntax not as a 
source for learning the meaning of the verb, but as a guide to interpreting the 
newly presented scenes as overall events. It is the observation of the scene which 
provides infants with some idea of what the novel word might mean. If this is 
correct, then there is no obligation on the infant to assign any meaning to the 
novel word at all. Their existing syntactic knowledge (ME) provides them with 
sufficient structure to direct their attention to one or the other scene to derive a 
pragmatically relevant interpretation.  
3. Fisher and colleagues: Syntactic bootstrapping experiments 
These experiments introduce input sentences which are designed to present 
the novel verb in different syntactic frames. The research supports SyB, which 
claims that when infants hear a novel verb in a number of syntactic frames they 
are better able to acquire its meaning. The test questions, however, are still 
presented in the present continuous. 
3.1 Gertner, Fisher & Eisengart (2005) 
This series of experiments is designed with the explicit intention of 
demonstrating that infants do have abstract syntactic knowledge that they bring to 
the learning task, and focuses on infant knowledge of word order to evoke the 
correct agent / patient relationship. The test scenes involve a bunny doing 
something to a duck, or a duck doing something to a bunny. The test measure is 
the identification, by looking time, of the appropriate scene given either ‘the 
                                                 
2
 This leaves aside the third experiment, which is problematic, largely due to a possible design 
fault in how discrete contact and causative actions are depicted in the composite scene. 
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bunny is gorping the duck’ or ‘the duck is gorping the bunny’ as the linguistic 
input. 
The first experiment involves infants with an average age of 25 months. The 
practice phase involves the infants hearing familiar verbs being used: ‘hug’ and 
‘feed’. Initially the scene is blanked from the screen and the infants hear: ‘the 
bunny is gonna hug the duck’. The scene appears on the screen and the sentence 
‘the bunny is hugging the duck’ is heard. The screen is then blanked and the 
infants hear: ‘the bunny hugged the duck’. The scene is played again and the 
infants hear ‘the bunny’s hugging the duck! Find hugging’ The procedure is 
repeated again for a new scene this time ‘the bunny is feeding the duck’ preceded 
as before with ‘the bunny is gonna feed the duck’ or ‘the bunny fed the duck’ in 
the appropriate place.  
After this familiarisation, the test phase then involved the infants hearing to 
a blank screen ‘Hey look! The duck’s gonna gorp the bunny!’ Two scenes are 
then presented simultaneously on two screens: one with the bunny as agent 
pushing the duck as patient along in a truck, and the other with the duck pulling 
the bunny’s arm. This time the infants hear: ‘The duck is gorping the bunny’. The 
screens are blanked and the audio states: ‘the duck gorped the bunny’. The scenes 
return to the screens and the infants hear ‘The duck is gorping the bunny! Find 
gorping. Find gorping.’ 
The result is that infants looked significantly longer at the appropriate scene 
(in this case the duck as agent pulling the bunny’s arm). It should be noted at this 
stage that the range of input sentences include INT utterances (‘the duck’s gonna 
gorp the bunny’) prior to viewing the scenes, and RES utterances (‘the duck 
gorped the bunny’) after viewing the scenes.  The syntax of these utterance types 
accommodates an Agent and an object/entity undergoing some change of state 
described by the verb. 
The second experiment is designed to test whether infants know that the 
second named participant is the patient. It involved the same procedure, only this 
time the subject of the audio sentences was ‘he’ (as in ‘he is gorping the bunny’). 
Although the experimental report does not detail the input, it is assumed that 
when the researchers declare the experiment to have the same structure as the first 
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experiment, then the audio can be assumed to include at the appropriate time, ‘he 
is gonna gorp the bunny’ and ‘he gorped the bunny’.  
The result of this experiment showed the infants looked significantly longer 
at the correct scene (bunny as patient). 
The third experiment focussed on younger infants, 21 month olds. The 
researchers reason that as the infants are younger and only at the beginning of 
word combination, they would fail the comprehension task. In this case the report 
suggests the design was similar to experiment one, with the change that the 
participants were a boy and girl in ordinary clothing (rather than dressed in duck 
or bunny costumes), and the test involved a choice between the girl bending the 
boy back and forth by pressing on his shoulder, or the boy rotating the girl on a 
chair by pulling on a band tied round her waist. The aim of the test was the 
correct identification of agent and patient roles using word order.  
The result was that the 21 month olds reliably looked at the appropriate 
scene, contrary to the experimenters’ prediction. Disappointingly, the researchers 
concluded that the infants allocated the correct agent/patient roles based on the 
test sentence: ‘the boy is gorping the girl’, and make no reference to the 
possibility that 21 month old infants may have acquired appropriate syntax to be 
able to make use of the practice sentences as INT or RES utterances. 
The fourth experiment with 21 month olds replaced the test sentence with 
‘who’s gorping the girl?’ This had the aim of demonstrating that infants would 
identify the agent from this frame. Again no mention is made of the structure of 
the practice utterances given, but as it is reported that the structure is similar to 
the other experiments and that changes to the test phase are reported, it must be 
assumed that infants heard the INT and RES type utterances in practice. 
The results showed that infants reliably identified the appropriate scenes. 
The researchers conclude that infants have an abstract knowledge of word 
order to be able to identify the appropriate participant roles from the test sentence, 
but miss the possible contributory factor that the infants may have prior 
knowledge of INT utterance syntax. ‘The X’s gonna gorp the Y’ is possibly an 
INT utterance, expressing an intentional action; and ‘the X gorped the Y’ is a 
possible RES utterance, expressing the result of an action. Both utterance types 
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have DPs in appropriate roles for the utterance type and should have a known and 
fully understood syntax. CIB suggests that infants of this age having already 
productively acquired the syntax for INT and RES utterances used, will have 
formed a representation of the scene which can be verified when the test scene is 
revealed.  
A further series of experiments following a similar design reinforce the 
conclusion that the acquired syntax for INT and RES utterances may be playing a 
role as CIB would assume. In each experiment the significance of this prior 
acquisition is not noted by the researchers. 
3.2 Yuan & Fisher 2009  
Two experiments  with infants (average age 28 months) follow a similar 
design to those already discussed, except the test scenes are presented ‘cold’ at 
the time of the test. The preliminary phase involves the infants viewing a scene of 
two people in dialogue, discussing either a transitive or intransitive scene. The 
infants on test then identify by looking time the appropriate scene. For example, 
dialogues are as follows (reproduced from the paper): 
Transitive 
Intransitive 
 
A: Hey … Jim is gonna blick the cat. 
B: Really? He’s gonna blick the cat? 
A: And Mary was blicking the man. 
B: Wow, she was blicking the man. 
And 
A: Guess what? Jane blicked the baby.  
B: Hmm, she blicked the baby? 
A: And Bill was blicking the duck. 
B: Yeah, he was blicking the duck 
 
A: Hey … Jim is gonna blick! 
B: Really? He’s gonna blick? 
A: And Mary was blicking. 
B: Wow, she was blicking. 
And 
A: Guess what? Jane blicked 
B: Hmm, she blicked? 
A: And Bill was blicking. 
B: Yeah, he was blicking. 
 
The infants then see two scenes presented simultaneously on two screens, 
one of a man pulling on a woman’s leg, and the other of a man alone standing 
holding his arm in the air. The accompanying audio asks: ‘Find blicking! Where’s 
blicking? See? Where’s blicking?’ 
The results showed that infants reliably identified the appropriate scene 
from the input of the transitive dialogues, but looking time to the intransitive 
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condition was less statistically robust. The conclusion, drawn by the researchers, 
is that infants learned combinatorial facts about a novel verb simply by listening.  
This can only be part of the story, as it leaves two factors out of the account. 
Firstly, the priming sentences in the transitive condition mention two actors while 
the intransitive condition mentions only one. It could be that infants only look at 
the scene with the relevant number of actors. Secondly, the syntax for INT 
utterances, in particular, utilises DPs and raises the expectation that the scene will 
exhibit a change of state for one of the two participants, and the change can be 
described as ‘blicking’. The researchers note that it is only the transitive input 
which has a strong effect on looking time. 
A CIB standpoint can provide a possible explanation why the intransitive 
input did not prompt significant looking time towards the intransitive scene. The 
input sentences feature sentences that might be described as INT utterances with 
omitted objects (‘He’s gonna blick’). A possible consequence may be that  
because INT focuses on change of state of a participant in Theme role, this 
prompted infants to  enrich their interpretation of the utterance by pragmatically 
inferring the existence of an object/entity to exhibit the necessary change of state. 
This eventuality could affect the amount of looking time to the intransitive scene, 
as the expected object/entity is absent. The infant can, however, find a 
representation of the expected object/entity in the transitive scene, attention to 
which would reduce looking time to the intransitive scene. 
A follow up experiment is described with certain changes to the amount of 
input, by increasing the syntactic frames for the new verb, although it is not 
reported what these are other than preserving the transitive / intransitive 
distinction. The test phase was changed so half the participants were asked 
‘where’s blicking’, and the other half ‘what’s happening’ as a control. An 
additional difference was that a group were tested after a delay of about a day, 
and this group had further additional sentence input, although the nature of this 
input was not reported. 
The results of this experiment showed that there was a robust response for 
the transitive events, and a lesser response for the intransitive which was border-
line for statistical significance for both the same day and next day testing 
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condition. This was principally for the experimental rather than control 
conditions, supporting the effect of the linguistic input rather than simply a 
perceptual response. 
Again, although the researchers make no reference to the effect of the 
dialogue input, CIB would suggest that the transitive events implied by INT 
utterances experienced prior to viewing the test scenes, were powerful enough to 
prompt the response. The infants might understand that ‘blick’ signified some 
change of state of a participant in Theme role, and when asked to identify 
‘blicking’ could home in on explicating the meaning already derived from the 
INT utterance. The control, ‘what’s happening’ may well prompt the infants to 
consider the scenes as unrelated to the prior dialogue, i.e. a new event experience, 
and therefore not relate the prior dialogue to the scenes. This appears to be what 
occurred. 
The conclusion given by the researchers is to support the hypothesis that 
infants, on hearing multiple syntactic frames for verbs, are enabled to deduce the 
meaning of the verb. Bombarding the infant with linguistic experience may well 
have had an effect, but it does not explain why the intransitive results should be 
markedly less robust than the transitive. Prior knowledge of INT utterance types 
would seem to provide some explanation for the results achieved. 
Two follow-up experiments emphasise this point even more: 
3.3 Arunachalam & Waxman (2010) (A&W) 
This experiment was designed to support the SyB hypothesis that meaning 
is derived from syntax, and follows closely the methodology adopted by Yuan & 
Fisher (above).  
The participants had an average age of 27 months. Again infants 
experienced a dialogue phase, and the test phase depicted scenes either of humans 
acting on other humans or humans acting on inanimate objects. Dialogues were 
accompanied by video of two human participants in discussion, talking about 
transitive or intransitive events, with the following format: 
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Transitive 
 
Intransitive 
 
A: You know what? 
B: What? 
A: The lady mooped my brother. 
B: Really? The lady mooped your 
brother? 
A: And the boy is going to moop the girl. 
B: Oh yes, he’s going to moop her 
 
A: You know what? 
B: What? 
A: The lady and my brother mooped. 
B: Really? The lady and your brother 
mooped? 
A: And the boy and the girl are going to 
moop. 
B: Oh yes. They are going to moop. 
 
 
The infants then see two simultaneous scenes on two screens: a transitive 
(causative) and a synchronous intransitive activity, both involving two 
participants, and the infants are asked ‘where’s mooping?’ which they indicate by 
pointing to the appropriate screen. 
The results showed that infants in the transitive condition were more likely 
to point to the causative screen. The infants in the intransitive condition pointed 
only at chance. The researchers explain this in the same way as Naigles, that 
infants accept both causative and non-causative scenes as representative of 
intransitive input. That is the verb may refer to one of the sub-events of the 
causative action rather than the whole complex event. The main conclusion drawn 
by the research is to highlight that infants formed a representative meaning for the 
verb from syntactic input. A&W suggest that infants are fast mapping verb 
meanings in the dialogue phase using syntactic information alone. This is 
interpreted as the verb’s syntactic properties which prompts a semantic 
interpretation. 
There is no doubt that syntactic bootstrapping might play a significant role 
in infant access to verb meaning, however, the case made here is that it could be 
that all infants have is ME, INT and RES type syntax, which does appear to 
explain the data. If my claim is correct, then infants are not focussing on a causal 
implication for the transitive sentence but the implication of a result. 
CIB proposes that as these utterances express a focus on object or entity 
state change, it is this which the infants are searching for in their identification 
procedure on test. It is not that the syntax provides a causal entailment for the 
verb which is then matched to the scene; it is rather that the infants are primed to 
Neil Parr  Chapter 8  
Page 290  
 
find out what state change might be attributed to the verb from the scene when 
viewed. INT and RES utterances have an obligatory theme role (whether overtly 
expressed or not) and as such it is expected that the transitive events will accord 
with the infants understanding of the dialogue. As there is no theme role 
expressed in the intransitive dialogues they are faced with a dilemma which is 
reflected in the results occurring at chance level. 
3.4 Arunachalam, Escovar, Hansen, & Waxman (2011)  
This experiment repeats the one above but the participating infants were 21 
months old. The same results were achieved. The researchers conclude that the 
infants use argument structure rules to define the meaning of verbs, in the absence 
of the visual scene. On the CIB account, it would be expected that a significant 
number of the 21 month old infants would have acquired INT and RES utterance 
types, and are using this information to understand the dialogue as a state change 
event. It is therefore not the deduced meaning of the verb which is actively 
prompting which scene to attend to, but rather the implied meaning of the whole 
utterance which prompts the infants to anticipate some kind of state change. It is 
this that the infants are looking for in the scene, and it is the interpretation of the 
visual scene which supports how infants assign meaning to the novel verb. 
Researchers, in not recognising infant knowledge of INT and RES utterance 
structure, miss the effect that the already acquired syntax may have on 
understanding.  
4 Discussion 
These comprehension studies test whether infants can learn the meaning of 
novel verbs from hearing them used in different syntactic frames, and aim to 
support the Syntactic Bootstrapping hypothesis. The hypothesis relates to a much 
wider time frame of input than can be defined by the content of the experimental 
condition. The alternative offered, that infants have knowledge of syntax for 
expressing ME and CE type utterances, appears to provide some explanation for 
the experimental results generally. It could be that by attending to the possibility 
that infants have established syntactic knowledge of the type suggested, further 
experiments could be devised to capitalise on this knowledge. Without this 
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acknowledgement the experimental design may include distractors affecting the 
results. 
All the experiments discussed in this chapter show a striking common 
feature. Despite different methodologies, the test results can be explained as the 
infants drawing on syntactic knowledge acquired according to the CIB proposal. 
This is encouraging, but leaves open a new question why the research design 
frequently adopts the use of INT and RES type utterances in practice sessions for 
the tests, yet there is no discussion why such have been selected. Tomasello & 
Kruger (1992) had suggested that in carer/infant CDS (discussed in Chapter 2 
section 1.2), new verbs are introduced predominantly prior to or directly after an 
event, which flags up that there is an element of intuition involved.  CIB can offer 
the clarification that adults are approaching the introduction of new verbs 
intuitively by utilising INT and RES utterances which infants have developed 
independently. The experimenters may also have been influenced by this 
intuition, which serves to underline the natural bootstrapping effect of such 
utterances.  
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Chapter 9 
Summary review and prospect 
Language is a uniquely human facility, and infants experience virtually 
continuous linguistic activity around them, either directed towards them or not. 
Thus, the acquisition of language and more specifically, the ambient language of 
the speech community is a must. For infants to acquire language, the learning 
system has to be such that it delivers an inevitable, positive outcome, without 
which the learner would be at a severe disadvantage.  
Any type of learning system would be inefficiently constructed if it were to 
make available too much information for the infant to process. Overloading the 
infant with processes which are not of immediate relevance cannot be viable, and 
as such there is a means for constraining learning in order to guarantee an 
inevitable result. These constraints limit the learning space sufficiently for a 
simple bootstrapping process to provide access to the acquisition of syntax. 
1. Constraints on learning 
Throughout my thesis the outcomes at each stage have defined a series of 
constraints on the learning space, and my proposal is that Conceptual-Intentional 
Bootstrapping works in conjunction with these to guide the infant to an inevitable 
result, i.e. access to syntax becomes plainly available. The constraining 
mechanisms, which in themselves may serve diverse purposes, can be 
summarised as follows from the discussion in the foregoing chapters.  
1.1 Conceptual-intentional development (Chapter 3) is structured, 
focussed and relevant to the infant. 
i). The initial interaction and development of inter-subjectivity with an adult 
provides a unique human relationship, from which a conversational, 
communicative exchange is established. 
ii). CDS focuses on meaning and understanding which helps build infant 
generic knowledge of the world. This is organised in such a way to provide a 
‘contextual funnel’ which ensures that all learning is inherently meaningful, 
which in turn, provides the context for interpreting and acquiring new knowledge.  
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iii). The key component of infant subjective (generic) knowledge is the 
event. Events are bounded, complete in themselves yet can be sequenced and 
integrated. Through their intentionality, infants engage with that which is relevant 
and contextually meaningful to them. Manifest, dynamic events are, therefore, 
understood in terms of participatory entities operating in largely predictable ways. 
1.2 Early word learning (Chapter 4) is flexible but contextually bound 
within the confines of the infant’s conceptual-intentional 
development. 
i). Because words are language specific and languages operate in different 
ways, it is advantageous for word learning to be maximally flexible. This is 
initially achieved if infant words are not considered to have inherent grammatical 
specifications. Syntactic role and category membership is defined by syntax and 
categories like [V] and [N] form as necessary elements of syntactic structure, not 
as specifications of lexical items.  
ii). Flexibility can be maintained if words are considered to be semantically 
under-determined. Conceptual understanding of objects/entities and their dynamic 
potentialities are derived from further ‘contextual funnelling’ from global 
categories to the particular. Meta-cognitive developments enable a shift from 
monitoring perceived events to mapping between events including linguistic 
events. In this way word learning and word meanings are distilled out from global 
contexts. On this basis, words do not label individual concepts, but map to events 
which can simulate or summon up a range of relevant experience stored as 
generic knowledge.  
1.3 Utterances of Manifest and Complex events (Chapter 5) provide 
the basis for productive verbal communication. 
i). Combining words requires a conventional means of organisation – 
syntax. In its acquisition, two contexts are identified, constrained by an infant’s 
growing meta-cognitive and representational abilities: Manifest and Complex 
Events.  
ii). Manifest events are defined as those occurring in the context of shared 
joint attention with an adult in the here and now. Infants form Primary 
Representations - the on-going updating of actuality. Two word utterances about 
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Manifest Events are descriptive of these events and have been characterised as 
syntactic constructions which exhibit the basic principle of Merge, which at this 
stage is not licensed by syntactic features but by perceptual, or conceptual 
binding.  
Utterances about Manifest Events are inherently atelic, and have been 
characterised as:  ME [Aspect atelic[substantive][modifier]].  
iii). Complex Events are defined as those which exhibit two sub-events 
which are the result of a collation of a Primary representation of current actuality 
and a constructed Secondary representation, which contrasts with current 
actuality. These have been shown to make two differing utterance types available: 
INT characterising intention towards a change of state, and RES characterised as 
the result of a changed state. These differ significantly from Manifest Events in 
that the infant’s communicative intention is not a directly shared feature of the 
context with the carer.  
1.4 Empirical evidence (Chapter 6) supports the contrast between 
Manifest and Complex Event utterance types. 
The empirical study in Chapter 6, demonstrated the influence of 
communication about Complex events, particularly INT utterances. This took the 
form of the positive significant association between DPs in Theme role and 
utterances of Complex Events. This was matched by the correlation between bare 
nominal forms and utterances of Manifest events. The strength of these relations 
suggested that INT utterances are the locus for syntactic development. 
Endocentric DPs occur as components of verb phrases, thus one conclusion is that 
INT utterances play a significant role in the development of [V]erbs. RES 
utterances. although fewer in number than INT utterances, showed strong 
associations with DPs, and those in Agentive roles in particular. 
It was noted that utterances of Manifest and Complex events differ by 
Aspect; the former are atelic, and the latter telic. 
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1.5 Utterances about Complex Events provide the locus for syntactic 
growth (Chapter 7).  
Based on infant utterances and the empirical data, the syntactic structure of 
INT and RES utterances could be characterised by a process of successive binary 
Merge. An important contributory element was found to be Aspect features.  
1.6 ME and CE syntactic knowledge confirmed by comprehension 
and production testing (Chapter 8). 
The assumption, that infants 18-30 months old have productive knowledge 
of ME and CE utterance types, was supported by demonstrating that the outcomes 
from comprehension testing experiments can be achieved by infants utilising such 
knowledge. 
2. How the Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal 
differs from other bootstrapping proposals 
Bootstrapping describes the problem of how an infant can relate an 
ungraded auditory linguistic input, to the syntactic specifications of the ambient 
language. The innatist version assumes a full competence system innately 
available to the infant from UG. The task is, therefore, one of starting up the 
language learning facility which will operate in the background to set parameters 
of UG which match those of the target language being acquired. For theoretical 
positions which do not attribute a role for UG, a bootstrapping process, however, 
can still be seen to play a role. For instance, emergentists need to define how 
item-specific lexical construction frames, learned from input, can become 
generalised syntactic constructions for productive use. 
Linguistic systems vary considerably across languages and are specific for 
individual languages. Unlocking the mysteries of a language specific syntactic 
system, which is always achieved successfully and accurately by all (typically 
developing) infants, is the bootstrapping problem.  
As has been shown, (Chapter 2), different bootstrapping approaches weight 
different aspects of this process. SeB suggests a direct semantic link to existing 
innately specified grammatical categories, on a perceived world to structure basis. 
VEPS assumes a kind of parametric template through which the language is 
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perceived and co-ordinated with innately specified UG. For both these approaches 
the learning space is constrained by innately specified elements. If, as has been 
discussed (Chapter3), the possibility of innate grammatical categories is denied, 
then SeB, which relies heavily on their existence cannot operate. Janet Fodor 
(1998) has argued that Gibson & Wexler’s (1994) approach to defining whole 
sentence triggers for VEPS presents the infant with a vast array of ambiguous 
triggers which necessitate a trial and error approach. In turn this can result in 
wholesale parameter resetting to derive the correct syntax. Her solution is to 
constrain the infant to unambiguous triggers which tend to mark structures within 
sentences or ‘treelets’ rather than whole sentence structure.  
VIH on the other hand, adopts a cumulative word-concept learning process 
where frequency of use groups words and phrases into larger units. The constraint 
on learning seems to be the context of use, although the tipping point from 
individual collections of words (verb islands) to categorical verb constructions 
appears to be ill-defined. The tipping point, which Tomasello (1992, 2000) 
attributes to analogy, may constitute a bootstrapping process. 
SyB, from an alternative perspective, assumes a syntactic knowledge and 
uses this as a constraint on deriving verb meaning. 
All approaches assume a degree of bootstrapping as useful, but to date the 
differing versions do not fully address the range of constraints on the learning 
process. As such these hypotheses leave too much of the acquisition process to 
chance, which patently cannot be the case. 
I have identified the following five key characteristics of the Conceptual-
Intentional Bootstrapping proposal which together mark it out as different from 
other bootstrapping hypotheses: 
i). Intentionality 
ii). Innate principle Merge, and possibly innate prototypical categories 
[substantive] [modifier], and grammatical [V], [D], and [N]. 
iii). Analytic, as opposed to synthetic processes. 
iv). The acquire as required principle 
v). Language production 
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2.1 Intentionality 
The overriding difference between CIB and all others is the role given to the 
infant herself as a participating, sentient being, not simply a location for 
acquisitional mechanisms. Recognising this aspect has a pervading effect on all 
other principles, as the infant takes some ‘responsibility’ for guiding her learning 
on the basis of what she finds relevant for her engagement in the learning process.  
This still allows for mechanistic processing to be happening in the 
background, and addresses the problem of dealing with ambiguous input. 
Background processing may provide possibilities, processing for relevance 
provides solutions.  
CIB therefore maintains that the infant, involved with human interaction, 
learning from and being included in the social/cultural context of the dyadic 
carer/infant relationship and the wider family/social context, has a growing 
individuality and identity. CIB capitalises on the advent of an infant’s personal 
identity and her desire to communicate her own intentions which are not simply 
following an adult lead. The process is therefore communication driven. 
2.2 Innate elements 
CIB recognises certain innate properties.   
Learning from prior experience, and the establishing of cognitive relevance 
are both assumed to be innate abilities for all infants; so too (meta-)cognitive 
development.  The advent of conceptually complex events is the result of general 
universal cognitive growth: the correlation of Primary and Secondary 
representations.  
Yang’s proposal (2004) that UG may be a guide for language learning, i.e. 
some sort of instruction manual, cannot be so. UG is generally held to specify 
universal linguistic options yet there seems to be no published evidence that UG 
is graded. This view is reinforced by Fodor’s (1998) observation of the extent of 
ambiguous triggers affecting parameter setting.  A further problem is why, if UG 
is a guiding principle, does it appear to take so long to yield results? Does UG lie 
dormant until an infant has matured enough for it to start up? If so, the 
bootstrapping problem remains. However, Chomsky’s vision (1980, 1995) that 
language acquisition can be thought akin to biological growth is instructive. CIB 
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has specified a developmental process inevitably resulting in language 
acquisition, which provides the certain environment for UG to operate. The 
bootstrapping process as described appears to define innate prototypical 
categories such as [substantive] and [modifier], when describing Manifest Event 
representations and are closely matched to conceptual categories evident in infant 
generic knowledge. Expressions about Complex Event representations require the 
grammatical categories [V], [D], and [N], and appear to be in a direct relation to 
conceptual properties of stae-change, reference and object/entity kind. I claim 
CIB to provide the missing link, which, due to its innate universality and 
inevitability of output, stands in a very close relation to UG itself, such that 
Principles operate and Parameters are set in a cognitive environment of rich 
contextual meaning and communicative intent.  
Emergentists rely on the linguistic input for infants to learn linguistic 
constructions, yet analysis of the input shows that there is not a systematic 
presentation of linguistic structures that can ensure the level of inevitability 
required. In fact it appears that adults are unaware of how to provide systematic 
instruction for grammar learning. There is evidence that initial utterances exhibit 
a mapping from linguistic to perceived events, but productive use of language by 
infants appears to begin using constructions never heard uttered by adults – (‘have 
it spoons’). CIB provides tight guiding principles which utilise what adults do 
actively provide in their talk with infants, leading to a position where the infant 
takes over the acquisition process for herself. This link is missing from the 
emergentist account. 
2.3 Analysis rather than synthesis 
The constraints in CIB are built on the notion of learning occurring within 
meaningful global contexts which is then subject to further refinements. This top 
down approach places CIB in opposition to many item-based acquisition theories 
(Tomasello 2005, Ninio 1999, McClure, Pine & Lieven 2006) where individual 
words and their meanings are learned and then combined into constructions which 
initially operate autonomously until there is some form of motivation for them to 
coalesce into a generalised structure. Throughout, it has been demonstrated that 
wide contexts always provide the starting point. Global categories define their 
membership rather than collections of items forming categories. Therefore, global 
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contextual, generic knowledge provides a meaningful context for learning about 
how entities interact in the world; global conceptual categories provide the 
context for distilling component categories; and words gain syntactic category 
membership from the roles demanded by syntax. This approach allows for what 
might be termed ‘constrained flexibility’, a process which allows for a 
functionally defined category boundary but the contents are loosely defined until 
accuracy becomes relevant. This ‘best fit’ approach favours fluency over accuracy 
and provides optimal access to an interacting conceptual/intentional/linguistic 
system which is communication driven. CIB makes quite strong claims about the 
communicative constraints on infants during the bootstrapping process. There are 
just two event types which characterise all early infant communication 
requirements: Manifest and Complex Events, and the latter present just two 
utterance types: INT and RES. These represent the communicative constraints 
within which there is a wide range of possibilities of what can be communicated, 
given the additional contextual constraints from infant subjective experience.   
2.4 Acquire-as-required. 
  The problem with a full competence model is how to explain why very 
young infants do not talk immediately like adults. Indeed it would be profoundly 
disturbing if they did! Conventionally the explanation centres on performance 
limitations in the young infant. CIB redefines performance limitations in terms of 
systematic constraints which limit infant access to aspects of syntax and 
communicative content relative to cognitive development and relevance in 
intentionality. The result is to view the infant not as a deficient adult, but as a 
developing human acquiring what is needed for effective communication at any 
one time in the infant’s life. CIB claims that infants acquire those aspects of adult 
grammar, within the bounds of ‘constrained flexibility’, which effectively meet 
their needs at any one time. It supports Rizzi’s (2002) and Fodor’s (1998) notion 
of partial syntactic acquisition. It implies a system, suggested by Braine (1992) of 
‘use what is already known, and if this doesn’t work then make appropriate 
changes’. Judgements of whether the system ‘works’ or not are defined on the 
basis of effective communication i.e. expressing a communicative intention and 
being understood by another.  
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This approach has implications for what constitutes ‘acquisition’. Language 
acquisition is not simply an inventory of linguistic knowledge but includes 
effective communicative use. As stated above communication is limited to two 
event types: Manifest and Complex Events. Manifest events provide overt support 
for comprehension; the context is fully shared between the infant and adult. 
Complex events provide a motivation for developing effective means for the 
expression of non-overt informative content. INT utterances in particular must be 
understood by a hearer because they represent important needs and requirements 
for the infant. A definition of language acquisition that fails to show that language 
knowledge is acquired for the purpose of linguistic production fails to take 
account of this evidence. 
2.5 Production 
By defining language acquisition as the acquisition of language knowledge 
for production raises a contentious proposition. There has been extensive debate 
about the relation between comprehension and production and language 
knowledge. Some of the issues are summarised here. Generative theory defines 
language knowledge in the form of syntax as the central element which through 
performance processes provides for comprehension and production as two 
comparable outcomes. The implication is that neither is possible without existing 
language knowledge (the syntax of the language). SyB (Syntactic bootstrapping) 
approaches claim that ‘structure is easy but meaning is difficult’ (Naigles 2002) 
implying a divide between syntax and comprehension and that syntax has 
ascendancy over comprehension. Production is not considered. Other approaches, 
like item-based, usage models, claim that meaning and comprehension have 
ascendancy over structure. Tomasello (2002) maintains that infants learn and 
reproduce structures that have been heard used in appropriate contexts.  
Either way, however the input is gained it is not until the infant attempts to 
put together what has been learned/constructed/confirmed in the personal context 
of her intentionality to make and produce an utterance, that she can gauge the 
effectiveness of her learning. As adults we may watch, study and understand what 
a master chef is doing in creating a remarkable dish, and appreciate it when eaten, 
but this will provide only a guide when asked to produce such a dish oneself. 
Infants experience communication from master crafts-people daily, delivered in 
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such a way to be readily understood and appreciated. Producing comparable 
utterances is difficult and an integral part of the acquisition process. CIB separates 
comprehension from production, and given the constraints already outlined 
proposes that comprehension is based on syntactic knowledge plus extensive 
pragmatic, inferential abilities drawn from generic knowledge. Production 
requires well-formed syntactic knowledge. Only the latter demands that the infant 
controls and manipulates syntactic elements. It is gaining control and ownership 
of linguistic knowledge for production that constitutes the largest part of the 
acquisition process. This major undertaking is mediated by the acquire-as-
required principle. 
3. Implications and ways forward 
The Conceptual-Intentional Bootstrapping proposal described in this thesis 
has been exemplified through the acquisition of the English verb, but all the steps 
which eventually arrive at Complex Event utterances can be assumed to be 
universal for all infants. An inevitable prediction is that when infants are able to 
make complex event utterances they will achieve a defining moment for accessing 
the syntax of the ambient language they are acquiring. Clearly the special 
privilege accorded to ‘it’ in English is a language specific device, which operates 
as a syntactic feature on words expressing telic events. The implication is that 
other languages make similar important devices apparent when infants express 
utterances about Complex Events. The uncovering of the significance of INT and 
RES utterance-types for syntactic growth should provide valuable insights into 
the explanation for various acquisition phenomena. One such is the use of Root 
Infinitives (RI) in infant speech to express eventualities. 
Use of RI by infants is evident in many languages and notably is absent 
from adult speech. Infants will not have learned this usage from adult input. 
Research into RI, briefly reviewed in Chapter 2 section 2.6, has described usage 
to be restricted to event-denoting verbs and related to a modal interpretation in 
several languages: French, German, Dutch, Greek and Russian (Hoekstra & 
Hyams 1998). Event denotation and modal interpretation provide a strong 
suggestion that INT utterances are implicated. It is noted by Hoekstra & Hyams 
and other research that for English, having no infinitival form, non-finite verbs 
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behave differently. CIB suggests that in English, INT utilises a discrete non-finite 
form, but RES verbs only appear to be non-finite in form because English does 
not have a distinct verb morphology to express Aspect as opposed to tense. 
Infants learn verb forms for RES (irreg, -ed, ø) dependent on what they have 
heard used. 
Gavruseva (2003) and Hyams (2007, 2011) have proposed conflicting 
aspectual explanations to incorporate infant use of bare perfectives and bare verbs 
for the languages listed above including English, although there is technical 
disagreement over how this should be formulated. 
INT and RES utterances are shown in CIB to have a significant influence on 
how Aspect, particularly telicity, is expressed by infants in English. It is predicted 
that categorising infant utterances into ME, INT and RES utterance-types from 
corpus data, drawn from languages other than English, will provide a clearer 
insight into how infants are approaching syntactic organisation in these languages, 
particularly RI usage. 
Even more interesting would be the insights revealed by INT and RES 
utterance-types into infant syntactic development, drawn from non-European 
languages. 
It would appear that utterances about Manifest and Complex Events 
described by CIB constitute the early intentional communication of all infants less 
than 30 months old, and therefore will provide a rich source of insight into the 
acquisition of the syntax of any language. By uncovering the specific linguistic 
devices infants uniquely use to express INT and RES utterances, additional 
otherwise hidden information about the syntax of particular languages will 
become apparent to researchers as much as it evidently does to 18 month old 
infants. 
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Appendix 1: MLU calculations 
 
The graphs presented here represent the MLU calculations for all the infants 
in the CHILDES/UK-Eng/Manchester corpus. 
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Appendix 2: Guidance for analysts 
 
Written guidance produced to provide support and ‘training’ for the 
independent analyst performing the verification task, for the empirical study 
reported in Chapter 6.  
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Guidance for independent analysts 
The task is to analyse each of the given 6 scripts into utterance types. There 
are three different types that are to be identified which are termed ‘here and now’; 
‘intentional’ or ‘resultative’ in the main research. This task is an important 
contribution to the research, and your participation is much appreciated. This 
document gives information about how to identify the types and provides a 
practice session in preparation for the main task.  
Some general points:  
i) Identification will depend quite a lot on your own judgement of 
what the infant is intending to communicate. It is recognised that 
this presents certain difficulties especially when there is only a 
transcribed text to work with.  
ii) Clearly, 2 year olds are not adults. Their topics of conversation and 
the ways they express themselves are sometimes obscure. As such, it 
is advisable to read through at least part of a transcript before 
analysing it to ‘tune into’ what is going on. 
iii) Infants’ general knowledge and ability with language is 
comparatively limited at this age and how infants say what they 
want to express can be quite approximate so the task is to try to 
focus on meaning rather than form. 
iv) Because context plays an essential role in the infant/adult 
interactions, your judgements will involve not only considering what 
an infant says but how the adult prompts or responds to the infant. 
v) The scope of this analysis is limited to two or more word utterances, 
so single word utterances (however interesting they may be) should 
be ignored. 
vi) Getting into this analysis may be slow at the beginning, but it really 
does get easier with practice! 
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What you will be looking for: 
Following this general overview, the utterance types will be considered in 
more detail with a practice extract. There are three utterance types that interest us. 
i) The first we will term the ‘here and now’, for the sake of this 
exercise. Through this type of utterance the child is describing what 
she can see or perceive actually happening in front of her, including 
her own actions. E.g. ‘doll sitting’; ‘broken toy’; ‘that, Thomas’.
     
You will not be asked to physically mark these utterances as they are 
the majority and we will consider them the default. (Naturally you 
will need to identify them in order to contrast them with the other 
utterances which we do want to be marked up!). 
ii) The second utterance type is termed (for various reasons) 
intentional (abbreviated to INT). In general terms a child will be 
expressing a desire to have something, or a desire for a change of 
state of an object or event. The key sign post is not the desiring per 
se (as she will have the desire in the here and now) but that the goal 
referenced in the utterance is different from the actual state of affairs 
in the here and now.  e.g. ‘get it train’ (train not present); ’want 
juice’ (juice not present); ‘no play this’ (desire for a changed event); 
‘mend it’ (desire for a change of object state from broken to fixed). 
There is a (near) future sense about these utterances. 
iii) The third utterance type is termed resultative (abbreviated to RES). 
In general terms, the focus of the utterance is on the means by which 
an object or event in the here and now has come about. There is a 
recent past sense about these utterances. E.g. ‘found the spoons’ 
(spoons present now and how this came about is suggested). ‘Nana 
bought this car’; ‘I hurt my hand’. 
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What you are asked to do 
i) Consider each two or more word infant utterance (infant utterances 
appear with the designation CHI: ) for each of the six script sets you 
have been given, and decide which of the three utterances she is 
probably using. 
ii) If the utterance is considered to be an INT utterance then use the 
green marker tool to highlight the utterance (just mark the CHI: 
designation in the transcript). 
iii) If the utterance is considered to be a RES utterance then use the red 
marker tool to highlight the utterance (again just the CHI: part). 
iv) If you find it impossible to make a decision one way or the other 
despite careful investigation (it happens), then as a last resort just 
mark the utterance with blue. 
v) That’s all there is to it!! 
vi) When you have finished, please send your marked scripts to 
<n.parr@ucl.ac.uk> and arrangements will be made for you to 
receive payment for this task. Many thanks for your time and effort.  
 
More detailed guidance and sample 
The following are some strong pointers towards INT utterances: 
CHI use of ‘where’ or ‘where’s’ generally signals INT. 
CHI use of ‘want’; ‘wanna’; ‘want to’. In general infants appear to use these 
words to signal intention (as do adults). Comparably the words ‘need’; ‘need to’; 
‘go’; ‘gonna’; ‘going to’; ‘can’; ‘will’ and negative forms of these with ‘no’ or 
‘not’  frequently appear in INT utterances. Note that this is not always the case. 
Compare the following: 
1) CHI: wanna have train  (INT) 
MOT: OK. I think it’s in the box over there. 
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2) CHI: wanna have train  (playing with it in the here and now) 
MOT: Yes that is always your favourite. 
In these examples the context shows that the infant is expressing different 
meanings. In (1) she is expressing that she wants the train, in (2) she is merely 
expressing something (in a non-adult way) about playing with her favourite train 
at present. Note that it is the context and the mother’s utterance which 
disambiguates this for the sake of the analysis. 
 
Other decision points concern whether the required action has happened or 
not: 
3) CHI: oh, broken… 
CHI: Mend it train (INT) 
MOT: Daddy’ll mend it when he gets home 
4) CHI: oh, broken… 
CHI: Mend it train (RES) 
MOT: So you have. You are clever! 
Once again the adult response disambiguates the utterance. In (3) the train is 
to be mended. In (4) the mending has taken place and the fixed train is the result. 
 
Although ‘get it’ frequently signals INT, ‘got’ is more difficult (as too in 
adult speech). Consider the following: 
5) CHI: got this train (in possession in the here and now) 
MOT: well, you have several there to play with. 
6) CHI: got this train ( retrieved it from the box- RES) 
MOT: oh yes, did you find it in the box? 
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The following suggest RES utterances: 
The infants sometimes use a (strong) past tense form of a verb in RES utterances: 
7) CHI: Nana bought the car 
8) CHI: I hurt my hand 
But as these infants do not have a full knowledge of tense forms, they are just as 
likely not to use a past tense form. Consider the single utterance (Weezer is the 
family pet): 
9) CHI: Weezer eat the food 
This could equally be expressed in adult terms as: 
10)  Weezer ate the food [RES] 
11)  Weezer (is) eat(ing) the food [here and now] 
12)  (I want) Weezer (to) eat the food [INT] 
13)  Weezer (is going to) eat the food [INT] 
It is only the context which will disambiguate these examples. 
A further issue to consider is when adults prompt the infant to remember a past 
event from the day or week before. There are only a few examples of this. A 
straight memory of the past with no resultant event or object in the present should 
not be marked as RES (simply left unmarked). For instance: 
14)  MOT: tell Anna what we did yesterday, when we went out…do you 
remember..we went to the clinic and you played didn’t you? Do you 
remember what you did? 
CHI: Play ball. 
MOT: You played in the ball pond didn’t you. 
Below is a sample script for you review. [Note that there is a certain amount of 
transcriber coding in the scripts which cannot easily be deleted. Ignore @c; <  > 
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and [/]. [*0..] means the transcriber has inserted what she thinks the child might 
mean ( this can be helpful). 
Sample script: 
139 *CHI: it's like it . 
140 *MOT: he likes it but what is it ? 
141 *MOT: what's that ? 
142 *CHI: oh no . 
143 *MOT: it's a sausage . 
144 *CHI: a sausage . 
145 *CHI: want eat it the sausage . 
146 *CHI: &mm . 
147 *MOT: yum yum yum . 
148 *CHI: bite it the lid off . 
149 *CHI: bye . 
150 *CHI: bye . 
151 *CHI: bye the sausage . 
152 *CHI: I find ice+cream . 
153 *MOT: &mm . 
154 *MOT: &mm . 
155 *CHI: &mm . 
156 *CHI: it's ice+cream . 
157 *CHI: xxx . 
158 *CHI: a egg . 
159 *CHI: there [* 0is] a egg in there . 
160 *CHI: there's a egg . 
161 *MOT: that's how you do boiled eggs 
, isn't it ? 
162 *MOT: &mm . 
163 *CHI: blup@c . 
164 *CHI: blup@c . 
165 *MOT: oh: . 
166 *MOT: you have to knock the top off 
and get your soldiers . 
167 *MOT: dunk it in the egg . 
168 *CHI: blup@c . 
169 *CHI: blup@c . 
170 *MOT: this is a silly game . 
171 *CHI: blup@c . 
172 *CHI: blup@c . 
173 *CHI: egg say blup@c . 
174 *MOT: you're talking nonsense . 
175 *CHI: oh I wanna blup@c . 
176 *MOT: you want to blup@c ? 
177 *MOT: okay then . 
178 *MOT: you blup@c . 
179 *CHI: blup@c . 
180 *CHI: oh <it's it's> [/] it's go 
blup@c . 
181 *CHI: go blup@c . 
182 *CHI: I want try again . 
183 *CHI: try again . 
184 *CHI: blup@c . 
185 *CHI: blup@c . 
186 *MOT: this cat's getting hungry . 
187 *MOT: he wants something to eat . 
188 *CHI: blup@c . 
189 *CHI: not [//] it's not cat want . 
190 *CHI: blup@c . 
191 *CHI: <I try I try> [/] I try again . 
192 *CHI: blup@c . 
193 *CHI: xxx . 
194 *CHI: blup@c . 
195 *MOT: what're you doing ? 
196 *CHI: I playing this little egg . 
197 *CHI: blup@c . 
198 *CHI: it bluped@c . 
199 *CHI: I got it . 
200 *MOT: yum yum yum . 
201 *CHI: blup@c . 
202 *CHI: oh he all cry . 
203 *MOT: oh is he crying ? 
204 *MOT: did you hit him ? 
205 *MOT: poor cat . 
206 *CHI: I want thank+you . 
207 *CHI: I want some . 
208 *CHI: it's in there . 
209 *MOT: has he eaten that all up ? 
210 *MOT: he's a good cat , isn't he 
eating his dinner ? 
211 *CHI: he's finished . 
212 *CHI: he's finished now . 
213 *CHI: he wants some . 
214 *CHI: he wants some nanas . 
215 *CHI: you better peel . 
216 *CHI: &mm . 
217 *CHI: and this want a bit of chew . 
218 *CHI: bit of chew . 
219 *CHI: want bit of chew . 
220 *CHI: he want [* 0es] bit of chew . 
221 *MOT: peeling them ? 
222 *CHI: yes . 
223 *CHI: you peel it . 
224 *CHI: sausage and chips . 
225 *CHI: sausage and chips . 
226 *MOT: &mm . 
227 *CHI: oh it's too hot . 
228 *MOT: oh dear . 
229 *MOT: blow on it . 
230 *CHI: it's too hot . 
231 *CHI: chips are hot . 
232 *MOT: oh: . 
233 *MOT: Carl likes chips . 
234 *CHI: too hot . 
235 *MOT: too hot . 
236 *MOT: oh dear . 
237 *CHI: it's too hot and no xxx here . 
238 *CHI: I [* 0am] not hungry . 
239 *CHI: I [* 0have] not got salamis . 
240 *CHI: got salamis in there . 
241 *CHI: got two . 
242 *CHI: got xxx . 
243 *MOT: you've got two what ? 
244 *MOT: what [/] what's in there ? 
245 *CHI: no .
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Summary of the marking showing INT, RES and the ‘unmarked’ utterances. 
Lines with INT Lines with RES Here and now 
145 
148 
175 
182 
183 
189 
191 
206 
207 
213 
214 
215 
217 
218 
219 
220 
223 
152 
198 
199 
211 
212 
139 
142 
144 
151 
156 
158 
159 
160 
173 
180 
181 
196 
202 
208 
224 
225 
227 
230 
231 
234 
237-242 
 
Lastly if there are any questions or problems that unduly worry you, don’t 
hesitate to get in touch: n.parr@ucl.ac.uk 
Thanks for your time and energy. 
Best wishes 
Neil Parr. 
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Appendix 3 Infant data 
 
Appendix 3 contains the raw data used for each of the 10 infants, for the empirical 
study in Chapter 6. 
The data is coded using combinations of the following elements: 
[ME] = ME utterance type 
[INT] = INT utterance type 
[RES] = RES utterance type 
[UttTOTAL] = total utterances 
[prop-] = indicates data proportioned to total utterances 
[-tot] = indicates totals of types 
[O-] = indicates theme role DP 
[S-] = indicates non-theme role DP 
[I-] = indicates first person singular 
[Bn] = indicates bare nominal 
[CE] = indicates Complex Event (INT+RES) 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Anne Script 2 6 8 10 14 17 
 
MLU 1.791 1.863 2.082 2.180 2.861 2.750 
 
MEtot 178 227 208 177 209 328 
 
INTtot 98 135 141 108 164 144 
 
REStot 16 15 27 10 21 20 
 
UttTOTAL 292 377 376 295 394 492 
        
 
propPR 0.610 0.602 0.553 0.600 0.530 0.667 
 
propINT 0.336 0.358 0.375 0.366 0.416 0.293 
 
propRES 0.055 0.040 0.072 0.034 0.053 0.041 
 
Otot 90 40 82 43 79 73 
 
Stot 33 102 57 73 126 100 
 
Itot 20 1 4 13 29 16 
 
Bntot 79 46 53 43 26 28 
 
INTOtot 66 30 62 32 65 61 
 
RESOtot 12 9 19 4 12 12 
 
MEOtot 12 1 1 7 2 0 
 
INTStot 9 17 18 14 34 20 
 
RESStot 0 5 12 4 5 9 
 
MEStot 4 79 23 42 58 55 
 
INTItot 10 1 3 11 23 12 
 
RESItot 7 0 1 1 2 1 
 
MEItot 3 0 0 1 4 3 
 
INTOprop 0.673 0.222 0.440 0.296 0.396 0.424 
 
RESOprop 0.750 0.600 0.704 0.400 0.571 0.600 
 
MEOprop 0.067 0.004 0.005 0.040 0.010 0.000 
 
INTSprop 0.092 0.126 0.128 0.130 0.207 0.139 
 
RESSprop 0.000 0.333 0.444 0.400 0.238 0.450 
 
MESprop 0.022 0.348 0.111 0.237 0.278 0.168 
 
INTIprop 0.102 0.007 0.021 0.102 0.140 0.083 
 
RESIprop 0.438 0.000 0.037 0.100 0.095 0.050 
 
MEIprop 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.019 0.009 
 
propO 0.308 0.106 0.218 0.146 0.201 0.148 
 
propS 0.113 0.271 0.152 0.247 0.320 0.203 
 
propI 0.068 0.003 0.011 0.044 0.074 0.033 
 
Bnprop 0.271 0.122 0.141 0.146 0.066 0.057 
 
CEprop 0.390 0.398 0.447 0.400 0.470 0.333 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Aran Script 2 4 8 11 13 17 
 
MLU 1.476 2.066 2.133 2.331 2.697 2.742 
 
MEtot 124 256 255 211 207 204 
 
INTtot 33 168 104 141 166 204 
 
REStot 5 40 49 32 37 26 
 
UttTOTAL 162 464 408 384 410 434 
        
 
propPR 0.765 0.552 0.625 0.549 0.505 0.470 
 
propINT 0.204 0.362 0.255 0.367 0.405 0.470 
 
propRES 0.031 0.086 0.120 0.083 0.090 0.060 
        
 
Otot 12 88 77 118 143 77 
 
Stot 30 90 117 131 122 150 
 
Itot 12 28 89 51 88 82 
 
Bntot 87 90 43 34 19 13 
 
INTOtot 10 50 33 81 92 63 
 
RESOtot 0 19 12 15 15 14 
 
MEOtot 2 19 32 22 36 0 
 
INTStot 0 25 6 11 0 14 
 
RESStot 0 7 9 11 4 12 
 
MEStot 18 30 13 58 30 42 
 
INTItot 9 10 37 37 48 63 
 
RESItot 2 11 27 8 18 8 
 
MEItot 1 7 25 6 22 11 
 
INTOprop 0.303 0.298 0.317 0.574 0.554 0.309 
 
RESOprop 0.000 0.475 0.245 0.469 0.405 0.538 
 
MEOprop 0.016 0.074 0.125 0.104 0.174 0.000 
 
INTSprop 0.000 0.149 0.058 0.078 0.000 0.069 
 
RESSprop 0.000 0.175 0.184 0.344 0.108 0.462 
 
MESprop 0.145 0.117 0.051 0.275 0.145 0.206 
 
INTIprop 0.273 0.060 0.356 0.262 0.289 0.309 
 
RESIprop 0.400 0.275 0.551 0.250 0.486 0.308 
 
MEIprop 0.008 0.027 0.098 0.028 0.106 0.054 
 
propO 0.074 0.190 0.189 0.307 0.349 0.177 
 
propS 0.185 0.194 0.287 0.341 0.298 0.346 
 
propI 0.074 0.060 0.218 0.133 0.215 0.189 
 
Bnprop 0.537 0.194 0.105 0.089 0.046 0.030 
 
CEprop 0.235 0.448 0.375 0.451 0.495 0.530 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Becky Script 6 9 12 14 18 21 
 
MLU 1.502 1.888 2.433 2.485 3.046 2.976 
 
MEtot 164 193 277 348 351 321 
 
INTtot 61 84 171 126 201 133 
 
REStot 25 36 34 43 35 27 
 
UttTOTAL 250 313 482 517 587 481 
        
 
propPR 0.656 0.617 0.575 0.673 0.598 0.667 
 
propINT 0.244 0.268 0.355 0.244 0.342 0.277 
 
propRES 0.100 0.115 0.071 0.083 0.060 0.056 
        
 
Otot 24 71 108 85 103 43 
 
Stot 31 91 196 225 306 204 
 
Itot 10 50 90 78 137 64 
 
Bntot 85 35 36 49 16 5 
 
INTOtot 20 45 88 57 61 24 
 
RESOtot 1 21 10 19 19 15 
 
MEOtot 3 5 10 9 23 4 
 
INTStot 7 11 25 34 44 28 
 
RESStot 2 3 15 12 21 25 
 
MEStot 12 27 66 101 104 87 
 
INTItot 4 12 60 27 78 33 
 
RESItot 0 19 4 22 7 5 
 
MEItot 6 19 26 29 52 26 
 
INTOprop 0.328 0.536 0.515 0.452 0.303 0.180 
 
RESOprop 0.040 0.583 0.294 0.442 0.543 0.556 
 
MEOprop 0.018 0.026 0.036 0.026 0.066 0.012 
 
INTSprop 0.115 0.131 0.146 0.270 0.219 0.211 
 
RESSprop 0.080 0.083 0.441 0.279 0.600 0.926 
 
MESprop 0.073 0.140 0.238 0.290 0.296 0.271 
 
INTIprop 0.066 0.143 0.351 0.214 0.388 0.248 
 
RESIprop 0.000 0.528 0.118 0.512 0.200 0.185 
 
MEIprop 0.037 0.098 0.094 0.083 0.148 0.081 
 
propO 0.096 0.227 0.224 0.164 0.175 0.089 
 
propS 0.124 0.291 0.407 0.435 0.521 0.424 
 
propI 0.040 0.160 0.187 0.151 0.233 0.133 
 
Bnprop 0.340 0.112 0.075 0.095 0.027 0.010 
 
CEprop 0.344 0.383 0.425 0.327 0.402 0.333 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Carl Script 1 6 11 13 16 18 
 
MLU 1.865 1.988 2.380 2.491 2.627 3.089 
 
MEtot 328 259 465 410 390 366 
 
INTtot 70 54 87 166 184 271 
 
REStot 20 7 26 19 30 55 
 
UttTOTAL 418 320 578 595 604 692 
        
 
propPR 0.785 0.809 0.804 0.689 0.646 0.529 
 
propINT 0.167 0.169 0.151 0.279 0.305 0.392 
 
propRES 0.048 0.022 0.045 0.032 0.050 0.079 
        
 
Otot 37 23 79 121 127 185 
 
Stot 90 30 78 84 146 235 
 
Itot 15 0 7 56 76 164 
 
Bntot 55 59 39 56 28 30 
 
INTOtot 25 14 49 100 91 140 
 
RESOtot 1 0 10 20 18 37 
 
MEOtot 11 9 20 1 18 8 
 
INTStot 7 10 8 6 25 41 
 
RESStot 3 2 9 2 5 15 
 
MEStot 65 18 54 20 40 15 
 
INTItot 12 0 1 38 53 116 
 
RESItot 1 0 2 5 16 24 
 
MEItot 2 0 4 13 7 24 
 
INTOprop 0.357 0.259 0.563 0.602 0.495 0.517 
 
RESOprop 0.050 0.000 0.385 1.053 0.600 0.673 
 
MEOprop 0.034 0.035 0.043 0.002 0.046 0.022 
 
INTSprop 0.100 0.185 0.092 0.036 0.136 0.151 
 
RESSprop 0.150 0.286 0.346 0.105 0.167 0.273 
 
MESprop 0.198 0.069 0.116 0.049 0.103 0.041 
 
INTIprop 0.171 0.000 0.011 0.229 0.288 0.428 
 
RESIprop 0.050 0.000 0.077 0.263 0.533 0.436 
 
MEIprop 0.006 0.000 0.009 0.032 0.018 0.066 
 
propO 0.089 0.072 0.137 0.203 0.210 0.267 
 
propS 0.215 0.094 0.135 0.141 0.242 0.340 
 
propI 0.036 0.000 0.012 0.094 0.126 0.237 
 
Bnprop 0.132 0.184 0.067 0.094 0.046 0.043 
 
CEprop 0.215 0.191 0.196 0.311 0.354 0.471 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Dom Script 7 10 13 16 23 26 
 
MLU 1.680 1.769 2.257 2.252 2.630 2.643 
 
MEtot 203 201 280 295 311 348 
 
INTtot 70 74 125 106 93 132 
 
REStot 9 21 21 40 36 38 
 
UttTOTAL 282 296 426 441 440 518 
        
 
propPR 0.720 0.679 0.657 0.669 0.707 0.672 
 
propINT 0.248 0.250 0.293 0.240 0.211 0.255 
 
propRES 0.032 0.071 0.049 0.091 0.082 0.073 
        
 
Otot 73 30 77 59 80 94 
 
Stot 23 35 96 128 164 227 
 
Itot 7 18 66 74 38 108 
 
Bntot 63 87 75 74 53 40 
 
INTOtot 50 23 57 38 26 58 
 
RESOtot 2 2 6 17 22 20 
 
MEOtot 21 5 14 4 32 16 
 
INTStot 15 5 9 21 19 29 
 
RESStot 1 5 8 7 13 15 
 
MEStot 0 7 13 26 94 75 
 
INTItot 7 16 52 38 3 46 
 
RESItot 0 2 7 17 16 10 
 
MEItot 0 0 7 19 19 52 
 
INTOprop 0.714 0.311 0.456 0.358 0.280 0.439 
 
RESOprop 0.222 0.095 0.286 0.425 0.611 0.526 
 
MEOprop 0.103 0.025 0.050 0.014 0.103 0.046 
 
INTSprop 0.214 0.068 0.072 0.198 0.204 0.220 
 
RESSprop 0.111 0.238 0.381 0.175 0.361 0.395 
 
MESprop 0.000 0.035 0.046 0.088 0.302 0.216 
 
INTIprop 0.100 0.216 0.416 0.358 0.032 0.348 
 
RESIprop 0.000 0.095 0.333 0.425 0.444 0.263 
 
MEIprop 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.064 0.061 0.149 
 
propO 0.259 0.101 0.181 0.134 0.182 0.181 
 
propS 0.082 0.118 0.225 0.290 0.373 0.438 
 
propI 0.025 0.061 0.155 0.168 0.086 0.208 
 
Bnprop 0.223 0.294 0.176 0.168 0.120 0.077 
 
CEprop 0.280 0.321 0.343 0.331 0.293 0.328 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Gail Script 1 4 9 12 16 20 
 
MLU 1.142 1.981 2.350 2.433 2.676 2.662 
 
MEtot 187 229 216 266 195 232 
 
INTtot 74 85 103 175 117 157 
 
REStot 6 17 16 18 23 25 
 
UttTOTAL 267 331 335 459 335 414 
        
 
propPR 0.700 0.692 0.645 0.580 0.582 0.560 
 
propINT 0.277 0.257 0.307 0.381 0.349 0.379 
 
propRES 0.022 0.051 0.048 0.039 0.069 0.060 
        
 
Otot 37 66 92 74 68 115 
 
Stot 84 66 94 69 73 106 
 
Itot 3 3 30 22 49 57 
 
Bntot 48 46 38 24 18 7 
 
INTOtot 35 48 74 65 51 89 
 
RESOtot 1 10 11 6 16 22 
 
MEOtot 1 8 7 3 1 4 
 
INTStot 22 34 20 28 12 15 
 
RESStot 2 6 7 6 10 8 
 
MEStot 57 23 37 13 2 26 
 
INTItot 0 2 17 13 39 36 
 
RESItot 0 1 4 5 5 10 
 
MEItot 3 0 9 4 5 11 
 
INTOprop 0.473 0.565 0.718 0.371 0.436 0.567 
 
RESOprop 0.167 0.588 0.688 0.333 0.696 0.880 
 
MEOprop 0.005 0.035 0.032 0.011 0.005 0.017 
 
INTSprop 0.297 0.400 0.194 0.160 0.103 0.096 
 
RESSprop 0.333 0.353 0.438 0.333 0.435 0.320 
 
MESprop 0.305 0.100 0.171 0.049 0.010 0.112 
 
INTIprop 0.000 0.024 0.165 0.074 0.333 0.229 
 
RESIprop 0.000 0.059 0.250 0.278 0.217 0.400 
 
MEIprop 0.016 0.000 0.042 0.015 0.026 0.047 
 
propO 0.139 0.199 0.275 0.161 0.203 0.278 
 
propS 0.315 0.199 0.281 0.150 0.218 0.256 
 
propI 0.011 0.009 0.090 0.048 0.146 0.138 
 
Bnprop 0.180 0.139 0.113 0.052 0.054 0.017 
 
CEprop 0.300 0.308 0.355 0.420 0.418 0.440 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Joel Script 5 8 11 14 16 20 
 
MLU 1.780 1.848 2.121 2.151 2.530 2.802 
 
MEtot 119 105 202 134 171 193 
 
INTtot 60 27 46 57 77 166 
 
REStot 16 5 6 2 17 22 
 
UttTOTAL 195 137 254 193 265 381 
        
 
propPR 0.610 0.766 0.795 0.694 0.645 0.507 
 
propINT 0.308 0.197 0.181 0.295 0.291 0.436 
 
propRES 0.082 0.036 0.024 0.010 0.064 0.058 
        
 
Otot 61 41 48 51 85 179 
 
Stot 89 52 72 86 134 165 
 
Itot 18 6 31 34 50 49 
 
Bntot 19 17 25 30 26 34 
 
INTOtot 36 22 17 26 41 108 
 
RESOtot 6 1 2 0 9 12 
 
MEOtot 19 18 29 25 35 59 
 
INTStot 15 15 3 6 9 43 
 
RESStot 4 2 2 0 2 4 
 
MEStot 52 29 36 46 73 69 
 
INTItot 12 1 8 9 23 28 
 
RESItot 3 3 1 0 11 6 
 
MEItot 3 2 22 25 16 15 
 
INTOprop 0.600 0.815 0.370 0.456 0.532 0.651 
 
RESOprop 0.375 0.200 0.333 0.000 0.529 0.545 
 
MEOprop 0.160 0.171 0.144 0.187 0.205 0.306 
 
INTSprop 0.250 0.556 0.065 0.105 0.117 0.259 
 
RESSprop 0.250 0.400 0.333 0.000 0.118 0.182 
 
MESprop 0.437 0.276 0.178 0.343 0.427 0.358 
 
INTIprop 0.200 0.037 0.174 0.158 0.299 0.169 
 
RESIprop 0.188 0.600 0.167 0.000 0.647 0.273 
 
MEIprop 0.025 0.019 0.109 0.187 0.094 0.078 
 
propO 0.313 0.299 0.189 0.264 0.321 0.470 
 
propS 0.456 0.380 0.283 0.446 0.506 0.433 
 
propI 0.092 0.044 0.122 0.176 0.189 0.129 
 
BNprop 0.097 0.124 0.098 0.155 0.098 0.089 
 
CEprop 0.390 0.234 0.205 0.306 0.355 0.493 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Liz Script 2 5 8 10 13 16 
 
MLU 1.662 1.793 2.075 2.156 2.510 2.783 
 
MEtot 110 203 178 258 171 175 
 
INTtot 35 80 116 100 92 175 
 
REStot 1 12 2 14 8 20 
 
UttTOTAL 146 295 296 372 271 370 
        
 
propPR 0.753 0.688 0.601 0.694 0.631 0.473 
 
propINT 0.240 0.271 0.392 0.269 0.339 0.473 
 
propRES 0.007 0.041 0.007 0.038 0.030 0.054 
        
 
Otot 20 57 108 76 92 216 
 
Stot 41 47 118 116 159 169 
 
Itot 1 4 41 54 64 111 
 
Bntot 63 101 67 84 32 11 
 
INTOtot 7 20 82 33 42 115 
 
RESOtot 0 2 1 2 4 17 
 
MEOtot 13 35 25 41 46 84 
 
INTStot 5 8 19 6 4 29 
 
RESStot 0 2 0 1 2 1 
 
MEStot 35 33 58 55 89 28 
 
INTItot 1 1 31 23 42 78 
 
RESItot 0 1 0 8 6 14 
 
MEItot 0 2 10 23 16 19 
 
INTOprop 0.200 0.250 0.707 0.330 0.457 0.657 
 
RESOprop 0.000 0.167 0.500 0.143 0.500 0.850 
 
MEOprop 0.118 0.172 0.140 0.159 0.269 0.480 
 
INTSprop 0.143 0.100 0.164 0.060 0.043 0.166 
 
RESSprop 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.071 0.250 0.050 
 
MESprop 0.318 0.163 0.326 0.213 0.520 0.160 
 
INTIprop 0.029 0.013 0.267 0.230 0.457 0.446 
 
RESIprop 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.571 0.750 0.700 
 
MEIprop 0.000 0.010 0.056 0.089 0.094 0.109 
 
propO 0.137 0.193 0.365 0.204 0.339 0.584 
 
propS 0.281 0.159 0.399 0.312 0.587 0.457 
 
propI 0.007 0.014 0.139 0.145 0.236 0.300 
 
BNprop 0.432 0.342 0.226 0.226 0.118 0.030 
 
CEprop 0.247 0.312 0.399 0.306 0.369 0.527 
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Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Ruth Script 16 19 22 26 31 33 
 
MLU 1.843 1.931 2.069 2.425 2.836 2.837 
 
MEtot 182 178 170 218 221 275 
 
INTtot 56 77 79 151 159 176 
 
REStot 3 17 18 22 16 51 
 
UttTOTAL 241 272 267 391 396 502 
        
 
propPR 0.755 0.654 0.637 0.558 0.558 0.548 
 
propINT 0.232 0.283 0.296 0.386 0.402 0.351 
 
propRES 0.012 0.063 0.067 0.056 0.040 0.102 
        
 
Otot 27 45 80 144 172 215 
 
Stot 33 51 66 148 200 269 
 
Itot 13 31 34 54 86 81 
 
Bntot 67 88 56 45 27 46 
 
INTOtot 6 21 38 77 64 89 
 
RESOtot 0 11 9 13 12 32 
 
MEOtot 21 13 33 54 96 94 
 
INTStot 7 7 6 27 28 57 
 
RESStot 1 3 6 10 11 37 
 
MEStot 12 10 20 57 75 94 
 
INTItot 9 13 22 32 55 40 
 
RESItot 0 2 4 7 2 15 
 
MEItot 4 16 8 15 29 26 
 
INTOprop 0.107 0.273 0.481 0.510 0.403 0.506 
 
RESOprop 0.000 0.647 0.500 0.591 0.750 0.627 
 
MEOprop 0.115 0.073 0.194 0.248 0.434 0.342 
 
INTSprop 0.125 0.091 0.076 0.179 0.176 0.324 
 
RESSprop 0.333 0.176 0.333 0.455 0.688 0.725 
 
MESprop 0.066 0.056 0.118 0.261 0.339 0.342 
 
INTIprop 0.161 0.169 0.278 0.212 0.346 0.227 
 
RESIprop 0.000 0.118 0.222 0.318 0.125 0.294 
 
MEIprop 0.022 0.090 0.047 0.069 0.131 0.095 
 
propO 0.112 0.165 0.300 0.368 0.434 0.428 
 
propS 0.137 0.188 0.247 0.379 0.505 0.536 
 
propI 0.054 0.114 0.127 0.138 0.217 0.161 
 
BNprop 0.278 0.324 0.210 0.115 0.068 0.092 
 
CEprop 0.245 0.346 0.363 0.442 0.442 0.452 
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        Name 
 
Band1 Band1 Band2 Band2 Band3 Band3 
Warren Script 1 2 6 8 11 18 
 
MLU 1.903 1.870 2.225 2.456 2.648 2.868 
 
MEtot 237 162 165 228 171 182 
 
INTtot 93 89 101 122 122 213 
 
REStot 16 30 18 17 17 9 
 
UttTOTAL 346 281 284 367 310 404 
        
 
propPR 0.685 0.577 0.581 0.621 0.552 0.450 
 
propINT 0.269 0.317 0.356 0.332 0.394 0.527 
 
propRES 0.046 0.107 0.063 0.046 0.055 0.022 
        
 
Otot 65 83 86 130 116 182 
 
Stot 122 122 138 101 135 139 
 
Itot 20 13 27 15 15 37 
 
Bntot 92 53 57 61 36 19 
 
INTOtot 36 43 49 76 76 145 
 
RESOtot 3 7 18 11 5 4 
 
MEOtot 26 33 19 43 35 33 
 
INTStot 21 12 41 31 28 33 
 
RESStot 8 22 11 5 15 6 
 
MEStot 73 75 59 50 77 63 
 
INTItot 19 7 15 12 12 30 
 
RESItot 1 2 3 3 1 0 
 
MEItot 0 4 9 0 2 7 
 
INTOprop 0.387 0.483 0.485 0.623 0.623 0.681 
 
RESOprop 0.188 0.233 1.000 0.647 0.294 0.444 
 
MEOprop 0.110 0.204 0.115 0.189 0.205 0.181 
 
INTSprop 0.226 0.135 0.406 0.254 0.230 0.155 
 
RESSprop 0.500 0.733 0.611 0.294 0.882 0.667 
 
MESprop 0.308 0.463 0.358 0.219 0.450 0.346 
 
INTIprop 0.204 0.079 0.149 0.098 0.098 0.141 
 
RESIprop 0.063 0.067 0.167 0.176 0.059 0.000 
 
MEIprop 0.000 0.025 0.055 0.000 0.012 0.038 
 
propO 0.188 0.295 0.303 0.354 0.374 0.450 
 
propS 0.353 0.434 0.486 0.275 0.435 0.344 
 
propI 0.058 0.046 0.095 0.041 0.048 0.092 
 
BNprop 0.266 0.189 0.201 0.166 0.116 0.047 
 
CEprop 0.315 0.423 0.419 0.379 0.448 0.550 
                
 
 
